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Abstract 
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Abstract 
 
As corporate income taxes possess a material proportion of earnings, understanding the 
relationship between income tax provision and future cash tax consequences can help users of 
financial statement in evaluating firms’ future commitment for internal funds (Ciconte et al. 
2013). This is consistent with the contention of standard setters and regulators that reported 
financial information should facilitate users to assess the ‘amount, timing and uncertainty’ of 
firms’ future net cash flows. However, there is a lack of empirical evidence with respect to the 
ability of income tax provision to explain future tax cash flows, particularly the evidence in the 
U.K. setting.  
This study examines the informativeness of corporate income tax provision to explain future 
tax cash flows in the UK setting. Results of this study indicate that income tax accruals are 
incrementally informative over cash tax paid in explaining future tax cash flows in the UK 
setting. The incremental informativeness of income tax accruals is significantly lower for firms 
that 1) engage in tax planning activities or; 2) exhibit strong incentives to avoid reporting an 
apparent decline in the post-tax profits. Higher levels of analysts coverage and institutional 
shareholding are found to play a significant role in attenuating the negative relation between 
the informativeness of income tax accruals and the managements’ incentives to avoid reporting 
an apparent decline in the post-tax profits. However, corporate governance mechanisms 
examined in this study are not significantly important in attenuating the negative impact of tax 
planning activities on the informativeness of income tax accruals. In addition, this study finds 
a significant downward trend in the informativeness of income tax accruals to explain future 
tax cash flows over the past three decades in the UK.
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1.1. Research Motivation and Research Questions 
Under UK GAAP and IAS 12, firms are required to provide a breakdown of income tax expense 
by reporting current and deferred taxes distinguishingly, which both have significant impacts 
on the computation of firms’ net earnings (Wahab and Holland 2012; Edgley and Holland 2018; 
Dhaliwal et al. 2004). As a result, the income tax expense recognised in firms’ income 
statement for a particular accounting period consists of both the current and future tax 
consequence of firms’ performance for that accounting period1.  
As corporate income taxes possess a material proportion of earnings, it is important to 
investigate the informativeness of income tax provision in explaining future tax-related cash 
flows. This is because that standard setters and regulators, such as the International Accounting 
Standard Board (IASB), highlight the importance of the representation and prediction of the 
‘amount, timing, and uncertainty’ of firms’ net cash flows. Understanding the relationship 
between income tax provision and future cash tax consequences can help users of financial 
statement in evaluating firms’ future commitment for internal funds (Ciconte et al. 2013). A 
lack of significant relationship between corporate income tax provision and future tax-related 
cash flows could compromise the value relevance of reported effective income tax rate and, 
thus, adversely impact the accuracy of investors’ forecasts about firms’ future net cash flow, 
as the tax rate they have applied to their valuation model may not necessarily represent firms’ 
future tax-related cash flows2 (Brouwer et al. 2018). However, there is a lack of empirical 
evidence with respect to the ability of corporate income tax provision to explain future tax cash 
flows, particularly the evidence in the U.K. setting. 
 
1 Under current UK GAAP and IAS 12, current income tax consequences are included in the ﬁnancial statements 
by recognising the amounts that are payable or refundable to the tax authorities with respect to taxable profit for 
the current period. Future tax consequences are recognised with respect to the difference between the carrying 
amount of assets and liabilities for book purposes and the carrying amount of assets and liabilities for tax purpose. 
Differences between the carrying amount of assets and liabilities for book purpose and tax purpose indicate that 
the recovery of assets and the settlement of liabilities may result in additional tax payments or refunds in the future 
(Telford et al. 2014; Brouwer et al. 2018).   
2 Weber (2009), Bratten et al. (2017) and Edgely and Holland (2018) provide evidence that investors and analysts 
use income-tax-related information (i.e., GAAP effective tax rate; tax expense or book-tax difference) to forecast 
firms’ future after-tax performance. However, the interview evidence from Edgely and Holland (2018) highlights 
that investors, even the professional investors, tend to put the effective tax rate into their valuation model to 
forecast the after-tax cash flow without understanding the informativeness and usefulness of the tax rate they use 
or possessing the technical tax knowledge underpinning the tax rate. 
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Therefore, this study is motivated to provide the first evidence concerning the informativeness 
of income tax provision to explain firms’ future tax cash flows in the UK setting, which focuses 
its attention on investigating the following research questions3: 
1. Whether income tax accruals are incrementally informative over cash tax paid in explaining 
future tax cash flows? 
Corporate income tax provision is made up of two components, i.e., income tax accruals 
and cash tax paid for an accounting period4. The first research question is designed to 
examine how well the income tax provision tracks future tax cash flows, through 
investigating whether the income tax accruals are incrementally informative over the cash 
tax paid to explain future one- to five-year ahead tax cash flows. 
 
2. How managers’ incentives to undertake tax management activities affect the 
informativeness of income tax accruals? 
Similar with other accruals, income tax accruals require managerial estimation to be made 
and subject to managements’ discretion. For this reason, it can be reasonable to expect that 
there are variations in the incremental informativeness of income tax accruals across firms 
due to the inherent differences in firms’ characteristics and management behaviours. Thus, 
if the investigation of the first research question shows that income tax accruals are able to 
explain future tax cash flows on average, the second research question will attempt to 
investigate the determinative factors that cause cross-sectional variations in the 
informativeness of income tax accruals, with the primary interests in seeking answers on 
how managers’ tax management incentives affect the informativeness of income tax 
accruals. 
 
3. Whether effective corporate governance mechanisms play a significant role in attenuating 
the negative impacts of managers’ tax management incentives on the informativeness of 
income tax accruals? 
It can be reasonable to expect that effective corporate governance mechanisms are effective 
in restricting self-interested managers from engaging in opportunistic tax management 
activities. Thus, if the investigation of the second research question provides evidence that 
 
3 In this study, all references to ‘income taxes’, ‘income tax provision’ and ‘income tax accruals’ are to ‘corporate 
income taxes’, ‘corporate income tax provision’ and ‘corporate income tax accruals’. 
4 See Section 2.4 for detailed information. 
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firms with strong incentives to opportunistically manage taxes have significantly lower 
informativeness of income tax accruals, the third research question will attempt to find out 
whether corporate governance mechanism is important in moderating the negative 
relationship between the informativeness of income tax accruals and managers’ tax 
management incentives.  
 
4. Whether the incremental informativeness of income tax accruals to explain future tax cash 
flows has deteriorated or improved over time in the U.K.? 
Over the past three decades, accounting methods for deferred taxes have evolved 
dramatically in the U.K. As deferred tax is an important component of income tax accruals, 
changes in the accounting methods for deferred taxes may lead to changes in the 
informativeness of income tax accruals. Therefore, the fourth research question in this 
thesis is designed to investigate the time-series trend in the ability of income tax accruals 
to explain future tax cash flows, to show whether the informativeness of income tax 
accruals has deteriorated or improved over time in the U.K.  
1.2. Research Findings and Research Contributions 
This study examines the informativeness of income tax provision to explain future tax cash 
flows in the UK setting. Using a panel dataset of publicly-traded non-financial UK companies 
for the period 1992 to 2016, this study provides evidence that income tax accruals are 
incrementally informative over cash tax paid in explaining future tax cash flows. The 
incremental informativeness of income tax accruals is significantly lower for firms that 1) 
engage in tax planning activities or; 2) exhibit strong incentives to avoid reporting an apparent 
decline in the post-tax profits. There is no significant evidence indicating that the incentives to 
avoid missing analysts’ forecasted earnings and to avoid reporting a post-tax loss strongly 
motivate managers to distort the income tax accruals.  
Higher levels of analysts coverage and institutional shareholding are found to play a significant 
role in attenuating the negative relation between the informativeness of income tax accruals 
and managers’ incentives to avoid reporting an apparent decline in the post-tax profits. 
However, corporate governance mechanisms examined in this study are not significantly 
important in attenuating the negative impact of tax planning activities on the informativeness 
of income tax accruals. In addition, this study finds that the incremental informativeness of 
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income tax accruals about future tax cash flows has deteriorated over time in the UK, implying 
that the adoption of partial provision method of deferred taxes provides income tax accruals 
with significantly greater ability to explain future tax cash flows as compared to the full 
provision methods of deferred taxes.  
The contribution of this study is fivefold:  
1. Through providing the first evidence concerning the informativeness of income tax 
provision to explain firms’ future tax cash flows in the UK setting, this study extends the 
literature that examines the value relevance of reported accounting information in financial 
statements.  
2. This study extends the agency perspective of corporate tax management and shows that 
tax-planning activities could add opacity and obfuscation to financial statements and reduce 
the informativeness of reported income tax information.  
3. This study contributes to the literature that examines the impacts of earnings management 
on the reliability and relevance of reported accounting information, by showing how 
management’s incentives to meet specific earnings targets through biasing income tax 
provision affect the informativeness of income tax accruals. 
4. This is one of the first studies, to the researcher’s knowledge, to empirically examine the 
role of corporate governance in attenuating the negative impacts of managers’ tax 
management incentives on the informativeness of income tax accruals, which extends the 
literature on understanding how corporate governance affects managerial performance.  
5. This study contributes to the literature that compares the information value of the partial 
with that of the full provision method of deferred taxes. By showing a significant downward 
trend in the informativeness of income tax accruals to explain future tax cash flows, this 
study provides evidence that the accounting standard setters’ focus on restricting 
managerial discretion can reduce managers’ ability to convey private information about 
future tax outcomes and, thus, compromising the informativeness of the reported tax 
information. 
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1.3. Thesis Structure 
The thesis is composed of seven chapters, including 1) Introduction, 2) UK Accounting and 
Taxation Environment, 3) Literature Review and Theoretical Framework, 4) Hypothesis 
Development and Research Design, 5) Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics, 6) 
Regression Analysis and Results, and 7) Conclusion, Implication and Limitation.  
Chapter 2 of this thesis discusses the background and institutional knowledge with respect to 
the UK accounting and taxation environment. This chapter begins with the description of the 
development of financial accounting standards available for UK listed entities to comply with 
when preparing their financial statement, and is followed by the discussion of advantages and 
disadvantages of the financial accounting information provided under the international 
financial accounting standards. The subsequent section of chapter 2 provides an insight into 
the tax accounting system in the UK, which includes the evaluation of the link between 
accounting and taxation system in the UK; the evolution of tax accounting standards in the UK; 
and the tax treatments of basic accounting issues in the UK. The final section of this chapter 
discusses the components of income tax provision and the definition of income tax accruals.  
Chapter 3 of this thesis reviews previous literature evidence that is relevant to the research 
topics of this thesis. This chapter begins with the section that reviews previous literature on 
corporate tax management. In this section, the definition of corporate tax management is 
discussed; theories related to corporate tax management (Scholes-Wolfson effective tax 
management theory; cost and benefit theory and agency theory) are presented; and the 
determinative factors that cause variations in firms’ engagements in tax management activities 
(objectives; benefits and motivation; costs and constraints; firm characteristics of corporate tax 
management) are evaluated. The subsequent section reviews previous literature on the 
relationship between corporate governance mechanism and corporate tax management. This 
section begins with the theories of corporate governance mechanism which are inclusive of the 
agency theory and stakeholder theory; and is followed by reviewing previous evidence on how 
corporate governance mechanisms (i.e., ownership structure, board of directors, external 
monitoring and corporate social responsibility) affect managers’ decisions of engaging in tax 
management activities. The final section of chapter 3 reviews previous literature on the 
association between corporate tax management, corporate governance mechanism and the 
informativeness of income tax provision. Previous value-relevance accounting and taxation 
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studies provide the theoretical and methodological foundation for assessing the 
informativeness of income tax provision. Therefore, the final section of chapter 3 begins with 
the review of value-relevance accounting and taxation studies; and is followed by discussing 
the joint impact of corporate governance mechanism and corporate tax management on the 
informativeness of income tax provision. 
Chapter 4 of this thesis presents the hypotheses development and research design. The 
development of the hypotheses is based on the background and institutional knowledge 
obtained from chapter 2 and the previous literature evidence reviewed in chapter 3. Specifically, 
the hypotheses development section presented in chapter 4 consists of three parts. The first part 
is related to the hypothesis that investigates whether the income tax accruals are able to provide 
incremental explanatory power about future tax cash flows on average. The second part raises 
hypotheses that investigate the cross-sectional determinates of the informativeness of income 
tax accruals to explain future tax cash flows, including the investigations of 1) how managers’ 
tax management incentives to engage in tax planning and tax-induced earnings management 
affect the informativeness of income tax accruals; 2) how firms’ innate characteristics affect 
the informativeness of income tax accruals; and 3) whether corporate governance mechanisms 
moderate the impact of managers’ tax management incentives on the informativeness of 
income tax accruals. The third part raises the hypothesis that examines the time-series trend in 
the informativeness of the income tax accruals in the UK. In the research design section, 
estimation models for testing each hypothesis of this study are constructed, and the potential 
econometric issues related to the multivariate regression analysis are discussed.  
Chapter 5 of this thesis begins with the details of the data screening and sample selection 
process; and is followed by the description of the summary statistics of the sample employed 
in this study.  
Chapter 6 of this thesis provides the multivariate regression results for each hypothesis test. 
In summary, this study finds that income tax accruals are incrementally informative over cash 
tax paid in explaining future tax cash flows. The incremental informativeness of income tax 
accruals is significantly lower for firms that 1) engage in tax planning activities or; 2) exhibit 
strong incentives to avoid reporting an apparent decline in the post-tax profits. Moreover, this 
study finds that higher levels of analysts coverage and institutional shareholding play a 
significant role in attenuating the negative relation between the informativeness of income tax 
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accruals and managers’ incentives to avoid reporting an apparent decline in the post-tax profits. 
In addition, this study finds that the incremental informativeness of income tax accruals about 
future tax cash flows has deteriorated over time in the UK. This study further conducts several 
additional tests to show the sensitivity and robustness of the research findings. 
Chapter 7 concludes the whole thesis. In this chapter, the summary of this study is provided; 
the limitations that may inhibit generalising the results of this study to other samples are 
discussed; and the practical implications of the research findings are evaluated. 
The following figure 1 and figure 2 exhibit the research framework and structure of this thesis.   
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Figure 1.1 Research Framework 
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Figure 1.2 Thesis Structure 
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2.1. Introduction 
This chapter aims to provide an insight into the background and institutional knowledge 
regarding the UK accounting and taxation environment. This chapter begins with an overview 
of options of the financial accounting standards available for UK listed entities to comply with 
when preparing their financial statements, and is followed by the discussion of the advantages 
and disadvantages of the financial accounting information provided under the international 
financial accounting standards. The UK tax accounting system is further discussed in this 
chapter to show the link between accounting and taxation system; the evolution of tax 
accounting standards in the UK; and the tax treatments of basic accounting issues in the 
financial reporting process in the UK. Subsequently, this chapter provides an understanding of 
the income tax provision by showing how individual components of income tax provision cause 
the reported income tax expense to differ from cash tax incurred for an accounting year. The 
final section concludes the chapter. 
2.2. Financial Accounting Standards in the UK 
This section aims to provide the institutional framework and background information about the 
development of financial accounting standards in the UK. This section begins with an overview 
of options of the financial accounting standards available for UK listed entities to comply with 
when preparing their financial statements. In the following subsection, the advantages and 
disadvantages of the adoption of international accounting standards for financial reporting 
purposes are evaluated to provide insights into the current financial reporting practices adopted 
by UK listed entities. 
2.2.1. The development of financial accounting standards in the UK 
All UK listed entities are required to comply with company law and must prepare financial 
statements in accordance with the generally accepted accounting principles (i.e., GAAP), with 
the aim of providing shareholders with a true and fair view of their underlying performance. 
For the year up to 2004, schedule 4 of Companies Act 1986 and UK GAAP were in force for 
the consolidated and unconsolidated financial reporting of UK listed entities. A listed UK entity 
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should adopt the same set of accounting standards for financial reporting purposes in its 
consolidated group accounts and unconsolidated individual account until the year 20045.  
Initially, the Statements of Standard Accounting Practice (SSAPs) were issued by Accounting 
Standard Committee (ASC). In 1990, the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) was established 
to be responsible for setting accounting standards in the UK. FRC consists of two main 
subsidiary bodies, i.e., the Accounting Standard Board (ASB) which is responsible for 
promulgating accounting standards; and the Financial Reporting Review Panel (FRRP) which 
is responsible for the implementation and enforcement of accounting standards (Fearnley and 
Hines 2018). On transition, the ASB adopted several SSAPs that were issued by ASC and 
issued its own Financial Reporting Standards (FRSs) from the year 1990. The newly issued 
FRSs together with the adopted SSAPs have been in use until 31 December 20146. In addition, 
the ASB introduced simplified accounting standards for small entities, i.e., the Financial 
Reporting Standard for Small Entities (FRSSE) and provided authorised guidance on emerging 
accounting issues which require a prompt reaction, i.e., Urgent Issues Task Force (UITF) 
abstracts. For accounting periods commencing on or after 1 January 2015, all existing SSAPs, 
FRSs, FRSSE and UITF Abstracts were superseded by the new accounting standards issued by 
FRC7 (Day 2000; Alexander and Nobes 2004). 
In the year 2004 to 2005, the European Union (EU) introduced a requirement for all listed 
companies whose securities (i.e., both equity and debt instruments) are listed in an EU 
regulated market to apply international financial reporting standards (IFRS) for their 
consolidated group reporting purpose8. The requirements of IFRS adoption were enacted in the 
UK by regulation (EC) 1606/2002 (i.e., ‘the IAS regulation’). Since the IAS regulation is only 
applicable to consolidated group accounts of UK listed entities, UK listed entities which are 
 
5 See https://www.icaew.com/library/subject-gateways/accounting-standards/knowledge-guide-to-uk 
accounting-standards  
6 See https://www.icaew.com/library/subject-gateways/accounting-standards/uk-frs  
7 The new accounting standards issued by FRC for accounting periods on or after 1 January 2015 include: 
FRS 100 Application of Financial Reporting Requirements; 
FRS 101 Reduced Disclosure Framework; 
FRS 102 The Financial Reporting Standard applicable in the UK and Republic of Ireland; 
FRS 103 Insurance Contracts. 
FRS 104 Interim Financial Reporting 
FRS 105 The Financial Reporting Standard applicable to the Micro-Entities Regime 
Source: https://www.icaew.com/library/subject-gateways/accounting-standards/knowledge-guide-to-uk-
accounting-standards  
8 All listed companies in the European Union (EU) countries, that is, about 7,000 to 8000 companies, are required 
to mandatorily prepare their consolidated financial statements in accordance with IFRS for periods commencing 
on January 2005 (Pacter 2017). 
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not groups are not required to apply IFRS. Regarding the unconsolidated individual accounts, 
Companies Act 2006 allows the parent company and the subsidiaries of the UK listed entities 
to choose between IFRS and UK GAAP for statutory financial reporting purposes. In addition, 
companies listed on the Alternative Investment Market (AIM) are not regulated by the IAS 
regulation, but the AIM introduced similar rules of requiring companies listed on AIM to 
prepare their consolidated group accounts under IFRS (Telford and Oats 2014). Options of 
accounting standards available for the UK listed companies to prepare their financial 
statements are summarised in the following table 2.1: 
 
Table 2.1: Options Available for UK Listed Companies 
Before 2004 UK GAAP   
Group Must   
Parent/Subsidiary Must   
Stand-alone (e.g. VCT) Must   
2004-2015 IFRS UK GAAP  
Group Must  /  
Parent/Subsidiary Option Option  
Stand-alone (e.g. VCT) Option Option  
After 2015 IFRS New UK GAAP 
FRS 101 
New UK GAAP 
FRS 102 
Group Must  / / 
Parent/Subsidiary Option  Option Option 
Stand-alone (e.g. VCT) Option  / Option  
Source : Telford and Oats 2014, ICAEW website 
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2.2.2. The advantages and disadvantages of IFRS adoption 
It has long been the goal for the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) and its 
processor, the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) to develop and promote 
a uniform set of accounting standards, with the aim of reducing the costs of international 
communication and transaction and improving the comparability of financial reporting among 
different jurisdictions9. As stated in IFRS Foundation Constitution, the objectives of IASB are:  
“To develop, in the public interest, a single set of high quality, understandable, 
enforceable and globally accepted financial reporting standards based upon clearly 
articulated principles; to promote the use and rigorous application of those 
standards; and to promote and facilitate adoption of International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRSs)…through the convergence of national accounting 
standards and IRFSs10”. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that the primary objective of IFRS is to enhance the 
comparability and transparency of reported financial information at an international level. The 
European Commissioner for the Internal Market, Frits Bolkestein, highlights that the adoption 
of IFRS “helps investors and other stakeholders to be able to compare like with like. It will 
help European firms to compete on equal terms when raising capital on world markets” 
(GAAP Convergence 2002). When making cross-border investments, the major concerns of 
investors could relate to costs of obtaining and understanding financial information about 
foreign companies’ underlying performance; and difficulties in identifying and reconciling the 
international differences in financial reporting standards (Bradshaw et al. 2004; Chan et al. 
2005; Covrig et al. 2007). The adoption of IFRS, which leads to standardised and uniform 
 
9 Over 80 per cent of countries permit or require the use of IFRS, that is, approximately 140 jurisdictions permit, 
and 126 jurisdictions require the use of international financial reporting standards (IFRS) for financial reporting. 
Only four large economies around the world have not yet to adopted IFRS, including China, Japan, USA and 
India. China has not mandatorily adopted IFRS but has recently reconfirm its work towards full adoptions of IFRS. 
The new Chinese Accounting Standards for Business Enterprises (ASBEs) have been largely converged with 
IFRSs, except for certain modifications (e.g. the reversal of impairment loss on long term assets is disallowed). 
Companies in Japan adopt IFRS voluntarily since 2010 and the number of Japanese companies that adopt IFRS 
grows rapidly. More than 120 Japanese companies which represent 20 per cent of the Japanese market 
capitalization have already adopted IFRS. The U.S. continues to use US GAAP but permits foreign companies 
listed on US stock exchanges to use IFRS. India has not mandatorily adopted IFRS but the Indian Accounting 
Standards (Ind AS) are based on and have been largely converged with IFRS from 1 April 2016 (Deloitte 2017). 
Source: https://www.iasplus.com/en-gb/resources/ifrs-topics/use-of-ifrs-g20 
10 Source: http://www.iasb.org/about/constitution.asp  
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financial reporting formats, could directly benefit investors by providing ‘high quality, 
transparent and comparable’ financial information with reduced information-processing costs. 
Consequently, the adoption of IFRS is expected to result in more-informed valuation by equity 
investors and reduced adverse-selection risk of less-informed investors who are not familiar 
with local accounting standards (Ball 2006, pp. 11). In addition, the increased transparency and 
comparability promised by IFRS may indirectly benefit investors by reducing the information 
asymmetry between managers and shareholders, because more transparent and comparable 
reported financial information would make it harder for managers to exploit financial 
statements for the purpose of manipulating earnings; concealing negative operating outcomes; 
and misleading investors (Ball 2006, pp. 12). 
Several studies provide evidence that IFRS adoption improves the quality and comparability 
of reported financial information. Byard et al. (2011) ﬁnd that the analyst forecast accuracy is 
improved for mandatory IFRS adopters with substantial and rigorous application of IFRS11. 
Similarly, Horton et al. (2013) find that analyst forecast accuracy is increased after the 
mandatory transition of IFRS. The improvement in analyst forecast accuracy is found to be 
driven by the enhanced accounting comparability and information quality, rather than by the 
increased ability of managers to beat or meet analysts’ forecasts due to their increased 
flexibility and discretion in accruals adjustments allowed under the principle-based IFRS. 
Defond et al. (2011) find that foreign mutual fund investment increases following the 
mandatory adoption of IFRS in countries with credible implementation 12 , suggesting that 
credible IFRS adoption enhances the comparability of financial statements and thereby leading 
to greater cross-border investment. Daske et al. (2008) find an increase in market liquidity, a 
decrease in cost of capital and an increase in equity valuation around the introduction of 
mandatory IFRS financial reporting. However, they find that the capital market benefits 
associated with IFRS adoption are strongly related to countries’ IFRS enforcement regimes 
and firms’ incentives to be transparent during the financial reporting process13.  
 
11 Specifically, Byard et al. (2011) use high-level differences between domestic accounting standards and IFRS 
to measure substantial adoption effect of IFRS. Rigorous application of IFRS is measured using the ‘rule of law’ 
proxy constructed by the World Bank. 
12 Defond et al. (2004) argue that comparability can only be achieved when the reported financial information 
“faithfully represents what it purports to represent”. They measure the credible implementation of IFRS using the 
earnings quality score developed in Leuz et al. (2003) which is computed as the average rank combining four 
individual aspects of country-level earnings quality, including two measures of earnings smoothness; one measure 
of earnings magnitude of firms’ accruals; and one measure of loss avoidance.  
13 Daske et al. (2008) measure the enforcement strength of IFRS using the ‘rule of law’ proxy constructed by the 
World Bank and measure the strength of firms’ incentives to be transparent in financial reporting using the 
earnings quality score developed by Leuz et al. (2003). 
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However, there are several reasons which may cause IFRS adoption to render the financial 
reporting less informative. First, although the increased comparability of reported financial 
information is an expected desired consequence of applying a uniform set of financial reporting 
standards across countries, the improved uniformity is only expected to lead to enhanced 
comparability when the uniform reporting standards are evenly and fairly implemented 
(DeFond et al. 2011, pp. 241). The enforcement of IFRS, however, is found to be uneven across 
the world because the ‘political and economic influences’ on the application of IFRS remain 
local (Ball 2006, pp. 15; Armstrong et al. 2010). Overemphasising on uniformity therefore may 
result in additional information losses and information-processing costs, because the regional 
differences regarding the economic and political influences on financial reporting quality are 
concealed by the veneer of uniformity at a deeper and less observable level, misleading 
investors and other financial statements’ users into believing that the financial reporting 
practices and reporting quality become uniform at the international level (Ball et al. 2000; Ball 
2006). 
Second, the accruals-based and principles-orientated IFRS increasingly relies on management 
judgements, providing managers with flexibility, subjectivity and discretion in the process of 
financial reporting. Specifically, in the process of financial measurements and reporting, all 
accrual accounting systems allow managers to make reliable assumptions and estimations 
about firms’ future cash flows, which may provide self-interested managers with latitude and 
leeway to deliberately manage earnings through distorting income accruals (Gu et al. 2003; 
Lang et al. 2010; Ahmed et al. 2013). The principle-based accounting standards typically 
require managers to exercise judgements rather than providing detailed rules and authoritative 
implementation guidance in the process of accounting for transactions and events, which may 
in turn facilitate managers to exercise judgements for the purpose of opportunistically 
influencing the reported earnings (Benston et al. 2006). Even if the financial statements are 
faithfully prepared without opportunistic managerial intentions, the exercise of professional 
judgments may lead to different financial outcomes for similar transactions and events across 
firms, leading to reduced cross-sectional comparability of the reported financial information 
(Schipper 2003).  
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Third, IFRS gives priority to fair value accounting14, with the aim of providing more relevant 
and incremental financial information to better reflect the reporting entities’ present and future 
financial state. However, the fair-value orientation of IFRS may lead to increased managerial 
estimation errors and manipulation in financial statements (Ball 2006; Benston et al. 2006; 
Landsman 2007). This is because that market price from a liquid market can subject to 
substantial uncertainty and volatility. The transitory nature of fair value obtained from a liquid 
market therefore may give rise to noise and estimation errors in financial statements. If the 
relevant liquid markets prices are not available, fair value should be determined from 
management’ appraisals and estimations using relevant pricing models, which may subject to 
opportunistic managerial behaviours such as the manipulation of the choice of pricing models 
or the procedure of simulating market prices (Ball 2006; Benston et al. 2006). The 
informativeness and decision usefulness of reported financial information about firms’ current 
and future performance can be compromised if the reported financial information is 
accompanied by substantial managerial errors and manipulations.  
In summary, through providing a uniform set of accounting standards, IFRS adoption is aimed 
at improving the transparency and the comparability of the reported financial information at an 
international level, thereby reducing the information processing costs of investors and the 
information asymmetry between shareholders and managers. However, it is likely that many 
potential benefits promised by IFRS can be curtailed by the uneven implementation of IFRS 
and the management judgments and estimations allowed under the principle-based and fair-
value-orientated IFRS. 
 
 
 
14 For example, IAS16 revaluation of property, plant and equipment should be made with sufficient regularity to 
ensure that “the carrying amount does not differ materially from the fair value at the end of the reporting period” 
(para 31); IAS36 requires asset impairments (and impairment reversals) to fair value; IAS38 the cost of an 
intangible asset “acquired as a part of business combination is its fair value at the acquisition date” (para 33); 
IAS38 provides an option to “revaluate intangible assets to the fair value at the revaluation date, less any 
accumulated depreciation and subsequent accumulated impairment loss” (para 72); IAS 39 requires “fair value for 
financial instruments other than loans and receivables that are not held for trading, securities held to maturity; and 
qualifying hedges” (para 9); IAS 40 provides “a fair value option for investment property, managers may choose 
its accounting policy to carry the investment properties at fair value or at cost less depreciation and impairment 
charges”.(para 30); IFRS 2 requires share-based payments (stock, option, etc.) to be accounted at fair value (para 
10); IFRS3 acquisitions by an investment entity of a subsidiary are “required to be measured at fair value through 
profit or loss” (para 2A) (Ball 2006; PwC 2015). 
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2.3. Tax Accounting System in the UK 
This section aims at providing the institutional framework and background information about 
UK tax accounting system. It begins with discussing about the relationship between financial 
accounting and income tax system in the UK to show how financial reporting and tax reporting 
articulate. The following subsection outlines the evolution of UK tax accounting standards and 
compares the similarities and differences between IAS 12 and UK GAAP in respect of deferred 
tax provision, to show the impact of changes in deferred tax accounting methods on tax 
reporting practices over the past fifty years in the UK. The final subsection provides an insight 
into the tax treatments of basic accounting issues in the financial reporting process in the UK. 
2.3.1. Links between accounting and taxation in the UK 
Based on the view that income tax expense is an outcome of transactions or events that bring 
about the accounting profits, tax accounting system is designed to translate a firm’s tax 
payments and obligations into accounting disclosures to match the income tax expense with 
the pre-tax income provided under financial reporting standards (i.e., the generally accepted 
accounting principle) 15 (Hanlon 2003; Brouwer et al. 2015, Edgley and Holland 2018). Under 
current UK tax laws, corporate tax treatment relies heavily on the individual legal entity’s 
accounting profit which is calculated and reported in accordance with generally accepted 
accounting practice16 (HMRC 2017). Specifically, tax legislation in the UK defines taxable 
profits as “profits of a trade calculated in accordance with generally accepted accountancy 
practice, subject to any adjustment required or authorised by law in calculating profits for 
corporate tax purposes” (Corporation Tax Act 2009, Section 46)17. In areas where the Tax Acts 
do not explicitly require adjustments, i.e., transactions are accounted for in the same manner 
under tax law and financial accounting standards, the amount of taxable income would be 
 
15 The UK tax accounting system perceives income tax as an expense for which accrual accounting should be 
applied to allocate income taxes within accounting periods. By contrast, some argue that income tax is solely a 
distribution similar to dividends rather than an expense, thereby should not be matched with the reported 
accounting profit (Brouwer et al. 2015). The “flow through method”, which is not a widely accepted accounting 
method for taxation among major accounting jurisdictions, is based on the principle that income tax is a 
distribution arising from taxable profit of that period. Under the flow through method, tax payable is charged in 
respect of a period when taxable profit occurs without attempts to reconcile differences between accounting profits 
and taxable profits, and therefore will not allocate tax within accounting periods by reference to timing differences 
(Davies et al. 1997; Lewis and Pendrill 2004).  
16 This means that the starting point in computing taxable profits is the individual legal entity’s accounting profit 
which is prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting practice. 
17 Section 46 CTA 2009. 
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dependent on the adopted accounting methods. However, in areas where the Tax Acts require 
adjustments in calculating taxable income, i.e., transactions are treated differently for tax and 
accounting purposes, accounting methods adopted for financial reporting purposes will be 
irrelevant for the computation of taxable profit. In this situation, the taxable profit which is 
governed by tax laws can be different from the accounting profit prepared under the financial 
accounting standards (Davies et al. 1997; Ng 2009).  
For example, whether a company adopts the straight-line method or the reducing-balance 
method for its depreciation charge is irrelevant for the calculation of taxable income, as UK 
tax law disallows depreciation for tax purpose and instead grants capital allowance on 
qualifying capital assets. In addition, a general doubtful debt provision could be recognised for 
accounting purpose “when there is objective evidence that a firm will not be able to collect the 
debt”, while tax relief of it is based on the extent to which the doubtful debt is estimated to be 
bad but a general provision is not allowable for tax deductions18.  
The differences between accounting and tax treatments bring the concepts of ‘timing difference’ 
and ‘permanent difference’ into existence. Timing difference 19  is the difference between 
taxable profit and accounting profit that arises from the recognition of incomes and expenses 
in financial statements in periods different from those in which incomes and expenses are 
included in tax assessments (Hanlon 2003). Permanent difference20 between accounting profit 
and taxable profit arises mainly because that some items are required to be recognised as one 
measure of income are never required to be recognised as the other (Hanlon 2005, pp 140).  
Permanent and timing differences between accounting and taxable income arise mainly 
because the purpose of taxation is different from that of financial accounting (James and Nobes 
2016). For example, the general purpose of financial accounting is to “provide financial 
information about the reporting entity that is useful to existing and potential investors, lenders 
and other creditors in making decisions about providing resources to the entity. Those 
decisions involve buying, selling or holding equity and debt instruments, and providing or 
 
18 See https://www.gov.uk/hmrc-internal-manuals/corporate-finance-manual/cfm80230 
19 An example of the timing difference between book and taxable income is the accelerated tax depreciation of a 
fixed asset which causes the taxable income to be lower than book income during the early life of this asset, but 
the difference between book and taxable income will reverse over time during the latter part of the asset’s life. 
20 For example, the entertainment fines and expenses that are not exclusively for business purpose are deductible 
for book purpose but are not allowed to be deductible for tax purpose under UK tax law, since providing corporate 
tax relief for them can be considered as against social benefits as a whole. This creates a permanent difference 
between book and taxable income (Telford and Oats 2014). 
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settling loans and other forms of credit” (IASB 2006, Conceptual Framework, OB2). GAAP 
often provide considerable discretions in the process of financial reporting which allow 
managers to exercise judgments in choosing appropriate accounting methods, such as 
determining the amount of reserve allowance (e.g., bad/doubtful debt or warranty allowance); 
or estimating the useful economic lives of fixed or intangible assets to determine the associated 
depreciation or amortisation (Watts et al. 1986; Mills 1998; Hanlon 2005, pp. 141). By 
comparison, the primary goal of taxation is to equitably collect revenue, in order for 
governments to provide public goods, distribute resources and maintain economic stability 
(Oats et al. 2017). Thus, conservativism or prudence is vital for financial reporting purposes to 
inform investors and stakeholders about firms’ underlying economic substance, while the 
principle of the income tax system focuses primarily on accuracy and fairness with less 
discretion allowed in the calculation of taxable income (Harris 2013).  
Besides book-tax differences resulting from the explicit differences between accounting and 
tax treatments, the aggressive reporting for book or tax purpose constitutes an additional source 
of book-tax difference (Hanlon 2003). Book-tax differences can arise from firms’ engagement 
in tax management activities that are designed to reduce taxable income relative to book 
income, or from firms’ earnings management activities that are designed to opportunistically 
overstate the reported book income relative to taxable income (Hanlon 2003; Erickson et al. 
2004). For instance, a firm can engage in strategic transfer-pricing arrangement to shift income 
from high-tax jurisdictions to low-tax jurisdictions, to reduce its worldwide tax burden relative 
to its overall pre-tax income and record an increased permanent book-tax difference in the 
financial statements 21 (Frank et al. 2009). By comparison, a firm can engage in income-
increasing accounting procedures such as temporarily inflating the fair value of investment 
assets or opportunistically lengthening the depreciable lives of its tangible or capitalised 
intangible assets. Such behaviour could inflate a firm’s book income without significantly 
affecting its current taxable income, leading to the recognition of additional temporary book-
tax differences in financial statements (Erickson et al. 2004).  
 
21 By overstating income in low-tax jurisdiction and understating income in high-tax jurisdiction, firms are able 
to reduce their overall effective tax rate if they make the reasonable assumption that the oversea earnings will be 
reinvested abroad permanently, since under SSAP 15, FRS 19 and IAS 12, deferred taxes are not required to be 
recognised in the consolidated accounts if there is no intention to remit the oversea earnings. This accounting 
treatment avoids the disclosure of both current and deferred tax obligations and creates a permanent difference 
between book and taxable income.  
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2.3.2. Evolution of tax accounting standards in the UK 
Accounting method for income tax is normally segregated into two components, i.e., the 
method for current tax and the method for deferred tax. Current tax is defined as “the amount 
of tax estimated to be payable (refundable) in respect of the taxable profit (tax loss) for the 
current period or past reporting periods, along with adjustments to estimates in respect of 
previous periods”. Deferred tax is defined as “income tax payable or recoverable in respect of 
the taxable profit or tax loss for future reporting periods resulting from past transactions or 
events” (Telford and Oats 2014, pp 108; IAS 12, para 5). As a result, the tax expense recognised 
in a firm’s income statement consists of both current and future tax consequence22 of firms’ 
current period’s transactions and activities (Hanlon 2003; Wahab and Holland 2012).  
Accounting method for current tax is relatively straightforward. In general, current tax is 
determined by the current taxable profit calculated as adjusting the accounting profit reported 
in financial statements in accordance with the requirements of tax laws. The unpaid tax for 
current and prior periods, which is the tax charge for the current period plus any current taxes 
of previous periods not yet settled less any tax payments made and recognised on the income 
tax account, should be recognised as a liability. The prepayment of taxes, which is the excess 
amount of tax paid for current and previous period over the amount due for those periods, 
should be recognised as an asset23 (FRS 16, para 5; IAS 12, para 12; FRS 102, para 29.3; 
Telford and Oats 2014, pp. 110).  
Accounting for deferred tax is a controversial and complex area which has experienced four 
exposure drafts (ED 11 in 1973, ED 19 in 1977, ED 33 in 1982 and FRED 19 in 1999) and five 
full standards (SSAP 11 in 1975, SSAP 15 in 1978, FRS19 in 2000, IAS 12 in 2004 and FRS 
102 in 2015) from the 1970s to the present. Accounting methods for deferred tax have long 
been the subject of debate among policymakers, corporate managers, academics and 
accountants in terms of the calculating approach (i.e., the deferral approach or the liability 
 
22 Under current UK GAAP and IAS 12, current income tax consequences are included in the ﬁnancial statements 
by recognising the amounts that are payable or refundable to the tax authorities with respect to taxable profit for 
the current period. Future tax consequences are recognised with respect to the difference between the carrying 
amount of assets and liabilities for book purposes and the carrying amount of assets and liabilities for tax purpose. 
Differences between the carrying amount of assets and liabilities for book purpose and tax purpose indicate that 
the recovery of assets and the settlement of liabilities may result in additional tax payments or refunds in the future 
(Telford and Oats 2014; Brouwer et al. 2018).   
23 Tax loss which can be carried back to recover current tax of a previous period should also be recorded as an 
asset (IAS 12, para 13).  
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approach); the provision basis (i.e., full provision or partial provision); and whether to discount 
the deferred tax balance or not. As stated by Mura (2000), deferred tax “questions the 
definitions of liability, asset, reserve, expense and distribution, the relationship between the 
‘prudence’, ‘going concern’, and ‘accrual’ concepts, and the relative role between balance 
sheet and profit and loss account” (pp 1). 
The deferral approach (i.e., the income-statement-based approach) places emphasis on the 
extent to which the profit and loss account has been affected by tax deferrals arising from the 
timing differences (Davis et al. 1997). Deferred tax account provided under the deferral 
approach is maintained using the tax rate that is applied to the originating timing differences, 
without being subsequently updated according to changes in tax rate between the origination 
and the reversal of timing differences. On reversal, the amount of the deferred taxes recognised 
in the profit and loss account is the amount which was accrued when the timing difference 
originates (Davis et al. 1997, pp. 1182; Lewis and Pendrill 2004). By contrast, the liability 
approach (i.e., the balance-sheet-based approach) focuses on the balance sheet rather than the 
profit and loss account. Under the liability approach, deferred tax is calculated at the tax rate 
that is ‘estimated to be applicable’ when the timing/temporary differences24  reverse. This 
means that if there are any changes in the tax rate, the deferred tax account will be adjusted by 
recalculating the accumulated timing/temporary differences with the enacted (or substantively 
enacted) tax rate by the end of the reporting period (Davis et al. 1997; Lewis and Pendrill 2004). 
As compared to the deferral approach, deferred taxes provided under the liability approach can 
be perceived as a future liability or asset rather than a deferred revenue or expenditure 
originated in a past period.  
Partial provision method requires deferred taxes to be recognised under managers’ reasonable 
estimations regarding the extent to which a liability or an asset will crystallise in the foreseeable 
future. Under the partial provision method, the full amount of deferred taxes should be 
calculated. However, only the amount of deferred taxes that are expected to reverse in the 
 
24 The temporary difference can be broader than, and include, timing difference (Telford and Oats 2014, pp 127). 
For example, since incomes or losses from revaluation are included in book income but are not allowable for tax 
purpose, the revaluation of fixed assets to fair value creates a temporary difference between the tax base of the 
assets and their carrying amount, even if there is no intention to sell the fixed assets (IAS 12, para 20). However, 
the revaluation induced differences between book and taxable income does not constitute timing difference unless 
there are binding agreements to sell the revalued assets or the gains and losses associated with selling the revalued 
assets have been recognised (FRS 19, para 14). 
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foreseeable future will be recognised in the financial accounts. Any amounts that are not 
expected to crystallise in the foreseeable future should only be disclosed in the notes rather 
than in the accounts. By contrast, the full provision method requires the full amount of deferred 
tax asset and liability arising from the timing/temporary difference to be recognised in the 
deferred tax account, regardless of whether the liability or asset is expected to crystallise in the 
foreseeable future or not (Davies et al. 1997; Citron 2001).  
Another controversial issue related to deferred tax provision is whether to provide deferred 
taxes on a nominal basis or on a discount basis25. It is argued that discounting deferred taxes 
based on the time until they reverse could make the deferred tax account more value relevant 
and better reflect their economic value. One reason for this is that deferred tax liabilities involve 
postponements of tax payments to tax authorities and, hence, can be perceived as taking an 
interest-free loan from tax authorities. Consequently, discounting the deferred tax liability 
based on the period of the deferment can better reflect the benefits associated with the 
postponement (Nurnberg 1972; Rayburn 1987; Davies et al. 1997). However, discounting 
deferred tax could be highly complex and impractical since it requires managers to clearly 
schedule the timing of the reversal of each individual deferred taxes (Brouwer 2018, pp. 211). 
In addition, previous studies suggest that it is the timing of expected future tax cash flows 
associated with deferred tax liabilities and assets rather than the timing of reversals affects the 
value of deferred taxes, thereby discounting the deferred tax assets or liabilities based on their 
expected timing of reversal may be irrelevant26 (Dotan 2003; Guenther et al. 2000; 2004; Laux 
2013). Specifically, deferred taxes which are included in GAAP prior to taxable income are 
expected to result in future tax-related cash flows. For these types of deferred taxes, their timing 
of reversals affects the timing of when future taxes will be paid and, thus, is value relevant. 
However, deferred taxes included in GAAP after taxable income are not expected to have 
future cash flows implications, thereby their timing of reversals may not be value relevant27 
(Guenther et al. 2004; Laux 2013). 
 
25 Specifically, FRS 19 permits but not requires the discounting of deferred tax balances. FRS 19 states that the 
discount rates are “the post-tax yields to maturity that could be obtained at the balance sheet date on government 
bonds with maturity dates and in currencies similar to those of the deferred tax assets and liabilities”. (FRS 19, 
para 52). FRS 19 also states that the discounting period is “the number of years between the balance sheet date 
and the date on which it is estimated that the underlying timing difference will reverse” (FRS 19, para 47). FRS 
102 and IAS 12 prohibit the discounting of deferred tax balances. 
26 FRS 19 which permits but not requires to discount deferred tax balances states that “it is therefore valid to 
discount deferred tax balances only if they can be viewed as representing future cash flows that are not already 
measured at their present value” (pp. 89). 
27 An example of deferred taxes included in GAAP income before taxable income is the deferred tax assets arising 
from warranty cost and expense. Warranty costs and expenses are included for financial reporting purposes in 
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The rest of this section will discuss about the changes in the UK accounting standards for 
deferred taxes over the past four decades. Two tables will be presented at the end of this section. 
One table summarises the evolution process of the accounting methods for deferred taxes in 
the UK, and the other one compares the key similarities and differences between different UK 
tax accounting standards. 
SSAP 11 
In May 1973, the Accounting Standard Committee (ASC) issued the exposure draft ED 11 
“Accounting for Deferred Taxation” as its first attempt to standardise the method of accounting 
for deferred taxation. It requires that “deferred taxation should be accounted for on all material 
differences, using the deferral method” (ASC 1973, para 33). This means that entities are 
required to provide deferred tax in full using the deferral approach. In August 1975, the 
exposure draft ED 11 was converted into a formal accounting standard—SSAP 11. SSAP 11 
requires deferred taxation to be provided according to all material timing differences but 
permits entities to use either the deferral method or the liability method. However, SSAP 11 
was under strong criticism on the ground that it is unfair to reduce shareholders’ asset by the 
amount of deferred tax liability which is not expected to be payable in the foreseeable future 
(Mura 2000). Among others, the Confederation of British Industry and the Committee of 
London Clearing Bankers suggested limiting the deferred taxes provisioning on short-term 
timing differences which are expected to crystallise within future five years (The Accountant 
1976 June 24th, pp 730). 
SSAP 15 
The exposure draft ED 19 “Accounting for Deferred Taxation” was published in May 1977 
with a fundamentally different approach compared to SSAP 11. ED 19 laid the foundations for 
the partial provision method of deferred tax by differentiating the short-term timing differences 
from timing differences that are not expected to reverse in the foreseeable future (Davies et al. 
 
periods when the related sales and revenues are recognised while they are not allowed to be tax deductible until 
the underlying liability is settled, which creates a timing difference and therefore giving rise to a deferred tax asset. 
This type of deferred taxes is able to signal future tax cash flows that will occur when the associated timing 
differences reverse. An example of deferred taxes included in GAAP income after taxable income is the deferred 
tax liabilities arising from the accelerated tax depreciation. The underlying tax cash flows from capital allowance 
are generally occurred and included in the taxable income before the reversal of the associated timing differences. 
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1997). Finally, SSAP 11 was withdrawn and SSAP 15, which was converted from ED 19, was 
initially issued in 1978 and subsequently revised twice in 1985 and 1995.  
SSAP 15 (revised version) “Accounting for Deferred Taxation” requires entities to provide 
deferred taxes using the liability approach on the partial provision basis. That is, entities are 
required to recognise deferred taxes to the extent that the corresponding timing differences are 
probable to reverse in the foreseeable future28 , using the tax rate that is estimated to be 
applicable when the timing differences reverse (SSAP 15, para 4-25). Therefore, the 
provisioning of deferred taxes under SSAP 15 requires firm managers to make ‘reasonable 
assumptions’ about whether or not the deferred taxes will reverse in the foreseeable future. 
Those assumptions should be based on managers’ private information about firms’ financial 
plans or projections to assess and predict the likely pattern of future tax liabilities or assets 
resulting from firms’ current activities (Davis et al. 1997, pp 1209). Therefore, deferred tax 
provided under the partial provision basis can provide managers with opportunities to convey 
their private information about firms’ future tax consequences. However, the complexity, 
discretion and judgements associated with the partial provision approach may facilitate 
managers to manipulate deferred taxes for the purpose of deliberately influencing net earnings 
(Holland and Jackson 2004). As a result, entities in similar economic and operational condition 
can make significantly different provisions for deferred taxes (Lewis and Pendrill 2004). 
FRS 19 
The Financial Reporting Exposure Draft 19 (FRED 19) “Deferred Tax” was issued in the year 
1999. After that, the FRS 19 “Deferred Tax” was effective for periods commencing on or after 
23 January 2002 with only a few adjustments to the requirements of FRED 19. In 2004/2005, 
the EU required all listed companies to use IFRS in their consolidated financial reporting. 
Under IFRS, IAS 12 “Income Taxes” is used to prescribe the income tax reporting practices. 
Parent company and subsidiaries within a group can choose between IFRS and the UK GAAP 
for financial reporting purpose. This indicates that the consolidated financial reports of UK 
listed companies must follow IAS 12 for tax reporting purpose, while the individual accounts 
of parent companies and each of their subsidiaries can choose between IAS 12 and FRS 16/19 
 
28 SSAP 15, Appendix, para 4 states that “the forecasting period may be relatively short-say three to five years”. 
Under SSAP 15, entities are required to account for the aggregated position of deferred tax provision by netting 
off various effects of each timing difference. 
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for tax reporting. In 2013, the Financial Reporting Council issued a series of new accounting 
standards which superseded all existing SSAPs and FRSs plus UITF Abstracts for accounting 
periods commencing on or after 1 January 2015. After 2015, the consolidated financial report 
of UK listed companies should be prepared in accordance with IFRS, while the individual 
accounts prepared by the parent companies and the subsidiaries can choose between IFRS and 
the new accounting standards, i.e., the FRS 101 or the FRS 10229.  
FRS 19 (and FRED 19), IAS 12 and FRS 102 all reject the partial provision approach in favour 
of the full provision approach for deferred tax disclosures. However, the requirements of full 
provisions for deferred tax disclosures are different among those three standards. Specifically, 
FRS 19 Deferred Tax requires deferred taxes to be provided in full using a so-called 
“incremental timing-difference approach”. The Financial Reporting Council highlights that 
FRS 19 adopts a ‘conceptually different’ approach as compared to IAS 12, since it perceives 
that “the conceptual arguments underpinning the requirements of IAS 12 could lead to 
companies making excessive provisions”30.  
FRS19 requires the provision of deferred tax on all timing differences but with a narrower 
range as compared to IAS 12. For instance, under FRS 19, deferred taxes would not be provided 
on valuation gains or losses if there is no binding commitment to sell the asset (FRS 19, para 
44). Deferred taxes will not be provided on realised gains or losses on disposal of assets if the 
assets are rolled over into replacement assets (FRS 19, para 42). In terms of earnings from 
subsidiaries associates and joint ventures, deferred taxes would not be provided if the earnings 
are not accrued as receivable or there are no binding agreements to distribute the earnings in 
the future (FRS 19, para 43). By comparison, IAS 12 is based on the “comprehensive balance-
sheet approach” to account for future tax consequences by recognising deferred taxes in respect 
of all temporary book-tax differences31. Lewis and Pendrill (2004) therefore argue that FRS 19 
 
29 FRS 101 combines the recognition and measurement requirements of IFRS with the presentation and disclosure 
requirements of UK GAAP and CA 2006. Therefore, it is equivalent with IFRS in respect of tax treatment since 
presentation and disclosure requirements are generally not relevant with tax consequences. FRS 102 is the new 
UK GAAP that is based on International Financial Reporting Standards for small and medium sized entities 
(Telford and Oats 2014). 
30Source: https://www.frc.org.uk/accountants/accounting-and-reporting-policy/uk-accounting-
standards/standards-inissue/frs-19-deferred-tax. 
31 Under IAS 12, deferred taxes should be recognised for all temporary differences besides several exemptions. 
For instance, deferred tax liability should not be recognised for the initial recognition of goodwill and should not 
be recognised on the initial recognition of an asset (or liability) which is not a business combination, and at the 
time of recognising the asset (or liability), affects neither the accounting nor tax proﬁt (IAS 12 para 15). IAS 12 
para 39 also states that deferred tax liabilities associated with investments in subsidiaries, joint ventures and 
associates are not recognised if the parent or investors are able to control the timing of the reversal of the temporary 
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“rests on very shaky foundations” since its requirement of full provision for deferred taxes rests 
upon the accruals or matching concepts, which is contradicted to the balance sheet orientation 
of the full provision method (pp 350). In addition, FRS 19 permits but not requires the 
discounting of deferred tax liabilities or assets. This means that preparers of financial accounts 
are allowed to choose as their accounting policies to discount the long-term deferred tax 
balances to reflect the time value of money (FRS 19, para 42).  
Through reducing the permissible latitude and discretion that can be exploited by managers to 
achieve the desired amount of deferred taxes, deferred tax account prepared on the full 
provision basis may reduce the opportunities for earnings management via manipulating 
deferred tax provisioning as compared to the partial provision approach required by SSAP 15. 
However, deferred tax provisioning “remains a relatively complex area of accounting”, since 
FRS 19 still requires firm managers to “form expectations concerning the future, apply 
judgement and make choices in accounting for deferred tax” 32 (Holland and Jackson 2004, pp 
104).  
IAS 12 
IAS 12 Income Taxes requires deferred taxes to be accounted for using the so-called 
“comprehensive balance-sheet approach”, i.e., deferred taxes should be recognised on a 
comprehensive basis with respect to temporary differences between “the carrying amount of 
an asset or liability in the statement of financial position and its tax base” (IAS 12, para 5). 
Specifically, IAS 12 requires deferred tax liabilities to be recognised in respect of all taxable 
temporary differences, except when certain specific exemptions apply33 (IAS 12, para 15). By 
 
difference, or it is probable that this temporary difference will not reverse in the foreseeable future. In addition, 
IAS 12 para 24 require a deferred tax asset should be recognised only if it is probable that sufficient taxable profit 
will be available against the deductible temporary differences. 
 
32 For example, under FRS 19, “a deferred tax asset is recognised in respect of timing differences and tax losses 
to the extent that it is more likely than not that the deferred tax asset will be recovered” (FRS 19, para 23). As a 
result, when making decisions on whether to recognise a deferred tax asset, managers still need to use their 
judgements to estimate the expected timing of reversal of the deferred tax asset and whether there will be sufficient 
taxable profits available against which the deferred tax asset can be utilised at the time of reversal.  
 
33 Except that the deferred tax liabilities arise from the “initial recognition of goodwill; the initial recognition of 
an asset or liability in a transaction which is not a business combination and affects neither accounting profit nor 
taxable profit (or tax loss) at the time of the transaction” (IAS 12, para 15). An entity shall recognise a deferred 
tax liability for all taxable temporary differences from “investments in subsidiaries, branches and associates, 
except to the extent that the parent, investor, joint venture or joint operator is able to control the timing of the 
reversal of the temporary difference or it is probable that the temporary difference will not reverse” (IAS 12, para 
39). 
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comparison, deferred tax assets are required to be recognised in respect of all deductible 
temporary differences to the extent that “it is probable that there will be sufficient taxable profit 
available against which the deductible temporary differences can be utilised”34 (IAS 12, para 
24). IAS 12 requires entities to determine the expected manner in which the carrying amount 
of assets is recovered and the carrying amount of liabilities is settled at the end of the reporting 
period to determine the corresponding tax base (IAS 12, para 51). In addition, deferred tax 
assets and liabilities should be measured at the enacted (or substantively enacted) tax rate that 
is expected to be applicable by the end of the reporting period (IAS 12, para 47). In this situation, 
IAS 12 places emphasis on the balance sheet and perceives deferred taxes as a future liability 
or asset with future tax consequences resulting from the settlement of liabilities or the recovery 
of the assets, rather than perceiving deferred taxes as a deferred revenue or expense originated 
in the past. 
The justification for the tax accounting method underlying IAS 12 is that it aims to faithfully 
represent35 an entity’s current and future tax positions on a comprehensive basis, with the 
attempts to reduce the latitudes for opportunistic managerial behaviours via deferred tax 
provisioning. However, the comprehensive nature of IAS 12, which requires deferred tax 
liabilities recognised with respect to all taxable temporary differences36, may restrict managers’ 
ability to convey their private information about firms’ future tax consequences and, thus, 
compromising the value relevance of information reported in tax accounts to explain future tax 
cash flows37 (Brouwer 2015).  
IFRS Conceptual Framework requires that “all items in the balance sheet, other than 
shareholders’ equity, must be either assets or liabilities as defined in the framework”. An asset 
 
34 Except that the deferred tax assets arise from the “initial recognition of an asset or liability in a transaction 
which is not a business combination and affects neither accounting profits nor taxable profit (tax loss) at the time 
of transaction” (IAS 12, para 24). An entity shall recognise a deferred tax asset for all deductible temporary 
differences arising from “investments in subsidiaries, branches and associates to the extent that it is probable that 
the temporary difference will reverse in the foreseeable future and taxable profit will be available against which 
the temporary difference can be utilised” (IAS 12, para 44). 
35 The conceptual framework of IFRS standards requires the faithful recognition. It requires a depiction to be 
“complete, neutral and free from error” and to include “all information necessary for a user to understand the 
phenomenon being depicted” (IFRS QC12-13).  
36 Except certain specific exemptions, see footnote 26 
37 Besides faithful representation, relevance is another important qualitative characteristic highlighted in IFRS 
Conceptual Framework. IFRS Conceptual Framework states that “if financial information is to be useful, it must 
be relevant and faithfully represent what it purports to represent” (IFRS QC4). Relevant financial information 
should have predictive value or confirmatory or both, in order to be capable of making a difference in users’ 
decision-makings (IFRS QC6-QC7). 
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should be recognised in the balance sheet “when it is probable that the future economic benefits 
will flow to the entity and the asset has a cost or value that can be measured reliably”. A 
liability should be recognised in the balance sheet “when it is probable that an outflow of 
resources embodying economic benefits will result from the settlement of a present obligation 
and the amount at which the settlement will take place can be measured reliably” (IASB 2006, 
Conceptual Framework, para 4.44-4.46). Thus, the definition of an asset and a liability stated 
in the IFRS Conceptual Framework is explicitly linked to an expected future inflow or outflow 
of economic benefits (Brouwer et al. 2018). However, only the recognition requirements of 
deferred tax assets under IAS 12 are applied with the probability threshold of future cash tax 
realisation, while deferred tax liabilities provided under IAS 12 are recognised on all temporary 
differences regardless of whether they have future cash tax consequences (Brouwer et al. 2018). 
As a result, the asymmetrical verification requirement of IAS 12 could result in the recognised 
deferred tax liabilities divergent from the criterion of a liability defined in the IFRS Conceptual 
Framework, because some deferred tax liabilities are not expected to reverse any time in the 
future owing to their nearly permanent nature38 (Loftus 2003).  
FRS 102 
Under FRS 102, deferred tax is provided using a so-called “timing difference plus approach”. 
That is, deferred taxes are calculated with respect to timing differences between “the taxable 
proﬁts and total comprehensive income as stated in the ﬁnancial statements that arise from the 
inclusion of income and expenses in tax assessments in periods different from those in which 
they are recognised in ﬁnancial statements” (FRS 102, para 29.6). The ‘plus’ part of the 
deferred tax is achieved by extinguishing certain exemptions that are required by FRS 19.  
For instance, FRS 102 requires deferred tax to be provided on revaluation gains or losses 
through other comprehensive income, while FRS 19 does not require recognising deferred tax 
on revalued assets unless there was a binding commitment to dispose of. FRS 102 requires 
deferred taxes to be recognised in a business combination when the fair value of assets (other 
than goodwill) and liabilities acquired differs from the amount attributed for tax purposes, 
while no deferred taxes are required under FRS 19 regarding business combination. FRS 102 
 
38 For example, IAS 12 requires deferred tax liabilities arising from upward revaluation of fixed assets to be 
provided, even if the taxable gain from disposal of a fixed asset will be indefinitely deferred or rolled over into a 
replacement asset with rollover relief. This type of deferred tax is nearly permanent in nature since no tax will 
become payable in the future until the replacement assets are disposed in the absence of rollover relief. 
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requires deferred tax to be recognised for timing differences where income or expenses from a 
subsidiary, associate, branch or joint venture are recognised in the financial statements in 
periods different from those in which taxable or deductible for tax purpose39, while FRS 19 
only requires deferred taxes to be recognised to the extent that the unremitted earnings have 
been accrued as receivable or there are binding agreements to distribute those earnings (FRS 
102, para 29.6-29.11).  
In light of the above discussions, it can be concluded that accounting methods for deferred 
taxes are in a continual process of development and modification over the past fifty years in 
the UK. Table 2.2 below summarises the significant milestones in the evolution process of 
accounting methods for deferred taxes in the UK. Table 2.3 below provides a detailed insight 
into key similarities and differences between tax accounting standards for UK listed companies 
in terms of the recognition, presentation and disclosure of deferred taxes, to show how different 
accounting methods for deferred taxes affect the tax reporting practices40.
 
39 Except that the entity can “control the reversal of the timing difference and it is probable that the difference will 
not reverse in the foreseeable future” (FRS 102, para 29.9). 
40 Until the year 2004, consolidated and unconsolidated financial reporting of UK companies were under Schedule 
4 to the Companies Act 1985 and UK GAAP (i.e., SSAP 15 and FRS 19 for income tax purposes). For 2005 
onwards, IFRS (i.e., IAS 12 for income tax purposes) was mandatorily applied to consolidated financial statements 
of listed UK companies. 
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Table 2.2: Evolution of Accounting Methods for Deferred Taxes in UK 
 
1973 
 
ED 11 
 
• Until 1973, deferred tax was not mandatory and followed a variety of 
practices. 
• Under ED 11, deferred tax should be “accounted for all material 
differences using deferral method” (ASC 1973, para 33). 
• It emphasises on profit and loss account rather than balance sheet. 
• Deferred taxation balance is seen as deferred revenue or deferred 
expense, as opposite to a future liability or repayment. 
1975 SSAP 11 • It was effective for periods beginning on or after 1 January 1976. 
• Deferred taxes should be “accounted for all material timing 
differences, using either deferral method or liability method”. 
1976 ED 18 • Opposite to SSAP 11, deferred taxes should be accounted for, “on the 
liability method, in respect of the tax reduction arising from all 
originating timing differences of material amount other than any tax 
reduction which can be seen with reasonable probability to continue 
for the foreseeable future” (ASC, 1976) 
1976 SSAP 11 • SSAP 11 was put off and then suspended. 
1977 ED 19 • ED 19 follows the approach set out in ED 18 and laid down conditions 
for partial provisions of deferred tax by differentiating short-term 
timing differences from timing differences that would not reverse in 
the foreseeable future. 
• It states that “provision should be made in full for short-term 
differences, but that the remaining timing differences should be 
considered jointly to see whether it could be established that some part 
of the potential liability need not be provided”. 
1978 SSAP 15 
(original) 
• SSAP 11 was withdrawn and SSAP 15 which is based on ED 19 was 
issued. 
• The liability method is no longer mandated, but it does not explicitly 
mention the liability method or deferral method. 
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1983 ED 33 • Deferred tax should be provided based on partial provision to the extent 
that “it is probable that a liability would crystallise and not set up to 
the extent that it would not”. 
• It states that liability method should be used since that deferral method 
was not compatible with the partial provision concept. 
1985 
1995 
SSAP 15  
(First and 
second 
revised) 
• It is similar to ED 33 with following changes: 
• It explicitly states that the liability method was the required method for 
deferred tax provision. 
• It drops the proposal in ED 33 to require the disclosure of the period or 
periods of time in which the liability was expected to crystallise. 
• It states that no deferred tax to be provided in respect of unremitted 
overseas earnings. 
1992 FRED 2 • It requires “either the full provision basis or the partial provision basis 
may be used in accounting for the deferred tax implications of pensions 
and other post-retirement benefits”. 
1999 FRED 19 • Deferred tax should be provided on full provision basis. 
• Although the Accounting Standard Board (ASB) claimed FRED 19 is 
aimed at international harmonisation, there are differences between 
FRED 19 and IAS 12. 
• Inconsistent with IAS 12, FRED 19 does not require deferred tax to be 
provided on valuation gains or losses unless the company is committed 
to selling the asset; the unremitted earnings of subsidiaries, associates 
and joint ventures unless earnings have been accrued or there is an 
obligation to distribute the earnings. 
• Inconsistent with IAS 12, FRED 19 suggests that deferred tax accounts 
should not include large, long-term liabilities at their full value, and 
requires discounting the long-term deferred tax balances if their effect 
is material.  
2000 FRS 19 • It is effective for accounting period ending on or after 2002. 
• There are only a few changes compared to FRED 19. 
• It requires deferred tax to be provided on full provision basis using the 
“incremental balance-sheet” approach. It requires deferred tax to be 
provided on all timing differences but with a narrower range compared 
to IAS 12. 
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• It permits but not require the discounting of long-term deferred tax 
balances. 
2004 IAS 12 • All UK listed companies are required to prepare their consolidated 
financial reports in accordance with International Accounting 
Standards for periods on or after 2004. 
• IAS 12 requires deferred taxes to be provided in full under the 
“comprehensive balance-sheet” approach in respect of all temporary 
differences except certain exemptions. 
• IAS 12 prohibits the discounting of deferred tax balances. 
2015 FRS 102 • FRS 102 requires deferred taxes to be provided in full using a “timing 
differences plus” approach, besides certain exceptions. 
• FRS 102 prohibits the discounting of deferred tax balances 
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Table 2.3: Similarities and Differences between IAS 12 and UK GAAP in terms of Deferred Tax Provision 
 
SUBJECT SSAP 15 (revised) FRS 19 IAS12 SUMMARY 
Validity period 
for UK listed 
companies 
From 1985 to 2001 From 2002 to 2004 From 2004 to the present  
Approach Liability approach on partial provision 
basis. 
 
Liability approach on full provision basis, 
i.e., “incremental timing-difference 
approach”. 
Liability approach on full provision basis, 
i.e., “comprehensive balance-sheet 
approach”. 
1) SSAP 15, FRS 19 and IAS 12 all 
employ liability approach.  
2) SSAP 15 requires deferred taxes to 
be provided under a partial 
provision basis while FRS 19 and 
IAS 12 require deferred taxes to be 
provided under a full provision 
basis  
Definition  Deferred tax is the “tax attributable to 
timing differences” (SSAP 15, para 
17). 
Deferred tax is the “estimated future tax 
consequences of transactions and events 
recognised in the financial statements for 
current and previous periods in respect of 
timing differences between the recognition 
of gains and losses in the financial 
statements and their recognition for tax 
purposes” (FRS 19, para 2).  
“Deferred tax liabilities under IAS 12 are 
the amount of income taxes payable in 
future periods in respect of taxable 
temporary difference. Deferred tax assets 
under IAS 12 are the amounts of income 
taxes recoverable in future periods in 
respect of deductible temporary 
differences; and the carry-forward of 
unused tax losses and tax credits” (IAS 12, 
para 5). 
 
Temporary 
difference 
No concept of temporary differences 
in SSAP 15. 
No concept of temporary difference in 
FRS 19. 
Fundamentally different from SSAP 15 
and FRS 19, a temporary difference under 
IAS 12 is “the difference between the 
carrying amount of an asset or liability and 
its tax base” (IAS 12, para 5). The 
temporary difference is broader than, and 
includes timing difference.  
 
Temporary difference focuses on the 
balance sheet, i.e., the tax payable of assets 
at the balance sheet date for their carrying 
values (Telford and Oats 2014, pp 127). 
 
In short, “temporary difference is the 
difference between the tax and financial 
IAS 12 recognises deferred taxes in 
respect of temporary differences with 
emphasis on the balance sheet. 
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reporting base of asset or liabilities” 
(James and Nobes 2016, pp 284).  
Timing 
difference 
“Timing differences are differences 
between profits or losses as computed 
for tax purposes and results as stated in 
financial statements, which arise from 
the inclusion of items of income and 
expenditure in tax computations in 
periods different from those in which 
they are included in financial 
statements. Timing differences 
originate in one period and are capable 
of reversal in one or more subsequent 
periods” (SSAP 15, para 18) 
“Timing difference are differences 
between an entity’s taxable profit and total 
comprehensive income as stated in the 
financial statements that arise from the 
inclusion of income and expenses in tax 
assessments in periods different from 
those in which they are recognised in 
financial statements” (FRS 19, para 2) 
 
Timing differences focus on the profit and 
loss account, i.e., the impacts from future 
reversal (Telford and Oats 2014, pp 127).  
In short, “timing difference is the 
reversible difference between 
revenues/expenses for accounting and tax” 
(James and Nobes 2016, pp 284).  
No concept of timing difference in IAS 12 SSAP 15 and FRS 19 recognise deferred 
taxes in respect of timing differences 
with emphasis on profit and loss 
account. 
Recognition  “Deferred tax should be accounted for 
in respect of the net amount by which 
it is probable that any payment of tax 
will be temporarily deferred or 
accelerated by the operation of timing 
differences which will reverse in the 
foreseeable future without being 
replaced. Partial provision recognises 
that, if an enterprise is not expected to 
reduce the scale of its operations 
significantly, it will often have what 
amounts to a hardcore of timing 
differences so that the payment of 
some tax will be permanently 
deferred. On this basis, deferred taxes 
should be provided only where it is 
probable that tax will become payable 
as a result of the reversal of timing 
differences” (SSAP 15, para 12) 
 
 
Deferred taxes “should be recognised in 
respect of all timing differences that have 
originated but not reversed by the balance 
sheet date, i.e., should be recognised as a 
liability if the transactions or events give 
the entity an obligation to pay additional 
tax in the future or as an asset if the 
transactions or events give the entity a 
right to pay less tax in the future” (FRS 19, 
para7) 
 
“Deferred tax assets should be recognised 
to the extent that it is more likely than not 
that there will be suitable taxable profits 
from which the future reversal of the 
underlying timing differences can be 
deducted” (FRS 19, para 23) 
“Deferred tax liabilities should be 
recognised for all taxable temporary 
difference, except the extent to which the 
deferred tax liability arises from: 
• The initial recognition of goodwill; or 
• The initial recognition of an asset or 
liability in a transaction which is not 
a business combination and at the 
time of transaction, affects neither 
accounting profit nor taxable profit or 
loss” (IAS 12, para 15) 
 
“Deferred tax assets should be recognised 
for all deductible temporary differences to 
the extent that it is probable that taxable 
profit will be available against which the 
deductible temporary difference can be 
utilised, except the deferred tax assets 
arise from the initial recognition of an 
asset or liability in a transaction that: 
• Is not a business combination; 
• At the time of the transactions, affects 
neither accounting profit nor taxable 
profit (tax loss)” (IAS 12, para 24) 
1) SSAP 15 and FRS 19 account for 
deferred taxes arising from 
differences in the timing of 
recognition of revenues and 
expenses for accounting and tax 
purposes. By considering between 
the carrying amount and tax value 
of the assets and liabilities, IAS 12 
aims at providing tax effects of 
liquidating the carrying amounts of 
all the assets and liabilities in the 
balance sheet  
 
2) SSAP 15 is based on a partial 
provision method to account for 
deferred taxes. It requires to 
recognise the amount of deferred 
taxes that are expected to reverse in 
the foreseeable future. FRS 19 and 
IAS 12 are based on the full 
provision method to recognise 
deferred taxes in respect of all 
timing/temporary differences. 
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Permanent 
difference 
Permanent differences are differences 
between taxable profits and 
accounting profits that are not reverse 
and have no effects on other periods. 
“Permanent differences are differences 
between an entity’s taxable profits and its 
total comprehensive income as stated in 
the financial statements, that arise because 
certain types of income and expenditure 
are non-taxable or disallowable other than 
timing differences” (FRS 19, para7) 
There is no separate concept of permanent 
difference in IAS 12.  
SSAP 15 and FRS 19 separately define 
permanent difference while IAS 12 does 
not. 
Deferred  
tax asset 
“Net deferred tax debit balances (i.e., 
arising from tax losses or the effect of 
timing differences) should not be 
carried forward as a deferred tax asset, 
except that it is assured beyond 
reasonable doubt that they are 
expected to be recoverable without 
being replaced by equivalent debit 
balances” (SSAP 15, para 30). 
 
“A deferred tax asset is recognised in 
respect to timing differences and tax losses 
to the extent that it is more likely than not 
that the deferred tax asset will be 
recovered” (FRS 19, para 23). 
“Deferred tax asset should be recognised 
for all deductible temporary differences to 
the extent that it is probable that taxable 
profit will be available against which the 
deductible temporary difference can be 
utilised”, except certain exemptions (IAS 
12, para 24). 
 
“The carrying amount of deferred tax 
assets are reviewed at the end of each 
reporting period and reduced to the extent 
that it is no longer probable that sufficient 
taxable profit will be available to allow the 
benefit of part or all of that deferred tax 
asset to be utilised. The reduction is 
reversed when it subsequently becomes 
probable that sufficient taxable profit will 
be available” (IAS 12, para 37) 
When recognising deferred tax assets, 
both FRS 19 and IAS 12 apply the 
probability threshold of future cash tax 
realisation regarding the recoverability 
of deferred tax assets. SSAP 15 
recognises deferred tax assets to the 
extent that they will not be replaced by 
new deferred tax assets. 
Asset carried 
at fair value 
SSAP 15 provides guidelines towards 
the revaluation of fixed assets in 
respect of the tax consequences arising 
from the disposal of the fixed assets at 
their revalued amounts. Specifically, 
“the revaluation of an asset (including 
an investment in an associated or 
subsidiary company) will create a 
timing difference when it is 
incorporated into the balance sheet, 
insofar as the profit or loss that would 
result from realisation at the revalued 
amount is taxable, unless disposal of 
the revalued asset and of any 
subsequent replacement assets would 
not result in a tax liability, after taking 
account of any expected rollover 
relief” (SSAP 15, para 20).  
FRS 19 requires recognising deferred 
taxes “when an asset is continuously 
revalued to fair value, with changes in fair 
value being recognised in the profit and 
loss account” (FRS 19, para 12). 
 
“No deferred tax is recognised on a 
revaluation gain in respect of a non-
monetary asset unless: 
• The entity entered into a binding 
agreement to sell the revalued non-
monetary asset. 
• Gain and losses expected to arise on 
the sale are recognised (FRS 19, para 
14)”. 
 
If it was more likely than not that a rollover 
claim would be made on disposal, no 
“The difference between the carrying 
amount of a revalued asset and its tax base 
is a temporary difference which gives rise 
to deferred tax assets or liabilities (IAS 12, 
para 20).  
 
This is true even if the entity does not 
intend to dispose of the asset or tax or 
capital gains is deferred if the proceeds of 
the disposal of the asset are invested in 
similar assets” (IAS 12, para 20). 
1) There are significant differences 
between SSAP 15, FRS 19 and IAS 
12 in terms of assets revaluation. It 
can be common that no deferred 
taxes are necessary to be 
recognised in respect of fixed assets 
revaluation under SSAP 15 (Dewis 
et al. 1997). However, this is not the 
case under FRS 19 and IAS 12. 
 
2) IAS 12 provides deferred taxes in 
respect of assets revaluation no 
matter whether the entity intends to 
sell the asset or not. FRS 19 
recognises deferred tax on revalued 
assets only when the entity has 
entered into a binding agreement to 
sell the asset or the associated gains 
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However, SSAP 15 provides no 
explicit guidelines towards the 
impacts of revaluation on deferred tax 
provision in respect of “timing 
differences between the amounts of 
depreciation charged in the accounts 
and of capital allowances in the tax 
computation” (SSAP 15, para 20). 
provision was necessary (FRS 19, para 
15). 
and losses have already been 
recognised 
 
Unremitted 
earnings of 
subsidiaries, 
associates and 
joint ventures 
“The retention of earnings overseas 
will create a timing difference 
therefore related deferred tax only if:  
• There is an intention or obligation 
to remit them;  
• The remittance would result in a 
tax liability after taking account 
of any related double tax relief 
(SSAP 15, para 21)” 
“Deferred tax is recognised only to the 
extent that, at the balance sheet date: 
• Earnings from subsidiaries, 
associates and joint ventures have 
been accrued as receivable; and 
• A binding agreement to distribute the 
past earnings in the future has been 
entered into by the subsidiary, 
associate or joint venture, those refer 
to timing differences between the 
periods for accounting purpose and 
the periods for tax purpose (FRS 19, 
para 21)”. 
An entity is required to “recognise a 
deferred tax liability for all taxable 
temporary differences associated with 
investments in subsidiaries, branches and 
associates, and interests in joint 
arrangements, except to the extent that 
both of the following conditions are 
satisfied:  
• The parent, investor, joint venture or 
joint operator is able to control the 
timing of the reversal of the 
temporary difference; and  
• It is probable that the temporary 
difference will not reverse in the 
foreseeable future (IAS 12, para 39)”. 
 
An entity is required to “recognise a 
deferred tax asset for all deductible 
temporary differences arising from 
investments in subsidiaries, branches and 
associates, and interests in joint 
arrangements, to the extent that, and only 
to the extent that, it is probable that:  
• The temporary difference will reverse 
in the foreseeable future and  
• Taxable profit will be available 
against which the temporary 
difference can be utilised (IAS 12, 
para 44)”. 
1) SSAP 15, FRS 19 and IAS 12 do 
not require the recognition of 
deferred taxes in respect of timing 
differences arising from the 
remittance of earnings from a 
subsidiary, associate or joint 
venture, if the remittance of the 
earnings is not expected to take 
place in the future. 
 
2) FRS 19 explicitly prohibits the 
recognition of deferred tax arising 
from the remittance of earnings 
from a subsidiary, associate or joint 
venture, if no commitment has been 
made to remit the earnings. 
Business 
combination 
No explicit requirement for deferred 
taxes arising from business 
combination.  
In general, no deferred taxes arises on 
business combinations.  
 
When there are adjustments of an acquired 
entity’s assets and liabilities to fair value, 
the treatment of those adjustments is in the 
Assets and liabilities should be recognised 
“at their fair value at the acquisition date. 
Deferred tax thereby should be recognised 
in respect of temporary differences that 
arise when the tax base of the identifiable 
assets and liabilities are not affected by or 
FRS 19 requires deferred taxes to be 
recognised with respect to timing 
differences arising from business 
combination, while IAS 12 requires 
deferred taxes to be recognised in 
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same way as if there were timing 
differences arising in the acquiring entity’s 
own financial statements. For example, 
deferred taxes should be recognised only 
when there are binding agreements to sell 
the revalued non-monetary asset (FRS 7, 
para 74). 
affected differently by the business 
combination. Deferred taxes from 
business combination are recognised to 
reflect future tax consequences with 
corresponding adjustments to goodwill” 
(IAS 12, para 19-66). 
respect of temporary differences arising 
from business combination. 
Measurement Deferred taxes provided in financial 
statements should be measured at the 
tax rate “that is expected to be 
applicable to the period when the 
timing differences reverse. Deferred 
taxes which are not provided in 
financial statements should be 
measured “at the expected long-term 
tax rate” (SSAP 15, para 23; Lewis 
and Pendrill 2004) 
 
Whether deferred tax liabilities or 
assets will crystallise in the 
foreseeable future or not should be 
assessed on the basis of reasonable and 
realistic assumptions. Plans and 
projections are required to be reviewed 
regularly since their tax consequences 
can be affected by many factors, 
including “the reassessment of asset 
lives, a decision to close part of the 
business which renders certain assets 
no longer needed, or the provision of a 
sum in respect of the permanent 
diminution of an asset” (Lewis and 
Pendrill 2004, pp. 1209; SSAP 15, 
para 27-28). 
Deferred taxes should be measured “using 
tax rates that have been enacted or 
substantively enacted at the balance sheet 
date and that are expected to apply in the 
periods when the timing differences are 
expected to reverse” (FRS 19, para 37). 
Deferred taxes should be measured using 
“the tax rates that are expected to apply to 
the period when the asset or liability is 
realised or settled, based on tax rates that 
have been enacted or substantively 
enacted by the end of the reporting period” 
(IAS 12, para 47). 
SSAP 15, FRS 19 and IAS 12 all use 
liability approach to account for deferred 
tax balances.  
 
Tax rate employed is the rate expected to 
be applicable to the period when the 
timing differences reverse or when the 
assets or liabilities that give rise to 
temporary differences realised or settled, 
rather than the tax rate that is applied to 
the originating timing/temporary 
differences.  
 
Disclosure Timing differences should be 
considered “in aggregate rather than 
individually for the purpose of 
determining the overall net reversal, 
except timing differences with respect 
to post-retirement benefits which are 
considered separately and provided in 
full because of the amendments to 
Reconciliation is required between the 
“current tax charge or credit on ordinary 
activities for the period reported in the 
profit and loss account and the current tax 
charge that would result from applying a 
relevant standard rate of tax to the profit 
on ordinary activities before tax. No 
requirements of reconciliation in terms of 
deferred taxes” (FRS 19, para 64(a)) 
“The relationship between total income 
tax expense (current and/or deferred) and 
accounting profit should be explained in 
either or both of the following ways: 
• A numerical reconciliation 
between income tax expense and 
the accounting profit multiplied 
by the applicable tax rates 
1) There are no explicit requirements 
in SSAP 15 regarding the 
disclosure of reconciliation items 
between tax expense and 
accounting profit, while FRS 19 
and IAS 12 require disclosing the 
relationship between tax expense 
and accounting profit by disclosing 
reconciliation items.  
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SSAP 15” (SSAP 15, Appendix para 
4) 
• A numerical reconciliation 
between the average effective tax 
rate and the applicable tax rate” 
(IAS 12, para 81(c)) 
2) The reconciliation items disclosed 
under FRS 19 focuses only on 
current taxes while IAS 12 focuses 
on both deferred and current taxes.  
Prior  
year 
adjustment 
Before FRS 3 was issued, “the effect 
of changes in the tax system should be 
treated as an extraordinary item if it 
was sufficiently material” (Lewis and 
Pendrill 2004, pp 1220). 
Prior year adjustments in terms of errors 
correction are required to be recognised 
“only when errors are identified as being 
fundamental” and “should be separately 
disclosed within the tax charge on the face 
of the profit and loss account” (FRS 3, para 
23) 
IAS 12 requires the separate disclosures of 
any adjustments of taxes of prior periods, 
“including the adjustments of the current 
and deferred tax of the prior periods; the 
adjustments relating to temporary 
differences that have impacts on current 
year’s tax expense; the adjustments 
relating to unrecognised tax losses and 
credits or temporary differences of a prior 
period; and the adjustments of deferred tax 
expense (or income) relating to changes in 
tax rates or the imposition of new taxes in 
the year when the errors or the changes are 
identified” (IAS 12, para 39-49).  
1) IAS 12 requires the separate 
disclosure of adjustments of 
estimation errors in current or 
deferred taxes or changes in 
accounting estimates when the 
estimation errors or the changes are 
identified. This is contrary to SSAP 
15 and FRS 3 that prior year 
adjustments are required only when 
errors are identified as being 
fundamental.  
 
2) Therefore, it is likely that prior year 
adjustments in terms of estimation 
errors are more frequent under IAS 
12.  
Uncertain  
tax position 
No specific requirements for uncertain 
tax position 
There are no specific guidelines on 
uncertain tax position under FRS 16/19. 
Entitles can make an accounting policy 
choice to quantify the uncertain tax 
position if the likelihood of the uncertainty 
is greater than 50%, using either a single 
best estimate or a probability-weighted 
average of the possible outcomes (PwC 
2015). 
IAS 12 does not provide specific 
guidelines for uncertain tax treatments. If 
“it is probable that a tax authority will 
accept an uncertain tax treatment, then an 
entity determines whether it needs to 
disclose the potential effect of the 
uncertainty as a tax-related contingency. 
Disclosures associated with tax-related 
contingent liabilities require an estimate of 
the financial effect; an indication of the 
uncertainties relating to the amount; or 
time of any outflow and the possibility of 
reimbursement” (KPMG 2017). 
 
Changes in “facts and circumstances or 
new information will generally result in a 
reassessment of the judgment or estimate 
used”. 
 
“IFRS standards do not specifically 
address the accounting for interest and 
penalties related to income taxes. If a 
particular amount payable or receivable of 
There are no explicit guidelines on 
uncertain tax position in SSAP 15, FRS 
19 and IAS 12. However, under certain 
circumstances, entities can determine 
whether or not to disclose their uncertain 
tax positions. 
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interests and penalties are considered as 
income taxes, then they are accounted for 
under IAS 12. If such interest and penalties 
related to uncertain tax treatment, then 
IAS 37 will be considered”. 
Offsetting  “Deferred tax liabilities should be 
reduced by deferred tax debit balances 
in respect of separate categories of 
timing differences” (SSAP 15, para 
29-30)  
“SSAP 15 allows unrelieved tax losses 
to be netted off against deferred tax 
liabilities” (Lewis and Pendrill 2004, 
pp. 1218).  
“Deferred tax assets and liabilities cannot 
be offset unless they: 
• Relate to taxes levied by the same tax 
authority; and 
• Arise in the same taxable entity or 
different taxable entities within a tax 
group” (FRS 19, para 56-57) 
Similar to FRS 19 (IAS 12, para 71-75). Compared to SSAP 15, rules in respect 
of offsetting deferred taxes are more 
restricted under FRS 19 and IAS 12. 
Recognition  
in the 
comprehensive 
income 
statements or 
directly into 
equity 
SSAP 15 requires the disclosure of the 
“amount of deferred tax charged or 
credited in the profit and loss account 
with separate disclosures of deferred 
taxes that associated with ordinary 
activities and those associated with 
any extraordinary items” (SSAP 15, 
para 33-34). 
“Deferred tax should be recognised in the 
proﬁt and loss account for the period, 
except to the extent that it is attributable to 
a gain or loss that is or has been recognised 
directly in the statement of total 
recognised gains and losses”. Deferred 
taxes are not recognised directly to equity 
(FRS 19, para 34-35; PwC 2015). 
Can be different from FRS 19. 
 
Deferred taxes shall be recognised in the 
same way with transactions or events that 
give rise to tax expense, i.e., deferred taxes 
should be recognised outside the profit and 
loss accounts in other comprehensive 
income or directly in equity, if their related 
transactions or events are recognised in 
other comprehensive income or directly in 
equity (IAS 12, para 61A). 
Deferred taxes can be recognised outside 
the profit and loss accounts in 
accordance with transactions or events 
that give rise to the deferred taxes. 
Discount There are no explicit guidelines about 
discounting deferred tax balances in 
SSAP 15. 
FRS 19 permits but not requires 
discounting of deferred tax balances 
IAS 12 prohibits discounting of deferred 
tax balances 
There are no explicit guidelines on 
discounting deferred taxes under SSAP 
15. FRS 19 permits but not requires the 
discounting of deferred taxes while IAS 
12 prohibits it.  
Source: Lewis and Pendrill 2004; PwC 2015; Telford and Oats 2014/2015; James and Nobes 2016/2017; KPMG 201741; Brouwer et al. 2018; IAS website; FRC website 
 
 
 
41 See: https://home.kpmg.com/content/dam/kpmg/us/pdf/2017/10/tnf-wnit-gaap.pdf 
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2.3.3. Tax treatment of basic accounting issues in the UK 
This section briefly discusses the tax treatments of basic accounting issues in UK companies, 
in order to show how tax consequences regarding the key accounting events which may arise 
in UK companies are computed and presented to financial statements. The basic accounting 
events discussed in this section include intangible asset, lease, financial instrument, inventory, 
plant, property and equipment, employee benefits and investment property. Understanding the 
tax treatments of accounting issues is important for solving this study’s research questions, as 
it provides an insight into identifying how deferred taxes might occur and how income tax 
provision reported in firms’ financial statement might be informative about firms’ future tax 
payments (e.g., certain cash tax deductions can be serially correlated over time). A table briefly 
summarising key events that trigger the recognition of deferred taxes and revenue tax 
deductions will be presented at the end of this section. 
2.3.3.1. Intangible asset 
Goodwill 
This section briefly discusses the tax treatments of basic accounting issues in UK companies, 
in order to show how tax consequences regarding the key events which may arise in UK 
companies are computed and presented to financial statements. Understanding the tax 
treatments of accounting issues is important for solving this study’s research questions, as it 
provides an insight into how deferred taxes might occur and how income tax provision reported 
in firms’ financial statement might be informative about firms’ future tax payments (e.g., 
certain cash tax incentives can be serially correlated over time). 
Accounting for goodwill and intangibles assets is governed by FRS 10 Goodwill and Intangible 
Assets and IAS 38 Intangible Assets. FRS 10 requires that “positive purchased goodwill should 
be capitalised and classified as an asset on the balance sheet” (para 7). Goodwill and 
intangibles assets that are regarded as having limited useful economic lives should be amortised 
on a systematic basis over their useful economic lives. For goodwill and intangible assets that 
are regarded as having infinite useful economic lives, they are not permitted to be amortised 
but are subject to impairment tests at each balance-sheet date (FRS 10, para 15-17). By contrast, 
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IAS 38 forbids amortising goodwill but requires firms to perform impairment tests of goodwill 
annually42 (IAS 36, para. 96). 
According to section 8 Corporation Tax Act 2009 (CTA 2009)43, corporate tax reliefs are 
provided for goodwill and intangible assets acquired from an unrelated party. This implies that 
under CTA 2009, either the systematic amortisation or impairment of goodwill/intangible 
assets is normally allowable to reduce taxable income when the amortisation or impairment 
expenditure is recognised in financial statements. Alternatively, companies may elect to write 
down the goodwill for tax purpose at a fixed 4% per annum in which case the accounting 
methods for goodwill become irrelevant (CTA 2009, s871-s873)44. However, after 8 July 2015, 
tax deductions are no longer allowable for any goodwill in respect of amortisation or 
impairment expenditures, regardless of whether the goodwill is acquired from a related or an 
unrelated party or is created by the company45 (CTA 2009, s861A)46.  
Research and Development Costs 
SSAP 13 Accounting for Research and Development is consistent with IAS 38 Intangible 
Assets in distinguishing costs incurred during the research phase from costs incurred during the 
developing phase. Under SSAP 13 and IAS 38, research cost does not give rise to intangible 
assets. Instead, it should be recognised as an expense in the profit and loss account when it is 
incurred (IAS 38, para 54-56; SSAP 13, para 8). Under SSAP 13, entities have the accounting 
policy choice either to recognise the development cost as an expenditure and write it off to the 
profit and loss account when incurred, or to capitalise the development cost and carry it forward 
as an intangible asset on balance sheet if certain criteria are met47 (SSAP 13, para 25). IAS 38 
does not provide the accounting policy choice but requires entities to capitalise costs incurred 
 
42 IAS 38 distinguishes goodwill from other intangible assets in terms of measurements subsequent to acquisition. 
Intangible assets which are classified as having finite useful economic lives should be amortised over their lives, 
while intangible assets which are classified as having indefinite lives are not required to be amortised, instead, 
they should be assessed for impairment. However, the requirement of IAS 38 in terms of goodwill is different 
from that of the other intangible assets as IAS 38 does not allow goodwill to be amortised (IAS 38, para 85-111). 
43 Section 8 Corporate Tax Act 2009. 
44 Section 871-section 873 Corporate Tax Act 2009.  
45See https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/restriction-of-corporation-tax-relief-for-business-goodwill-
amortisation  
46 Section 861A Corporate Tax Act 2009.  
47 The criteria include: “1) there is a clearly defined project; 2) expenditure is separately identifiable; 3) the project 
is commercially viable; 4) the project is technically feasible; 5) project income is expected to outweigh cost; 6) 
and resources are available to complete the project” (SSAP 13, para 25). 
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in the development phase if certain criteria are met48 (IAS 38, para 57). Therefore, the primary 
difference between SSAP 13 and in IAS 38 in terms of research and development costs is that 
companies following IAS 38 are more likely to capitalise the development cost and recognise 
it as an intangible asset. 
The tax treatment of research and development expenditures follows their accounting treatment 
in terms of whether the expenditure is classified as a capital or a revenue expenditure (Telford 
and Oats 2014, pp.167). UK tax legislation provides 100% capital allowances for capital 
expenditure on research and development. That is, capital expenditure on research and 
development can be fully deductible for tax purpose during the accounting period when the 
expenditure is incurred (CAA 2001, s441)49. By comparison, the incurred revenue expenditure 
on research and development is eligible for enhanced tax reduction, depending on the size of 
the companies50 (CTA 2009, s1043-s1079)51. Once the development cost has been capitalised 
and recognised as an intangible asset, deferred taxes related to the capitalised cost may need to 
be provided when the carrying value of the intangible asset differs from its tax base.  
Software and Website Development Costs 
FRS 10 Goodwill and Intangible Assets requires the software development costs that are 
“directly attributable to bring a computer system or other computer-operated machinery into 
working condition” to be recognised as a tangible fixed asset rather than an intangible asset 
(para 2). UITF 29 Website Development Costs requires that the website development costs 
should be classified and recognised as a tangible fixed asset if they are expected to create 
enduring assets and generate future economic benefits (para 5-6). IAS 38 requires that the 
computer software cost should be treated as a tangible asset if it is ‘an integral part’ of the 
related hardware without which a computer-controlled machine tool cannot operate. When the 
software cost does not constitute ‘an integral part’ of the related hardware, it should be 
 
48 The criteria include: “1) the technical feasibility of completing the intangible asset; 2) its intention to complete 
the intangible asset and use or sell it; 3) its ability to use or sell the intangible asset; 4) the ability of the intangible 
asset to generate probable future economic benefits; 4) the availability of adequate technical, financial and other 
resources to complete the development and to use or sell the intangible asset; 5) the ability to measure reliably the 
development expenditure” (IAS 38, para 57). 
49 Section 441 Capital Allowance Act 2001. 
50 For SMEs, i.e., companies with less than 500 employees and either an annual turnover not exceeding €100m or 
a balance sheet total not exceeding €86m, 230% of qualifying R&D expenditure can be claimed for enhanced 
ductions. For large companies, 130% of qualifying R&D expenditure can be claimed.  
51 Section 1043-section 1079 Corporate Tax Act 2009.  
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recognised as an intangible asset (IAS 38, para 4). Under IAS 38, the website development cost 
falls into intangible regime if it is probable that the website development cost will generate 
future economic benefits and the cost can be reliably measured (IAS 38, para 21; SIC-32) 
When the software and website development costs are recognised as intangible assets, the tax 
treatment would generally follow the accounting treatment to provide tax relief on the 
amortisation and impairment expenses written off to the profit and loss account52 (HMRC 2017; 
CTA 2009, s181)53. When software and website development costs are classified as tangible 
fixed assets, depreciation calculated for accounting purpose will not be allowable for tax 
deductions, while plant and machinery capital allowance will be granted according to tax 
laws54(CTA 2009, s804)55 . However, managers can effectively choose between claiming 
capital allowances or amortisation on software and website development expenditures. The 
election, which is irrevocable, should be made within two years when the expenditures were 
incurred (CTA 2009, s815)56.  
2.3.3.2. Lease 
Operating Lease  
A lease is defined as “an agreement whereby the lessor conveys to the lessee in return for a 
payment or series of payments the right to use an asset for a specified period of time” (Telford 
and Oats 2014, pp. 193). Accounting methods for leases are governed by SSAP 21 Accounting 
for Leases and Hire Purchase Contracts; UITF Abstract 28 Operating Lease Incentives; and 
IAS 17 Leases57. A lease is classified as an ‘operating lease’ if the lessor retains the risk and 
reward identical to ownership of the underlying asset (SSAP 21, para 7; IAS 17, para 4). The 
rental payments under an operating lease should be written off over the lease term to the profit 
and loss accounts (SSAP 21, para 37-43; IAS 17, para 33-35).  
 
52 According to HMRC (2017), under the corporate intangible asset regime, “sums written off intangible fixed 
assets are usually deductible so long as their treatment is in accordance with GAAP”. See 
https://www.gov.uk/hmrc-internal-manuals/corporate-intangibles-research-and-development-manual/cird10115 
53 Section 181 Corporate Tax Act 2009.  
54See https://www.gov.uk/hmrc-internal-manuals/business-income-manual/bim35801  
and https://www.gov.uk/hmrc-internal-manuals/business-income-manual/bim35805 
55 Section 804 Corporate Tax Act 2009 
56 Section 815 Corporate Tax Act 2009 
57 IAS 17 will be superseded by IFRS 16 for periods beginning on or after 1 January 2019. For lessees, IFRS 16 
would no longer separately define an ‘operating’ lease and a ‘finance’ lease. 
Chapter 2 UK Accounting and Taxation Environment 
46 
 
The tax treatment of operating lease generally follows its accounting treatment, i.e., the lease 
rental payments are tax-deductible when they are charged to the profit and loss account58 
(HMRC 2017). In terms of operating lease incentives, UITF Abstract 28 requires that the lease 
incentives should be spread to the next rent review, while IAS 17 requires a lessee entity to 
treat the lease incentives as a reduction of lease expense and recognise the lease incentives over 
the lease term59 (UITF Abstract 28, para 14; SIC-15). Since the tax treatment of operating lease 
follows its accounting treatment, the different accounting methods of operating lease incentives 
may alter the amount and the timing of rental expenses recognised for tax purposes. 
Specifically, the switch from UK GAAP to IFRS may result in higher rental payments and 
therefore lower taxable profits over the earlier period of the lease (HMRC 2017; Ng 2009).  
Finance Lease 
A lease is classified as a ‘finance lease’ if the substantial risk and reward identical to ownership 
of the lease assets have been transferred to the lessee (IAS 17, para 4; SSAP 21, para 8). The 
classification of a lease as a finance lease or an operating lease should depend “on the substance 
of the transaction rather than the form” (IAS 17, para 10). SSAP 21 requires a lease to be 
classified as a finance lease “if the present value of the minimum lease payments, including any 
initial payment, amounts to substantially all (i.e., 90% or more) of the fair value of the leased 
asset” (SSAP 21, para 15). The initial accounting treatment of a finance lease is to capitalise 
the leased asset and recognise a lease liability to represent the obligation to pay future rentals 
in the lessees’ balance sheet (IAS 17, para 20; SSAP 21, para 32). Under a finance lease, an 
annual charge written off to the profit and loss account should equal to the depreciation of the 
lease-asset (i.e., the capital repayment) plus the interest payment (i.e., the finance cost). The 
depreciation of assets under finance lease must be consistent with the deprecation policy of 
firms’ other assets and the interest payment is dependent on the total rental payments and the 
carrying value of the lease-asset60 (IAS 17, para 31; SSAP 21, para 32).  
 
58 See https://www.gov.uk/hmrc-internal-manuals/business-leasing-manual/blm00510  
59 For example, a company is considering a 10-year operating lease with the first two years being rent free. The 
next rent review due at the end of Year 5. The annual rent is £10,000. Under SSAP 21, the free rent fees are spread 
over the period to the date of the review, i.e., over the first 5 years, resulting in an annual rental expense of £6,000 
(£10,000*3/5) over the first 5 years and £10,000 for the rest 5 years. Under IFRS 16, the free rental fees for the 
first two years should spread over the 10-year lease term, which will result in an annual rental expense of £8,000 
(£10,000*8/10). 
60 The interest rate used to calculate the interest payment should be the discount rate that “causes the aggregate 
present value of the minimum lease payments and the residual value to be equal to the fair value of the leased 
assets” (Telford and Oats 2014; pp 194). 
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In April 1991, the Statement of Practices SP3/91 confirmed that the finance-lease-induced 
depreciation and interest charge written off to the profit and loss account according to GAAP 
are allowable for tax deductions. The concept of long-funding assets was introduced in FA 
2006 Sch 861 and was applied to periods on or after 1 April 2006. Where a lease is classified as 
long-funding lease, i.e., a funding-lease62 with a life more than seven years, the lessee is 
entitled to capital allowance, and the related finance component of the rental payments can be 
deducted for tax purpose over the life of the lease. The lessors, on the other hand, need to 
include the finance element of the lease rental into their taxable income (FA 2006, s81)63. 
2.3.3.3. Financial Instrument 
A financial instrument is “any contract that gives rise to a financial asset of one entity and a 
financial liability or equity instrument of another entity” (IAS 32, para 11). In the UK, listed 
entities are mandatory to comply with IFRS (as embodied in IAS 39 Financial Instruments: 
Recognition and Measurement; IAS 32 Financial Instrument: Presentation; IFRS 7 Financial 
Instrument: Disclosures and IFRS 9 Financial Instruments) in dealing with financial 
instruments in their group account. FRS 26 Financial Instrument: Recognition and 
Measurement, which is aligned to IAS 39 in terms of accounting methods for financial 
instruments, applies to unlisted companies whose financial statements are prepared in 
accordance with fair value accounting rules (Telford and Oats 2014). Under IFRS 9 and FRS 
26, financial assets are classified into three categories, including financial assets measured at 
fair value through profit or loss; financial assets measured at fair value through other 
comprehensive income; and financial assets measured at amortised costs64. Financial liabilities 
are classified into two categories including financial liabilities carried at fair value through 
profit or loss and other financial liabilities measured at amortised cost (IFRS 9, para 4.1.1-4.2.1; 
FRS 26, para 9-12).  
 
61 Schedule 8 Financial Act 2006 
62 A funding lease is “a plant or machinery lease that meets one or more of the following: 1) the finance lease test, 
i.e., a lease is classified by GAAP as a finance lease; 2) the lease payments test, i.e., the present value of the 
minimum lease payment is 80% or more of the fair value of the assets; 3) the useful economic life test, i.e., the 
term of the lease is more than 65% of the remaining useful economic life of the asset” (CAA 2001, s 70K-70P). 
63 Section 81 Financial Act 2006.  
64 Held-for-trading financial assets are “initial recognised and subsequently measured at fair value with fair value 
changes recognised in profit and loss account”. Available-for-sale financial assets are “measured at fair value with 
fair value changes directly recognised in equity through the statement of changes in equity”. Loans and receivables 
and held-to-maturity assets “are measured at amortised cost” (IAS 39, para 46-47; FRS 26, para 9-21).  
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Under current UK tax law, the tax treatments of financial instruments normally fall within loan 
relationships rules (under CTA 2009, Part 5); non-lending money debts rules (treated as loan 
relationships under CTA 2009, Part 6)65; or derivative contracts (under CTA 2009, Part 7)66. 
The accounting treatments of financial instrument are therefore generally followed for tax 
purposes, given that the corporation tax treatments of loan relationships and derivative 
contracts are accounts-based under CTA 2009 part 5-7. In addition, UK tax legislation in 
respect of loan relationship and derivative contracts requires that the amounts recognised to 
determine taxable profits are not confined to those recognised in profit and loss accounts. 
Amounts that are recognised directly to equity or to reserves through ‘Statement of Total 
Recognised Gains and Losses’ or ‘Other Comprehensive Income’ should also be brought into 
account in the same way as if they were recognised to profit and loss account in determining 
taxable profits67. As a result, to the extent that financial instruments are measured at fair value, 
either with fair value changes recognised in profit and loss accounts or in other comprehensive 
income, these fair value movements should be accounted for tax purposes under current UK 
tax law68.  
2.3.3.4. Inventory 
Accounting methods for inventories are governed by SSAP 9 stock and long-term contracts 
and IAS 2 inventories. SSAP 9 defines inventories as “goods purchased for resale, consumable 
stores, raw materials, work in progress, long-term contract balances and finished goods” 
(SSAP 9, para 16). IAS 2 defines inventories as “assets held for sale in the ordinary course of 
business; in the process of production of such sake; or in the form of materials or supplies to 
be consumed in the production process or in the rendering of services” (IAS 2, para 6). Under 
SSAP 9 and IAS 2, inventories are initially measured at cost and subsequently measured at the 
 
65 CTA 2009 Part 6 brings the money debts that do not meet the definition of “loan relationship”, i.e., do not arise 
from a transaction for the lending of money, within the loan relationship regime. CAT 2009 s483 treats exchange 
gains or losses on currency holdings or liabilities within loan relationship regime (Telford and Oats 2014, pp. 228) 
66 See https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/accounting-standards-the-uk-tax-implications-of-new-uk-
gaap/frs-102-overview-paper-new  
67 Before 2005, UK tax law required "accruals" accounting to be followed on a realisation basis. Where a company 
used a mark-to-market method to account for financial instrument under which gains and losses are recognised 
into accounts by reference to a fair value at the end of each accounting period, UK tax law required to treat those 
gains and losses as they were accrued.  
See http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/practitioners/int_accounting.htm 
68 There are, however, certain exceptions where the tax legislation overrides accounting treatment. For example, 
CTA 2009 section 349 requires that the taxable profits should be calculated on an amortised cost basis if there is 
a loan relationship between connected parties. 
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lower of cost or net realisable value69. SSAP 9 allows to use the FIFO (i.e., first in first out), 
LIFO (i.e., last in first out) or weighted average price for valuation of inventories, but 
exceptionally points out that the LIFO method for stock valuation may lead to misstatements 
in financial statements. Where the LIFO method is adopted, directors must assure that the 
employment of this method enables the account to give a true and fair view (SSAP 9, para 37-
39). However, the LIFO method for stock valuation is prohibited by IAS 2 (IAS 12, para IN13).  
Under FA 1998, s42 and CTA 2009, s4670, the tax treatments of stock or inventories generally 
follow their GAAP accounting treatments71. As Freeney (2017) document, “any method of 
computing the value of stocks and work in progress which is recognised by the accountancy 
profession is an acceptable method of valuation for taxation purposes provided the method is 
consistently applied and does not conflict with taxing statutes as interpreted in the case 
law”72(pp 319). Consequently, the accounting methods of stock valuation can be relevant for 
tax purpose. When the inventory price is rising, the use of FIFO method will result in lower 
costs of goods sold and therefore higher accounting and taxable incomes as compared to those 
provided under the LIFO method and/or weighted average costing method.  
Provisions that reduce stocks from cost to net realisable value may need to be made on a 
justifiable basis considering the ages, the past and future movements and the estimated scrap 
value of the stocks (SSAP 9, para 16). When there are circumstances that costs of inventories 
incurred, i.e., resulting from deterioration, obsolescence or changes in demand, are not likely 
to be recovered from sufficient future revenue, the irrecoverable amount of costs should be 
directly charged to profit and loss account when the write-down occurs (IAS 2, para 6). For tax 
purpose, the general provisions against inventory values are not tax deductible. Instead, 
allowable provisions and write-downs should be estimated with sufficient accuracy, i.e., 
 
69 Costs include the costs of purchase (i.e., the purchase price, import duties, transport); cost of conversions (i.e., 
the direct overhead, direct labour, direct expense); production overheads and other costs (i.e., costs bring 
inventories to their present location and condition) (IAS 2, para 10-15; SSAP 9, para 17-20). The net realisable 
value is defined as the estimated selling price in the normal course of business, less costs to complete and sell 
(IAS 2, para 6; SSAP 9, para 5). 
70 Section 42 Financial Act 1998; Section 46 Corporate Tax Act 2009.  
71 There are some exceptions. First, if the stock is transferred to a connected party, in which case an arm’s length 
value should be used for tax purposes (CAT 2009, s166). Second, if the stock is taken for private use, the selling 
prices (i.e., the market value) should be used for tax purposes (CAT 2009, s157). HMRC does not permit LIFO 
for tax purposes (BIM33100). 
72 Similarly, HMCR states that “typically stock is measured for accounting purposes at the lower of cost and net 
realisable value and this is followed for tax purposes”. See: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/accounting-standards-the-uk-tax-implications-of-new-uk-gaap/frs-
102-overview-paper-income-tax-implications#inventories---stock  
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formulae (such as the age-related formulae) used to derive the provisions and the write-downs 
should “reflects a realistic appraisal of the future income from the particular category of stock 
and results in the stock being included at a reasonable estimate of its net realisable value” 
(HMRC 2013, BIM33145).  
2.3.3.5. Plant, Property and Equipment 
Accounting for plant, property and equipment is governed by FRS 15 Tangible Fixed Assets 
and IAS 16 Property, Plant and Equipment. Plant, property and equipment (PPE) should be 
recognised as an asset “when it is probable that economic benefits resulting from utilising the 
PPE will flow to the entity in the future and when its cost can be measured reliably” (FRS 15, 
para 20; IAS 16, para 7). Plant, property and equipment should be initially measured at cost73 
and subsequently measured using either the cost model or the revaluation model (FRS 15, para 
42; IAS 16, para 31). When the cost model is adopted, the carrying amount of the plant, 
property and equipment should be measured at cost less any accumulated amortisation and 
impairment losses. When the revaluation model is adopted, the carrying amount of the plant, 
property and equipment should be measured at fair value (the term “current value” is used 
under FRS 15) at the revaluation date less any subsequent accumulated depreciation and 
impairment losses (IAS 16, para 29-31; FRS 15, para 45-68). FRS 15 and IAS 16 require the 
revaluation of plant, property and equipment to be carried out on a regular basis74.  
UK tax legislations depart from the accounting standards by disallowing depreciations and 
revaluations of tangible assets but instead grant capital allowance on qualified capital assets75. 
Depreciation and revaluation with respect to plant, property and equipment therefore are 
typically not relevant for tax purposes; and changes in accounting treatments regarding 
 
73 FRS 15 and IFRS are similar in defining costs of plant, property and equipment. Costs is the amount of cash or 
cash equivalents paid to bring the asset into working condition for its intended use, which include not only the 
purchase price but also cost of preparation and clearance; cost of delivery and handling; installation cost and 
professional fees; and the estimated costs of dismantling and removing the asset and restoring the site (FRS 15, 
para 10; IAS 16, para 16-17). 
74 IAS 16 requires that revaluation should be carried out annually for property, plant and equipment that are 
significantly volatile in fair value. For property, plant and equipment with only insignificant changes in fair value, 
the revaluation can be conducted every three to five years (para 34). FRS 15 requires that a full valuation should 
be carried out at least every five years and an interim valuation in year 3 (para 45). 
75 The qualifying capital expenditure arising from a qualifying plant, property and machinery is entitled to capital 
allowances, with different type and rate of capital allowances available for different classes of plant, property and 
machinery, including the annual investment allowance (AIA), first year allowance (FYA), writing down 
allowance (WDA) and balancing allowance. Among the four types of capital allowance, AIA and FYA can only 
be claimed when the assets are purchased. FYA was largely replaced by AIA from 1 April 2008 (Miller et al. 
2017). 
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depreciation and revaluation of plant, property and equipment may not have significant tax 
impacts76. It is important to note that rather than claiming the full amount of the available 
capital allowance, a firm can choose to make reduced claim of capital allowance for the purpose 
of maximising its accounting loss for a specific accounting period, which may “influence both 
the immediate exposure to tax and the allowances available in subsequent accounting period” 
(Miller et al. 2017, pp 111). In addition, FRS 15 and IAS 23 permit the capitalisation of the 
borrowing costs as part of the asset cost if the borrowing costs are directly attributable to the 
“acquisition, construction or production of a qualifying asset” (FRS 15, para 22; IAS 23, para 
10). UK tax law provides tax reliefs to the capitalised borrowing costs on tangible fixed assets 
as if they were debit to the profit and loss accounts77 (Miller et al. 2017). 
Unlike capital expenditures, the tax treatment of revenue expenditures related to property, plant 
and machinery follows the timing and amount recognised in the profit and loss account (HMRC 
2013, BIM 31060). FRS 15 is different from IAS 16 in permitting renewals accounting on 
infrastructure assets, in which case the estimated annual expenditure arising from maintaining 
the operating capacity is treated as depreciation and charged to the profit and loss account (FRS 
15, para 98). Where the renewals accounting method is adopted, HMRC allows the estimated 
annual expenditure to be deductible for tax purpose on an on-going basis (HMRC 2013, BIM 
31065). IAS 16 prohibits the employment of the renewals accounting. 
2.3.3.6. Employee benefits 
Until the application of IAS 19 Employee Benefits, there was no general guidance on 
accounting methods for costs associated with employment in the UK. IAS 19 defines employee 
benefits as “all forms of consideration given by an entity in exchange for service rendered by 
employees or for the termination of employment” (para 8). Under IAS 19, employee benefits 
fall into four categories, including short-term employee benefits, post-employment benefits, 
other long-term employee benefits and termination benefits.  
 
76 However, accounting methods of property, plant and equipment in terms of depreciation and revaluation can be 
relevant for the timing and amount of the provided deferred taxes, since the difference between the book net 
written down value of a plant, property and machinery and its tax written down value can give rise to temporary 
differences between the tax base of the asset and its carrying amount.    
77 However, tax reliefs in respect of borrowing costs are only restricted to tangible fixed assets and projects rather 
than intangible assets and work in progresses. 
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Short-term employee benefits, such as paid absences and profit-sharing and bonus plans, are 
items expected to be settled wholly within twelve months after the end of the accounting year 
in which employees render their services (IAS 19, para 9). The expected costs related to short-
term employee benefits payable should be recognised as a liability and an expense in financial 
statements when employees are entitled to such benefits (IAS 19, para 11). For example, an 
entity should recognise the expected costs of paid absences (e.g., holiday pay or sick pay) when 
employees render their services that increase their entitlement to future paid absences, and 
should recognise the expected cost of profit-sharing and bonus payments when this entity has 
a present obligation to make such payments. For tax purposes, costs related to the short-term-
employee benefits are not allowed for tax deduction until the amounts are paid78 (CTA 2009, 
Part 20)79. In this case, timing difference (and therefore deferred tax assets) may arise because 
the liabilities in respect of employee benefits are accrued, but tax deductions are only allowed 
when the expected costs are paid in a later period.  
Post-employment benefits, such as pension schemes, can be classified as either the defined 
contribution plans or defined benefit plans (IAS 19, para 27). Under the defined contribution 
plan, amounts required to be recognised for an accounting period is limited to the agreed 
contributions payable to the scheme within that period (IAS 19, para 28). Under the defined 
benefit plan, amounts required to be recognised are dependent on actuarial assumptions about 
the pension costs and the fair value of the plan assets. Any actuarial risk that makes the pension 
cost more than expected or investment risk that reduces the value of the plan asset may cause 
an increase in entities’ obligation associated with the post-employment benefits (IAS 19, para 
30 and 56). Surpluses or deficiencies arising from differences between the fair value of the net 
assets of the pension scheme and the amount of the accrued liability to pay future pension costs 
should be measured and recorded at the end of each reporting period (IAS 12, para 58; Telford 
and Oats 2014). For tax purposes, the contribution payments to a pension scheme are revenue 
expenses allowable for tax deductions when the contribution is paid and if the payments are 
wholly and exclusively for business purposes (FA 2004, s196; CTA 2009, s1290)80. Deferred 
taxes therefore should be provided in accordance with the timing differences arising because 
the contributions charged in an accounting period are not tax deductible until a later period 
 
78 In order to be tax deductible, the amount of payments should be made with in the year, or within nine months 
after the end of the year (CTA 2009, Part 20). 
79 Part 20 Corporate Tax Act 2009. 
80 Section 196 Financial Act 2004; Section 1290 Financial Act 2009.  
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when they are actually paid. Movements associated with the net defined liability (asset) should 
be reflected in the adjustments of deferred taxes.  
Other long-term employee benefits such as sabbatical leave should be accounted for by 
accruing the costs when employees’ services are rendered (IAS 19, para 153). Termination 
benefits should be included as a liability and expenses when the entity is committed to 
terminate the employment before the retirement date or when an employee has accepted the 
offer of benefits in exchange for voluntary redundancy81 (IAS 19, para 159 and 165). The 
accounting figures of expenses charged in an accounting period are irrelevant for tax purposes, 
since tax reliefs are given on a paid basis rather than on accrued basis, which can give rise to 
timing differences and the corresponding deferred taxes. 
2.3.3.7. Investment Property 
Accounting for investment property is governed by SSAP 19 Accounting for Investment 
Properties and IAS 40 Investment Property. Investment property is defined as “a property that 
is held to earn rentals or for capital appreciation or both, rather than for use in the production 
or supply of good or for administrative purposes or for sale in the ordinary course of business” 
(IAS 40, para 7; SSAP 19, para 7). Under SSAP 19, investment property should be initially 
measured at the open market value with subsequent changes in value recognised in revaluation 
reserves (para 11-14). Investment properties are not subject to systematic annual depreciation 
charges as their disposal value is not expected to be materially reduced by “consumption, 
effluxion of time or obsolescence through technology or market changes”82 (SSAP 19, para 1 
and 10). IAS 40 requires investment properties to be initially measured at costs but allows 
entities to choose as their accounting policy either to subsequently measure investment 
properties at fair value or at costs (IAS 40, para 30). Gains and losses arising from movements 
of the fair value of investment properties is required to be recognised in profit and loss account 
when they occur (IAS 40, para 35). 
 
81 Termination benefits should be recognised in financial statements as a liability and expenses when there is no 
possibility to withdraw the offer of those benefits (IAS 19, para 165) 
82 Except properties held on lease which should be subject to systematic annual depreciations. 
Chapter 2 UK Accounting and Taxation Environment 
54 
 
Under current UK tax legislation, movements in fair value of investment properties are not 
taxable until the investment properties are disposed of with a chargeable gain83. However, 
deferred taxes may need to be provided in respect of changes in the fair value of investment 
properties when the carrying amount of the revalued properties are different from their tax base. 
Revenue rental incomes should be included in taxable income when the incomes are recognised 
in profit and loss accounts. Revenue rental expenses which are incurred wholly and exclusively 
for business purposes are allowed to be tax deductible84 (CTA 2009, s210)85.  
This section discusses the tax treatments of basic accounting issues that may arise in UK 
companies, including the tax treatments of intangible assets, lease, financial instrument, 
inventory, plant, property and equipment, employee benefits and investment property. The 
following table summarises the discussion of this section and concludes the key accounting 
events that might trigger the recognition of deferred taxes and annual cash tax deductions in 
companies’ financial statements. 
 
Table 2.4: Key Events that Trigger the Recognition of  
Deferred Taxes and Revenue Tax Deductions  
Goodwill The recognition of deferred taxes on the temporary differences that 
arises from the initial recognition of goodwill is exempted.  
However, any temporary differences between the carrying amount 
and the tax base of the goodwill arising after the initial recognition 
should be recognised as deferred taxes.   
 
The systematic amortisation or impairment of goodwill/intangible 
assets is normally allowable for tax purpose when it is recognised in 
financial statements. 
Research and 
Development 
Expenditure 
When the research and development expenditure is recognised as 
capital expenditure according to the relevant requirements, deferred 
taxes might occur if the carrying amount of the capital expenditure 
is different from its tax base (e.g., the annual accounting depreciation 
of the capital expenditure is different from its annual tax deduction).  
 
When the research and development expenditure is recognised as 
revenue expenditure, enhanced tax reduction depending on the size 
of the companies might occur. 
 
83 See: https://www.gov.uk/corporation-tax and https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/accounting-
standards-the-uk-tax-implications-of-new-uk-gaap/frs-102-overview-paper-new#investment-property  
84See:https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/652420/
Property_Rental_toolkit_17.pdf 
85 Section 210 Corporate tax Act 2009.  
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Software and 
Websites 
Development Costs 
When software and website development costs are classified as 
tangible fixed assets according to the relevant requirements , 
deferred taxes might occur if the carrying amount of the asset is 
different from its tax base (e.g., the accounting depreciation is 
different from the granted capital allowance for tax deductible 
purpose). 
 
When software and website development costs are classified as 
intangible assets, annual cash tax relief based on the annual 
amortisation and impairment expenses might occur. 
Operating Lease The annual lease rental payments are generally tax-deductible for the 
lessee. However, this will not trigger the recognition of deferred 
taxes on the lessee’s finanicla statements. 
Finance Lease Under the finance lease, the lessee is entitled to capital allowance if 
the lease asset is classified as long-funding lease. Therefore, deferred 
taxes might occur on the lessee’s financial statements if the carrying 
amount of the lease asset is different from its tax base.  
 
The relevant annual finance component of the rental payments can 
be deducted for tax purpose over the life of the lease. 
Financial Instrument Deferred taxes might occur when the financial instrument is revalued 
to fair value for accounting purpose, but the revaluation is not 
allowed for tax purpose. 
Inventory Deferred taxes might occur when the provision that reduce stocks 
from cost to net realisable value is not allowable for tax purpose. 
Plant Property and 
Equipment 
UK tax legislations depart from the accounting standards by 
disallowing depreciations and revaluations of tangible assets, but 
instead grant capital allowance on qualified capital assets Therefore, 
deferred taxes might occur if the carrying amount of the asset is 
different from its tax base. 
Employee Benefits Deferred tax assets might occur since the employee benefits should 
be recognised as a liability and an expense in financial statements 
when employees are entitled to such benefits, but they are not tax 
deductible until the expected costs are paid in a later period. 
Investment Property Deferred taxes might occur when the investment property is revalued 
to fair value for accounting purpose, but the revaluation is not 
allowed for tax purpose. 
 
2.4. Tax Information Reported in Income Tax Provision 
Corporate income tax disclosures in a firm’s financial statements are the key source for 
financial statements’ consumers, such as investors, analysts and creditors, to assess this firm’s 
income tax position. According to Graham et al. (2012), “one common misunderstanding is 
that the number reported as income tax expense is merely the cash tax paid” (pp. 415). 
However, a firm’s reported income tax expenses, which are prepared under the same 
Chapter 2 UK Accounting and Taxation Environment 
56 
 
accounting standard that governs the reporting of other economic transactions or events of this 
firm, rarely equals the cash tax incurred for a respective reporting year86. This section attempts 
to discuss components that cause the reported income tax expense of a firm to differ from its 
cash tax incurred for an accounting year, as well as their implications for future tax-related 
cash flows.  
As discussed in section 2.3.2, the income tax expense reported in the financial statements 
consists of both current and deferred taxes. Specifically, the current portion of taxes is intended 
to capture firms’ tax liability for the current reporting year, while the deferred portion of taxes 
is the taxable or deductible amount that will be payable or recoverable in a future period as a 
result of firms’ current transactions or events (Hanlon 2003; Graham et al. 2012; Telford and 
Oats 2014). Thus, one apparent reason that causes the income tax expense reported in financial 
statements for an accounting period to differ from the cash tax paid for the same period is the 
inclusion of deferred taxes in the income tax accounts. This is because deferred taxes are 
intended to represent a firm’s future or deferred tax consequences resulting from its current 
period’s transactions or events.  
However, even without deferred taxes, the remainder of the income tax expense (i.e., the 
current portion of income taxes) is hardly equal to cash tax incurred during a respective 
reporting year due to several reasons. First, because financial statements are usually prepared 
months before when the tax return is filed to tax authorities, current income taxes reported in 
financial statements are primarily based on managerial estimates of firms’ eventual tax return 
for the current reporting year87 (Hanlon 2003; Graham et al. 2012; Choudhary et al. 2016). 
Corporate taxes are paid in instalments in the UK. The total amount of the instalment payments 
is based on firms’ estimates of their corporation tax liability for the current accounting year, 
while each instalment payment is a quarter of the estimated total tax liability. For a twelve-
month accounting period, firms are required to make four equal annual instalments due on the 
“14th day of the seventh, tenth, thirteenth and sixteenth month after the start of the accounting 
 
86 Cash flow arising from income taxes during a period can be found in the statement of cash flows. The tax cash 
flow disclosed in the statement of cash flows is the net taxes paid during the current period, including actual tax 
paid based on the estimated current tax expenses; cash tax refunds upon tax return filed in previous periods; or 
additional taxes and interests required upon audits of tax returns of previous periods (Dyreng et al. 2008). 
87 According to HMRC, the deadline for a firm to fill tax return is 12 months after the end of the accounting period 
it covers. See https://www.gov.uk/company-tax-returns. 
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year”88 (Lewis and Pendrill 2004, pp 339). At the end of an accounting year, the difference 
between the current tax expense (i.e., the estimated tax payable for the current full accounting 
year) and the two instalments which have been paid during the year should be recognised as a 
liability, which represents the income tax accrued but not yet paid in respect of taxable profit 
for the current accounting period (Lewis and Pendrill 2004, pp. 339; Maas 2017).  
Second, due to the complex nature of corporate tax affairs and the prudent administrative 
approaches adopted by tax authorities, it could take more than one year for the eventual 
agreements on firms’ final tax liability for a respective reporting period. Current income taxes 
disclosed in firms’ financial statements therefore may contain unsettled estimates regarding 
firms’ previous periods’ tax outcomes, which will not show in the cash tax incurred until the 
tax authority makes the final decision (Wahab and Holland 2018).  
Third, even if there are no accrued or unsettled tax liabilities in respect of taxable profits for 
the current or previous accounting periods, the current income tax expense is not necessarily 
equal to the cash tax incurred, because some financial accounting standards could cause the 
current income tax expense to be over- or under-stated relative to the cash tax incurred during 
an accounting period (Hanlon 2003; Choudhary et al. 2016).  
For example, the current tax expense reported in a firm’s financial statements does not 
represent its total tax owed on all type of corporate activities and transactions for an accounting 
year. Instead, it only represents the portion of taxes on continuing activities. Although earnings 
from discontinued operations and extraordinary items affect the cash tax incurred for an 
accounting period, they are often reported net of income taxes separately below the continuing 
activities (Hanlon 2003; IAS 12, para 81h). As a result, the current tax expense can be under-
stated relative to cash tax incurred due to the fact that discontinued transactions and activities 
are reported net of income tax expenses. In addition, employee share options would normally 
be expensed for financial accounting purposes based on their fair value at the grant date (IAS 
12, para 68A). However, no tax deduction is available regarding the employee share option 
until the share option is exercised. Thus, there is a deductible temporary book-tax difference 
 
88 For example, for a firm with an accounting year end on 31th December, the due dates of the four instalment 
payments will be 14th July and 14th October during the accounting period, and 14th January and 14th April following 
the accounting period. The instalment payment rule was effective for accounting periods ending after 30 th June 
2002. Before the instalment payment rule was effective in UK, cash taxes are required to be paid within 9 months 
and one day after the end of the accounting period. See https://www.gov.uk/guidance/corporation-tax-paying-in-
instalments.  
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which requires firms to recognise a deferred tax asset at the time when the share option is 
expensed for financial accounting purposes. To the extent that the tax deduction (or estimated 
future tax deduction) with respect to the employee share option exceeds its related financial 
accounting expense, the excessive amount of the associated tax deduction should be recognised 
directly to equity rather than reducing current tax expense (IAS 12, para 68C). In this situation, 
the current tax expense will be overstated relative to the cash tax paid by the amount of the 
excessive tax deduction associated with employee stock option89. The financial-accounting-
standards induced differences between current tax expense and cash tax payments are not 
expected to have future cash tax implications because they are not intended to reflect firms’ 
ex-post cash tax outcomes (Choudhary et al. 2016).  
Following Hribar and Collins (2002) who define accrual as the difference between the income 
statement revenue or expense and the related cash flows, Choudhary et al. (2016) define the 
income tax accruals as the difference between the total income tax expense and the cash tax 
incurred for a respective accounting period. Based on the above discussion, it can be concluded 
that a firm’s income tax expense reported in financial statements for a financial reporting year 
rarely equals the cash tax incurred during the same reporting period. Income tax accruals, i.e., 
the differences between the income tax expense and the cash tax incurred, could arise because 
of 1) the inclusion of the deferred taxes in income tax expense which are intended to represent 
firms’ future tax consequences of their current period’s transactions or events; 2) the inclusions 
of income taxes accrued but not yet paid in respect of taxable profit for the current accounting 
period; 3) the inclusion of the unsettled tax liabilities in respect of previous periods’ tax 
outcomes in income tax expense; 4) the financial-accounting-standards induced differences 
between the current tax expenses and the cash tax paid. Therefore, income tax accruals are 
expected to have explanatory power about future tax cash flows which would occur when the 
deferred, accrued or unsettled taxes are settled/realised. The relationship between income tax 
provision, income tax accruals and cash tax paid can be illustrated from the following figure 
2.1. 
 
89 Besides discontinued operation, extraordinary items and employee stock option, tax effects of several other 
items are required or permitted to be credited or charged outside profit and loss accounts, i.e., either in other 
comprehensive income or directly in equity. Examples of such items includes 1) adjustments of retained earnings 
due to changes in accounting policy or the correction of an error; 2) exchange differences due to translation of the 
financial statements of a foreign operation; 3) revaluation of assets for tax purposes which is related to an 
accounting revaluation of an earlier period, or to one that is expected to be carried out in a future period (IAS 12, 
para 61A-65). Hanlon (2003) demonstrates that “these items are more technical in nature and are generally not 
as common or as large as the stock option deduction” (pp 843). 
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Similar with other accruals, the calculation of income tax accruals requires managerial 
estimation and subjects to managements’ discretion. Therefore, the ability of income tax 
provision to explain the realizability of future tax cash flows largely depends on the precision 
of estimated income tax accruals to reflect firms’ underlying tax obligations. Management’ 
estimation errors in the income tax accruals, either intentional or unintentional, could lead 
managers to revise the income tax account and adjust the cash tax payments in a future 
accounting period90, making the ex-ante estimated amount of income taxes reported in financial 
statements differ from the ex-post realisation of tax cash flows. Moreover, the financial-
accounting-standards induced differences between current tax expenses and cash tax paid are 
not expected to have future cash tax implications, thereby could obfuscate the ability of income 
tax accruals to explain future tax-related cash flows.  
 
Figure 2.1  
Relationship between Income Tax Provision, Income Tax Accruals and Cash Tax Paid 
 
 
90 Since the incurred instalment tax payments within an accounting year are based on the estimated corporate tax 
liabilities, it may be necessary to revise the estimates of firms’ tax liabilities and therefore adjusting the incurred 
instalment tax payments as the accounting period progresses, which could also result in additional tax payments 
or claim back during a future accounting period. 
See https://www.gov.uk/guidance/corporation-tax-paying-in-instalments#make-an-instalment-payment  
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2.5. Conclusion  
This chapter evaluates the UK accounting and taxation environment, with the aim of providing 
a systematic understanding of the background and institutional knowledge relevant in 
answering the research questions of this thesis. This chapter begins with an evaluation of 
financial accounting standards for UK listed entities and is followed by an overview of the tax 
accounting system in the UK. The final section of this chapter provides an insight into 
components inherent in income tax provision that cause the reported income tax expense to 
differ from the cash tax incurred for an accounting period, as well as their implications for 
explaining future tax cash flows. Based on the discussions in this chapter, it can be concluded 
that:  
First, the adoption of IFRS as the current financial reporting practices for UK listed companies 
is aimed to enhance the comparability and transparency of financial reporting information at 
an international level. However, the uneven implementation of IFRS and the principle-based 
and fair-value-orientated IFRS may curtail the benefits promised by IFRS and compromise the 
informativeness of accounting information reported in financial statements. 
Second, under current UK tax laws, corporate tax treatment relies heavily on entities’ 
accounting profit prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting practice.  
Third, accounting methods for deferred taxes have evolved dramatically in the UK from the 
partial to the full provision approach. The partial provision approach, which is based on 
managers’ projections about the expected reversals of the deferred taxes in the foreseeable 
future, can provide opportunities for managers to convey their private information about firms’ 
future tax consequences. However, it is criticised that the partial provision approach allows too 
much discretion for managers during the deferred tax provisioning process. By contrast, the 
full provision approach, whereby deferred tax liability is provided on all taxable timing (or 
temporary) differences, is likely to reduce the latitudes for opportunistic managerial behaviours 
via deferred tax provisioning, but may restrict managers’ ability to convey their private 
information about firms’ tax consequences in the foreseeable future. 
Fourthly, the tax treatments of certain accounting events might depart from their accounting 
treatments, which may trigger the recognition of deferred tax liabilities or assets representing 
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a firm’s future tax consequences resulting from its current period’s transactions or events. In 
addition, the revenue tax deductions of certain accounting events might be serially correlated 
overtime. For example, under UK tax legislation, the systematic annual amortisation or 
impairment expenditure of intangible assets are allowable for tax deductions over their useful 
lives. 
Finally, the reported income tax expense for an accounting period is rarely equal to the cash 
tax paid for the same accounting period. The difference between the income tax expense and 
the cash tax paid is defined as the income tax accruals. Income tax accruals consist of the 
deferred taxes; the income taxes accrued but not yet paid; the unsettled tax liabilities; and the 
financial-accounting-standards induced over- or under-statements of the current tax expense 
relative to the cash tax incurred. Therefore, income tax accruals should be representative about 
future cash tax consequences that would occur when the accrued or unsettled income taxes are 
realised or when the carrying amount of tax assets (liabilities) is recovered (settled). The 
calculation of income tax accruals requires managerial estimation and subjects to managements’ 
discretion. Both the intentional and unintentional estimation errors in income tax accruals can 
obfuscate the ability of income tax provision to reflect firms’ real tax obligation and 
compromise its informativeness to explain future tax-related cash flows. 
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3.1. Introduction  
This chapter aims to review previous literature that is relevant to the research topics of this 
thesis. This chapter begins with the section that reviews previous literature on corporate tax 
management, which includes discussing the definition of corporate tax management; 
evaluating theories related to corporate tax management; and assessing the determinative 
factors that cause variations in firms’ engagements in tax management activities. Reviewing 
previous literature about the definition, theories and determinations of corporate tax 
management aims to introduce the principle and concept of corporate tax management and 
provide a general understanding of the motivation and consequence of firms’ tax management 
behaviours. 
The subsequent section of this chapter reviews previous literature on the impact of corporate 
governance mechanism on corporate tax management behaviours. Corporate governance 
mechanism can be vital in explaining corporate tax management behaviours, since it represents 
how the decisions and actions made by managers are monitored to mitigate the conflicting 
interests between managers and firm owners. This section begins with an overview of the 
agency theory and is followed by reviewing previous evidence on how corporate governance 
mechanisms might affect managers’ incentives to engage in tax management activities.  
Previous value-relevance literature provides a theoretical and methodological foundation for 
justifying and developing the key topic of this thesis, i.e., the informativeness of income tax 
provision. Therefore, the following section of this chapter begins with discussing the 
theoretical foundation and methodology employed by the existing value-relevance accounting 
and taxation studies. This section further reviews previous studies relevant with the joint impact 
of corporate governance and corporate tax management on the informativeness of income tax 
provision, with the aim of showing the research gap that exists in the literature and interpreting 
this study’s research framework under the context of the existing literature. 
The final section concludes this chapter. 
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3.2. Corporate Tax Management 
This section reviews previous literature about the definition, theories and determinations of 
corporate tax management. The aim of this section is to introduce the principle and concept of 
corporate tax management and provide a general understanding of the benefits and costs of 
firms’ tax management behaviours. 
3.2.1. Definition of corporate tax management  
Corporate tax management is ‘a highly significant activity’ that forms the major source of the 
estimated corporate tax gap, i.e., the difference between the theoretical tax liability and the 
amount that HMRC collected91 (Wahab and Holland 2012, pp 111). There is no universally 
accepted definition of corporate tax management. Hoffman (1961) defines tax management as 
“tax payer’s capacity to arrange his financial activity in such a manner as to suffer a minimum 
expenditure for taxes” (pp 274). Tiley (2005) defines tax management as “what all sensible 
people do in order to reduce their tax liabilities” (pp 94). Those definitions of tax management 
are consistent with the legal facts of Helvering v. Gregory (1935), in which Judge Learned 
Hand wrote: “Anyone may so arrange his affairs that his taxes shall be as low as possible; he 
is not bound to choose that pattern which will best pay the Treasury; there is not even a 
patriotic duty to increase one's taxes”. Similarly, the judge Lord Tomlin stated in the case of 
IRC v. Duke of Westminster (1936) as: “Every man is entitled, if he can, to order his affairs so 
that the tax attaching under the appropriate Acts is less than it otherwise would be. If he 
succeeds in ordering them so as to secure this result, then, however unappreciative the 
Commissioners of Inland Revenue or his fellow tax-payers may be of his ingenuity, he cannot 
be compelled to pay an increased tax”.  
Under the above cases, corporate tax management refers to an activity that is undertaken by 
taxpayers to reduce their tax liabilities by means of legitimately arranging their financial and 
business affairs to take advantage of the available tax resources, including the utilisation of 
 
91 HMRC defines the theoretical tax liability as representing the tax that “would be paid if all individuals and 
companies complied with both the letter of the law and HMRC’s interpretation of the intention of parliament in 
setting law (i.e., the spirit of the laws)”. The tax gap in the U.K. for the year 2015/2016 was estimated to be £34 
billion (HMRC 2017). The corporate element of the tax gap accounts for 9%. In particular, £2.5 billion of the gap 
arises from tax avoidance, £4.9 billion from differences of opinion in the legal interpretation of tax law, and £4.4 
billion from tax evasion. 
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allowance, reliefs, deductions, exemptions and other tax concessions. Corporate tax 
management therefore is designed to reduce tax liabilities through effective managements of 
the business and financial affairs in such a way that statutory requirements of tax laws and tax 
accounting standards are accurately interpreted and applied; taxable consequences of business 
or transactions are anticipated and monitored; and tax audits, penalties and prosecutions are 
settled. According to Agrawal (2007), corporate tax planning can be perceived as the pivot that 
ensures the drawing up of the tax strategies and goals. Corporate tax management, on the other 
hand, is the revolving wheel that translates the tax strategies and goals into expected results92. 
Corporate tax management can be perceived as legitimate steps taken by taxpayers to reduce 
their tax burden, if it “involves no criminal activity, and no failure to make a required 
disclosure” (Devereux 2012, pp 3). However, this does not necessarily result in successfully 
achieving the objective of effectively managing tax liabilities93. A seemingly-legitimate tax 
planning strategy and its related tax management devices can be successfully challenged by tax 
authorities and become ineffective, if they are conducted to obtain tax benefits through taking 
advantages of ambiguities in tax laws or using dubious devices, in which case the statute is 
followed in strict words, but the true spirit of the statute is violated94 (Sikka 2010, Devereux 
2012). For example, the Supreme Court in McDowell & Co. v. CIT (1985) has observed that 
"tax planning may be legitimate provided it is within the framework of the law. Colourable 
devices cannot be part of tax planning and it is wrong to encourage or entertain the belief that 
it is honourable to avoid payment of tax by resorting to dubious methods”. Similarly, the 
OECD Guidelines highlight the importance of following both the letter and the spirit of tax 
laws, by stating that “it is important that enterprises contribute to the public finances of host 
countries by making timely payment of their tax liabilities. In particular, enterprises should 
comply with both the letter and spirit of the tax laws and regulations of the countries in which 
they operate. Complying with the spirit of the law means discerning and following the intention 
of the legislature” (OECD 2012, pp. 210). Thus, it can be concluded that in order to be legal 
and effective in managing corporate tax liabilities, transactions and management devices with 
respect to corporate tax management should be conducted correctly in both form and substance.  
 
92 Unless otherwise stated, this study will equally treat the terms “tax planning” and “tax management”. 
93 Devereux (2012) documents that HMRC has recently won cases against taxpayers’ tax planning strategies, even 
though the law in that area is unclear and other cases have been lost. He notes that the approach of the courts can 
vary over time, and in some cases courts at different level can make very different conclusions (pp 4).  
94 Weisbach (2002) argues that “viewing something as a right usually means that there is something profound or 
inviolate about it. But if the so-called right is based merely on language in the statute, nothing stops Congress 
from changing the language” (pp 221). 
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It is essential to distinguish between tax avoidance and tax evasion when understanding the 
concepts and the effectiveness of a firm’s tax management practices. In explaining the 
relationship between tax avoidance and tax evasion, Hoffman (1961) states that “tax avoidance 
is usually the ultimate goal to be achieved by tax planning. In this sense, the exercise of legal 
prerogatives may aid in the avoidance of taxes. Tax evasion, however, connotes the 
misrepresentation or omission of key financial information in an effort to evade the taxes that 
are largely enforceable. One is fraudulent and abhorrent to any decent and honest practitioner, 
and the other is completely acceptable” (pp 274-275). Killian and Kolitz (2007) document that 
“tax avoidance can be described as the avoidance, reduction or postponement of a taxpayer’s 
liability for tax by means that are legal and within the provisions of the law. In contrast, tax 
evasion can be described as an illegal, dishonest activity that entails the evasion of a taxpayer’s 
existing liability for tax on income, for example, either by the taxpayer not declaring the income 
or by claiming deductions against income to which he is not entitled” (pp 235). Similarly, Rego 
(2003) defines tax avoidance as any tax-management methods that are employed by taxpayers 
to reduce their income tax burdens legally. Definitions stated in Hoffman (1961), Killian and 
Kolitz (2004) and Rego (2003) imply that the key difference between tax avoidance and tax 
evasion, i.e., the two important components that constitute the tax management/planning 
continuum, is legality. In particular, the term ‘tax avoidance’ refers to working within the law 
to minimise tax liability in a way either intended or unintended by tax law or the government. 
Tax evasion, on the other hand, is a legal offence which involves criminal tax deduction 
activities such as underreporting revenues or concealing key financial information (Oats et al. 
2017).  
However, it can be disputed to perceive corporate tax avoidance as ‘completely acceptable’, as 
the line of demarcation between ‘acceptable’ and ‘unacceptable’ tax avoidance is ambiguous 
and blurred. Different reasonable people can have different points of views towards what 
constitutes ‘acceptable’ tax avoidance practice (Devereux 2012; Oats et al. 2017). According 
to ActionAid (2015), “tax planning rules, and opportunities to exploit them, may be very 
different in the context of different countries’ economies, tax regimes and revenue authorities. 
What is acceptable and unacceptable tax practice may vary accordingly” (pp. 13). Thus, 
although tax avoidance is described as a lawful activity to reduce corporate tax liabilities, what 
constitutes an ‘acceptable’ tax avoidance practice remains ambiguous and can be highly 
dependent on the courts’ interpretation and all the surrounding information (Oats 2005; 
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Devereux 2012. pp. 3) 95. As Sikka (2010) highlights, “some interpretations may appear as 
acceptable ‘avoidance’ but once challenged in the court can be classified as ‘evasion’” (pp 4). 
However, despite a lack of clear line between ‘acceptable’ and ‘unacceptable’ tax avoidance, 
both practices may have negative impacts on fiscal revenues, because they could both result in 
“a loss of tax revenues, impair the chance of realising the distributional or equity goal of 
taxation, and, if they become widespread, then more taxpayers may lose faith in the tax 
administration system and may be tempted to join the ranks of tax evader” (Spicer 1975, pp 
152; He and Li 1996, pp 38).  
In summary, corporate tax management/planning can be largely interpreted as managing to 
reduce a firm’s tax liabilities. Tax avoidance and tax evasion, as described above, constitute 
important components of the corporate tax management/planning continuum. Although tax 
avoidance is generally perceived as working within the law to reduce tax liability, the 
distinction between ‘acceptable’ and ‘unacceptable’ tax avoidance is often unclear, which 
makes it hard to clarify the difference between tax avoidance and tax evasion96. However, 
despite the lack of a clear line between ‘tax avoidance’ and ‘tax evasion’, both practices may 
exert negative effects on fiscal revenues and prevent the economic and social developments. 
Due to the difficulties in empirically investigating and determining the legality of firms’ tax 
practices, this study will not attempt to differentiate between tax avoidance and tax evasion 
when examining corporate tax management/planning behaviours 97 . The following figure 
illustrates the relationship between tax management, tax avoidance and tax evasion based on 
the above discussions. 
 
 
 
 
95To be specific, Devereux (2012) argues that “no basis for a right to tax plan other than statements made up out 
of thin air by a few judges using questionable theories of statutory interpretation. Congress can limit or expand 
the scope of the right to tax plan with the stroke of a pen. If it is desirable to restrict tax planning, it should be 
restricted notwithstanding that doing so would reduce the scope of allowable planning permitted under current 
law” (pp 222). 
96 According to Oats et al. (2017), tax avoidance can be subdivided into ‘acceptable’ and ‘unacceptable’ avoidance. 
Unacceptable tax avoidance and tax evasion can be grouped together and labelled as non-compliance (pp. 14). 
97 Unless otherwise stated, this study will equally treat the terms “tax planning” and “tax management”, and define 
tax planning/management broadly as all activities undertaken by companies to reduce their explicit taxes. 
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Figure 3.1: Relationship between Tax Management, Tax Avoidance and Tax Evasion 
 
 
   
  
 
3.2.2. Theories related to corporate tax management 
3.2.2.1. Scholes-Wolfson effective tax management paradigm 
Management strategies in all business and organisational activities involve achieving the 
fundamental goal of maximising firm value, through choosing a pattern of interrelated and 
multifaceted actions and decisions based upon firms’ specific strengths and weakness 
(Hambrick 1983; Miller 1987; Porter 2004). Consistent with this notion, the Scholes-Wolfson 
framework adopts a multilateral approach to explain the role of effective tax management in 
achieving the organisational goal, i.e., the maximisation of firms’ after-tax returns (Scholes et 
al. 1992; 2016). Scholes et al. (1992; 2016) document that the optimal scale for effective tax 
management should be achieved through a pattern of decisions and actions that consider three 
important themes, including the tax implications for all associated contracting parties; the 
importance of implicit taxes; and the impact of non-tax costs. Specifically, effective tax 
management “requires the tax planner to consider the tax implications of a proposed 
transaction for all of the parties to the transaction”; “requires the planner, in making 
investment and financing decisions, to consider not only explicit taxes but also implicit taxes”; 
and “requires the planner to recognize that taxes represent only one among many business 
costs, and all costs must be considered in the planning process” (Scholes et al. 2016, pp 19).  
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According to Shackelford et al. (2001), the three themes of Scholes-Wolfson framework (i.e., 
all parties, all taxes and all costs) provide a widely accepted analytical structure of corporate 
tax management, which can be used to explain the role of taxes in achieving organisational 
goals98 (pp 323). First, all contracting parties associated with tax management transactions 
should be taken into account. From a contractual perspective, all contracting parties could refer 
to employers, employees, shareholders, customers, suppliers, lenders and tax authorities. 
Effective tax management therefore involves trade-offs of the benefits and long-term goals 
regarding corporate tax activities required by all contracting parties (Scholes et al. 2016, pp 
22). Second, when making investment and financing decisions, effective tax management 
requires the consideration of not only the explicit taxes, i.e., the tax burden required to be paid 
to tax authorities, but also the implicit taxes that may take the form of tax-planning-induced 
reductions in firms’ pre-tax rate of return99. Third, effective tax management requires the 
consideration of the impacts of both tax and non-tax costs when making tax-related decisions. 
Tax just represents one among many business costs. Thus, effective tax management can be 
fundamentally different from tax minimisation activities, since tax minimisation activities may 
result in an increase in non-tax costs, such as management incentive costs100; fees paid to tax 
expertise to accomplish tax management activities; or penalties incurred when the tax 
management transactions are challenged by tax authorities. The increased non-tax costs may 
result in an overall reduction in firms’ after-tax wealth, if the expected benefits of the tax 
reduction activity are lower than its associated costs (Scholes et al. 2016, pp 142).   
In summary, the Scholes-Wolfson effective tax management framework implies that tax 
minimisation activities do not necessarily result in effective tax management. Instead, in 
making effective tax management decisions and achieving tax management goals, tax planners 
must organise a competitive and efficient tax management structure to consider the impacts of 
 
98 Shackelford et al. (2001) further point out that Scholes-Wolfson framework is less effective for rigorous tests 
as non-tax costs are difficult to quantify, which leads to difficulties in interpreting the results drawn from the 
framework. 
99  According to Scholes et al. (2016), due to market competition, lower explicit tax rates will lead to higher 
implicit taxes, which is reflected in the form of the differences between pre-tax returns on fully taxed investments 
and the pre-tax returns on partially or tax-exempt investments. For example, compared to fully taxable corporate 
bond with fully taxable interests, the tax-exempt municipal bond can have lower pre-tax rate of return due to the 
market competition which bids up its bond price and reduce its pre-tax rate of return.  
 
100 In addition, Scholes et al. (2016) document that as tax-related information is asymmetrically distributed among 
agents, tax management activities may involve information-related costs such as costs incurred to align managers’ 
performance with the owners’ interests. See section 1.3.3.2. for detailed discussions about direct and indirect costs 
associated with corporate tax management.   
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corporate tax management on all themes based on a multilateral perspective. The themes in the 
Scholes-Wolfson framework implicitly assume that if all contractual parties; the explicit and 
the implicit taxes; and the tax and non-tax costs are all considered and controlled within the tax 
management structure, it can be expected that the tax management activities are ‘rational and 
predictable’ in increasing firms’ after-tax net wealth (Shackelford et al. 2001, pp. 323).  
3.2.2.2. Cost and benefit trade-off theory 
By adapting Becker’s (1968) model of the economics of crime, Allingham and Sandmo (1972) 
developed a deterrence model to evaluate the choice of an individual taxpayer regarding 
whether and how much to avoid tax. In this model, taxpayers make decisions about avoiding 
tax to maximise their expected benefits in the similar manner as making any risky decisions or 
gambles (Slemrod 2007, pp 36). This model implies that the level of tax compliance of 
individual taxpayers is dependent on the amount of tax required to be paid; the probability of 
getting detected and penalised; the size of the penalties; and the level of taxpayers’ risk aversion 
(Hanlon et al. 2010). Many of those factors have been applied to the examination of corporate 
tax compliance from a cost-benefit perspective.  
On the one hand, corporate tax management has been perceived as an extension of tax-favoured 
activity that is designed to transfer wealth from the government to firm owners (Desai et al. 
2009; Kim et al. 2011). For example, Graham et al. (2006) argue that one common feature of 
tax management transactions is that “they effectively produce deductions that can be used to 
offset income or gains” (pp 569). Based on the view that corporate tax management is a tax-
favoured activity, previous studies provide empirical evidence that corporate tax management 
increases earnings per share which in turn increases market capitalisation (McGill and Outslay 
2004); serves as a substitute for debt-induced tax deductions thereby reducing leverage 
(DeAngelo and Masulis 1980; Graham et al.2006); and generates cash tax savings thereby 
increasing financial slack and reducing the covenant violation risk and the cost of debt (Lim 
2011; Edward et al. 2015).  
On the other hand, the benefits of corporate tax management can be offset by various costs 
associated with corporate tax management activities. In particular, costs associated with 
corporate tax management refer to cash outflows that are inevitably incurred to achieve tax 
management goals, including fees paid to external tax expertise for soliciting tax guidance; 
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salaries paid to in-house tax departments for maintaining tax-related records; tax and nontax 
costs incurred when tax management transactions are challenged by tax authorities (i.e., repaid 
taxes, hefty penalties, reputation damage costs and potentially more rigorous scrutiny from tax 
administrations in the future); or the implicit costs that may take the form of tax-management-
induced reduction in the reported book income101 (Mills 1998; Hansan et al. 2014). 
In summary, the cost and benefit trade-off theory, which perceives corporate tax management 
activity as a mere tax-saving device, implies that tax planners put emphasis on balancing 
between the benefits from corporate tax management and its associated costs when making tax-
management decisions. However, the cost and benefit trade-off theory only considers the 
impacts of ‘all costs’ and ‘all taxes’ inherent in the Scholes-Wolfson framework when 
evaluating corporate tax management behaviours, without addressing any agency dimensions 
through taking into account of the conflicting interests in the contractual relationship between 
managers and shareholders (i.e., ‘all parties’). 
3.2.2.3. Agency theory 
The view of corporate tax management as a mere tax-favoured activity overlooks an important 
characteristic of modern corporations, that is, the conflicting interests between managers and 
shareholders due to the separation of ownership and control (Kim et al. 2011). Jensen et al. 
(1976) define the agency relationship as a contract under which the principals (i.e., the 
shareholders) engage the agents (i.e., the managers) to act on their behalf through delegating 
some decision-making authority to the agents. Within the agency framework, agency problems 
could arise if the interests of the agents are not aligned with those of the principals, which may 
take the form of the managements’ attempts to pursue non-value-maximising behaviours, such 
as “on-the-job perks”, “shirking”, “perquisite consumption”, “rent extraction” or “making 
self-interested and entrenched decisions that reduce shareholder wealth” (Badertscher et al., 
2013, pp. 230; Ang et al. 2000, pp. 83).  
In order to mitigate the agency problems, it is essential for shareholders to take some initiatives 
to ensure the alignment of the managements’ and shareholders’ interests. Jensen et al. (1976) 
define the costs incurred by shareholders to take initiatives to mitigate the agency problems as 
 
101 See section 3.2.3.3. for detailed discussions about the direct and indirect costs arising from corporate tax 
management activities.  
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the agency costs. According to Jensen et al. (1976), agency costs include monitoring 
expenditures incurred by the principal (i.e., costs incurred to evaluate and control agents’ 
behaviors such as managerial incentive compensation, operating rules and budget restrictions); 
bonding costs incurred by the agents (i.e., pecuniary or non-pecuniary costs to ensure that the 
principals are compensated by the agents if the agents take actions that harm the principal); and 
the residual losses (i.e., costs incurred due to divergences between the decisions of agents and 
the decisions that would optimise principals’ wealth, given the optimal monitoring costs and 
bonding costs are incurred) (pp. 308). 
Through emphasising the interaction of corporate tax management and the agency tension 
between managers and shareholders in publicly-traded companies, Slemrod (2004), Chen and 
Chu (2005) and Crocker and Slemrod (2005) provide the theoretical foundation for examining 
corporate tax management from a principal-agent perspective. Chen and Chu (2005) argue that 
tax management behaviours conducted by a corporation can be more complicated than that of 
individuals, since the implementation of corporate tax strategies often involves multiple parties, 
including shareholders, stakeholders, managers, tax authorities and the general public. To the 
extent that risk-neutral shareholders delegate the authority of tax-related decision-making to a 
risk-averse manager, corporate tax management decisions will not only increase the risk of 
being challenged and penalised by tax authorities, but also alter the optimal compensation 
scheme offered to managers, leading to efficiency losses in controlling managers’ efforts102.  
Slemrod (2004) suggests that in publicly-traded companies, tax decisions are not made by 
shareholders directly but rather by their agents. Risk-neutral shareholders expect managers to 
make tax decisions on behalf of their benefits to reduce tax liabilities effectively and thereby 
maximising firms’ after-tax wealth, while the incentives of managers to engage in tax 
management depend on “the nature of the contractual relationship between the shareholders 
of a firm and the manager of the company’s tax affairs” (pp 12). Thus, shareholders need to 
use appropriate compensation and penalty contract to align managers’ incentives regarding 
corporate tax management with the interests of shareholders. Similarly, Crocker and Slemrod 
 
102 In particular, the efficiency losses in controlling firm managers is due to the illegal nature of many tax 
management strategies which entail future risks of being detected by tax authorities. The compensation contract 
of firm managers who conduct aggressive tax management activities should be contingent on the outcome of the 
tax management behaviours, i.e., managers should be compensated not only for their efforts in conducting tax 
management, but also for additional risks of being detected and penalised by tax authorities. Such compensation 
contract can lead to incomplete contract of management incentives since managers will be compensated no matter 
whether the tax management is successful or not.  
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(2005) study corporate tax management under the context of the contractual relationship 
between shareholders and firms’ tax executives who possess tax-related discretion in making 
decisions about whether to reduce corporate tax liability by legal approaches or through illegal 
tax evasion. They highlight the importance of the managerial incentive compensation contract 
in effective corporate tax management; and argue that the optimal incentive compensation 
contracts should tie tax managers’ salary to the achieved effective tax rate and impose non-
compliance penalties on tax managers, to encourage the reduction of firm’ effective tax burden 
and restrict illegal tax evasions (pp. 1594-1595). 
The agency perspective of corporate tax management in the above studies does not assume that 
corporate tax management is “in itself a reflection of the agency problems” (Hanlon et al. 2010, 
pp 138). Instead, these studies assume that the agency tension between managers and 
shareholders due to the separation of ownership and control could lead managers to implement 
corporate tax management in a way that is not desired by shareholders. For this reason, it is 
important for shareholders and boards of directors to provide effective compensation contract 
to align the incentives of managers with shareholders’ interests, in order to mitigate the agency 
tension between shareholders and managers and motivate managers to conduct tax 
management for the benefits of shareholders (Hanlon et al. 2010). Consistent with this notion, 
Armstrong et al. (2015) perceive corporate tax management as one of many investment 
opportunities available to managers, which entails varying degrees of uncertainty and risk 
regarding challenges and penalties by tax authorities. The unresolved agency problem due to 
information asymmetry between managers and shareholders could lead managers to adopt a 
tax strategy with the level of associated risk differing from what shareholders would expect. 
They find that corporate governance mechanism, which is measured by board independence, 
financial expertise on board and incentive-based managerial compensation, plays an important 
role in mitigating tax-induced agency problems by attenuating the extreme levels of tax 
management (i.e., both the over-investment and the under-investment in tax management 
which are not desired by shareholders). 
An alternative principal-agent perspective of the corporate tax management was proposed by 
Desai et al. (2006), which emphasises that corporate tax management activities and managerial 
rent diversion can be complementary. Specifically, corporate tax management activities can 
create tools, shields and opportunities to facilitate managerial opportunism and resource 
diversion, since corporate tax management often increases organisational and financial 
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reporting complexity to avoid providing a roadmap to tax authorities. To the extent that the 
organisational and financial complexity arising from tax management activities cannot be 
adequately communicated with shareholders and investors, information about firms’ tax 
management strategies will be asymmetrically distributed between the management and firm 
owners, leading to a less transparent corporate information environment which expands the 
scope for managers to divert corporate resources for their personal benefits103 (Desai et al. 2006; 
Balakrishnan et al. 2018).  
Desai et al.’s (2006) principal-agent perspective of corporate tax management underlies a 
number of empirical tax studies. For example, using a sample of 862 U.S. firms over the period 
1993-2001, Desai et al. (2009) find a positive association between corporate tax management 
(as measured by book-tax gap) and firm value (as measured by Tobin’s q), given there is a 
strong level of corporate governance mechanism (as measured by a high level of institutional 
ownership). However, for firm-years with weak corporate governance, the beneficial effects of 
tax management on firm value are not pronounced. Their results indicate that corporate 
governance acts as an important determinant in explaining the valuation of corporate tax 
management activities. Shareholders tend to perceive corporate tax management as conducted 
in a beneficial manner only when firms’ corporate governance mechanism is strong enough to 
restrict managerial opportunism in tax management, while poor corporate governance can 
cause shareholders to suspect the motivation of tax executives and discount the value of tax 
management. Wahab and Holland (2012) provide evidence that corporate tax management is 
negatively valuated by shareholders. Their findings are consistent with the agency cost 
perspective of corporate tax management that tax management transactions could increase the 
tax-related information asymmetry between shareholders and managers and facilitate 
managerial rent diversion at the expense of shareholders, leading to shareholders’ concern of 
moral hazard risk. However, inconsistent with Desai et al. (2009), the authors find that 
corporate governance mechanism does not play a significant role in affecting relationship 
between tax management and shareholders’ valuation.  
 
 
103 According to Scholes et al. (2016), the use of the complicated organisation structure to achieve tax management 
goals, such as joint venture or special-purpose entities, could create “serious conflicts of interests between parties, 
leading to forced trade-offs by tax planners” (pp 142). In addition, survey evidence in Henderson et al. (2005) 
shows that managers are reluctant to disclose tax-related risk management information to outside parties to avoid 
being detected by external scrutiny. 
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In summary, the principal-agent perspective of corporate tax management incorporates agency 
cost into the total costs of corporate tax management. The agency costs104 related to corporate 
tax management refer to the incremental costs incurred by shareholders to align the incentives 
of managers with shareholders’ interests and ensure that tax management activities are 
conducted in an effective manner to maximise the after-tax wealth of firm owners. 
3.2.3. Determinants of corporate tax management 
Understanding the determinants of corporate tax management is vital for understanding the 
wide variations in tax management behaviours across firms. As highlighted by Dyreng et al. 
(2008), there are significant variations in the extent to which firms are able to pay lower taxes 
relative to their pre-tax income, even among firms in the same industry. According to Weisbach 
(2002), it is puzzling that some firms engage in corporate tax management activities 
enthusiastically whereas others do not avail themselves of available tax management 
opportunities and forgo the potential benefits of corporate tax management. This section 
reviews relevant literature to provide insights into the determinative factors that cause 
variations in firms’ tax management behaviours.  
3.2.3.1. Objectives of corporate tax management 
Some studies define corporate tax management broadly as the ability of firms to reduce their 
tax liabilities. For example, Dyreng et al. (2008) define tax management as anything that 
reduces firms’ cash effective tax rate. Consistently, Hanlon et al. (2010) define tax management 
as the reduction of explicit taxes. Such definitions of corporate tax management implicitly 
assume that firms engage in tax management with the aim of reducing their tax burden to the 
lowest level. Firms engaging in tax minimisation activities might benefit from the reduced 
explicit tax burdens that would be paid to tax authorities. However, not all tax minimisation 
activities are effective in reducing a firm’s tax burden to a desirable minimum level (Phillips 
2003; Robinson et al. 2010). This is because “in a world of costly contracting, implementation 
of tax minimising strategies may introduce significant costs along non-tax dimensions” 
 
104  Basically, the costs incurred by shareholders in reducing agency problems include costs of incentive 
compensations to motivate managers to engage in tax management for the benefits shareholders, if shareholders 
view corporate tax management as a worthwhile (value-enhancing) activity; or costs associated with monitoring 
or regulation to moderate managers’ incentives to engage in tax management, if shareholders view tax 
management activities as associated with information asymmetry and managerial rent extraction (Desai et al. 2006; 
Hanlon et al. 2010).  
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(Scholes et al. 1992, pp 3). Therefore, the ultimate goal of effective tax management should be 
the optimisation of firms’ tax liabilities and the maximisation of firms’ after-tax net wealth, 
through considering not only the explicit taxes but also the implicit taxes and non-tax costs 
(Scholes et al. 2016).  
3.2.3.2. Benefits and motivation of corporate tax management 
The benefits of engaging in tax management activities can be straightforward, i.e., they reduce 
present and future taxes that would be levied, collected or withheld by tax authorities. 
Therefore, corporate tax management may benefit firm owners in the form of reduced tax 
liability, the increased after-tax net income and after-tax cash flows (Rego et al. 2012). For this 
reason, shareholders and boards of directors might be motivated to undertake a pattern of tax 
management actions that effectively balance the benefits of corporate tax management against 
its associated costs, with the primary aim of achieving the maximisation of firms’ after-tax net 
wealth (Scholes et al. 1992). 
3.2.3.2.1. Increased after-tax return 
In light of the Scholes-Wolfson framework of effective tax management, the ultimate objective 
of corporate tax management is the maximisation of firms’ after-tax returns through 
implementing tax strategies that are expected to generate incremental net benefits. Consistent 
with this notion, Koester (2011) documents that investors may view corporate tax management 
activities as ‘good stewards of firm resources’ that managers are capable of seeking 
opportunities to prevent the transfer of firm resources to the governments. They find that 
investors place a premium on firms that engage in tax management activities. Desai and Hines 
(2002) find that on average stock prices react positively to firms’ announcements of plans to 
expatriate, and the positive reaction of the stock price is more pronounced for highly levered 
firms who have sizable interest expenses assigned to foreign income source which reduce their 
ability to claim foreign tax credits 105 . Results in Desai and Hine (2002) suggest that 
shareholders perceive the changing of corporate residence from the U.S. to foreign tax 
jurisdictions as a tax-favoured activity which is designed to reduce firms’ overall tax liabilities 
 
105 According to Desai et al. (2002), U.S. tax laws require the allocation of general expense items between 
domestic income source and foreign income sources based on fractions of assets located inside and outside the 
U.S. Thereby, interest expenses allocated to foreign income sources will reduce the foreign tax credit that can be 
claimed due to the lowered magnitude of foreign income.  
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and enhance shareholder wealth, and positively value the increased ability of highly-levered 
firms to utilise interest tax shields as a result of their expatriation decisions.  
In examining the market valuation of the components of tax management, Amir et al. (1999) 
find that share prices respond positively to information contained in deferred taxes arising from 
losses carryforwards, suggesting that equity investors reward tax savings from deferral tax 
activities. In addition to deferral tax activities, investors may also positively valuate the 
permanent tax management activities, due to their ability to permanently reduce firms’ taxable 
income relative to pre-tax book income. Frank et al. (2009) argue that as there are areas of 
nonconformity between financial reporting standards and tax rules, firms are provided with 
opportunities to undertake aggressive financial and tax reporting activities during the same 
accounting period. They find a strong and positive association between aggressive tax reporting 
(measured as high-level of discretionary permanent book-tax difference) and aggressive 
financial reporting (measured as high-level of discretionary accrual), and that future abnormal 
stock return is positively associated with current tax-reporting aggressiveness in firms with 
high level of aggressive financial reporting. Their results indicate that the market overprices 
the permanent tax management activities undertaken by firms that are aggressive in financial 
reporting. Inconsistent with Scholes-Wolfson theoretical framework which demonstrates that 
the explicit tax benefits obtained from operating in low-tax jurisdictions may be offset by the 
non-tax costs and the implicit taxes in the form of lower pre-tax rate of return106, Bryant-
Kutcher et al. (2012) find that firms operating in foreign countries with lower foreign effective 
tax rates exhibit higher after-tax return and higher firm value as measured by Tobin’s q. Their 
results imply that the implicit tax or non-tax costs do not completely offset the explicit tax 
benefits obtained from operating in low-tax jurisdictions, since the market frictions and heavy 
transaction costs associated with foreign business operations may restrict the market 
competition of operating in low-tax countries.  
3.2.3.2.2. Increased cash flows 
Compared to benefits associated with after-tax returns due to reduced tax expense, the cash 
flow benefits of corporate tax management could arise in the form of the reduced cash tax 
 
106 According to Bryant-Kutcher et al. (2012), the implicit tax could arise from competitions among firms who 
operate in low tax countries to obtain explicit tax benefits, which drive up assets price and drive down pre-tax 
return. The non-tax costs refer to high transactional, transportation and communicational costs of operating 
business in low tax countries due to the lack of well-structured infrastructure. 
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payments. The increased cash flow benefits can be achieved by engaging in either the 
permanent-based or the deferral-based tax management strategies. To the extent that a firm 
engages in tax management through permanent-based tax management transactions, the after-
tax cash flow benefits may arise in the form of permanently reduced tax payments, if the tax 
management transactions are not challenged and overturned by tax authorities in the future. By 
comparison, to the extent that a firm engages in tax management through delaying the 
remittance of tax revenue to tax authority, the after-tax cash flow benefits may arise in the form 
of the deferment of tax payments, which can be perceived as being provided with an interest-
free loan from the tax authority over the deferral period (Davies et al. 1997).  
Graham et al. (2006) provide evidence that tax management departments in tax shelter firms 
use both permanent- and deferral-based tax sheltering transactions as tools to reduce firms’ tax 
burden in a given reporting year. They find that firms that are accused as tax shelters use less 
debt, since the cash flow benefits (i.e., annual deductions in cash tax payments) generated by 
tax shelters in their sample account for 9% of asset value on average, which are much higher 
than the interests tax deductions from issuing debt. Using a large sample of U.S. firms from 
1993-2010, Goh et al. (2016) find a negative association between corporate avoidance (as 
measured by higher level of book-tax difference, permanent book-tax difference and lower 
level of long-run cash ETR) and the cost of equity which is derived from firms’ current stock 
prices and analysts’ forecast of future earnings107. Specifically, they find that a one-standard-
deviation increase in their tax management measures averagely leads to a 13 to 26 basis points 
reduction in the cost of equity, suggesting that the cash ﬂow benefits associated with corporate 
tax management generally reduce the expected rate of return required by equity investors. This 
is consistent with Lim (2011) who uses a large sample of Korean firms and finds that the cost 
of debt is negatively associated with the level of corporate tax management, indicating that 
corporate tax management serves as a substitute for the use of debt because it increases 
financial slacks, reduces expected probability of bankruptcy and lowers firms’ default risks. 
Consistently, Edward et al. (2015) investigate the interrelationship between financial 
constraints and firm-specific tax management behaviours, and find that firms who experience 
financial constraints tend to rely more on internally generated cash savings via tax management 
activities, since it can be more costly and difficult for firms in financial distress to get access 
 
107 Goh et al.’s (2016) measure of cost of equity is based on the “discount rate that the market applies to a firm’s 
future cash flow to determine the current stock price” and the analysts’ expectations of future earnings are 
employed as a proxy for the market’s expectations of firms’ future cash flow (pp. 1653) 
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to external funds via the traditional debt and equity financing source. In addition, they find that 
cash tax savings from tax management activities in financial-distressed firms are primarily 
obtained through deferral-based tax strategies by accelerating tax deductions or delaying the 
remittance of tax revenue.  
3.2.3.2.3. Sustainable tax savings 
In addition to the increased after-tax return and cash flow benefits, firm owners may also prefer 
an effective tax management structure which can sustain tax savings generated from tax 
management activities for a long period of time, to enhance the after-tax firm value in the long 
run. Maintaining tax outcomes stable and sustainable can be a fundamental goal for tax 
departments. For instance, a survey of tax departments conducted by Tax Executive Institute 
suggests that the ability to avoid tax-related surprises is an important criterion to evaluate the 
performance and capability of tax executives (TEI 2005). KPMG LLP (2007) indicates that 
sustainable tax management is a long-term goal for many companies because financial analysts 
and investors perceive unexpected variations in a firm’s effective tax rate as a signal of poor 
tax management. Lev et al. (2004) suggest that firms are incentivised to manage their taxes 
through smoothing both current and future taxable income, to avoid variations in taxable 
income and thereby reducing the present value of income taxes108. Drake et al. (2017) provide 
empirical evidence that investors’ valuation of corporate tax management depends on the 
sustainability of the tax benefits associated with firms’ tax strategies. Using a large sample of 
U.S firms from 1992 to 2014, the authors find that firm value as measured by Tobin’s q is 
positively associated with corporate tax management which is measured by low-level of cash 
ETRs, but is negatively associated with tax uncertainty as measured by high-level of the 
standard deviation of annual cash ETRs. Their results suggest that investors prefer persistent 
corporate tax management strategies but discount tax benefits generated from the available tax 
management transactions which are less likely to be sustained in the future. Similarly, Edgeley 
and Holland (2018) provide interview evidence that tax managers view stable effective tax rate 
as competent and reflecting high-quality management, because they firmly believe that their 
shareholders are “looking for stable and sustainable after-tax earnings per share” (pp 18).  
 
108 According to Lev et al. (2004), “holding the average level over time of taxable income constant, the lower the 
volatility of taxable income, the lower the present value of income taxes” (pp 1069). 
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According to Hoffman (1961), it is important for tax planners to be aware that outcomes of 
corporate tax management strategies cannot be sustained in the long run unless the employed 
tax strategies are flexible, consistent and do not rely on ambiguities in tax law. Using a large 
sample of 2,077 U.S. firms, Dyreng et al. (2008) provide empirical evidence that a large subset 
of firms, i.e., approximately one-fourth of their sample firms, is able to sustain a relatively low 
level of tax payments over a ten-year period. Guenther et al. (2017) find that high effective tax 
rates are less persistent than low effective tax rates. Consistent with the argument stated in 
Hoffman (1961), Guenther et al. (2017) suggest that the persistence of low tax payments is 
more likely to be achieved through taking advantage of benign tax-favoured transactions in a 
consistent way, rather than engaging in temporary tax incentives that will reverse shortly or 
undertaking risky tax management activities that rely on ambiguities in tax law. 
3.2.3.3. Costs and constraints of corporate tax management 
Although corporate tax management may lead to increased after-tax return; increased after-tax 
cash flow; and sustainable tax savings for a long period of time, there can be various direct and 
indirect costs associated with corporate tax management which constrain firms from 
maximising their after-tax wealth through engaging in tax management activities. This is 
consistent with Scholes-Wolfson framework which highlights the importance of considering 
the implications of corporate tax management from perspectives of ‘all taxes’; ‘all costs’ and 
‘all parties’. As the process of corporate tax management may incur both direct and indirect 
costs, it is important for tax planners to weigh the expected benefits of tax management against 
its expected total costs, in order to achieve the fundamental goal of maximising firms’ after-
tax wealth. Various costs arising from corporate tax management activities may provide an 
explanation of the “under-sheltering puzzle” pointed out by Weisbach (2002) that not all firms 
are incentivised to minimise their tax liabilities through fully taking advantage of their available 
tax management opportunities (Wahab and Holland 2012).  
3.2.3.3.1. Direct tax-related costs  
Corporate tax management activities can impose significant direct costs on both firm owners 
and managers. Direct costs associated with corporate tax management refer to cash outflows 
that are inevitably incurred by firms to take advantage of their tax management opportunities. 
These costs include both the administrative costs and the compliance costs. The administrative 
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costs of corporate tax management are costs incurred to set up and maintain firms’ tax 
management activities, including the initial setup and implementing costs of tax management 
channels109 (Mills et al. 1998; Scholes et al. 2016); tax managers’ efforts and time spent on 
structuring and monitoring tax management activities110 (Kim et al. 2011; Armstrong et al. 
2012); salaries paid to employees of in-house tax departments for keeping tax-management-
related records (Mills et al. 1998; Slemrod and Yitzhaki 2002); and costs of collecting, 
documenting and communicating tax-management-related information across dispersed 
operational segments located in multiple tax jurisdictions (Gallemore et al. 2015). Besides 
administrative costs, firms may also bear compliance costs as part of the corporate tax 
management costs. A firm will subject to hefty penalties, back taxes and potentially heightened 
tax scrutiny by tax authorities in the future, once its tax management strategies are challenged 
and overturned by tax authorities or by the court using judicial doctrine (Slemrod et al. 2002; 
Guenther et al. 2017). Compliance costs also refer to tax-related fees paid for obtaining external 
assistance that facilitate the developments of tax management investment opportunities or the 
elimination of risk and uncertainty associated with tax management, such as fees paid to 
lawyers, tax expertise, accountant and other relevant parties (Slemrod 2004, pp 17). 
3.2.3.3.2. Indirect and nontax costs 
a. Agency cost (managerial incentive compensation) 
To the extent that corporate tax management is effective in increasing firm's after-tax 
return/cash flows and sustaining the tax benefits for a long period of time, shareholders may 
be motivated to encourage their managers to engage in tax management activities and maximise 
firms’ after-tax wealth. However, under the agency context where the ownership and control 
are separate and the management is delegated to act on behalf of shareholders, it is essential 
for shareholders and the boards of directors to take some initiatives to align the management’s 
incentives with shareholders’ interests, thereby ensuring that managers are willing to bear 
increased efforts and risks in undertaking tax management activities with the aim of 
maximising shareholders’ after-tax wealth (Slemrod 2006). Previous studies provide empirical 
 
109Examples of initial setup and implementing costs of tax management channels are costs arising from the 
constructions of complicated organizational structures such as joint ventures and special-purpose entities (Scholes 
et al. 2016). 
110 For example, Armstrong et al. (2012) identify the role of tax managers as responsible for compliance; providing 
expertise to advise firms’ senior executives; and actively pursuing and generating tax management investment 
opportunities.  
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evidence that various types of managerial incentive compensation, such as the after-tax 
performance-based measure or the equity-based compensation for top executives and tax 
directors, are used to pursue the alignment of managers’ incentives and shareholders’ interests 
in undertaking corporate tax management, based on the view that tax savings generated from 
managers’ tax management efforts are expected to increase with the level of incentive 
compensation. 
Newman (1989), Carnes and Guffey (2000) and Atwood et al. (1998) were among the first to 
examine firms’ choice of using after-tax accounting-based performance measure (e.g., after-tax 
earnings) to determine CEO bonus plans. These studies provide evidence that CEO after-tax 
compensation is positively associated with firms’ multinational status, size, capital intensity, 
and numbers of business units, indicating that firms with more tax management opportunities 
are more likely to reward their CEOs against the after-tax accounting-based performance 
measures. However, these studies provide no evidence on whether the use of after-tax 
performance measures leads to managements’ actions in effectively reducing corporate tax 
liabilities.  
Phillips (2003) investigates the usefulness of including after-tax accounting-based measures 
into managers’ compensation contracts in motivating the efforts of CEOs and business-unit 
managers to reduce explicit tax liabilities. Using the proprietary survey data to indicate whether 
a firm uses after-tax performance measures to compensate its CEOs and business-unit 
managers, the author finds that compensating business-unit managers against after-tax 
accounting-based performance measures leads to reduced tax liabilities and economically 
significant tax benefits, whereas compensating CEO using after-tax accounting-based 
performance measures has no significant impact on firms’ effective tax rates. The author 
interprets their results as highlighting the practical implications of the after-tax accounting-
based incentives on improving business-unit managers’ tax management efficiency. However, 
the after-tax accounting-based compensation only provides incremental motivation for 
business-units managers rather than for CEOs, suggesting that CEOs might be sufficiently 
motivated by other incentives such as job retention rather than by the annual after-tax 
accounting-based compensation. Armstrong et al. (2012) investigate the link between the 
incentive compensations of tax directors who are directly involved in firms’ tax decisions and 
the extent of firms’ tax management activities. They find that tax directors’ compensation is 
negatively associated with firms’ GAAP ETR while there is no evidence supporting that tax 
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directors’ compensation has an impact on firms’ Cash ETR or the level of firms’ tax 
aggressiveness111. Their results indicate that tax directors are provided with strong incentives 
to obtain the after-tax financial reporting benefits through reducing the level of tax expense 
reported in financial statements, but have little incentives to take effective actions in lowering 
firms’ cash tax burden112 . However, it is still unclear about the individual effects of top 
executives, i.e., CEO or CFO, on the process of corporate tax management.   
Based on the conjecture that CEOs and CFOs can exert pressure on firms’ tax departments 
thereby influencing the level of firms’ tax management activities, Rego et al. (2012) investigate 
the relationship between top executives’ equity risk incentives and the level of corporate tax 
management. They argue that corporate tax management is an activity which can induce tax-
saving benefits in the form of reduced tax liabilities while at the same time can also incur 
significant uncertainty and costs to both firms and top managers. Therefore, CEOs’ or CFOs’ 
equity risk incentives are expected to play a role in mitigating the “risk-related incentive 
problem between managers and shareholders”, by motivating top executives to undertake tax 
management activities that involve uncertainty but are expected to generate significant net 
benefits for firms’ shareholders (pp 782). Using four measures to proxy firms’ risky tax 
positions113 , Rego et al. (2012) find that equity risk incentives of top executives114 , which 
motivate top executives to make more risky financing and investing decisions, positively 
determine the level of corporate tax management. Similarly, Gaertner (2014) provides evidence 
that compensating CEO against the after-tax accounting-based performance measure results in 
lower ETRs115. In addition, the author finds that there is a positive association between CEOs’ 
cash compensation and the use of after-tax CEO incentives, indicating that CEOs are 
compensated for taking additional compensation risks because corporate income taxes can be 
affected by exogenous factors that are beyond managements’ control, and thereby the after-tax 
 
111 The level of firms’ tax aggressiveness in this study is measured using Frank et al.’s (2009) permanent book-
tax difference and Wilson’s (2009) tax-sheltering prediction score. 
112 Traditional agency theory indicates that compensation of the agents should be determined by performance 
measures that are controllable by the agent. In terms of the compensation contract for the tax director, Armstrong 
et al. (2012) interpret that “the GAAP ETR is relatively controllable by the tax director and can be measured with 
sufficient precision so as to make it valuable for contracting. In contrast, the firm's other tax attributes are either 
not sufficiently controllable by the tax director and/or are too noisy to be valuable for contracting” (pp 393-408). 
113 The four measures include Frank et al.’s (2009) discretionary permanent book-tax differences; Wilson’s (2009) 
tax shelter prediction score; the five-year Cash ETR and the level of unrecognised tax benefits (UTBs), 
114 Rego et al. (2013) define equity risk incentives as “reflecting how changes in stock return volatility affect 
managers’ wealth”. Managers’ equity risk incentives are measured as “changes in value of a manager’s stock 
option portfolio for a given change in stock volatility” (pp. 783). 
115 ETR in this study is measured by a firm’s annual total income tax expense divided by its pre-tax income. 
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incentive compensation of managers can be more uncertain and entail more risks than the pre-
tax compensation (pp. 1077-1078). Results in Rego et al. (2013) and Gaertner (2014) are in 
line with Dyreng et al. (2010) who find that individual top executives could influence the level 
of a firm’s tax planning by setting the ‘tone at the top’ with respect to the firm’s tax management 
strategies.  
Acknowledging that effective tax management can serve as a long-term investment which 
maintains tax benefits for a long period of time, some studies examine the impact of managerial 
incentive on the sustainability of firms’ tax strategies. Using a large sample of U.S. firms for 
the period 1996 to 2005, Minnick et al. (2010) provide evidence that the pay-performance 
sensitivity116 motivates CEOs and directors to reduce taxes in the long run. Specifically, they 
find that a one-unit increase in CEO (director) pay-performance-sensitivity leads to a 0.541%  
(0.337%) decrease in the five-year GAAP ETR and a 0.571% decrease in five-year cash ETR117, 
indicating that managerial incentive compensation motivates firm executives to engage in long-
run tax management. Brown et al. (2016) investigate whether and how managers’ bonus 
payments vary with their tax management efforts and find that board of directors tend to 
encourage their managers to engage in tax management activities (i.e., measured as low cash 
ETRs) by providing them with higher bonuses. However, the bonuses associated with managers’ 
tax management efforts are adjusted downwards if firms’ tax positions entail high uncertainty 
as proxied by high UTBs118. These results imply that boards tend to encourage their managers 
to engage in tax management activities but penalise those who avoid tax in an uncertain manner. 
This is in line with DeWaegenaere et al. (2015) who provide theoretical evidence that a proper 
compensation system should reward tax managers for reducing firms’ cash tax payment but 
penalise tax managers for increasing UTB. In this way, the effort-averse managers will be 
motivated to undertake effective tax-saving activities to increase firms’ net wealth, while at the 
same time managers will be disincentivised to undertake risky tax activities which may lead to 
high uncertainty regarding future detections and penalties by tax authorities. 
 
116 Minnick et al. (2010) measure pay-performance sensitivity based on stock holdings and option holdings of 
CEO and directors. The pay-performance sensitivity is defined as “the change of an executive's wealth (in 
thousand dollars) from his/her stock and option holdings given a 1% change in stock price” (pp.712). 
117 In this study, the director pay-performance-sensitivity is found to only affect GAAP ETRs. 
118 According to Brown et al. (2014), FIN No. 48 in U.S. requires managers to recognise a contingent liability 
(UTB) for uncertain tax positions regarding whether tax authorities will challenge and disallow the current tax 
benefits. Higher (lower) value of UTB reflects higher (lower) expected future tax-related cash outflows upon 
future audits by tax authorities. Therefore, UTBs provide boards and managers an explicit measure of ex ante 
uncertainty and risk related to current tax performance to contract upon.  
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In summary, risk-neutral shareholders can be motivated to pursue tax management 
opportunities as long as the expected incremental benefits of tax management exceed the 
associated incremental costs. However, as tax management activities can impose significant 
costs and risks to firms and managers, risk-averse managers may be disincentivised to engage 
in tax management (Hanlon et al. 2010). As a result, it is essential for shareholders to take some 
initiatives to ensure that managers are motivated to undertake value-enhancing tax management 
activities on behalf of shareholders’ benefits. According to previous literature, the initiatives 
could incur various types of agency costs, such as the increased bonus and the increased after-
tax-performance-based or equity-based compensation for top executives and tax directors. 
b. Agency costs (managerial opportunism)  
The agency relationship is defined as “a contract under which one or more persons (the 
principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some services on their behalf which 
involves delegating some decision-making authority to the agent” (Jensen et al. 1976, pp 308). 
Within the agency framework where the ownership and control are separate, agency problems 
could occur if managers, who are delegated to act on behalf of firm owners, opportunistically 
pursue their personal benefit instead of maximising the benefits of firm owners. According to 
Jensen et al.’s (1976) model of managerial rent extraction under the principal-agent perspective, 
managers tend to receive ‘declining marginal utility’ from extracting firm resources for their 
own interests until the marginal benefits of rent extraction equal to the marginal costs arising 
from risks of losing job or equity compensation. By comparison, shareholders set up 
monitoring mechanisms to control managers’ consumption of firm resource until the 
incremental monitoring costs exceed the benefits of reducing managerial rent extraction 
(Blaylock 2016). 
As discussed above in section 3.2.3.2., corporate tax management may benefit firms and 
shareholders in the form of increased after-tax return, increased cash flows and sustainable tax 
savings. However, Desai et al.’s (2006) principal-agent framework of corporate tax 
management implies that tax management activities conducted with the intention of avoiding 
detections by tax authorities could provide tools and shields for managers to extract firm 
resources at the expense of shareholders. This is because that the complexity, opacity and 
obfuscation associated with tax management transactions, which make firms’ tax management 
information less likely to be detected and challenged by tax authorities, could in turn increase 
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the information asymmetry between managers and shareholders and thereby increasing the 
latitudes for managerial opportunistic behaviours (Desai et al. 2006; Desai et al. 2009; Frank 
et al. 2009; Kim et al. 2011; Wahab and Holland 2012; Goh et al. 2016). In addition, the 
concealment or neutralisation of material tax issues and any accompanied obfuscation in firms’ 
reported financial information119 could prevent boards and shareholders from understanding 
firms’ underlying economic performance, which makes it more difficult to monitor and control 
managers’ opportunistic behaviours (Blaylock 2016; Edgley and Holland 2018).  
In this situation, corporate tax management and managerial rent diversion can be 
complementary, because of the complementary relationship between the obfuscation required 
by managers to ensure that the tax management information is kept secret from the tax authority 
and the obfuscation needed for managers to extract ﬁrm resources for their own benefits (Desai 
et al. 2006; Blaylock 2016). As discussed in the above section, to the extent that corporate tax 
management increases firms’ after-tax wealth, greater managerial incentive compensation 
designed to ensure that managers act on behalf of shareholders’ interests is expected to 
encourage managers to engage in a higher level of tax management. However, under Desai et 
al.’s (2006) framework, if corporate tax management and managerial rent diversion are 
complementary, high-powered incentive compensation that reduces managerial rent diversion 
through aligning managers’ interests with those of shareholders will constrain managers from 
engaging in tax management activities, since the reduced rent diversion is accompanied by the 
reduced tax management. In addition, the impact of high-powered incentive compensation on 
corporate tax management can be conditional upon the strength of corporate governance 
mechanism, since well-governed firms tend to exist less scope for reductions in managerial 
rent diversion and, accordingly, less offsetting reductions in corporate tax management as 
compared to their poorly-governed counterparts (Desai et al. 2006, pp 147). 
Consistent with the notion that corporate tax management and managerial rent diversion are 
complementary, previous studies provide evidence that corporate tax management facilitates 
 
119 For example, Desai et al. (2009) document that the complex tax shelter activities, such as Enron’s Project Steel, 
facilitate managers to opportunistically manufacture financial reporting income while prevent shareholders and 
other users of financial statements from understanding and detecting managers’ opportunistic behaviours. Desai 
(2005) argues that the complexity associated with Tyco’s tax planning activities centralise power at hands of top 
executives and provide top executives with tools and shields for managerial rent diversion by way of abusing 
compensation, inside trading and opportunistically exploiting corporate funds. 
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opportunistic managerial behaviours such as rent extraction; bad news hoarding120; and opaque 
financial reporting, thereby exacerbating the information asymmetry between managers and 
various stakeholders and diminishing the incremental benefits associated with tax management. 
For example, based on the notion that the organisational complexity and information opacity 
accompanies with corporate tax management could provide self-interested managers with 
covers and shields for extracting firm resources and concealing negative firm-specific 
information for extended periods, Kim et al. (2011) find that firms engaging in aggressive tax 
management (as measured by higher sheltering probabilities, lower long-run cash ETRs and 
large book-tax differences) are more likely to experience future stock price crash risk. Frank et 
al. (2009) find that aggressive tax management to manage taxable income downward is 
positively associated with aggressive financial reporting to manage book income upward for a 
particular accounting period, suggesting that financial reporting opacity facilitates 
expropriation in which case managers can disguise tax management as a value-enhancing 
activity. Similarly, Balakrishnan et al. (2018) find that firms engaging in aggressive tax 
management exhibit larger analysts’ forecast errors, greater analysts’ forecast dispersion and 
lower accruals quality, indicating that sophisticated tax management transactions could impair 
the quality of the reported financial information and increase the information asymmetry 
between managers and financial statements users.  
Although corporate tax management may lower firms’ default risk by way of increasing after-
tax cash flows; reducing leverage; and increasing financial slack, corporate tax management 
could engender uncertainty about the volatility and the magnitude of firms’ future cash flows, 
as it can increase the probability of detection and penalisation by tax authorities and exacerbate 
the information asymmetry between managers and stakeholders (Mills 1998; Graham et al. 
2006; Desai et al. 2006; Frank et al. 2009; Shevlin et al. 2013; Kim et al. 2011; Balakrishnan 
et al. 2018). Consistent with this argument, previous studies investigate how corporate tax 
management activities are perceived and evaluated by lenders/debtholders. Hasan et al. (2014) 
find that banks charge higher loan spreads to firms engaging in greater tax management. They 
find that the positive relationship between tax management and bank loan spread is primarily 
due to banks’ perception of corporate tax management as inducing higher agency costs (as 
 
120 The bad news hoarding activities refer to the managerial incentives to maintain a bad project for extended 
periods in order to earn the convex payoffs (Black and Liu 2007; Kim et al. 2011). Managers may keep the bad 
projects alive for extended periods if they withhold the project’s negative performance and make it difficult for 
shareholders to discriminate good from bad projects. Corporate tax management can facilitate the bad news 
hoarding activities because of the complexity and opacity involved with the tax management transactions. 
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measured by poor quality of corporate governance); higher information risk (as measured by 
higher discretionary accruals); and higher probability of being audited by tax authorities (as 
measured by high IRS audit probabilities). However, they find no evidence that the reduced 
leverage and improved financial slack arising from tax management exert impacts on the bank 
loan spread. This is consistent with Shevlin et al. (2013) who find that firms engaging in greater 
tax management exhibit higher offering yields of public bonds, suggesting that bondholders 
tend to value corporate tax management negatively.  
In light of the above discussion, the agency cost perspective of corporate tax management in 
terms of the complementary relationship between corporate tax management and managerial 
rent diversion could offer some explanations of the under-sheltering puzzle that not all firms 
engage in tax management activity enthusiastically (Desai et al. 2009). Managers can be 
reluctant to provide detailed disclosures about their firms’ tax management strategies, in order 
to avoid providing a roadmap to tax authorities and outside auditors. As a result, the 
sophisticated and complex tax management activities may lead to severe opacity and 
obfuscation in financial reporting, which can provide self-interested managers with tools, 
masks and opportunities to extract firm resources at the expense of shareholders, debtholders 
and other stakeholders. Shareholders and other stakeholders therefore may become suspicious 
about the motivation and the consequence of corporate tax management, which in turn, 
moderate managers’ incentives to undertake tax management activities (Desai et al. 2006).  
c. Reputational costs  
Reputational costs are often conjectured as an important restrictive factor that constrains firms 
from engaging in tax management activities, especially the most aggressive form of tax 
management activities (Gallemore et al. 2014; Graham et al. 2013). Bankman (2004) suggests 
that firms who engage in aggressive tax management activities may be labelled a “poor 
corporate citizen” and, thus, bearing significant reputational damage and political costs. As 
demonstrated by Financial Secretary to the Treasury David Gauke, “entering into a tax 
planning scheme can be complex, expensive and cause extensive reputational damage for the 
companies involved”121. Reputational costs are perceived as relating to public visibility and 
political costs (Gallemore et al. 2014; Dyreng et al. 2016). This is consistent with Zimmerman 
 
121 See https://www.gov.uk/government/news/hmrc-defeats-three-more-corporate-avoidance-schemes 
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(1983) who employs firm size as a proxy for public visibility and political cost. They find that 
firms’ effective tax rates are positively associated with firm size, which suggests that corporate 
tax strategies can be partially dependent on public visibility, because it might be less likely for 
firms which are highly sensitive to political costs and reputational damage to engage in tax 
reduction activities. 
In order to examine whether firms bear reputational damage if their involvements in aggressive 
tax management are revealed to the public, Hanlon et al. (2009) use event study tests to 
investigate the stock price reaction to news about firms’ involvements in aggressive tax 
management. They find that there is a decline in firms’ stock price following the public 
revelation of firms’ involvements in tax shelter activities, suggesting that the market 
participants react negatively to aggressive tax management. The authors carefully note that 
reputational damage can only be one of many possible determinants of the negative market 
reactions towards aggressive tax management. By contrast, Gallemore et al. (2014) perceive 
reputation as a multifaceted construct resulting from impressions of multiple interested parties. 
Therefore, instead of only focusing on the reputational effects exerted by equity investors 
towards aggressive tax management, Gallemore et al. (2014) examine whether tax shelter firms 
and their managers bear negative reputational effects from equity investors, customers and tax 
authorities. Consistent with Hanlon et al. (2009), they find that there is a decline in stock price 
following the public revelation of firms’ engagement in aggressive tax management. However, 
the negative market reaction towards aggressive tax management is temporary which reverses 
back within 30 days. In addition, they find no significant changes in firms’ sales; advertising 
expense; level of effective tax rates; and turnover of CFOs, CEOs or auditors following the 
public revelation of aggressive tax management, which suggests that tax shelter firms and their 
executives do not face significant negative reputational concerns from equity investors, 
customers and tax authorities.  
One limitation in Hanlon et al. (2009) and Gallemore et al. (2014) is that the use of a sample 
of tax shelter firms to investigate the reputational effects from tax management cannot provide 
evidence about whether the ex-ante reputational concerns constrain firms from engaging in tax 
management. In other words, it is unclear whether managers’ reputational concern is a 
determinative factor to explain the “under-sheltering puzzle”, if investigating the reputational 
effects on corporate tax behaviours using a sample of firms that have been accused as tax 
shelters (Graham et al. 2014). In order to solve the limitations of using archival data in 
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examining the reputational influences on managers’ motivation for tax management, Graham 
et al. (2014) survey nearly 600 tax executives and find that 69% of them agree that the potential 
reputational damage is an important restrictive factor when deciding whether or not to engage 
in tax management activities. In addition, they ﬁnd that firms which are publicly listed; large 
in size; more profitable; and in the retail industry are signiﬁcantly more concerned about the 
negative reputation effects from engaging in tax management. However, although survey-
based approach has the advantage of gaining direct insights into the impacts of reputational 
concerns on managers’ incentives for tax management, it naturally subjects to the limitation 
that managers may be reluctant to reply to the survey questions truthfully (Lietz 2013).  
In summary, as reputation is a multifaceted construct which is difficult to be observed and 
measured with accuracy, the impacts of reputational concerns on corporate tax management 
decisions are empirically inconclusive. The extent to which reputational concerns restrain a 
firm from engaging in tax management activities can vary considerably depending on firm-
specific characteristics, the nature of firms’ business and the attitudes of tax executives. 
d. Financial reporting cost 
Shackelford and Shevlin (2001) define financial reporting costs as “those costs related to 
reporting lower income or shareholders’ equity” (pp. 326). Under UK tax legislation, corporate 
taxable profit relies heavily on the reported accounting profit which is calculated in accordance 
with the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). That is, the starting point of 
computing taxable income is the accounting profit reported in individual legal entity’s financial 
statements, and then certain adjustments will be needed in accordance to requirements in tax 
laws (e.g., adding back depreciation or deducting capital allowance) (HMRC 2017).  
 In areas where tax laws do not explicitly require adjustments (i.e., book-tax conformity), 
incomes are recognised in the same manner for both book and tax purposes, thereby the amount 
of taxable income would be dependent on the adopted accounting methods. In this situation, it 
can be difficult for a firm to reduce or defer tax payments (increase or accelerate book income) 
without reducing or deferring book income (increasing or accelerating tax payments) (Guenther 
et al. 1997). Therefore, in areas of book-tax conformity, the tax management incentives to 
minimise the reported taxable income could lead to financial reporting costs in terms of the 
reduced financial reporting income, which can adversely affect financial contracts with various 
Chapter 3 Literature Review and Theoretical Framework 
91 
 
stakeholders (e.g., creditors, lenders, customers, suppliers and managers), because many 
financial contracts use book income numbers to outline the term of trade (Shackelford and 
Shevlin 2001, pp. 326). More important, publicly-held firms which rely heavily on the capital 
market to raise investment funds can face great financial reporting pressure of signalling high 
financial income and competent managerial performance to the capital market. Therefore, the 
engagements in book-tax-conforming tax management strategies which reduce both book 
income and tax liability can make public firms bear additional costs of being undervalued by 
equity investors (Klassen 1997).  
By contrast, in areas where the tax legislation requires adjustments in calculating taxable 
income (i.e., book-tax nonconformity)122, transactions are accounted for differently for tax and 
accounting purposes and, hence, the accounting methods adopted for financial reporting 
purposes become irrelevant for the computation of taxable profit. Therefore, in areas of book-
tax nonconformity, managers are provided with opportunities to report higher book income and 
lower taxable income for the same reporting period (Frank et al. 2009). However, reporting 
large positive book-tax differences can be a “red flag” which attracts heightened scrutiny from 
tax authorities, external auditors, financial analysts and investors (Mills and Newberry 2001; 
Phillips et al. 2003; Erickson et al. 2004). For example, Hanlon (2005) provides evidence that 
large positive book-tax differences are negatively associated with the market’s expectation of 
firms’ future earnings persistence, suggesting that equity investors tend to perceive large 
positive book-tax difference as a signal of poor earnings quality thereby reducing their 
expectations about firms’ future earnings persistence. 
Thus, financial reporting considerations might restrict firms from undertaking tax management 
activities, since managerial incentives to minimise taxable income could lead to financial 
reporting costs in the form of reduced book income reported in financial statements or 
heightened scrutiny and reputational damage as a result of large positive book-tax differences. 
Effective tax management therefore requires tax planners to balance the conflicts between the 
objective of financial reporting to report a higher book income and the objective of tax 
management to report a lower taxable income (Scholes et al. 1992; Shackleford and Shevlin 
2001).  
 
122 See page 19-21 for detailed discussion about book-tax nonconformity.  
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e. Earnings management  
Previous studies provide evidence that managers have strong incentives to meet particular 
‘target’ earnings figures, such as avoiding the reports of decreased or negative earnings or 
avoiding failing to meet or beat analysts’ earnings forecasts. For instance, Hayn (1995) and 
Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) provide evidence about earnings management by showing an 
unusually high frequency of zero or small-increased earnings and an unusually low frequency 
of slightly-decreased earnings. Barth et al. (1999) find that firms sustaining earnings increases 
for a continual period tend to have greater price-earnings multiples than other firms that are 
unable to maintain steady earnings increases, indicating that market rewards firms that exhibit 
continual positive changes in earnings. Brown and Caylor (2005) document that managers tend 
to shift their emphases from avoiding the reports of negative or decreased earnings to meeting 
or beating analysts’ earnings forecasts, because firms that successfully meet or beat analysts’ 
expectations of earnings are found to be valued more by equity investors as compared to firms 
that avoid reporting losses or earnings decreases. In addition, a number of studies provide 
evidence that firms close to their covenants (e.g., dividend covenants and debt covenants) make 
income-increasing accounting changes (Healy and Palepu 1990; Sweeney 1994).  
Since income tax expense is substantial for a broad set of firms, managers may be incentivised 
to opportunistically manage the income tax provision for the purposes of improving firms’ 
after-tax earnings and achieving a particular earnings benchmark, when firms’ pre-tax earnings 
fail to achieve the benchmark. The complexity of computing income tax expense and the 
managerial judgements allowed in estimating tax implications of firms’ operations likely 
exacerbate the information asymmetry between managers and financial statement users, which 
provides necessary conditions for managers to achieve earnings targets through deliberately 
manipulating the income tax provision. For example, Dhaliwal et al. (2004) argue that 
managing income tax provision provides a final chance for achieving the expected earnings 
target, since the income tax account is one of the last accounts finalised before earnings are 
released123. They find that firms decrease their annual effective tax rate from the third to the 
fourth quarter, when their earnings would have missed analysts’ consensus forecasts in the 
absence of tax expense management. Cook et al. (2008) extend Dhaliwal et al. (2004) by 
investigating the extent to which changes in effective tax rates from the third to the fourth 
 
123 Dhaliwal et al. (2004) suggest that income tax account is one of the last accounts closed after the agreements 
of any pre-tax adjustments, since changes in pre-tax accounts will affect the tax accounts. 
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quarter is associated with investments in tax management (as proxied by the level of tax fees 
paid to auditors). They find that for firms which have achieved analysts’ earnings forecasts, 
there is no significant association between third-to-fourth-quarter changes in ETRs and tax fees 
paid to auditors. However, for firms that would have fallen short of consensus earnings 
forecasts in the absence of tax expense management, greater amount of tax fees paid to auditors 
results in larger reductions in ETR from the third to the fourth quarter. Results in Dhaliwal et 
al. (2004) and Cook et al. (2008) provide evidence that income tax accounts are regularly used 
by managers to alter the after-tax earnings. 
Gordon and Joos (2004) and Holland and Jackson (2004) provide U.K. evidence to show that 
managers use discretions and flexibility allowed in computing deferred taxes for the purpose 
of altering reported information in financial statements and meeting ‘target’ earnings figures. 
During the sample period under review in the two studies, U.K firms were required to provide 
deferred taxes under the partial provision method, i.e., deferred tax liabilities or assets should 
only be recognised in the financial accounts if they are expected to reverse in the foreseeable 
future (3-5 years ahead) without being replaced. Under the partial provision method for 
deferred taxes, managers are provided with discretions and flexibility in determining the 
required amount of recognised or unrecognised deferred taxes, since they must use their private 
information to forecast firms’ future tax events. In particular, Gordon and Joos (2004) argue 
that given a total amount of deferred taxes, firms can reduce their total liability and increase 
their after-tax earnings and shareholders’ equity by increasing (decreasing) the amount of 
unrecognised deferred tax liabilities (assets). They find that the amount of unrecognised 
deferred tax liability is significantly and positively associated with leverage ratio after 
controlling for firm-specific operational factors, indicating that deferred tax balances are used 
by managers to opportunistically influence indicators of leverage to relax firms’ debt covenant 
constraints. Holland and Jackson (2004) find that the under- (over-) provision of deferred taxes 
is positively (negatively) associated with firms’ leverage and the upward adjustments of the 
prior-year tax charge, but is negatively (positively) associated with firms’ profit status, 
indicating that deferred tax accounts are deliberately used by managers to influence the level 
of firms’ leverage; to absorb tax shocks in the form of prior year adjustments and to smooth 
profits.  
Besides the aggregated income tax accounts and deferred taxes, several studies focus on 
investigating whether firms manage earnings through exploiting discretion inherent in specific 
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tax accounts, including the permanently reinvested foreign earnings; the tax losses; and the 
value allowances for deferred tax assets. Specifically, Krull (2004) documents that the 
computation of the permanently reinvested foreign earnings requires managers to exercise 
discretion and judgements in determining the timing and amount of the repatriations of foreign 
earnings. Thus, managers are provided with opportunities for earnings management via 
deferring (accelerating) the recognition of income tax expense in financial statements by 
increasing (reducing) the amount of foreign earnings designated as permanently reinvested 
abroad. Krull (2004) finds that firms designate more foreign earnings as permanently 
reinvested abroad when their earnings in the absence of tax-induced earnings management 
would fall short of analysts’ expectations, suggesting that managers exploit discretion in 
reporting permanently reinvested foreign earnings to beat analysts’ earnings expectations124. 
However, she finds no evidence that firms designate less foreign earnings as permanently 
reinvested abroad when their earnings in the absence of earnings management exceed analysts’ 
forecasts, implying that the permanently reinvested earnings designation is not used to smooth 
earnings.  
Maydew (1997) provides evidence on earnings management through intertemporally shifting 
income to magnify the net operating loss (NOL) carrybacks. He finds that after the reduction 
of tax rates as a result of U.S. Tax Reform Act of 1986, firms with tax losses carrybacks defer 
the recognition of year-end operating income and recognise more nonrecurring losses during 
the NOL year to maximise their tax refunds from pre-1986 high-tax-rate years. However, since 
magnifying current tax losses would reduce the available investment tax credits and increase 
the probability of violating debt covenants125, firms with large amount of investment tax credits 
and high leverage ratio are found to be less incentivised to increase tax refunds through 
intertemporally shifting income. This is consistent with tax and nontax costs (i.e., the reduced 
available investment tax credits and the increased probability of debt violation) as being the 
restrictive determinants of the tax-related earnings management to increase NOL carrybacks. 
 
124 According to Krull (2004), managing earnings through exploiting discretion in designating foreign earnings as 
permanently reinvested abroad is concentrated in firms whose foreign tax rates are below the domestic tax rate. 
This is because that under U.S. tax law, firms with foreign tax rates that exceed the domestic tax rate face no 
additional tax burden on repatriation, thereby changing the amount of permanently reinvested earnings has no 
income tax consequences and cannot affect firms’ after-tax earnings. However, for firms whose foreign tax rates 
are below the domestic tax, additional taxed are owned on repatriation at a rate approximately equal to the U.S. 
tax rate minus foreign tax rate.  
125 This is because that magnifying tax losses carrybacks would reduce the taxable income thereby reducing the 
allowed investment tax credits in the carryback year. In addition, magnifying current tax losses through 
accelerating the recognition of losses and deferring the recognition of operating income can heighten risks of debt 
covenants violation of highly levered firms. 
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In addition, a number of U.S. studies that focus on the link between earnings management and 
value allowances for deferred tax assets provide evidence that the value allowances are used to 
meet prior-year earnings (Schrand and Wong 2002); to meet analysts’ earnings forecasts 
(Bauman et al. 2001; Schrand and Wong 2002; Frank and Rego 2006); and to increase the 
magnitude of a big bath (Bauman et al. 2001). 
In summary, managing the income tax provision provides a source of earnings management, 
since changes in income tax expenses could accordingly alter firms’ reported after-tax earnings. 
Previous literature provides evidence that the aggregated income tax accounts, the deferred tax 
balances and specific tax accounts can be used by managers to improve firms’ net-earning 
performance and to meet particular ‘target’ earnings figures, which may result in opacity and 
obfuscation of the reported financial information and thereby increasing the information 
asymmetry between managers and financial statement users.  
f. Risks in tax outcomes 
According to Blouin (2014) and Armstrong et al. (2015), corporate tax management can be 
perceived as a form of investment opportunity available to management. Similar to any 
investment projects, managers must evaluate the expected cash flows associated with the tax 
management project and its inherent risk, in order to estimate its net present value. Tax 
management risk is defined by HMRC as “an identified tax issue, where HMRC and the 
customer may not agree about a particular tax analysis set out in a return or declaration. Or 
it may be a less specific uncertainty about whether tax returns and declarations are correct 
which may lead to an issue being identified”126 . OECD defines the inherent risk of tax 
management as “taking a tax position that is favourable to the taxpayer without openly 
disclosing that there is uncertainty whether significant matters in the tax return accord with 
the law”127.  
In light of the above definitions, risks of tax management practices mainly arise because of the 
ambiguities in complying with tax regulations and difficulties in understanding what 
constitutes appropriate tax practices, resulting in conflicting views between taxpayers and tax 
authorities about whether a tax management behaviour is ‘acceptable’ or ‘unacceptable’. In the 
 
126 HMRC Approach to Compliance Risk Management for Large Business (HMRC 2007) para.3.2 
127 OECD Study into the Role of Tax Intermediaries (OECD,2008) 
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UK, HMRC has developed a risk-based approach with a number of risk rating criterion128 to 
determine the intensity of their administrative intervention in a firm’s tax affairs. Firms who 
are characterised by HMRC as low risk may benefit from a light-touch approach with fewer 
HMRC-initiated interventions, while firms who are characterised as high risk will subject to 
more intensive HMRC-initiated interventions and scrutiny, bearing incremental tax repayment 
and hefty penalties pursuant to a future tax audit if their tax reduction strategies are challenged 
and overturned by tax authorities129 (HMRC 2007; Freedman et al. 2014). 
Firms’ attitude towards tax management can be an important risk rating criterion for large and 
complex companies. This is because it can be difficult for large and complex companies to 
bring down their overall tax-risk rating through managing risks associated with the inherent 
factors such as ‘changes, complexity and boundary issues’. Therefore, large and complex 
companies may emphasise on improving their overall tax-risk rating by lowering risks 
associated with behavioural factors, such as improving their corporate tax governance or 
altering their attitudes towards aggressive tax management 130 (Freedman et al. 2014). Thus, 
fears of being characterised by HMRC as high tax risk may constrain firms from engaging in 
aggressive tax management activities.  
However, managers’ attitudes towards whether a tax management strategy constitutes 
‘aggressive’ or ‘unacceptable’ tax management can vary considerably depending on their 
appetite for risk. Freedman et al’s. (2014) interview evidence documents that some managers 
are unwilling to alter their tax management strategies although they understand that doing so 
can improve their HMRC risk rating, particularly “when HMRC’s view that a piece of tax 
planning is ‘unacceptable’ is based on an interpretation of the law which they feel they are 
entitled to disagree with, pending determination by the courts” (Freedman et al. 2014, pp 83). 
This is consistent with Blouin’s (2014) argument that risk-taking (risk-averse) firms can be 
more (less) willing to engage in aggressive tax management activities, when there is ambiguity 
in tax laws or a lack of clarified guidance with respect to the appropriate tax practices.  
 
128 The risk rating criteria include inherent factors such as “changes, complexity, boundary issues” and behavioural 
factors such as “corporate governance, delivery, and company’s attitude to tax planning and avoidance” (HMRC 
2007). 
129 See: https://www.gov.uk/hmrc-internal-manuals/tax-compliance-risk-management/tcrm2430  
130 HMRC approve that a good management of tax risk should have “strong governance, with a clear tax strategy 
and principles set by its board, and well-defined accountabilities, roles and responsibilities that are understood 
throughout the business”. HMRC Approach to Compliance Risk Management for Large Business (HMRC March 
2007)  
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In summary, corporate tax management can be perceived as one of many investment 
opportunities available to managers with expected benefits and inherent risks. The inherent 
risks of deteriorating firms’ overall tax-risk rating and intensifying the HMRC-initiated 
interventions might disincentivise firm managers to engage in aggressive tax management 
activities. However, the extent to which the risk-rating considerations restrict managers from 
pursuing tax management opportunities can vary across firms, depending on their appetites for 
risks. Firms with greater risk tolerance might be more likely to engage in tax management that 
entails higher tax risk but higher returns, while risk-averse firms might be less willing to take 
advantage of aggressive tax opportunities, although they may lead to increases in firms’ after-
tax wealth. 
3.2.3.4. Corporate tax management and firm characteristics 
This section reviews relevant literature to discuss how firms’ fundamental characteristics, 
including differences in firm size, leverage, capital intensity, internal information environment, 
in-house tax department, growth opportunities and foreign operations, determine the level of 
corporate tax management. Since different firm characteristics may lead to variations in firms’ 
incentives and opportunities for tax management, differences in firms’ fundamental 
characteristic are expected to provide an explanation on the cross-sectional variations in the 
level of corporate tax management. 
3.2.3.4.1. Firm size  
The political power hypothesis and the political cost hypothesis can be used to explain the 
association between firm size and corporate tax management (Belz et al., 2016). In particular, 
the political power hypothesis implies that firm size can be positively associated with tax 
management, since large (small) firms tend to have greater (less) bargaining power with the 
governments to impact the political process to their advantage. In addition, large (small) firms 
may have greater (less) resources available to obtain professional expertise on tax management 
and arrange their operational transactions in an ‘optimal tax-saving’ manner (Siegfried 1972; 
Stickney et al. 1982, pp. 127). On the contrary, the political costs hypothesis indicates that large 
(small) firms may be subject to heightened (reduced) public visibility and regulatory scrutiny, 
thereby can be more (less) reluctant to engage in tax management activities (Zimmerman 1983; 
Kern et al. 1992).  
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Zimmerman (1983), Omer et al. (1993), Rego (2003) and Minnick et al. (2010) find a negative 
association between firm size and corporate tax management, which is consistent with the 
political cost hypothesis that large (small) firms are exposed to greater (less) public visibility 
and scrutiny, thus are more (less) reluctant to engage in tax planning activities. By contrast, 
Siegfried (1972), Siegfried (1974), Porcano (1986), Richardson and Lanis (2007), Hanlon et 
al. (2005), Dyreng et al. (2008) and Wilson (2009) find a positive association between firm 
size and corporate tax management, which is consistent with the political power hypothesis 
that large (small) firms tend to have more (less) resources and opportunities to influence tax 
policy; acquire tax-planning expertise; and arrange their transactions in a tax-saving manner.  
As a result, the empirical evidence on the association between firm size and corporate tax 
management is inconclusive. The conflicting results on the association between firm size and 
corporate tax management can be partially attributed to the employment of different 
measurements of effective tax rates; different proxies for firm size; and different sample 
selection procedures in the process of empirical analyses. For example, Porcano (1986) 
measures effective tax rate as current U.S. federal income taxes scaled by adjusted net income 
before tax. Zimmerman (1983) measures the effective tax rate as the difference between 
income tax expense and change in deferred tax scaled by the difference between sales and cost 
of goods sold. Wilkie and Limberg (1990) argue that the conflicting results in Zimmerman 
(1983) and Porcano (1986) are mainly due to their employment of different deferred tax 
portion131 when estimating tax payables. In addition, Kern et al. (1992) find that Porcano’s 
(1986) results are sensitive to the chosen database (i.e., the Valueline or Compustat database) 
while Zimmerman’s (1983) results are robust in terms of the choices of databases. Instead of 
using year-to-year annual effective tax rate, Dyreng et al. (2008) measure corporate tax 
management using a ﬁrm’s long-run cash ETR, i.e., cash taxes paid scaled by pre-tax financial 
accounting income calculated over a ten-year period, and ﬁnd a positive relationship between 
long-run tax planning and ﬁrm size. Holland (1998) employs both total assets and sales as 
proxies for firm size to investigate the association between firm size and corporate tax 
management for a period of 26 years from 1968 to 1993. The author finds a significant negative 
 
131 According to Wilkie and Limberg (1990), both Zimmerman (1983) and Porcano (1986) exclude deferred taxes 
when calculate the effective tax rate. However, Zimmerman (1983) exclude changes in deferred tax liability (from 
balance sheet) while Porcano (1986) exclude deferred tax expenses (from income statement), which can create 
systematic differences since “changes in the liability account would approximate long-term deferrals only and 
may be affected by foreign currency translations, but the deferred tax expense account contains both current and 
long-term deferrals” (Kern et al. 1992; pp. 2). 
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association between ETR and firm size for the year 1978-1981 when firm size is measured by 
sales, but this significant negative association is only found for the year 1978 and 1982 when 
firm size is measured by total assets, suggesting that “sales and assets are not equivalent 
proxies for political visibility” (Holland 1998, pp 273). 
3.2.3.4.2. Leverage 
The tax influence on corporate debt policy can be substantial because tax laws normally offer 
tax reliefs to firms’ financing choices in different ways (Gupta and Newberry 1997; Richardson 
and Lanis 2007). Firms that rely heavily on debt financing are expected to have lower ETRs 
compared to firms that rely more on equity financing, since interest expenses from debt 
financing are normally deductible for tax purpose while dividends from equity financing are 
not. For this reason, Gupta and Newberry (1997), Derashid and Zhang (2003) and Richardson 
and Lanis (2007) find that a firm’s leverage is negatively associated with ETRs. Using 
confidential firm-level tax-return data in the UK, Devereux et al. (2018) find a positive and 
long-run effect of corporate tax on firm leverage. In particular, they provide evidence that a 10 
percentage points increase in the marginal tax rate132 results in a 7.6 percentage points increase 
in the leverage ratio, indicating that firms adjust their capital structures gradually according to 
changes in the marginal tax rate (pp 17). This is consistent with Gupta et al.’s (1997) research 
finding that it is more likely for firms with high marginal tax rates to use debt financing (Gupta 
et al. 1997, pp 7). Empirical evidence in those studies shows that debt financing can be used as 
a tax shield.  
Consistent with the notion that debt financing acts as a tax shield, previous studies provide 
evidence that the greater the use of debt tax shields, the lower the needs for firms to undertake 
non-debt tax-saving activities (Makie-Mason 1990; Mills et al. 1998; Armstrong et al. 2012). 
For example, Mills (1998) investigates the determinates of the level of firms’ expenditures 
invested in tax management and finds that highly levered firms do not invest more in tax 
management (pp 13). An alternative perspective of the substitute relationship between leverage 
and corporate tax management has been proposed by DeAngelo et al. (1980) and Graham et al. 
 
132 Specifically, Devereux et al. (2015) adopt the ‘before-financing’ marginal tax rate which is calculated on the 
basis of firms’ taxable profits before deducting interest expenses, since the ‘after-financing’ marginal tax rate 
which is calculated using taxable profit after deducting interest expenses can involve endogeneity problems, as 
firms that are highly levered can mechanically have higher interest payments and lower ‘after-financing’ marginal 
rate. 
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(2006) who demonstrate that corporate tax management (i.e., non-debt tax shields) could in 
turn affect ﬁrm’s debt financing policy. In particular, Graham et al. (2006) employ a sample of 
43 U.S. firms that are accused as tax shelter and find that tax-sheltering firms use less debt than 
their non-sheltering counterparts (i.e., the debt-to-asset ratio of tax-sheltering firms are 5 
percent points lower than that of non-sheltering firms). Their results suggest that the reduction 
of explicit taxable income resulting from non-debt tax shields is a substitute for the use of 
interest tax deductions from debt financing.  
3.2.3.4.3. Capital intensity 
Capital-intensive firms, which are subject to high level of utilisation of property, plant and 
equipment in corporate operation, may have tax management opportunities that are not 
available to their noncapital-intensive counterparts, including the management of the timing of 
acquiring and disposing assets; the choice of accounting depreciation method; and the choice 
of buying or leasing equipment (Mills et al. 1998). In addition, capital investments of tangible 
fixed assets normally provide taxpayers with cash tax benefits associated with accelerated 
depreciation, since tax law typically allow the capital assets to be written off for tax purpose 
over periods shorter than their economic lives (Gupta et al. 1997).  
Gupta et al. (1997) measure capital intensity as the ratio of net property, plant and equipment 
to total assets. They find that there is a negative relationship between capital intensity and 
ETRs. Mills et al. (1998) find that firms’ investment in tax management as measured by salaries 
paid to in-house tax departments and tax-related fees paid to obtain tax expertise increases with 
the level of firms’ capital intensity. Newman (1989) finds that capital-intensive firms are more 
likely to reward their managers using after-tax bonus plan, which implies that capital-intensive 
firms have more tax management opportunities from the utilisation of fixed assets. The 
conclusive evidence provided by previous studies suggests that capital-intensive firms, i.e., 
firms with a large amount of tangible assets, can take advantage of various tax-saving 
opportunities resulting from the utilisation of capital allowances or incentive provisions 
associated with qualified fixed assets to reduce their tax liability. 
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3.2.3.4.4. Internal information environment 
Decision theory indicates that “the quality of the information on which decisions are based 
affects the quality of those decisions and their outcomes” (Gallemore et al. 2015, pp 149). 
Based on the conjecture that the achievement of effective tax management requires 
comprehensive considerations of firms’ economic environment, business strategies and taxable 
performance across different operating segments133, Gallemore et al. (2015) posit that the good 
quality of firms’ internal information environment helps to improve the ability and efficiency 
in managerial decision-making and implementations of tax management, by providing 
managers with ‘accessible, useful, reliable and accurate’ information across dispersed business 
segments.  
Gallemore et al. (2015) measure firms’ information environment quality using four proxies, 
including the speed of releasing earnings announcements; management earnings forecast 
accuracy; the absence of material weakness in internal control; and the absence of restatements 
due to errors. They find a negative association between internal information quality and 
effective tax rates, indicating that firms with better information environment quality are more 
capable of undertaking effective actions to reduce their tax liabilities. Moreover, they find that 
better information environment quality plays a role in mitigating the negative impacts of 
geographic dispersion and environmental uncertainty on corporate tax management. Better 
information environment quality also facilitates firms to achieve more favourable tax outcomes 
(as measured by lower ETRs) without incurring additional tax risks (as measured by the ETR 
volatility). In summary, internal information environment quality is important in determining 
firms’ ability to reduce tax liabilities and tax risks associated with firms’ tax management 
strategies.  
3.2.3.4.5. In-house tax department 
Firms’ choices of the performance evaluation system for their tax departments, i.e., either to 
evaluate their tax departments as a profit centre or a cost centre, are found to play a significant 
 
133 For example, as argued in Robinson et al. (2010), corporate tax management often requires the communication 
and integration of specific tax and performance information among different operating segments. However, 
information problems due to decentralisation and lack of coordination and communication among operating 
segments can cause difficulties in assessing and estimating whether firms’ all tax-planning opportunities have 
been identiﬁed and utilised. 
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role in determining firms’ tax management behaviours (Robinson et al. 2010). Specifically, a 
cost centre is a performance measurement system which evaluates a department against its 
ability to “minimise costs for a given output, maximise output for a given cost, or minimise 
average cost”. A cost centre would be an optimal performance measurement system if the 
quantity and quality of the department output can be easily evaluated. By contrast, a profit 
centre is a system which evaluates a department against “the difference between its costs and 
revenue”. A profit centre performance measure would be more effective if “the knowledge 
required to make the product mix, quantity and quality decisions is speciﬁc to the division and 
therefore costly or impossible for managers at higher levels to obtain” (Jensen and Meckling 
1998; pp 352; Robinson et al. 2010, pp 1038).  
In their first-step test, Robinson et al. (2010) find that the availability of corporate tax 
management opportunities, as measured by the level of R&D expenses; capital intensity; 
inventory intensity; intangible intensity; leverage; and the extent of foreign operations, drives 
the corporate decision to evaluate a tax department’s performance as a profit centre134. This 
means that when efforts on tax management become the emphasis of a tax department, it is 
more efficient to measure this tax department’s performance using a profit-centre performance 
measure system, because the quantity and quality of the tax-planning efforts can be difficult to 
assess with accuracy. In their second-step test, Robinson et al. (2010) find that firms who opt 
for measuring their tax department as a profit centre have lower GAAP ETRs. However, a 
ﬁrm’s choice to measure its tax department as a proﬁt centre is found to have no significant 
effect on the cash tax consequences as measured by cash ETR. These results imply that the 
adoption of profit-centre performance measure provides tax department more of an incentive 
to obtain financial reporting benefits through lowering GAAP ETRs, rather than to create cash 
tax savings through engaging in real tax management activities. The authors carefully note that 
their results can be affected by potential endogeneity problems. That is, firms with lower ETRs 
may be more likely to measure their tax department as a profit centre. Although they try to 
address the endogeneity between the choice of performance measurement and ETRs using the 
two-stage approach, a two-stage approach may be inadequate to eliminate endogeneity 
problems (Larcker 2003). 
 
134 Robinson et al. (2013) determine firms’ choice of performance evaluation system for their tax department 
based on survey data collected by Ernst & Young about how managers in Fortune 1000 companies view and 
measure their tax departments. They also find that factors such as decentralization, firm growth, departmental 
interdependencies and coordination are important factors that drive the decision to evaluate a tax department’s 
performance as a profit center.  
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3.2.3.4.6. Growth 
A firm’s growth opportunity could be interrelated with tax management activities in the sense 
that various tax management opportunities can be available to firms with different levels of 
growth (Higgins et al. 2015). Miles et al.’s (1978) topology suggest that growing firms concern 
less about costs minimisation. Instead, they emphasise more on innovation, searching for new 
markets and generating new products. This implies that firms in high-growth rate may tend to 
place less emphasis on reducing firms’ tax burden through engaging in tax management 
activities.  
However, Higgins et al. (2015) suggest that due to their aggressive pursuit of innovations and 
entering into new geographic or productive markets, growing firms are likely to have more tax-
planning opportunities that are not available to their less-growing counterparts. This is because 
less-growing firms can be more inclined to maintain operational and organisational stability 
with fewer adaptability to organisational changes and risks, therefore having fewer 
opportunities for tax planning. As compared to less-growing firms, high-growing firms tend to 
have greater propensity for risk and uncertainty. The aggressive culture in growing firms might 
encourage them to engage in corporate tax management in an aggressive manner. Using six 
measures to capture a firm’s growth opportunity, including the ratio of research and 
development to sales; the ratio of employees to sales; one-year percentage change in total sales; 
the ratio of marketing to sales; the employee fluctuations and capital intensity, Higgins et al. 
(2015) provide empirical evidence that growing firms have lower GAAP ETR; lower Cash 
ETR; higher permanent book-tax difference; and less sustainable tax positions as compared to 
firms with less growth opportunities. This is consistent with the conjecture that growing firms 
possess more tax-planning opportunities and have greater risk tolerance in utilising tax 
management opportunities. 
3.2.3.4.7. Foreign operations 
Multinational companies may have tax-planning opportunities that are not available to 
domestic-only companies, such as strategically arranging their business in low-tax 
jurisdictions; taking advantage of international tax rate differentials by transferring income 
from high-tax jurisdictions to low-tax jurisdictions; and exploiting tax-law differences among 
different tax jurisdictions (Rego 2003, pp. 808). Consistent with this conjecture, Rego (2003) 
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finds that the worldwide ETRs as measured by the ratio of current income tax payable to pre-
tax accounting income across all firms’ tax jurisdictions are significantly lower for 
multinational companies who have intensive foreign operations.  
Wilson (2009) infers tax-sheltering activities from firms’ financial statements by employing a 
sample consisting of 59 U.S. firms that are accused of actively engaging in tax-sheltering 
activities. He finds that those tax-sheltering firms display higher levels of foreign income. 
However, the author highlights that his research finding is based on ‘a unique subset of tax 
shelter participants’ whose tax reduction methods are successfully detected and challenged by 
tax authorities135, which may not be able to provide a generalised guidance to a broader set of 
tax-sheltering participants or to tax-sheltering firms that engage in alternative types of tax 
reduction methods. Lisowsky (2010) uses confidential tax return data and finds that the 
probability of firms to engage in tax-sheltering activities is positively associated with the 
intensity of their foreign operations and the presence of subsidiaries located in tax havens. This 
is consistent with Hanlon et al. (2005) who use confidential tax return data to examine the 
association between firm characteristics and the extent of corporate tax noncompliance (as 
measured as the level of tax deficiencies proposed upon Internal Revenue Service (IRS) audits 
and examination). They find that multinational firms have greater tax deficiencies as compared 
to their domestic-only counterparts. 
The above studies show that multinational ﬁrms tend to have more corporate tax management 
opportunities arising from their operations in foreign countries than domestic-only firms. As a 
result, the OECD has introduced countermeasure to tax noncompliance stemming from 
multinational operations, i.e., the global action plan, to promote information exchange among 
different tax jurisdictions with the aim of curtailing base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) 
and improving the tax compliance at an international level (OECD 2017)136. Action 11 to 13137 
in the OECD action plan particularly require firms to provide governmental authorities with 
their key business and tax information across all involved tax jurisdictions, such as profits 
before taxes and taxes paid or accrued for each tax jurisdiction, in order to facilitate the 
 
135 The tax reduction methods used by his sample firm include: ‘lease-in, lease out’; ‘corporate-owned life 
insurance’; ‘contested liability acceleration strategy’; ‘contingent-payment instalment sales’; ‘cross-border 
dividend capture’; ‘transfer pricing’; ‘offshore intellectual property havens’ and ‘deduction acceleration strategy’. 
136 See http://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/country-by-country-reporting.htm 
137 Action 11: Measuring and monitoring BEPS; Action 12: Mandatory disclosure rules; Action 13: Transfer 
pricing documentation and Country-by-Country reporting. 
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identification of aggressive tax activities conducted via profit sharing and income shifting. 
In conclusion, the section 3.2 reviews previous literature regarding the definition, theories and 
determinants of corporate tax management. Based on the literature, corporate tax management 
can be largely interpreted as managing to reduce a firm’s tax liabilities. Tax avoidance and tax 
evasion constitute important components of the corporate tax management continuum. Due to 
the difficulty in discriminating between ‘acceptable’ and ‘unacceptable’ tax avoidance, this 
study will not attempt to differentiate between tax avoidance and tax evasion when examining 
corporate tax management behaviours.  
According to the Scholes-Wolfson effective tax management paradigm, managers have the 
incentives to manage the tax liability through taking advantage of tax-planning opportunities 
based on their firms’ characteristic, in order to increase firms’ after-tax return and after-tax 
cash flow and sustain the tax benefits over a long time. However, the process of corporate tax 
management may incur both direct and indirect costs. The traditional cost-benefit perspective 
perceives corporate tax management as a mere tax-saving device, but this perspective 
overlooks an important characteristic of modern corporations, i.e., the conflicting interests 
between managers and shareholders. By comparison, the principal-agent perspective of 
corporate tax management indicates that the conflicting interests between managers and 
shareholders might lead managers to implement corporate tax management in a way that is not 
desired by shareholders. Therefore, the corporate governance mechanism, which represents 
how the agency tension between managers and owners is mitigated, can be important in 
explaining corporate tax management behaviours. The next section will review literature on 
how corporate governance might affect managers’ engagement in tax management activities. 
3.3. Corporate Tax Management and Corporate Governance Mechanism 
Corporate governance mechanism can be vital in explaining corporate tax management 
behaviours, since it represents how the decisions and actions made by managers are monitored 
and how the conflicting interests between managers and firm owners are mitigated. As far as 
the agency tension between managers and owners is concerned, corporate governance is 
expected to play a role in determining the level of corporate tax management. Therefore, this 
section aims to review previous evidence that explains how corporate governance mechanisms 
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might affect managers’ incentives to engage in tax management activities. This section begins 
with the discussion of the agency theory. 
3.3.1. Agency theory 
Agency theory is a theory that identifies the agency relationship in modern corporations where 
“one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some 
service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision-making authority to the agent” 
(Jensen and Meckling 1976, pp. 308). Under the agency theory, a public corporation is 
perceived as a legal fiction that acts as “a nexus for a set of contracting relationships”, in which 
the conflicting objectives of individual participators are brought into accounts and the 
conditions of individual behaviours are specified ex ante in contracts (Jensen and Meckling 
1976, pp. 308-311). Under the agency relationship where the management and control are 
separate, agency problems could arise because of the conflicting interests between the agents 
and the principals in the sense that the agent who is delegated to act on behalf of the principals 
does not act to maximise the principals’ welfare; and because of the impossibility of perfectly 
specifying in advance every possible decision and action of the agent in contracts (Brennan 
1995; Shleifer and Vishny 1997).  
Therefore, the agency theory rests on the premise that agency problems might arise in an 
organisation when two conditions are displayed. First, the separation of ownership and control 
leads to conflicting interests between the agent and the principals. Second, it is impossible to 
address the conflicting interests between the agent and the principals through a complete 
contract (Hart 1995). Specifically, in the public corporations with dispersed ownership, it may 
not be rational to expect those individual owners who possess only a small stake to have strong 
incentives to devote resources to monitoring the management and ensuring that the 
management acts in their best interests 138  (Grossman and Hart 1980). The separation of 
ownership and control and the lack of monitoring may allow self-interested managers of a 
public company to extract firm resources and pursue their own goals at the expense of those of 
shareholders139. In addition, under the agency theory, a public corporation represents a nexus 
 
138 This creates the ‘free-ride problem’ which is explained in Grossman et al. (1980) and Hart (1995) that each 
fragmented shareholder will forego the involvement in monitoring the management and free-ride in the 
expectation that other shareholders will devote resources to monitoring the management. 
139 For example, managers may overpay themselves; pursue non-value-adding but power-enhancing projects; be 
risk-averse or effort-averse; or be reluctant to lay off workers that are no longer productive (Hart 1995, pp. 681). 
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of contracts which specify ex ante all parties’ rights and obligations, such as conditions under 
which the agents should be nominated and replaced; conditions under which corporate assets 
should be bought or disposed of ; costs and rewards of each agent; criteria against which the 
performances of the agents are evaluated; the allocation of the raised funds and profits; and the 
allocation of steps of the decision-making process among agents (Jensen and Meckling 1976; 
Fama and Jensen 1983, pp. 302; Hart 1995, pp. 679; Shleifer and Vishny 1997, pp. 741). 
However, due to the fact that completely and comprehensively contracting for every 
conceivable eventuality that may occur in the contractual relationship can involve significant 
transaction costs140 and are technically impractical since most future contingencies are difficult 
to foresee and control, there exists ‘residual control rights’, i.e., the rights to make decisions 
under unforeseen conditions which are not specified ex ante in the contracts (Shleifer and 
Vishny 1997).  
Theoretically, owners of organisations should retain all the residual control rights. However, 
due to the information asymmetry, firm owners, especially those of organisations with 
dispersed ownership, may not be qualified or informed enough in exerting the control rights as 
compared to managers who have full access to firms’ internal information and possess abilities 
and experience to generate returns on the raised funds (Hart 1995; Shleifer and Vishny 1997). 
As a result, managers end up with extensive residual control rights to allocate and use investors’ 
funds and assets, given the allocation and usage are not specified in the initial contracts. This 
may trigger the problem of managerial opportunism in the sense that managers use their 
discretions to expropriate firm resources or pursue their own benefit at the expense of 
shareholders (Williamson 1985; Grossman and Hart 1986).  
The presence of conflicting interests between agents and principals and the incomplete contract 
of the principal-agency relationship provides a rationale for corporate governance to act as a 
mechanism for restricting managerial expropriation, through monitoring managers’ exercise of 
residual control rights in making decisions that have not been specified in advance in the 
contracts141 (Hart 1995; Shleifer and Vishny 1997). Essentially, the objective of the corporate 
 
140 According to Hart (1995), the incompleteness of the contracts between the agents and the principals can due 
to the significant transaction costs incurred during the process of contracting, including “the cost of thinking about 
all the different eventualities that can occur during the course of the contractual relationship, and planning how 
to deal with them”; “the cost of negotiating with others about these plans”; and “the cost of writing down the plans 
in such a way that they can be enforced by a third party - such as a judge - in the event of a dispute” (pp. 680).  
141 According to Hart (1995), if the principal-agent contracts are complete, there can be no room for corporate 
governance structure to play a significant role, since “governance structure matters when some actions have to be 
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governance mechanism is to limit managerial discretion and enhance managerial accountability, 
in order to mitigate agency problems and ensure the alignment of the managements’ interests 
with those of the shareholders. In this way, it is expected that effective corporate governance 
machinsm plays a role in optimising the managerial investment decisions about allocations of 
investors’ funds; improving the corporate performance efficiency; and enhancing firms’ overall 
transparency and credibility.  
In summary, agency theory is a corporate governance theory which deals with agency problems 
under the agent-principal contractual relationship. Agency theory rests on the premise that 
agency problems would occur when two conditions are met, i.e., there is a conflict of interests 
between the agents and the principals; and the principal-agent contract is not complete in 
addressing the conflicting interests. Under this context, corporate governance mechanism is 
expected to play a role in mitigating the agency problems through limiting managerial 
discretion and improving managerial accountability.  
3.3.2. Corporate governance mechanism and corporate tax management  
3.3.2.1. Ownership structure and corporate tax management  
According to the agency theory, agency problems could arise because “the separation of 
ownership from control produces a condition where the interests of owner and of ultimate 
managers may, and often do, diverge” (Demsetz 1983, pp. 375). Due to the information 
asymmetry between managers and shareholders as a result of managers’ full-time status and 
private knowledge about firms’ price-sensitive information, and due to the imperfectability of 
shareholders to monitor the managerial behaviours, managers who control the corporate assets 
may potentially exercise their discretions to extract firm resources for their personal use; or 
allocate funds to unprofitable projects for the purpose of producing private benefits (Lemmon 
and Lins 2003). As claimed by Demsetz (1983), management can “exercise more freedom in 
the use of firm’s resources than would exist if the firm were managed by its owner(s), or at 
least, if ownership interest were more concentrated” (pp. 375). This implies that different 
characteristics of firms’ ownership structure may lead to varying nature of firms’ agency 
 
decided in the future that have not been specified in an initial contract: governance structure provides a way for 
deciding these actions”. However, if the principal-agent contract is complete, it is hard to find a role for corporate 
governance structure since all conditions and obligations have been specified in advance with no residual 
decisions (pp. 676). 
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problems, as different ownership structure may result in different abilities of firm owners to 
restrict managerial expropriation. More specifically, firm owners, depending on the 
concentration and the identities of their ownership (e.g., diffused ownership, institutional 
shareholding or family firms), may differ in terms of preferences, goals, resources, incentives 
and voting rights in monitoring managerial behaviors, leading to different nature and extents 
of firms’ agency problems (Pedersen and Thomsen 2003). 
For example, for firms with dispersed and diffused ownership, as typical for firms in the U.S. 
and the U.K., agency problems often arise as a result of the conflicting interests between 
shareholders who own the firm and managers who are delegated to act on behalf of 
shareholders (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Roe 1994; Fan and Wong 2002, pp. 405). Therefore, 
the primary objective of corporate governance under this context is to mitigate managerial 
incentives for outright expropriation and to reinforce the alignment of shareholders’ and 
managers’ interests, thereby enhancing the managerial accountability. Jensen and Meckling’s 
(1976) convergence-of-interests hypothesis advocates that increases in managerial share-
ownership may help align the interests of managers with those of shareholders, which in turn 
reduces the managerial incentives to expropriate firm resources at the expense of shareholders 
or engage in sub-optimal projects that provide private benefits. This is because that any increase 
in managements’ private wealth from extracting firm resources or undertaking nonprofitable 
projects will be counteracted by an ultimate decline in the value of managements’ managerial 
ownership as a result of the decline in firm value (Singh et al. 2003; Lafond et al. 2008; 
Margaritis et al. 2010). However, it is possible that the excessive managerial equity ownership 
may trigger the exacerbation of the managerial entrenchment problem, since it can be more 
difficult for the boards of directors and the external market142 to discipline, control or remove 
self-interested managers who have large ownership stake and sufficient voting rights (Demsetz 
1983; Fama and Jensen 1983; Morck et al. 1988; Danis et al. 1997; Short et al. 1999).  
When corporate ownership is concentrated at the hands of certain shareholders, the nature of 
the agency problems will shift from the conflicting interests between managers and 
shareholders to the conflicting interests between controlling shareholders and non-controlling 
minority shareholders (Fan and Wong 2002; Roe 2004). While the small atomistic shareholders 
 
142 Morck et al. (1988) denote that the external market discipline is mainly from the managerial labor market 
(Fama 1980); the product market (Hart 1983); and the market for corporate control, to force managers towards 
the engagements in value enhancing activities (Jensen and Ruback 1983) (pp. 294). 
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are reluctant to devote resources to closely monitoring managerial actions, the presence of large 
shareholders, i.e., individuals or institutions who possess large stakes in a firm, may play an 
active role in improving corporate governance through mitigating the conflicting interests 
between managers and shareholders and enhancing the managerial accountability. As 
compared to small shareholders, large shareholders, by virtue of their nontrivial amounts of 
shareholdings in a firm, are expected to have greater incentives and resources143 to incur costs 
of disciplining managerial behaviours and monitoring firms’ long-term performances, in order 
to restrict managerial expropriation and ensure that managers act to maximise shareholders’ 
wealth in the long run. This is because that the returns of large shareholders from monitoring 
managerial behaviours and firm performance are likely to be large enough to cover their 
incurred monitoring costs (Hart 1995; Shleifer and Vishny 1997; Danis et al. 1997; Gillan and 
Starks 2000). The closer monitoring of managerial behaviours and firm performance provided 
by large shareholders can be beneficial to all other shareholders, even if they do not bear any 
costs incurred from the monitoring processes (Huddart 1993; Gillan and Starks 2000).  
However, the beneficial role played by large shareholders in addressing agency problems can 
be debated, since large shareholders may use their voting power to pursue their own benefits 
at the expense of minority shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny 1997; La Porta et al. 2000; 
Holderness 2001; Pedersen et al. 2003). For example, large shareholders may have access to 
management and board members (Carleton et al. 1998; Chen et al. 2007, pp. 283), therefore 
might be able to access and utilise firms’ inside information for pursuing their own interests or 
persuade management to arrange self-dealing transactions for the purpose of transferring firm 
resources to companies owned by themselves (Hart 1995, pp. 683; Fan and Wong 2002, pp. 
406). In this case, the increased ownership concentration at the hands of a small number of 
shareholders may therefore induce entrenchment problems in a similar way that high 
managerial ownership triggers the exacerbation of managerial entrenchment (Jensen and 
Meckling 1976; Morck et al. 1988; Pedersen and Thomsen 2003).  
 
143 According to Faccio et al. (2011), if a risk-averse shareholder’s wealth is largely concentrated in a single firm, 
he/she will face higher systematic risk since his/her wealth is significantly affected by firm-specific risks. By 
contrast, a well-diversified shareholder is less affected by firm-specific risk because it has been diversified away. 
Therefore, large shareholders with concentrated ownership in one firm can be more motivated to monitor 
manager’s behaviours to reduce firm-specific risks. This is consistent with Shleifer and Vishny (1997) which 
documents that large shareholders are motivated to address the agency problems since they have incentives to 
maximise firm wealth and have enough control over firm assets to protect their interests. Specifically, large 
shareholders “have enough voting control to put pressure on the management in some cases, or perhaps even to 
oust the management through a proxy fight or a takeover. In the more extreme cases, large shareholders have 
outright control of the firms and their management with 51 or more percent ownership” (pp. 754).  
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Further, the incentives of large shareholders to exercise their resources and ability to monitor, 
discipline and influence managerial behaviours can be dependent on the size of their 
shareholding stake and the length of time they invest in the firm. Shareholders with large and 
less marketable shareholding may focus more on firms’ long-run performance, and thereby will 
have greater incentives to oversee management performance and correct managerial failures to 
ensure that the management acts in the best interests of shareholders and firm survival. 
However, shareholders with relatively small shareholdings can easily liquidate their investment 
stakes, rather than involving into the costly processes of monitoring and intervening managerial 
behaviours if they find that firm managers have been performing poorly (Maug 1998; Chung 
et al. 2002; Cornett et al. 2007).  
As discussed above, it is likely that shareholders with concentrated ownership have stronger 
incentives to devote resources to monitoring managerial behaviours and addressing agency 
problems. Different from other large shareholders, family owners tend to “maintain their 
ownership stakes for several generations; have a majority of their wealth invested in a single 
firm; and often serve as senior executives in the firm” (Anderson et al. 2004, pp. 212). Family 
firms, by virtue of their concentrated founding-family ownership and their intra-familial 
altruistic element, are expected to subject to less severe agency problems arising from the 
separation of ownership and control as compared to nonfamily firms (Chrisman et al. 2004). 
This is because family owners typically hold substantial and less well-diversified shareholdings 
in their family firm, thereby tend to have strong incentives to monitor managerial actions 
closely and create a long-term commitment to their firms’ survival. This may help mitigate the 
managerial opportunistic incentives for private rent-seeking and alleviate the free-rider 
problems as existed in firms with diffused and atomistic shareholdings (Schulze et al. 2001; 
Ali et al. 2007; Andres 2008). In addition to their strong incentives, family owners also have 
the ability, power and advanced firm-specific knowledge to monitor and discipline managers, 
owing to their long-term presence in the firm (Anderson and Reeb 2003a; Andres 2008). 
Furthermore, the undiversified nature of founding-family ownership and the long-run 
relationship with suppliers and other external stakeholders can make family firms more 
concerned about their reputation, since adverse reputation effects can create longer-lasting and 
substantial detrimental consequences on family owners’ wealth (Villalonga and Amit 2006; 
Anderson and Reeb 2003b).  
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However, agency issues can arise in firms with concentrated founding-family ownership in a 
form that is not presented in nonfamily firms. For example, the self-imposed personnel 
selection criterion in family firms would likely make family owners hand over executive 
authorities to certain family members and create impediments for recruiting more qualified 
personnel from the outside labour market, which may likely lead to biased evaluations of the 
performance of the selected family agents and create aggravated managerial entrenchment 
problems. The concentrated founding-family ownership and the entrenchment of family 
executives can provide opportunities for controlling shareholders in a family firm to 
expropriate firm resources at the expense of non-controlling minority shareholders, which may 
occur in the form of the excessive compensation; the disproportionate shares of corporate profit 
using special dividends; or engaging in self-dealing or related-party transactions (Fama and 
Jensen 1983; La Porta et al. 1998; DeAngelo et al. 2000; Faccio et al. 2001; Anderson and 
Reeb 2003a; Anderson and Reeb 2004). 
Previous empirical studies have widely investigated the impacts of various corporate ownership 
structure on corporate tax practices. In addition to the association between corporate tax 
management and managerial stock ownership as discussed in section 3.2.3.3.2, the association 
between corporate tax management and ownership structure has also been examined from 
aspects of managerial dual-class stock ownership, concentrated (private firms) versus diffused 
ownership (public firms), institutional ownership, hedge fund ownership and family ownership.  
In particular, McGuire et al. (2014) argue that managerial dual-class ownership, in which 
managers entitle to a majority voting rights but a minority cash flow rights, provides a powerful 
and unique context to examine the impact of agency cost on corporate tax management. This 
is because the separation of the managements’ cash flow rights and voting rights can exacerbate 
the managerial entrenchment problems, as it alleviates the takeover threats from outside 
shareholders and simultaneously insulates managers from bearing the ‘pro rata shareholder 
wealth consequences’ resulting from their performance. Using a sample of 1800 dual-class 
firms for period 1995-2002, McGuire et al. (2014) find that dual-class firms appear to engage 
in less tax management (as measured by higher GAAP ETRs and cash ETRs) relative to their 
single-class counterparts, suggesting that dual-class managers are less incentivised to engage 
in costly tax management. The authors interpret their results as that the entrenchment restricts 
the ability of outside shareholders to compel the dual-class managers to engage in value-
enhancing tax management activities, or that the dual-class managers are reluctant to engage 
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in tax management activities to avoid the price discount imposed by shareholders who may 
concern about the managerial rent extraction associated with corporate tax management. 
In explaining the impact of differences between private and public firms on corporate tax 
management, Cloyd et al. (1996) argue that public firms rely heavily on the external capital 
market for equity financing and require managerial performance-based compensation to 
alleviate agency tension between managers and shareholders. Therefore, managers in public 
firms tend to have greater pressure to report high financial accounting income to capital market 
and, thus, are less likely to engage in tax planning activities which may reduce both taxable 
and book income. This is because that the reduced financial reporting income in publicly-traded 
firms can “increase the probability of debt covenant violations; reduce manager compensation 
tied to reported income; lead to lower performance evaluation; and it may even be perceived 
as lowering the market value of the firm” (Cloyd et al. 1996, pp. 28). By comparison, privately-
held firms, which have more concentrated shareholder ownership and can communicate 
information about firm performance and tax strategies with their shareholders more efficiently 
through channels other than publicly-reported financial statements, tend to experience less 
capital market pressure of reporting high financial income and rely less on reported financial 
information for contracting with managers, lenders and other stakeholders (Ball and 
Shivakuma 2005). As a result, it can be less costly for privately-held firms to sacrifice reporting 
high earnings in favour of aggressive and beneficial tax positions through transactions that 
reduce both reported book and taxable income (Klassen 1997; Slemrod 2004).  
Consistent with the ‘financial reporting cost’ and ‘capital market pressure’ explanations, Penno 
et al. (1986) provide questionnaire evidence to show that compared with private companies, 
publicly-traded firms tend to be more likely to adopt income-increasing accounting methods 
and, thus, are less likely to engage in book-tax conforming tax strategies that reduce both book 
income and tax liabilities for the same accounting period (e.g., using First-In-First-Out 
inventory accounting under the condition that inventory price is increasing). Using a sample of 
major assets divesture, Klassen (1997) investigates whether firms’ inside ownership 
concentration affects their trade-offs between tax incentives to capture tax savings and financial 
reporting incentives to signal profitable firm value to the capital market. The author shows that 
for high tax-rate firms, managers of firms with more diffuse stock ownership emphasise more 
on financial reporting to meet market expectations via recognition of higher gains or smaller 
losses, while managers of firms with concentrated ownership are more likely to engage in 
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transactions that produce tax benefits but reduce financial reporting income. His results suggest 
that the financial reporting costs associated with book-tax conforming tax strategies are higher 
(lower) for firms with diffused (concentrated) ownership. Using a size-matched sample of 297 
private and 553 public banks, Beatty et al. (1999) provide some evidence that private banks are 
more aggressive in managing taxes than public banks, while public banks concern more about 
earnings management with less sensitivity to tax rates. Results in these studies are consistent 
with Hanlon et al. (2005) who use confidential tax return data and find that private firms have 
greater level of tax deficiencies proposed upon Internal Revenue Service (IRS) audits. Their 
results suggest that private firms are more inclined to engage in aggressive tax activities than 
public firms, as they are less constrained by capital market pressures and financial reporting 
costs.  
However, these studies only focus on examining the impact of differences between public and 
private ownership on conforming tax management, without reflecting firms’ incentives to 
engage in book-tax nonconforming activities that may generate higher book income relative to 
taxable income for a particular accounting year. Extending studies that focus on conforming 
book-tax reporting of public and private firms, Mills et al. (2001) shed light on the influence 
of public VS private ownership on book-tax income differences. Using confidential tax return 
data for U.S. public and private manufacturing firms, Mills et al. (2001) find that public firms 
generally report greater book-tax income differences than their private counterparts, consistent 
with the argument that public firms subject to greater capital market pressure to report higher 
financial income and, therefore, are more likely to engage in nonconformity tax strategies that 
generate higher book income relative to taxable income. Taken together, previous studies 
indicate that due to differences in capital market pressure and financial reporting costs, private 
firms tend to have more incentives to engage in conforming tax-reduction strategies than public 
firms, while public firms are more likely than private firms to engage in nonconforming 
transactions that produce positive book-tax differences.  
Khurana et al. (2013) investigate whether institutional shareholders with a long-term 
investment horizon have an impact on the level of corporate tax management. Using data from 
1995 to 2008 and ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, they find that the level of corporate 
tax management (i.e., measured by total and permanent book-tax differences, annual cash 
effective tax rates and probability of involving in tax shelter) are negatively associated with the 
level of long-term institutional ownership (i.e., measured by low average portfolio turnover of 
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institutional shareholders). However, the full sample results are only statistically significant in 
firms with weak corporate governance as measured by a high level of the anti-takeover 
protection index. Their results indicate that institutional shareholders with long-term 
investment horizon play an active role in monitoring managerial tax behaviours and restricting 
managers from undertaking aggressive tax management activities, with the aim of eliminating 
the scope for self-interested managers to take advantage of the complexity and opacity 
associated with tax management transactions. In order to overcome concerns about 
endogeneity that may arise from examining the association between institutional ownership 
and corporate tax management, Khan et al. (2017) and Bird et al. (2017) employ the regression 
discontinuity design to investigate the impact of institutional ownership on corporate tax 
management under the context of exogenous shocks to institutional ownership from Russell 
index reconstitutions144. Inconsistent with Khurana et al. (2013), Khan et al. (2017) and Bird 
et al. (2017) both find that increases in institutional ownership lead to greater tax management, 
especially the tax management through international tax-planning strategies such as the use of 
tax havens. Their results suggest that institutional shareholders tend to view the benefit of 
corporate tax management as outweighing its associated costs and encourage managers to 
engage in international tax-planning activities.  
Cheng et al. (2012) examine the impact of hedge fund ownership on corporate tax management. 
They argue that hedge funds activists, who possess high share ownership and voting rights, are 
likely to exercise their influence to monitor management behaviours and encourage managers 
to improve tax-planning efficiency for the purpose of increasing firm value. Using a sample of 
435 U.S. activist hedge funds drawing from SEC 13D filings for period 1994-2008, they find 
that the target firms experience lower tax management as compared to a sample of matched 
control firms before the hedge fund intervention, but the level of tax management in those 
target firms is increasing subsequent to hedge fund intervention. After explicitly controlling 
for other possible indirect influences resulting from hedge fund intervention which may also 
 
144 The Russell index membership is closely followed by institutional shareholders. By market capitalisation, 
Russell assigns firms into Russell 1000 (the top 1000 firms) and Russell 2000 (the following 2000 firms) at May 
31 of each year. Therefore, the index assignment around the index threshold (i.e., between top Russell 2000 and 
bottom Russell 1000) is “quasi-random with respect to corporate behaviour”. However, a stock’s index assignment 
can significantly affect this stock’s portfolio weight, since the Russell 1000 and Russell 2000 are value weighted 
in which firms at the top of their index receive the highest weight. Therefore, the largest stock in Russell 2000 
can receive significant higher weight than the smallest stock in Russell 1000. As a result, firms that around the 
index threshold can subject to a large and discontinuous jump in institutional ownership, which provides a unique 
context to study exogenous shocks to the level of institutional ownership (Bird et al. 2017, pp. 30; Khan et al. 
2017, pp. 103).   
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affect corporate taxes (e.g., changes in level of leverage, property, plant and equipment and 
intangible assets), the authors further confirm that hedge fund intervention has a direct impact 
on the increased level of corporate tax management in the target firms. Moreover, the increase 
in corporate tax management subsequent to hedge fund intervention is a positive function of 
hedge-fund activists’ past success in inducing tax changes145 and their tax knowledge and 
interests. However, there is no evidence indicating that hedge funds intervention encourages 
target firms to engage in high-risk and potentially illegal tax shelter activities.  
Chen et al. (2010) investigate whether family firms are more aggressive in tax management 
relative to their non-family counterparts. They argue that the level of tax management in family 
firms can be different from that in non-family firms, because owners in family firms and 
managers in non-family firms may view the benefits and costs associated with corporate tax 
management differently. Family firms, in which family owners have higher and less diversified 
ownership, longer investment horizons and greater reputation concerns, tend to exhibit less 
severe owner-manager agency conflict but greater agency tension between the controlling and 
minority shareholders relative to their non-family counterparts. Therefore, family owners can 
capture more benefits from tax saving activities, owing to their substantial shareholdings in the 
firm. However, the less-diversified equity position of family owners and their stronger 
incentives to protect the family reputation can constrain family firm from engaging in tax 
management activities, because the reputational damage and the price discount imposed by 
minority shareholders are likely to exert substantial and longer-lasting detrimental impacts on 
family owners’ wealth. Using 3865 firm-year observations for the period 1996 to 2000, Chen 
et al. (2010) find that family firms are less aggressive in tax management (as measured by 
higher effective tax rates and lower book-tax differences) relative to their nonfamily 
counterparts.  
Based on the above research evidence, it can be concluded that firms’ ownership structure, 
including managerial dual-class stock ownership; concentrated versus diffused ownership; 
institutional ownership; hedge fund ownership; and family ownership, plays an important role 
in determining the level of corporate tax management, through influencing managers’ 
preferences and attitudes towards undertaking tax management activities.  
 
145 As measured by the average changes in tax management in the firms targeted by the activist during the past 
five years. 
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3.3.2.2. Board of directors and corporate tax management 
According to the agency theory, a modern corporation operates under the separation of 
management and ownership, with a nexus of contracts specifying in advance all parties’ rights 
and obligations (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Baysinger et al. 1985, pp. 104). Owing to the 
information asymmetry between managers and shareholders and the impossibility of perfectly 
contracting for every conceivable decision and action of managers, managers may exercise 
their discretions and power to opportunistically pursue their own objectives at the expense of 
shareholders’ goals (Masson 1971; Zahra and Pearce 1989). Therefore, it is essential for 
shareholders to ratify and monitor managerial behaviours, in order to alleviate the agency 
conflicts and ensure that managers act in their best interests. However, given that monitoring 
is costly, dispersed shareholders who possess small stakes may lack sufficient incentives to 
devote resources to closely monitoring managerial actions, which can cause the ‘free-rider 
problems’ that individual shareholder attempts to free-ride in the expectation that other 
shareholders will involve in the process of monitoring the management, and ends up with no 
effective monitoring taken place within the firm (Grossman and Hart 1980; Fama 1980; Hart 
1995; Beasley 1996).  
Under this circumstance, the board of directors is elected and delegated by shareholders to act 
as the ‘apex’ of the internal decision control within a firm (Fama and Jensen 1983, pp. 323). 
The board of directors is responsible for setting firms’ strategic aims and implementation 
guidelines; ratifying and monitoring managerial behaviours; recruiting, dismissing and 
compensating top-level managers for the benefit of shareholders; and alleviating agency 
problems by aligning the emphasis of managerial efforts with shareholders’ goals (Fama and 
Jensen 1983, pp. 311; Zahra and Pearce 1989, pp. 301; Beasley 1996, pp. 446; Committee 
Cadbury 1992, para 2.5). The board therefore can be viewed as a “market-induced institution, 
the ultimate internal monitor of the set of contracts called a firm, whose most important role is 
to scrutinise the highest decision makers within the firm” (Fama 1980, pp. 294). 
To the extent that the board of directors is responsible for setting firms’ strategic aims and 
providing guidelines on the implementation of the strategic aims, boards’ duty should include 
monitoring of managers’ tax management decisions and their implementation process. This is 
because corporate tax decisions, as noted by Glaister and Hughes (2008), are closely integrated 
and articulated with the process of developing and implementing firms’ strategic decisions and 
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cannot be managed independently from other corporate business activities (Landolf 2006; 
Schön, 2008; Hartnett 2008; Erle 2008; Richardson et al. 2013). Therefore, the board of 
directors should be responsible for ensuring that a firm’s tax positions are managed with careful 
considerations of related uncertainty and their impacts on firms’ other business objectives and 
the broader society. In fact, UK tax authorities recognise that as an important internal 
monitoring mechanism, board of directors should play a role in assessing and evaluating risks 
of firms’ tax-related activities; ensuring tax activities are conducted with restricted tax 
aggressiveness; and bearing the ultimate responsibility for firms’ tax strategies and outcomes146 
(HMRC 2006; Lanis and Richardson 2011).  
Previous empirical studies have investigated the impacts of the board of directors on corporate 
tax practices, from perspectives of board independence; board size; and characteristics of the 
board such as directors’ financial sophistication and whether a board establishes risk 
management and internal control system. According to Fama (1980) and Fama and Jensen 
(1983), the composition of individuals (i.e., the inside and outside members) serving on the 
board has a crucial impact on board’s efficacy in monitoring managerial behaviours and 
correcting managerial failures. In particular, inside members, who possess substantial 
information advantage about the organisational performance due to their full-time status, can 
assist the board to ratify or rationalise firms’ strategic decisions and exercise effective controls 
over the implementation of such strategic decisions. The outside members, owing to their 
independent characteristics, play an important role in enhancing the viability and independence 
of the board in the process of internal decision control, by preventing collusion between top-
level executive directors; limiting the discretion of executive directors in making key decisions; 
and aligning the interests between shareholders and managers (Fama 1980; Fama and Jensen 
1983; Williamson 1984; Beasley 1996).  
Therefore, the effectiveness and independence of a board acting as an important corporate 
governance mechanism can be a positive function of the proportion of outside members serving 
on the board. This is consistent with Baysinger and Butler (1985) who state that “the board's 
ability to perform the multiple tasks of dealing with the corporate agency problem, providing 
expertise or guidance, and maintaining effective inter-organisational strategies depends to a 
large degree on the affiliations of the individual directors comprising the board and the 
 
146 See: Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) (2006). Tax on the Boardroom Agenda: The Views of 
Business, HMRC, London, UK. 
Chapter 3 Literature Review and Theoretical Framework 
119 
 
proportional representation of those individuals” (pp. 110). 
Based on the view that a higher proportion of outside members serving on board increases 
board independence and enhances the effectiveness of boards in monitoring managerial 
behaviours, Lanis and Richardson (2011) investigate the impact of the board composition on 
corporate tax aggressiveness using a sample of Australia firms which are accused of involving 
in aggressive tax practices. Their logistic regression results indicate that higher percentage of 
outside directors serving on the board significantly reduces the likelihood of corporate tax 
aggressiveness, indicating that independent boards are more effective in monitoring managerial 
performance and restricting corporate tax aggressiveness. Using a sample of U.S. firms for the 
period 1996-2005, Minnick et al. (2010) include board composition as one of their four facets 
of corporate governance (i.e., board compensation, entrenchment, executive compensation and 
board composition) to investigate the impact of corporate governance on firms’ long-run tax 
behaviours. Their empirical results show that 1 percent increase in board independence (as 
proxied by the number of non-executive directors on board) results in 0.054 percent reduction 
in foreign taxes and 0.137 percent increase in domestic taxes, which suggests that more 
independent board have stronger motivation to reduce taxes internationally, but are reluctant 
to undertake activities that reduce domestic taxes due to concerns about the reputational risk. 
Results in Lanis and Richardson (2011) and Minnick et al. (2010) both indicate that board 
independence plays a significant role in monitoring managerial tax behaviours and influencing 
the level of firms’ tax management.  
However, the role of board independence in restricting corporate tax aggressiveness is found 
to be conditional on shareholders’ priority in residual claims. Richardson et al. (2015) find that 
financial-distressed firms show greater incentives to take advantage of cash tax savings from 
aggressive tax management activities, because the traditional sources of external financing for 
organisational operations such as borrowing from debtholders, becomes more costly for them 
due to their greater bankruptcy risk. However, they further find that corporate tax 
aggressiveness is positively associated with the interaction between board independence and 
financial distress, indicating that outside directors devote less effort to monitoring managerial 
behaviours and restricting tax aggressiveness during financial distress, when debtholders have 
priority over shareholders in residual claims. 
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In addition to board independence, the impacts of board characteristics and board size on 
corporate tax practices have also been investigated by prior studies. For example, Armstrong 
et al. (2011) perceive corporate tax management as one of many investment opportunities that 
are expected to generate cash flows with varying associated risks, and argue that the unresolved 
agency problems could lead managers to undertake tax management activity with a level of 
risk differing from what shareholders would desire. Effective corporate governance mechanism 
ratifies and monitors firms’ strategic decisions, therefore, is expected to play a role in 
mitigating agency problems associated with tax management decisions by attenuating extreme 
levels of tax management (i.e., by mitigating the over- or under-investments in corporate tax 
management). Using quintile analysis to investigate the association between corporate 
governance and tax management at different levels, the authors show that board’s financial 
expertise and independence are positively related to tax management for firms with low-level 
tax management, but are negatively related to tax management for firms with high-level tax 
management. Their results suggest that financially sophisticated and independent board are 
effective in mediating extreme levels of tax management, by encouraging (discouraging) the 
engagements in tax management activities when firms underinvest (overinvest) in tax 
management.  
Richardson and Lanis (2013) argue that board of directors in a firm is responsible for 
implementing tax risk management framework with effective policies and procedures, to 
minimise uncertainties and risks regarding the interpretation and application of complex tax 
laws and alleviate the reputational damage from engaging in aggressive tax activities. Based 
on a sample of 203 Australian public firms for the period 2006-2009, Richardson and Lanis’s 
(2013) logistic regression results147 suggest that firms in which their board establishes a risk 
management system and internal controls148 are less likely to be tax aggressive. In addition, 
they find that the interaction effect between board independence (as measured by a higher 
proportion of independent members on board) and the establishment of an effective risk 
management system and internal control jointly leads to reduced tax aggressiveness in a firm. 
The authors interpret their results as providing policy and practical implications for 
policymakers and regulatory bodies about the impacts of boards’ oversight characteristics on 
 
147 The dependent variable of the logistic regression is a dummy variable indicating whether a sample firm is 
accused of involving in tax dispute under the Australia tax laws. 
148 According to Richardson and Lanis (2013), the Australian Stock Exchange requires publicly-listed firms to 
disclose information in their financial statements about whether a firm has established of risk management systems 
and internal controls on board. 
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restricting corporate tax aggressiveness. 
Board size can affect the effectiveness of firms’ governance mechanism in either a positive and 
negative way (Wahab and Holland 2012). On the one hand, boards in large size are likely to 
have directors with diverse backgrounds, skills and experience. Large boards with members in 
heterogenous backgrounds and skills therefore are expected to be more active in restricting 
CEO domination and limiting the scope for managerial discretion, thereby enhancing the 
effectiveness of the board in ratifying and implementing firms’ strategic decisions (Zahra and 
Pearce 1989, pp. 309). On the other hand, larger boards may negatively affect the effectiveness 
of boards’ monitoring function, since it is likely that larger boards are associated with increased 
difficulties and complication in the process of coordinating, communicating and decision-
making as compared to smaller boards (Florackis 2008). Previous empirical studies do not 
provide compelling evidence on the impact of board size on corporate tax management. 
Minnick et al. (2010) argue that smaller boards may be nimbler in decision-making and thereby 
more adept to convince management to allocate resources to tax management. Their results, 
however, do not show any significant impacts of board size (as proxied by the total number of 
board members) on firms’ long-run tax management (as measured by five-year GAAP ETR 
and five-year Cash ETR). Similarly, Lanis and Richardson’s (2011) logistic regression results 
show that the board size does not exert significant impacts on the level of firms’ engagement 
in aggressive tax management activities149.  
To summarise, the board of directors, which serves as a key component of internal governance 
mechanism, is responsible for ratifying and monitoring firms’ strategic decisions; scrutinising 
managerial behaviours; and alleviating the agency problems to protect the interests of 
shareholders. Boards’ duties, among others, include monitoring and implementing firms’ tax 
management strategies and managing firms’ tax-related risks, since there is a close liaison 
between corporate strategic decisions and taxation decisions, due to the fact that tax decisions 
cannot be made and managed independently from firms’ other business activities. Based on the 
view that board of directors plays a role in mitigating agency problems and monitoring firms’ 
tax matters, previous empirical studies have investigated the impacts of board of directors on 
corporate tax management, from perspectives of board independence, board size, and 
characteristics of the board such as directors’ financial sophistication and whether a board 
 
149 The uncompelling results regarding the relationship between board size and corporate tax management may 
due to the nonlinear impact from board size.  
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establishes a risk management system and internal controls. 
3.3.2.3. External monitoring and corporate tax management 
In addition to ownership monitoring and board of directors, the external mechanism such as 
firms’ external auditors and financial analysts also play an active role in scrutinising managerial 
behaviours and reducing the information asymmetry between managers and financial statement 
users, by regularly tracking firms’ financial statements to detect financial reporting 
irregularities and to verify the reliability and transparency of the reported financial information. 
The primary role of external auditors is to offer an independent assessment and express an 
opinion on the validity and reasonableness about whether the client firms’ financial disclosures 
represent their underlying financial conditions and are in conformity with generally accepted 
accounting principles (Abdel-Khalik and Solomon 1988; Han et al. 2012, pp. 29). DeAngelo 
(1981) and Lennox (2005) define audit quality as the ‘joint probability’ that an existing 
problem related to financial statement is detected and reported by auditors. They suggest that 
the audit quality is a function of auditors’ competence and independence and the level of 
complexity and opacity associated with the existing financial reporting problem. Palmrose 
(1986) defines audit quality as the probability that financial statements are free from material 
omissions or misstatements. These definitions of audit quality imply that high-quality external 
auditors might enhance the financial reporting quality, through improving the fairness and 
reliability and reducing the managerial estimation errors in financial disclosures.  
Since income taxes are substantial for a broad set of companies, and the managerial judgements 
needed to estimate the tax-related provisions are frequently documented as contributing to 
financial statement misstatements, auditors must be well informed about their client firms’ tax 
performances and provide adequate assurance about the validity and fairness of the tax-related 
disclosures in their clients’ financial statements (Barrett 2004, pp. 490-491; Donohoe and 
Knechel 2013). The involvements in questionable tax-related activities can cause managers to 
conceal the material information of the tax disclosures. Therefore, auditors have to devote 
effort and resources to evaluating the reasonableness and reliability of their clients’ tax 
accounts, in order to ensure that the managements do not bias tax provisions to deliberately 
influence earnings; or engage in tax planning transactions that may be uncovered and 
overturned by tax authorities in the future. Auditors, if necessary, should require their clients 
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to correct the questionable tax disclosures by recording a contingent tax reserve which 
increases the reported tax expense; or reducing the financial statement benefits arising from 
involving in abusive tax transactions (Kanagaretnam et al. 2016).  
The importance of external auditors on firms’ tax positions has been examined by several 
studies. Donohoe and Knechel (2013) employ a large sample of U.S. firms for the year 2002-
2010 to explain the association between corporate tax management and audit fees. They find 
that corporate tax management (as measured by lower cash or current effective tax rates) and 
the interaction between tax management and tax uncertainty (as measured by greater 
unrecognised tax benefits) positively influence audit fees after controlling proxies for earnings 
quality. Their empirical findings suggest that increases in external audit fees can represent a 
nontax cost borne by tax-aggressive firms, since the complex and risky techniques associated 
with aggressive corporate tax activities likely increase the required audit efforts and expose 
auditors to reputational and regulatory risks, leading to a fee premium for external audit 
services.  
Kanagaretnam et al. (2016) employ an international setting to investigate the impact of auditor 
quality on corporate tax management. Using a sample of non-U.S. companies from 31 countries 
for the period 1995-2007, they conclude that as compared to the employment of non-Big N 
external auditors, the employment of Big N firms as external auditors reduces the likelihood of 
companies’ engagement in tax management activities. The authors interpret their findings as 
that high-quality external auditors play an effective role in reducing managers’ incentives to 
engage in abusive tax transactions, which enhances the credibility of corporate tax reporting. 
This is because that the tax-related deficiencies in clients’ financial statements and the financial 
restatements resulting from detections by tax authorities regarding clients’ aggressive tax 
transactions inevitably heighten the litigation and reputational risks of auditors. Therefore, 
higher-quality audit firms with greater reputational concerns likely impose stricter reporting 
standards on their clients’ tax disclosures.  
Consistently, Klassen et al. (2016) employ confidential tax data from IRS (Internal Revenue 
Service) and provide evidence that firms whose tax returns are prepared and signed by external 
auditors, especially by Big 4 auditors, have less aggressive tax positions claimed in their tax 
returns (as measured by lower FIN 48 tax reserves) than firms whose tax returns are prepared 
and signed by their internal tax departments or by external non-auditors. Their results indicate 
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that high-quality external auditors are likely to impose stricter tax reporting standards and 
discourage their clients to engage in aggressive tax management activities.  
Financial analysts, who act as important information intermediaries in capital markets, are 
responsible for collecting, analysing and disseminating information reported in firms’ financial 
statements with the aim of issuing earnings forecasts and recommending stocks for equity 
investors (Yu 2008). Given the prominent role of financial analysts in processing and 
distributing firms’ financial information, prior studies provide evidence that financial analysts 
are effective in reducing the information asymmetry between managers and investors (Jensen 
and Meckling 1976); detecting financial fraud and restricting earnings management (Yu 2008; 
Dyck et al. 2006); enhancing firms’ liquidity (Irvine 2003); and increasing firms’ voluntary 
disclosures (Anantharaman and Zhang 2011; Balakrishnan et al. 2014). Yu (2008) 
demonstrates that financial analysts can be deemed as external monitors against managerial 
misbehaviour and financial reporting irregularities, since their ability and resources to 
understand and analyse information reported in financial statements create an ‘external layer 
of scrutiny’ of firms’ information distribution process (pp. 247). 
Allen et al. (2016) argue that firms with higher analyst coverage might be less incentivised to 
engage in aggressive tax management activities, since the higher the analyst coverage, the more 
likely firms’ underlying practices such as their aggressive tax activities are revealed to the 
public through analysts’ comments and reports. This can lead to reputational costs and 
undervaluation by equity investors and, thus, dampening firms’ incentives to engage in 
aggressive tax management. However, higher analyst coverage can also create greater market 
pressure for managers to avoid missing analysts’ earnings expectations through earnings 
management. In this case, firms with high analyst coverage would likely to reduce tax expenses 
through manipulating income tax provision for the purpose of manufacturing earnings. This is 
consistent with Graham et al.’s (2014) survey evidence that the publicly-traded firms with 
higher analyst coverage emphasise more on the importance of tax management techniques 
which are designed to increase after-tax earnings. Using a difference-in-difference method, 
Allen et al. (2016) examine the causal effect of the exogenous decrease in analyst coverage due 
to brokerage house mergers on corporate tax management. They find that firms experiencing 
reductions in analyst coverage increase their engagements in tax management activities during 
the post-merger period, confirming the constraining effects of financial analysts on corporate 
tax management. Using the similar method, Chen et al. (2018) find that reductions in analyst 
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coverage due to broker mergers/closures lead to 2.5 percent (2.6 percent) decrease in firms’ 
GAAP (cash) effective tax rates on average, and the constraining effects of financial analysts 
are more pronounced among financial-distressed firms and firms with weaker corporate 
governance.  
To summarise, prior studies provide evidence that high-quality external auditors and intensive 
analysts coverage exert significant influence on constraining firms’ aggressive tax management 
activities and improving firms’ tax and financial reporting quality. This is primarily because 
external auditors and financial analysts play an active role in tracking firms’ financial 
statements on a regular basis to detect managerial misbehaviours and financial fraud from the 
reported financial information, which may facilitate to enhance firms’ information 
transparency and reduce the information asymmetry between managers and financial statement 
users.  
The section 3.3 reviews previous literature that examines the relationship between corporate 
governance and corporate tax management. This section begins with the discussion of agency 
theory, and is followed by the review of research evidence on how various governance 
mechanisms affect managers’ engagement in tax management activities. The principal-agent 
perspective of corporate tax management indicates that agency tension between managers and 
shareholders might lead managers to implement corporate tax management in a way that is not 
desired by shareholders. Therefore, it can be important for shareholders to rely on various 
corporate governance mechanisms to monitor managers’ behaviours and make sure that 
managers engage in tax activities on behalf of shareholders’ interest. In conclusion, previous 
studies find that different ownership structure, board of directors, external auditors and 
financial analysts play a role in affecting managers’ incentives and actions in the engagements 
of tax management activities.
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3.4. Corporate tax Management, Corporate Governance and the 
Informativeness of Tax Disclosures in Financial Statements 
This section reviews previous value-relevance accounting and taxation literature, as they 
provide a theoretical and methodological foundation for justifying and developing the key topic 
of this thesis, i.e., the informativeness of income tax provision. This section begins with 
discussing the theoretical foundation and methodology employed by the existing value-
relevance accounting and taxation studies, and further reviews previous studies regarding the 
joint impact of corporate governance and corporate tax management on the informativeness of 
income tax provision. The main objective of this section is to show the research gap that exists 
in the literature and to interpret this study’s research framework under the context of the 
existing literature. 
3.4.1. Theoretical foundation of value-relevance research 
The main objective of the regulated financial reporting and disclosures prepared by firm 
managers is to credibly communicate firms’ current and expected future financial position with 
financial statements users, in order to provide high-quality information which is useful in 
facilitating financial statement users to estimate firm value and make a difference in their 
investment, pricing or allocation decisions (IASB 2018 Conceptual Framework, para 1.3-1.11). 
The quality and decision-usefulness of accounting information reported in financial statements 
is based on the pillars of relevance and reliability. Specificlly, relevance refers to “the ability 
of the item to make a difference to decisions of financial statement users”. Reliability refers to 
“the ability of the measure to represent what it purports to represent”, i.e., the accounting 
information is provided with a significant degree of assurance that the information is complete, 
neutral and free from error (Barth 2000, pp. 16; IASB 2018 Conceptual Framework, para 
2.4-.219).  
Under the efficient market assumption, firm value equals the present value of the expected 
future net cash flows discounted at an appropriate risk-adjusted rate of return (Kothari 2001, 
pp. 108-109). Therefore, whether an accounting amount is significantly related to a firms’ 
contemporary security prices or future cash flows can be of great interests to financial statement 
users, because a significant association between an accounting amount and a firm’s 
contemporary security prices or future cash flows implies that this accounting amount is 
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measured with sufficient reliability and provides incremental explanation about firms’ 
underlying performance and profitability, thereby might be useful in making a difference in 
financial statement users’ decisions about providing resources to this firm (Lev 1989; Kothari 
2001; Barth et al. 2001). As highlighted by IFRS Conceptual Framework, information reported 
in financial statements should facilitate users of financial statements to assess the ‘amount, 
timing and uncertainty’ of future net cash inflows to the entity (IASB 2018 Conceptual 
Framework, para 1.2-1.3).  
Based on this notion, the primary focus of value-relevance accounting studies is to determine 
how well a particular accounting amount provides reliable and relevant information for valuing 
a firm, by employing various valuation models to investigate the association between this 
accounting amount and a selected variable which represents the ‘normative’ benchmark 
amount of firm value (Barth 1994; Holthausen and Watts 2001; Lee 2001). As Barth (2000) 
highlighted, “value-relevant means the accounting amount is associated with some measure of 
value, e.g., share prices. If the amount significantly increases the power of the estimating 
equation to explain equity value, then it must be relevant and measured with at least some 
reliability. If it is not relevant there would be no relation with equity value. If the amount is 
fraught with ‘too much’ measurement error, the researcher also would not detect a significant 
relation” (pp. 16). Consistently, Holthausen and Watts (2001) document that assuming 
efficient markets, the presence of managers’ misrepresentation of a particular accounting 
variable for the purpose of misleading financial statement users can bias downward the 
usefulness 150  of this accounting variable in reflecting firms’ underlying performance and 
facilitating investors’ estimation of firm value. 
It is important to point out that using the association with share price as a criterion for 
evaluating the informativeness or value relevance of a particular accounting amount is based 
on the assumption that the capital market is reasonably efficient. That is, competitions among 
rational and profit-maximising participants will drive the share prices fully and immediately to 
 
150 However, Lev (1989) and Holthausen et al. (2001) argue that using the return-earning regression to represent 
the usefulness of earnings is incomplete, since earnings are deemed to provide useful information for a broad 
range of users under various context, such as predicting corporate bankruptcy and bond rating or for contracting 
purposes between shareholders and managers or between the firm and its lenders and creditors, rather than solely 
providing information for equity investors. However, Barth et al. (2001) argue that the usefulness of earnings as 
reflected from the return-earnings regression captures the ability of earnings to explain securities returns, which 
can be useful for updating beliefs of investors and accounting standard setters regarding how well share prices 
reflect an accounting amount. 
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reflect the effects of this accounting amount on firms’ intrinsic values (Fama 1965, pp. 4; Fama 
1970, pp. 8; Kothari 2001, pp. 114). The efficient market hypothesis “provides justification for 
selecting the behaviour of security prices as an operational test of usefulness of accounting 
information” reported in financial statements (Ball and Brown 1968, pp. 160). Otherwise, if 
the capital market is inefficient in fully and immediately processing the available public 
information about firms’ underlying performance and future prospects, the market participants’ 
estimates of firm value implicit in stock price would be irrational and, thereby, the stock price 
would not be a good benchmark to evaluate the reliability and relevance of a particular 
accounting amount in explaining firm value (Ball and Brown 1968, pp. 160; Holthausen and 
Watts 2001, pp. 18) 151.  
Although there exists evidence to support the relevance of efficient market hypothesis in 
explaining the stock market behaviours (e.g., Fama 1976; Seyhun 1986; Landsman and 
Maydew 1999; Malkiel 2005), substantial empirical evidence suggests that capital market 
might be inefficient in processing and interpreting available public information (e.g., Barberis 
et al. 1998; Daniel et al. 1998; Aboody et al. 2002; Lee 2001; Kothari 2001). As Lee (2001) 
argues, “if a particular piece of value-relevant information is not incorporated in price, there 
will be powerful economic incentives to uncover it, and to trade on it. As a result of these 
arbitrage forces, the price will adjust until it fully reflects the information”, However, “price 
discovery is an on-going process and the current price of a security is best regarded as a noisy 
(or incomplete) proxy for a security's true fundamental value” (pp. 237). 
Base on the above discussion, it can be concluded that the primary purpose of value relevance 
accounting research is to empirically test the reliability and relevance of an accounting variable 
in providing useful information for financial statement users to estimate firm value. An 
accounting amount is defined as informative or value-relevant if it exhibits a predicted 
association with a selected benchmark variable (e.g., a firm’s future cash flows or 
contemporary share price/stock return) (Barth 2000). When the association with share 
price/stock return is used as a criterion to evaluate the informativeness or value relevance of an 
 
151However, Barth et al. (2001) argue that using the amount implicit in share prices as the selected benchmark 
variable to represent firm value only requires the assumption that share prices reflect investors’ consensus beliefs 
rather than the assumption that capital market is efficient, unless that a value-relevance study is designed to test 
how well the accounting amounts such as the book value of assets, liabilities and accounting net income reflect 
their corresponding economic amounts (pp. 94,98). 
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accounting variable, it is necessary to assume that capital markets are at least reasonably 
efficient in processing the publicly available information to reflect firm value.  
3.4.2. Value-relevance accounting and taxation research 
3.4.2.1. Value-relevance or informativeness of accounting disclosures 
As discussed above, value-relevance studies generally focus on determining the reliability and 
relevance of an accounting amount by employing various valuation models to investigate the 
association between this accounting amount and a normative valuation benchmark (e.g., firms’ 
future cash flows, stock price or stock return), with the aim of assessing how well this 
accounting amount provides useful information in explaining the selected valuation benchmark. 
Previous value-relevance accounting literature has typically examined the informativeness or 
value relevance of financial information152 by 1) testing the association between the financial 
information and prices or returns to show the ability of the financial information to “change 
the total mix of information in the marketplace”; 2) testing if the financial information 
“contains the variables used in a valuation model or assists in predicting those variables”, e.g., 
testing the ability of the financial information to predict future cash flows or future earnings 
(Francis and Schipper 1999, pp. 325). Therefore, in the following sections, previous literature 
regarding the value relevance of the accounting disclosures will be reviewed from aspects of 
the return-earnings association; the ability of accounting disclosures to predict future cash 
flows; and the long-term trend of the value relevance of accounting disclosures. 
3.4.2.1.1. Return-earnings association 
The correlation between stock returns and earnings has been commonly analysed by previous 
studies to evaluate the informativeness or value relevance of earnings, based on the underlying 
logic that if earnings provide useful information to facilitate investors in firm valuation,  
earnings should be able to provide incremental explanatory power about the price revisions 
around the earnings announcement and thereby be significantly related to stock returns (Lev 
1989). As argued by Lev (1989), “if an action (reflected by, say, a change in stock price or 
volume) can be attributed to specific information, such information is considered useful. This 
 
152  Financial information examined by previous value-relevance accounting studies includes the aggregated 
earnings; the disaggregated earnings components and other non-earning items over short-term and long-term.  
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is the logic underlying the return/earning association studies” (pp. 156). Inferences regarding 
the informativeness or value relevance of earnings are generally based on the significance of 
the slope coefficient (earnings response coefficient) or the explanatory power 𝑅2 generated 
from regressing stock returns on earnings over time and/or cross-sectionally153 (Kormendi and 
Lipe 1987; Collins and Kothari 1989; Easton and Zmijewski 1989). In particular, the slope 
coefficient of the return-earning regression represents the “average change in the stock price 
associated with a unit change in earnings” (Lev and Zarowin 1999, pp. 356) and the 𝑅2 
measures “the degree to which observed price revisions can be ascribed to (or explained by) 
earnings, or, rather, the extent to which earnings are actually used by investors” (Lev 1989, 
pp. 157)154.  
The time-series returns-earnings regressions are estimated based on the assumption that 
investors react identically to earnings of the same firm over time, and the cross-sectional return-
earning regressions are based on the assumption that investors react identically to earnings 
released across all firms. While the cross-sectional assumption can be less realistic than the 
time-series assumption since investors’ reactions to earnings of a firm over time might be more 
stable than that across different firms within a particular reporting period, the cross-sectional 
return-earnings regressions can be useful for testing the degree of ‘intertemporal stability’ of 
the returns-earnings relationship, i.e., the fluctuation of the coefficients or 𝑅2 generated from 
the returns-earnings regression from period to period (Lev 1989). Running the return-earnings 
regression cross-sectionally for period 1982-1986, Lev (1989) reveals that the return-earning 
association is intertemporally instable over time.  
Numerous studies show that ERCs vary significantly across firms or industries. For example, 
in explaining the cross-sectional variations of ERC, Collins and Kothari (1989) and Eason and 
Zmijewski (1989) find that ERC is negatively related to firm’s systematic risk and positively 
related to firms’ earnings persistence and growth opportunity. Biddle and Seow (1991) perform 
the cross-industry comparison of return-earning association and find that both the response 
coefficients and 𝑅2 vary considerably across industries. As a result, Biddle and Seow (1991) 
 
153 A lower (higher) slope coefficient and/or a lower (higher) 𝑅2 suggest that the reported earnings are less (more) 
informative in explaining stock returns (Lev and Zarowin 1999). 
154  According to Beisland (2009), in regression analysis, 𝑅2  measures “the proportion of variance in the 
dependent variable explained by the independent variable”. Therefore, in the return-earning regression, 𝑅2 
measures “how much variation in stock prices or returns is explained by the accounting variance analyzed” (pp. 
11).  
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claim that the return-earnings association should be estimated by industry, as the cross-industry 
variations in ERCs can bias the magnitudes and significance of ERCs or 𝑅2  if estimated 
without controlling for characteristics differing systematically across industries155. Teets and 
Wasley (1996) suggest that the firm-specific time-series estimation of ERC should be used 
instead of pooled cross-sectional estimation, since the pooled return-earning regression 
estimated on the basis of the assumption that return-earning association is homogenous across 
firms can bias downwards the magnitude of estimated ERC, leading to incorrect inference 
about behaviours of ERC between groups of firms under examined.  
Previous value-relevance literature that examines the return-earning association finds small 
magnitudes of the slope coefficients (i.e., ERCs ranging from 1 to 3) and low levels of 
explanatory power (i.e., 𝑅2 ranging from 2% to 5%). The general weak association between 
returns and earnings, as argued by Kothari (2001), can be explained in four ways. First, a 
reasonably efficient market can instantaneously incorporate substantial information about 
firms’ underlying performance and future prospects into contemporaneous stock values, while 
accounting earnings, due to the revenue realisation and expense matching processes, 
incorporate information about expectations of firms’ future cash flows with a lag. This leads to 
a richer information set implicit in stock prices relative to that in the contemporaneous 
accounting earnings and, hence, a weak return-earnings association (Beaver et al. 1980). 
Second, the small association between price change with earnings change may imply that the 
capital market is not efficient enough to correctly and timely interpret and process the 
information reflected in accounting earnings when forming expectations of a firm’s prospect. 
Third, poor earnings quality induced by deficient accounting standards (e.g., the discretionary 
accounting policy choices or subjective judgements allowed by GAAP) may render accounting 
information less useful in facilitating investors to predict firms’ future prospects, leading to 
weak return-earnings association (Lev 1989; Amir and Lev 1996; Aboody and Lev 1998). 
Finally, the transitory earnings that are not expected to persist into the future can be less 
informative about firms’ future performance, which contributes to the weak association 
between earnings and stock returns (Ou and Penman 1989; Hayn 1995; Basu 1997). The 
presence of transitory earnings can be attributable to transactions that produce one-time gains 
 
155Different industrial characteristics include financial and operating leverage, growth, product type and entry 
barriers. Biddle and Seow (1991) demonstrate that estimating the return-earning association by industry 
membership can naturally capture industry-specific characteristics and control for omitted variables that differ 
significantly by industry.  
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or losses; accounting conservatism that reflects bad news more quickly than good news156; or 
the managerial misuse of discretionary accruals for opportunistic purposes such as increasing 
managers’ compensation or job security157. 
To summarise, this section highlights that previous studies focus on examining the 
informativeness or the value relevance of earnings based on two important indexes, i.e., the 
magnitudes of the earnings response coefficient and the coefficients of determination (𝑅2) 
generated from the return-earning regression. Specifically, running the time-series returns-
earnings regression can be used to test the cross-sectional behaviour of the return-earning 
relationship, while running the cross-sectional returns-earnings regression can be used to test 
the ‘intertemporal stability’ of the returns-earnings relationship over periods. In addition, 
previous studies find small earnings response coefficient and  low levels of explanatory power 
from the return-earning regression, indicating general weak association between returns and 
earnings. 
3.4.2.1.2. The ability of accounting disclosures to predict future cash flows 
In addition to examining the value relevance of earnings by evaluating the association between 
earnings and stock price/return under the efficient market assumption, some value-relevance 
studies employ earnings’ predictive ability regarding future operating cash flows as a criterion 
to evaluate the value relevance of earnings. Since firm value is the dicounted present value of 
the expected future cash flows, testing the ability of an accounting variable to forecast future 
cash flows can be the ‘crux’ of valuation, which is more directly consistent with the financial 
accounting standards’ contention that financial information should facilitate users to assess the 
‘amount, timing and uncertainty’ of firms’ future cash flows (Kothari 2001, pp. 172; Kim and 
Kross 2005; IASB 2018 Conceptual Framework, para 1.2-1.3).  
 
156 Conservatism can affect the informativeness of earnings since losses are more timely but more transitory than 
gains. This is because that the recognition criteria in GAAP are generally less stringent and require less verifiable 
information for losses than the recognition of good news (Basu 1997). In addition, Hayn (1995) provides evidence 
that losses are less informative than profits regarding firms’ future prospect, since when investors perceive the 
current reported losses as a signal for low future cash flows of a firm, investors can exercise their options to 
liquidate the firm rather than suffering from perpetuate losses. Under this circumstance, “investors do not evaluate 
firms strictly on the basis of their reported earnings, thus leading to a weak observed return-earnings association” 
(Hayn 1995, pp. 127). 
157 Discretionary accruals which are used for managerial opportunistic purposes tend to be transitory and can 
reduce the value relevance of earnings, because they are not designed for providing useful information about firms’ 
future performance or long-term strategies (Marquardt and Wiedman 2004; Kothari 2001; Schmidt 2006). 
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For example, Greenberg et al. (1986) compare the ability of current-period earnings and cash 
flows to predict future cash flows ranging from one to five years ahead. Using ordinary least-
square regression, they find that the coefficient of determination for the earnings model (i.e., 
the regression of future cash flow on current-period earnings) is greater than that for the cash 
flow model (i.e., the regression of future cash flow on current-period cash flow), which 
suggests that earnings have a greater ability to predict future cash flow than cash flow. This is 
consistent with Lorek and Willinger (1996) who employ quarterly rather than annual data to 
test the value relevance of earnings and find that earnings are incrementally more useful than 
cash flows in forecasting future cash flows.  
Finger (1994) examines the value relevance of earnings by investigating the ability of earnings 
to predict future operating cash flow one through eight years ahead, using both firm-specific 
in-sample and out-of-sample regression. After correcting for autocorrelation, nonstationary and 
cointegration, her in-sample results show that earnings are a significant predictor of future cash 
flows for approximately 90% of the sample firms. When using out-of-sample regression to 
compare the ability of earnings to predict future cash flows with that of cash flows, she finds 
that cash flow is a superior short-term predictor about future cash flows, while earnings and 
cash flows are approximately equivalent in forecasting future cash flows over the long-term 
horizon.  
Furthermore, the theoretical model and the firm-specific coefficients analysis of Dechow et al. 
(1998) both show that current-period earning is a significant predictor of future cash flows, 
either by testing alone or in conjunction with cash flows. In addition, they suggest that the 
superiority of earnings over cash flow to predict future cash flows is increasing as the operating 
cycle increases. Building on Dechow et al.’s (1998) model, Barth et al. (2001) find that the 
ability of earnings to predict future operating cash flows up to four years ahead has been 
significantly improved when disaggregating earnings into cash flow and six accruals 
components, including change in accounts receivable, change in inventory, change in accounts 
payable, depreciation, amortization and other accruals. In particular, they find that the 
predictive ability of cash flow and the six accruals components are greater than that of current 
and up to six lags of aggregate earnings.  
To summarise, previous studies have also evaluated the value relevance of earnings by 
examining their ability to predict future operating cash flows, because it is consistent with the 
Chapter 3 Literature Review and Theoretical Framework 
134 
 
financial standards’ contention that it is important to predict the ‘amount, timing, and 
uncertainty’ of firms’ future operating cash flows. Thoese studies use the coefficients of 
determination (𝑅2 ) from the regression of future cash flow on current-period earnings to 
measure earnings’ ability to predict future cash flows. Those studies generally find that earning 
is a significant predictor of future cash flows. 
3.4.2.1.3. The long-term trend in the value relevance of accounting disclosure 
Previous studies have also examined the long-term trend in the value relevance of financial 
information, motivated by concerns that increased complexity in institutional, technological 
and macroeconomic factors might render the financial statements less useful in providing 
relevant information about firms’ underlying economic conditions and future prospects. 
Collins et al. (1997) use cross-sectional regressions and 𝑅2 as the primary metric to examine 
the value relevance of financial information spanning from 1953 to 1993. Regressing the yearly 
𝑅2s derived from three valuation models (i.e., regressing share price three months after fiscal 
year-end on the book value per share and the earnings per share, jointly and individually) on a 
time-trend variable (i.e., a variable representing the period 1953-1993), they find that the 
incremental value relevance of the bottom-line earnings has decreased over time, while the 
incremental value relevance of book values has increased over time. They further provide 
evidence that the shift in value relevance from earnings to book value is attributed to the 
increase in the magnitude of one-time items, intangible intensity and the frequency of negative 
earnings; and the decrease in average firm size over time.  
Similarly, regressing of the yearly 𝑅2𝑠 over a time-trend variable which represents the period 
1952-1994, Francis and Schipper (1999) show that the value relevance of earnings to explain 
stock return has decreased over time, while the value relevance of balance sheet items to 
explain stock return has increased over time158. Lev and Zarowin (1999) use similar time-trend 
regression but a shorter sample period than Collins et al. (1997) and Francis and Schipper (1999) 
to examine the long-term trend of value relevance of accounting information. They find that 
the cross-sectional associations (as measured by yearly 𝑅2𝑠) between capital market values and 
the accounting information (i.e., earnings, book value, and the combination of earnings and 
book value) have decreased over the sample period 1977-1993. The authors further denote that 
 
158 Collins et al. (1997) and Francis and Schipper (1999) also include a time-square variable in the time trend 
regression to capture the potential nonlinearities on the long-term trend of value relevance of financial information. 
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the decline in the value relevance of the reported accounting information is attributed to the 
increasing rate of business changes which is measured by the higher-level of firms’ year-end 
switches in ranked book value portfolio, and the increasing level of investment on research and 
development.  
However, Brown et al. (1999) argue that the presence of scale factors (i.e., differences in the 
size of observations) in the levels regressions would render the 𝑅2 a biased and unreliable 
measure in comparing changes in the value relevance of an accounting amount over time. 
Specifically, a regression that exhibits an increase in the coefficient of variation of the scale 
factor would generate higher 𝑅2𝑠 as compared to the same regression without scale effects. 
After controlling for the scale effects by deflating159 a proxy for the unobservable scale factor 
(i.e., deflating the stock price to control for the size of a share), Brown et al. (1999) replicate 
Collins et al. (1997) and find different results that the value relevance of both the book value 
and earnings has decreased over time, suggesting that the empirical results of Collins et al. 
(1997) might be biased due to the potential scale effects.  
Instead of employing the statistical associations between an accounting variable and capital 
market values (e.g., stock price and return) to measure the value relevance of this accounting 
variable, Kim and Kross (2005) examine the long-term trend of the ability of earnings to 
explain future one-year-ahead operating cash flows over a 28-year period, based on the 
conjecture that since the stock price is the present value of the expected future cash flows, the 
deterioration in the association between earnings and stock prices as revealed by previous 
studies should imply a decrease in the ability of earnings to predict future operating cash flows.  
Through regressing the 𝑅2𝑠 derived from annual cross-sectional regressions (regressing future 
cash flow on current-period cash flow and earnings) on a time-trend variable that represents 
the period 1973-2000, Kim and Kross (2005) find that the ability of accounting earnings to 
explain future one-year-ahead cash flows has increased over the 28-year period, regardless of 
firm size; firms’ dividend payments and profit status160. It is important to point out that in order 
to address issues related to the cross-sample comparison of 𝑅2𝑠 that may occur in analysing 
 
159 Brown et al. (1999) point out that deflating by a proxy for scale effects yields 𝑅2s that “better reflect the 
explanatory power of the underlying variables and not that of scale” than including the proxy as an explanatory 
variable (pp. 103). 
160 The authors further provide evidence that increased accounting conservatism, i.e., the prompter recognition of 
bad news in financial statements, is the primary factor that make the financial statement more relevant for future 
cash flow projections. 
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the long-term trend of the value relevance of an accounting amount, Kim and Kross (2005) 
follow Brown et al. (1999) to deflate all variables by total assets to control for the potential 
scale effects. Since Gu (2002) argue that the inherent sampling variations across samples would 
also make the 𝑅2 a biased and unrealistic statistic even in the absence of scale effects, Kim and 
Kross (2005) further rank the dependent variable and all independent variables into percentiles 
each year to ensure that the sample variance in all regressions are constant over time, thereby 
eliminating problems regarding the cross-sample comparisons of 𝑅2 s due to the inherent 
sampling variations. However, results in Kim and Kross (2005) fail to reveal the long-term 
trend of the ability of earnings to predict future cash flows beyond the one-year horizon. 
Overall, the section 3.4.2.1 reviews previous literature regarding the value relevance of the 
accounting disclosures from aspects of the return-earnings association; the ability of accounting 
disclosures to predict future cash flows; and the long-term trend of the value relevance of 
accounting disclosures. To summarise, previous studies focus on examining the 
informativeness or the value relevance of earnings based on two important indexes, i.e., the 
magnitudes of the earnings response coefficient and the coefficients of determination (𝑅2) 
generated from the return-earning regression. Consistent with the financial standards’ 
contention that it is important to predict the ‘amount, timing, and uncertainty’ of firms’ future 
operating cash flows, previous studies have also evaluated the value relevance of earnings by 
examining their ability to predict future operating cash flows. Moreover, previous studies have 
examined the long-term trend in the value relevance of financial information by regressing the 
yearly 𝑅2s derived from valuation models on a time-trend variable. In the next section, relevant 
tax studies will be reviewed to show the informative role of tax-related disclosures. 
3.4.2.2. Value relevance or informativeness of tax-related disclosures  
Book and taxable income reporting are two income systems which serve different objectives 
and are governed by different rules. For instance, book income is prepared according to the 
generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), to provide financial information which is 
useful for potential and existing investors, lenders and other creditors in making investment 
decisions. By comparison, the calculation of taxable profits is governed by tax legislation with 
the primary goal of facilitating governments to efficiently and equitably collect revenue. While 
GAAP often permits considerable discretion in the process of financial reporting, such as 
allowing managers to exercise judgments and discretion in recognising reserve allowance or 
Chapter 3 Literature Review and Theoretical Framework 
137 
 
choosing between different accounting approaches, less discretion is allowed by tax law in the 
process of calculating taxable income (Hanlon 2005; Ayers et al. 2010; Miller and Oats 2017). 
Moreover, since book and tax reporting serve different purposes, managers tend to have 
different incentives when preparing book and taxable income in financial statements. Managers 
might be incentivised to report higher book income to attract new investors; relax debt 
covenants; or improve managements’ compensation and job security, but might be incentivised 
to report lower taxable income to avoid the transfer of firm wealth from shareholders to tax 
authorities.  
Given that book and taxable income reporting systems are governed by unique set of rules and 
are subjected to different managerial incentives, it is likely that book and tax disclosures in 
financial statements serve as alternative sources of information in facilitating the assessment 
of firms’ current and future performance. This section therefore reviews relevant tax studies to 
provide an insight into the informative role of tax-related disclosures in reflecting firms’ current 
and future performances, from aspects of the role of tax-related disclosures in indicating 
earnings characteristics; the market participants’ valuation of tax-related disclosures; and the 
ability of tax-related disclosures to predict future tax cash flows.  
3.4.2.2.1. The role of tax-related disclosures in indicating earnings characteristics 
Previous studies have examined the information contained in book-tax differences in indicating 
various earnings characteristics. For example, Revsine et al. (1999) demonstrate that an 
increase in a deferred tax liability (i.e., where book income is in excess of taxable income) 
“might be an indication of deteriorating earnings quality”, and the deferred tax assets accounts 
(i.e., where taxable income is in excess of book income) can be manipulated as “a way to 
artificially increase earnings” (pp. 633-634). Consistent with this notion, Hanlon (2005) 
investigates the role of temporary book-tax difference in reflecting the persistence of earnings, 
accruals, and cash flows in explaining future one-year-ahead earnings, based on the inference 
that large book-tax differences, if arising from earnings management, should be informative 
about the lower persistence of firms’ earnings and accruals because the manipulated portion of 
accruals tend to be transitory in nature. Results in Hanlon (2005) show that as compared to 
firm-years with small book-tax differences, firms-years with large positive and negative book-
tax differences both have less persistent earnings, accruals and cash flows, implying that large 
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book-tax differences might be an indicator of earnings management which results in lower 
quality of both cash flow component and accrual component of earnings.  
Blaylock et al. (2012) argue that if large temporary book-tax differences employed in Hanlon 
(2005) solely reflect large book accruals 161 , Hanlon’s (2005) empirical results could be 
explained just as that larger accruals are less persistent than small accruals, which is highlighted 
by Sloan (1996) and Dechow and Ge (2006). Blaylock et al. (2012) therefore re-examine the 
incremental informativeness of temporary book-tax differences about earnings persistence 
after controlling for the magnitude of book accruals. Their results suggest that large temporary 
book-tax differences provide incrementally useful information about earnings persistence 
beyond the magnitude of book accruals. In addition, Blaylock et al. (2012) extend Hanlon 
(2005) by partitioning firms with large positive temporary book-tax differences into three 
subsamples based on three different sources of book-tax differences, i.e., book-tax differences 
predominantly arising from 1) firms’ upward earnings management; 2) firms’ engagements in 
tax management activities; or 3) the normal differences between book and tax treatments in the 
absence of tax management or earnings management. They find that firms with large positive 
temporary book-tax differences that arise primarily from earnings management (tax 
management) exhibit the lowest (highest) persistence in earnings and accruals.  
Rather than focusing on the temporary book-tax differences, Lev and Nissim (2004) suggest 
that the tax-to-book ratio (i.e., the ratio of estimated taxable income to book income) is a 
comprehensive ‘tax-based fundamental’, which reflects the aggregated tax-disclosure 
information including the temporary book-tax differences; the permanent book-tax differences 
and the changes in valuation allowance. They investigate whether tax-to-book ratio provides 
incremental information about earnings’ growth over accruals and cash flows162, and find that 
the tax-to-book ratio provides incremental explanatory power about earnings growth for up to 
 
161 Accruals recognised for book purposes but not for tax purposes. 
162 Lev and Nissim (2004) demonstrate that the tax-to-book ratio is a measure of earnings growth for three reasons. First, 
overstating (understating) of current earnings through discretionary accruals can be informative about earnings growth since 
the overstatement (understatement) of earnings increases (reduces) the base from which future earnings grow and an 
overstatement of earnings by shifting future earnings to the present (an understatement of earnings by shifting present earnings 
to the future) is generally followed by a reduction (increase) in earnings. Therefore, to the extent that the tax-to-book ratio 
reflects the overstatement or understatements of current earnings, it should be informative about future earnings. Second, since 
tax management behaviors through smoothing both current and future taxable income can make the current taxable income 
better reflect future taxable income and thereby better related to future earnings, the tax-to-book ratio should be predictive 
about future earnings to the extent it reflects tax smoothing behaviors. Third, since revenues (expenses) are often included in 
taxable income before (after) they are included in book income, a higher tax-to-book ratio may indicate higher future revenue 
or smaller expense and, hence, high future earnings growth. 
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five years in the future. Schmidt (2006) examines the implications of the tax change component 
of earnings (i.e., earnings generated by changes in the effective tax rate) for earnings prediction. 
He argues that the tax change component of earnings can exert either positive or negative 
impacts on earnings persistence, since earnings generated by changes in the effective tax rate 
are affected by both persistent and transitory elements, including long-run tax management 
strategies (i.e., persistent element); period-specified earnings management (i.e., transitory 
element); and the tax sheltering activities (relatively transitory element). Empirical results in 
Schmidt (2006) show that the tax change component of earnings in the first fiscal quarter is 
less transitory and more informative in predicting future earnings than that in the subsequent 
quarters. His results suggest that the initial estimated ETR in the first quarter incorporates 
information about managements’ estimations regarding the most material and long-term effects 
on firm earnings. However, the revisions to the annual ETR estimates can be evidence of 
earnings management or tax-sheltering activities, which leads the tax change of earnings to 
become more transitory and less informative in predicting future earnings as the year 
progresses. 
Dhaliwal et al. (2013) posit that the disclosure of valuation allowance for deferred tax assets163 
requires managers to exercise their private information about firms’ current underlying 
financial performance and future prospects, to determine whether it is unlikely for their firms 
to generate sufficient taxable income in the future to utilise the benefits arising from deferred 
tax assets. As a result, the valuation allowance disclosures should provide forward-looking 
information about the persistence of firms’ accounting losses. Using a large sample of U.S. 
loss firms, they find that managements’ decisions regarding the recognition of valuation 
allowance provide incremental information which is useful for predicting the persistence of 
firm losses up to three years ahead. Specifically, loss-firms that have materially increased their 
valuation allowance are found to exhibit losses more persistent than loss-firms that report 
positive taxable income or recognise net operating losses carryforward without increasing 
valuation allowance. 
 
163 The U.S. accounting standard SFAS 109 requires firms to reduce deferred tax assets by a valuation allowance 
if it is more likely than not (i.e., the probability is more than 50%) that firms will not generate sufficient future 
taxable income to utilise benefits arising from deferred tax assets. Therefore, managers should use their private 
information about firms’ current and future financial position, to make judgements about whether to reduce 
deferred tax assets by the valuation allowance.  
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To summarise, previous tax studies provide compelling and consistent empirical results that 
tax-related disclosures in financial statements are useful in indicating earnings quality. 
Specifically, different components of tax disclosures (e.g., temporary book-tax differences; the 
components of temporary book-tax differences arising from earnings management or tax 
management; tax-to-book ratio; the initial and revised tax change component of earnings; and 
the valuation allowance for deferred tax assets) are found to be able to explain various earnings 
characteristics, including earnings persistence; earnings growth and the persistence of 
accounting losses.  
3.4.2.2.2. The market participants’ valuation of tax-related disclosures 
As discussed above, tax information reported in financial statements provides forward-looking 
information about earnings persistence; growth in future earnings; and persistence of 
accounting losses. Therefore, reported tax information in financial statements might be useful 
for capital market participants in evaluating and forming expectations about firm value. Prior 
literature has identified the value relevance of tax disclosures for capital market participants, 
through revealing the ability of tax disclosures to explain firms’ contemporaneous returns or 
predict future returns164.  
Hanlon et al. (2005) examine the information content of book income and taxable income to 
determine whether reducing the differences between the two income measures leads to 
information loss. Using association tests to regress the contemporaneous security returns on 
book income and the estimated taxable income, they find that although book income exhibits 
larger explanatory power about firms’ annual stock returns than the estimated taxable income 
(as reflected by higher 𝑅2𝑠 of the book income regression compared to 𝑅2𝑠 of the taxable 
income regression), the estimated taxable income provides significant information to the 
capital market as it is found to be significantly and positively associated with the 
contemporaneous returns. In addition, their portfolio-return tests show that incorporating 
foreknowledge of both the sign and the magnitude of the pre-tax income (the estimated taxable 
income) lead to 27.4% (21.1%) average market-adjusted returns. Hanlon et al. (2005) therefore 
 
164 According to Graham et al. (2012), the association between tax disclosures and contemporaneous returns 
generally reflects whether equity investors incorporate information about tax-related disclosures into their firm 
valuation process, but does not provide evidence about whether investors fully and instantaneously impound the 
tax-related information when the tax disclosures are released. A significant relation between current tax 
disclosures and future returns shows that equity investors fail to fully and simultaneously value tax disclosures 
when the tax disclosures are released. 
Chapter 3 Literature Review and Theoretical Framework 
141 
 
conclude that conforming book and taxable income measures would result in information 
losses, because the two income systems are both useful for equity investors in assessing firms’ 
underlying performance. Ayer et al. (2009) extend Hanlon et al. (2005) by investigating how 
corporate tax planning and earnings management affect the information content of estimated 
taxable income relative to book income. They find that the estimated taxable income is more 
(less) useful165 in explaining the annual stock returns for firms with low earnings quality (high 
tax planning) than for other firms, suggesting that engaging in tax planning compromises the 
ability of reported tax disclosures to explain firms’ underlying economic performance, and 
investors perceive taxable income as a more useful summary measure of a firm’s performance 
when its book income is considered as being managed opportunistically. 
In addition to measuring the information content of tax-related disclosure through its ability to 
summarise information that affects firms’ contemporaneous stock returns, several studies have 
examined the association between tax disclosures and future stock returns, to show whether the 
capital market is efficient in simultaneously impounding tax-related information into security 
prices166. For example, Lev and Nissim (2004) find that tax-to-book ratio for the current period 
is positively and significantly associated with subsequent stock returns, consistent with that the 
information contained in tax-related disclosures about firms’ underlying performance is not 
fully and immediately reflected in the contemporaneous stock prices. However, they find that 
the ability of the capital market to impound tax-related information has improved over time, as 
reflected by a stronger association between tax-to-book ratio and contemporaneous stock price 
and a weaker association between tax-to-book ratio and future stock returns after the 
implementation of SFAS No. 109 in the year 1993. Hanlon (2005) finds that equity investors 
use information contained in book-tax differences to assess the persistence of firms’ future 
 
165 Ayer et al. (2009) define the usefulness of taxable income relative to book income as the ratio of the adjusted 
𝑅2 generated from regression of firms’ contemporaneous returns on their estimated taxable income to the adjusted 
𝑅2 generated from regression of firms’ contemporaneous returns on their estimated taxable income. High tax-
planning firms are defined as firms in the lowest quintile of accumulated effective tax rates over a five-year 
window and low earning-quality firms are defined as firms in the highest quintile of absolute abnormal accruals. 
However, Raedy (2009); Hanlon et al. (2010) and Graham et al. (2012) posit that categorizing book-tax differences 
according to their sources. i.e., from tax planning or earnings management can be difficult. One problem of Ayers 
et al. (2009) is that they fail to control for impacts from earnings management (tax planning) when examining the 
incremental information content of taxable income for high tax-planning (low earnings-quality) firms. 
 
166 Weber (2009) argues that the ability of tax-related information to predict future returns may either due to equity 
investors’ misunderstanding of tax-related information, leading to systematic errors in investors’ earnings 
expectation, or due to the possibility that tax-related disclosures (e.g., book-tax differences) reflect risk factors 
that are not well understood by investors. His results support the argument that the positive association between 
tax-related information and future stock return is attributable to investors’ misunderstanding of tax-related 
information. 
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earnings. Investors appear to correctly price the persistence of future earnings for firms with 
large negative book-tax differences, while tend to perceive the positive book-tax difference as 
a ‘red flag’ and lower their expectation of future earnings persistence for firms with large 
positive book-tax differences. Moreover, they find that they exhibit future abnormal returns for 
firm-years with book-tax differences, indicating that earnings expectations embedded in 
contemporaneous stock prices fail to immediately and completely reflect information about 
book-tax differences.  
Similarly, Schmidt (2006) provides evidence that the capital market fails to fully understand 
the implication of tax change components of earnings (i.e., earnings generated by changes in 
effective tax rates) on earnings persistence, and the mispricing is mainly attributable to 
investors’ underestimation of the persistence of the revised tax change component of earnings 
(i.e., the tax change components generated from quarter 2-4) due to their transitory nature. As 
argued by Schmidt (2006), decreases in effective tax rate arising from tax management 
strategies, such as tax sheltering activities or taking advantage tax rate differentials across tax 
jurisdictions, can lead to greater tax savings and the consequent increases in earnings, thereby 
should be perceived as good news. However, Thomas and Zhang (2010) find that the quarterly 
tax expense surprises (i.e., increases in quarterly tax expense) are positively related to future 
stock returns, which indicates that increases in tax expense are incrementally useful in 
indicating firms’ higher underlying profitability and hence can be perceived as good news.  
Therefore, results of prior research regarding the value implications of tax expense for equity 
investors are inconclusive. On the one hand, tax expense is perceived as a fundamental cost 
which represents value lost to the incurred and potential tax obligations, thereby higher tax 
expenses represent bad news and should be negatively related to value (e.g., Schmidt 2006). 
On the other hand, taxable income represents an alternative summary measure of firms’ 
underlying profitability, thereby higher tax expenses should be perceived as good news and 
positively related to value (e.g., Lev and Nissim 2004; Hanlon et al. 2005; Ayer et al. 2009; 
Thomas and Zhang 2010). Thomas and Zhang (2014) argue that the contradictory results with 
respect to the value implication of tax expense can be attributed to different regression 
specifications employed in the studies. The inclusion of proxies for investors’ expectations of 
future profitability (measured using analysts’ forecasts) in the regression restricts the ability of 
tax expense to indicate firms’ future profitability and, hence, emphasises the role of tax expense 
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in representing value lost. However, omitting proxies for expectations of future profitability 
allows tax expense’s ‘proxy-for-profitability role’ to emerge.  
In examining factors that restrict the efficiency of equity investors to use tax-related disclosures 
in forming expectations of future earnings, Dhaliwal et al. (2013) argue that investors may not 
fully understand tax-related information due to the complex nature of accounting for income 
taxes. Moreover, the ability of investors to understand the tax-related information is dependent 
on the saliency of the tax disclosures and the quality of firms’ information environments. 
Dhaliwal et al. (2013) find that investors generally understand the implication of changes in 
value allowance on predicting firms’ future losses, while do not appear to fully understand the 
implication of loss firm-years with positive taxable income, since the material decisions 
regarding valuation allowance are more frequently disclosed in news release and more 
prominently discussed by management. Moreover, they find that abnormal returns from the 
mispricing of tax-related information are only present in firm-years with a lower level of 
analysts following, suggesting that better information environment mitigates the mispricing of 
tax-related information. This is consistent with Weber’s (2009) empirical finding that higher 
level of analyst following attenuates the positive association between book-tax-differences and 
future stock returns, which indicates that equity investors become more sophisticated in 
incorporating information contained in book-tax differences into their earnings expectation for 
firms with richer information environments.  
Besides equity investors, prior studies provide evidence that information contained in tax-
related disclosures can also affect decisions made by other capital market participants, such as 
financial analysts or credit rating agencies. Amir and Sougiannis (1999) document that analysts’ 
earnings forecasts are less precise and over-optimistic for firms with tax-loss carryforwards. 
Shane and Stock (2006) provide evidence that financial analysts fail to fully understand the 
impacts of tax-motivated intertemporal income-shifting from high-tax to low-tax periods. 
Similarly, Weber (2009) finds that firms with higher book income relative to taxable income 
display greater optimism167 in analysts’ forecasts of future earnings, suggesting that financial 
analysts fail to fully understand the value implication of information contained in book-tax-
differences on future earnings. In addition, he finds that the enhanced information environment 
of firms (as measured by higher level of firms’ analyst coverage) and the improved forecasting 
 
167 Firms’ actual earnings are lower as compared to analysts’ consensus forecast of those earnings. 
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experience of analysts gained from repeating the forecasting process over time (as measured 
by the number of years that an analyst has made forecasts for a firm) can mitigate the tax-
related forecast errors. These studies are consistent with Plumlee’s (2003) arguments that due 
to the complex nature of accounting for income taxes, financial analysts are less capable of 
accurately incorporating tax-related information into their forecasts. 
By contrast, Bratten et al. (2017) provide evidence that financial analysts pay close attention 
to income taxes and are able to incorporate tax-related information into their earnings forecasts. 
Bratten et al. (2017) attempt to explain how financial analysts forecast tax expense and what 
factors affect the accuracy of the tax expense forecasted by analysts. They find that when a 
firm’s tax environment is complex or when managements’ estimates include discrete tax 
items168, financial analysts are more likely to make improvements on managements’ estimates 
rather than completely echoing managements’ estimates of tax expenses.  Further, they find 
that although the tax environment complexity and the presence of discrete items in 
managements’ estimates significantly impair the accuracy of both analysts’ and managements’ 
tax expense forecasts, the analysts’ tax forecasts are relatively more accurate than 
managements’ estimates under this context. Their results are consistent with Hutchens (2016) 
who finds that financial analysts incorporate tax-related information into their earnings forecast, 
and that the tax footnote readability is positively associated with the accuracy of analysts’ tax 
expense forecasts. 
Research evidence suggests that credit rating agencies also use the tax-related information to 
assess a firm’s credit risk. Ayers et al. (2010) argue that information contained in firms’ book-
tax differences can be informative for credit rating agencies, since higher book income relative 
to taxable income may signal firms’ deteriorated earnings quality and increased reliance on 
off-balance-sheet financing169, thus might be associated with less favourable rating changes. 
Using an ordered logit model, they find that firms that have large positive changes in book-tax 
 
168 Bratten et al. (2017) measure tax environment complexity as higher level of changes in ETRs; higher level of 
volatility of ETRs; the presence of equity compensation; higher level of permanent differences between tax and 
book income; the period when legislation retroactively extending the R&D credit is passed; and the presence of 
unused tax-loss carryforwards. The discrete items refer to “settlements with tax authorities, one-time charges, and 
return-to-provision reconciliations” (pp. 2). 
169 According to Mills and Newberry (2005); Maydew (2005) and Wilson (2010), large positive book-tax 
differences may arise from ﬁrms’ utilisation of the off-balance-sheet financing to report greater interest expense 
on their tax returns without correspondingly reporting higher interest expense on their financial statements. 
Extensive utilisation of off-balance-sheet financing increases the probability of firms’ default risk thereby may 
result in downgrades in firms’ credit rating. 
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differences are more likely to experience a downgrade in credit rating. However, the negative 
association between book-tax differences and credit rating changes is only manifested among 
the non-tax-planning firms (i.e., firms in the top four quintiles of current or cash effective tax 
rates). Results in Ayers et al. (2009) suggest that credit rating agencies are able to incorporate 
the tax-related information into their credit risks analysis and perceive large positive book-tax 
difference arising from non-tax-planning sources as an indicator of credit risk.  
In light of the above-discussed literature, it can be concluded that tax disclosures in financial 
statements contain useful information for capital market participants (e.g., equity investors, 
financial analysts and credit rating agencies) in evaluating firms’ current performance and 
future prospects. However, research evidence regarding whether greater tax expense represents 
value lost to tax paid or conveys favourable news about a firm’s future profitability is mixed 
and is sensitive to the regression specification employed (Thomas and Zhang 2014). In addition, 
evidence on the efficiency of the capital market in fully and properly understanding the value 
implication of the tax-related information is inconclusive. Some studies suggest that equity 
investors (financial analysts) are able to effectively impounds the tax-related information into 
their security prices (earnings forecasts), while other studies provide evidence that due to the 
complexity of tax-related disclosures, equity investors and financial analysts fail to properly 
understand the value implications of the tax-related financial information. 
3.4.2.2.3. The ability of tax-related disclosures to predict future tax cash flows 
Previous studies have also examined the usefulness and the informativeness of tax-related 
disclosures to provide forward-looking information about firms’ future tax payments, based on 
the notion that understanding the association between firms’ reported tax information and 
future cash tax outflows is more consistent with the primary objective of financial accounting 
standards, i.e., to make projections about the ‘amount, timing and uncertainty’ regarding firms’ 
future cash flows and help investors to make relevant investment decisions. 
In explaining the value relevance of deferred taxes and their components about future tax 
payments, some studies suggest that it is essential to assess the timing and likelihood of the 
reversals of deferred taxes. For example, White et al. (2003) argue that “the component of the 
deferred tax liability should be analysed to evaluate the likelihood of reversals or continued 
growth. Only those components that are likely to reverse should be considered a liability” (pp. 
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304). Givoly and Hayn (1992) investigate whether investors perceive deferred tax liability as 
a ‘real’ liability, by examining how firms’ equity value changes around news disclosures about 
the proposed reduction in the corporate tax rate as a result of the enactment of the Tax Reform 
Act of 1986 in the US. They find that the decline in deferred tax liability resulting from tax rate 
deduction leads to equity appreciation. However, the equity appreciation resulting from the 
decline in the nominal value of deferred tax liability varies cross-sectionally as a function of 
the expected timing and likelihood of the settlement of the deferred tax liabilities. Specifically, 
the equity appreciation is lower for firms with a higher growth rate in deferred tax liability 
balance and for firms exhibiting a higher probability of reporting future losses, suggesting that 
investors tend to perceive deferred tax liability as a ‘real’ liability and discount it based on the 
timing and likelihood of its reversal170.  
Similarly, Amir et al. (1997) investigate the value relevance of deferred taxes, by classifying 
deferred taxes into disaggregated components based on the timing and likelihood of reversals 
for each component. Their results show that deferred taxes are incrementally useful in 
explaining cross-sectional variation in firms’ equity value and that deferred tax components 
which are expected to reverse sooner exhibit greater valuation coefficients, indicating that the 
deferred tax balance plays an informative role in equity valuation, and the value of deferred 
taxes is dependent on the length of expected time of their reversals. 
However, theoretical evidence provided in Guenther and Sansing (2000; 2004) and Dotan 
(2003) challenges the conventional wisdom that the valuation of deferred taxes is dependent 
on the time that the deferred taxes are expected to reverse, by arguing that the value of deferred 
taxes is only based on their future cash tax consequences rather than their length of expected 
time until reversal. Specifically, they classify deferred tax assets and liabilities into two main 
categories, i.e., the deferred tax assets or liabilities whose reversal is triggered by tax events 
and whose reversal is triggered by the accounting recognition of tax expense or benefits, 
respectively. They demonstrate that only deferred taxes whose reversal is triggered by tax 
events are value relevant, since those deferred taxes are expected to have future cash tax 
consequences and, therefore, changes in the timing of their reversal would alter the present 
value of the associated future tax cash flows. However, for deferred taxes whose reversals are 
 
170 Givoly and Hayn (1992) measure the expected timing and likelihood of the settlement of deferred tax liability 
(DTL) as the expected growth rate of firms’ deferred tax liabilities (i.e., the higher the growth rate, the more 
distant the settlement of DTL) and the likelihood of firms’ future losses (i.e., the higher the likelihood of future 
losses, the lower the probability of the settlement of DTL), respectively. 
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triggered by accounting recognition, the timing of their reversal has no future cash flow 
implication and therefore is not value relevant.  
In validating the theoretical predictions of Guenther and Sansing (2000; 2004) and Dotan 
(2003), Laux (2013) provides cross-sectional empirical evidence to show whether deferred 
taxes provide incremental forward-looking information about future tax payments171. Their 
multivariate empirical results are in line with the theoretical predictions documented in 
Guenther and Sansing (2000; 2004) and Dotan (2003), which indicates that only the 
components of deferred taxes whose reversals are triggered by tax events are associated with 
future tax payments and, hence, are value relevant. In addition, Laux (2013) finds that the 
growth in the deferred tax balances has no impact on the association between deferred taxes 
and future tax payments. 
Choudhary et al. (2016) develop a measure of income tax accruals quality172, which captures 
the precision of income tax accruals to map into the past, current and future income tax-related 
cash flows. Low (high) precision of the income tax accruals in mapping into tax-related cash 
flows indicates bad (good) income tax accruals quality, which primarily arises from greater 
(less) intentional or unintentional managerial estimation errors in the process of estimating 
income tax accruals 173 . They find that the quality of income tax accruals is negatively 
 
171 Laux (2013) partitions deferred taxes into two categories: (1) deferred tax assets and liabilities arising from 
revenue and expenses that are included in GAAP income before the tax-related cash flow is realised, i.e., the 
reversal of deferred taxes will be triggered by the tax event (e.g., restructuring charges; warranty expenses; and 
employ post-retirement benefits); and (2) deferred tax assets and liabilities arising from revenue and expenses that 
are included in GAAP income after tax-related cash flow is realised, i.e., the reversal of deferred taxes will be 
triggered by the accounting recognition after cash tax implication occurred (e.g., depreciation-related deferred tax 
liability). 
172 Instead of using balance sheet approach to calculate tax accruals, Choudhary et al. (2016) define income tax 
accruals as the differences between total income tax expense and cash tax incurred for a respective accounting 
period. They document that tax accruals obtained from income statement induce less noise than that obtained from 
balance sheet, since “cash tax paid pertains only to income taxes” while non-income-related cash flow would not 
map into tax-related cash flows (pp. 94). See section 2.4 in the Background Chapter for detailed information about 
income tax accruals. 
 
173 Specifically, Choudhary et al. (2016) argue that intentional or unintentional managerial estimation errors 
occurred in the process of estimating income tax expense before filling firms’ tax return could reduce the income 
tax accruals quality, since both managers’ intentional manipulation and their unintentional inability to have perfect 
insight of the taxable implication of firms’ operation could cause the ex-ante estimated income tax accruals 
reported in financial statements to differ from their ex-post realisations, obfuscating the ability of current tax 
expense to represent firms’ real tax obligations for a respective accounting period. In addition, the financial-
accounting-standards induced over- or under-statements of current tax expense relative to cash tax payments, 
which may occur even if the GAAP is properly applied without managerial estimation errors, can reduce the 
income tax accruals quality, since they are not intended to reflect firms’ ex-post tax outcomes and, hence, are not 
expected to map into tax-related cash flows. See section 2.4 of the background chapter for detailed information. 
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associated with firms’ future financial restatement resulting from tax issues, indicating that the 
measure of income tax accruals quality is informative to predict management estimating errors 
in tax accounts. In explaining the value implication of income tax accruals quality, they further 
provide evidence that the good (bad) quality of income tax accruals improves (reduces) the 
usefulness of taxable income in facilitating investors’ estimates of firm value. 
In addition, Robinson et al. (2016) investigate the informativeness of income tax provision in 
explaining future tax-related cash flows under the focused setting of FIN 48 in the US. They 
argue that FIN 48 might either increase or decrease the value relevance of income tax reporting 
in predicting future tax cash flows. This is because that although FIN 48 is designed to restrict 
managers’ ability to distort tax reserves for the purpose of earnings management, the uniform 
criteria in FIN 48 fails to adequately reflect firm-specific ‘knowledge, experience and judgment’ 
about their overall tax outcomes, which might cause firms to report tax reserves that have little 
future cash tax implications174. Specifically, they find that the proportion of FIN 48 reserves 
being released via cash tax settlement with tax authorities is relatively small as compared to 
the proportion of reserves being released through other positions with no cash consequences 
(e.g., due to statute lapses or concessions by tax authorities). In evaluating how the adoption of 
FIN 48 changes the ability of income tax expense to predict future tax cash flows, they employ 
the methodology used in previous accounting studies 175  to regress the yearly 𝑅2 s which 
indicate the incremental explanatory power of income tax expenses about future tax cash flow 
on a time-trend variable denoting the pre-FIN 48 or the post-FIN48 period. Their results 
indicate that the implementation of FIN 48 does not improve the incremental informativeness 
of income tax expense to explain future tax-related cash flows, but instead results in a 
significant decline in the predictability of income tax expense about future tax cash flows 
among certain groups of firms. 
 
 
 
174 According to Robinson et al. (2016), FIN 48 reserves might overstate cash required to settle uncertain tax 
positions and thereby reducing the value relevance of income tax accounts in predicting future tax cash flows. 
This is because that FIN 48 does not adequately reflect the inability of firms “to take into account the dynamic 
process of a tax audit and reflect the firm’s judgment about the overall outcome’’,  which may result in generating 
liabilities that “will never be paid in cash” (pp. 1199). 
175 For example, Collins et al. (1997) and Kim and Kross (2005). See section 4.2.1.3. for detailed discussion. 
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To summarise, previous research evidence indicates that the inter-period income tax allocation 
plays a significant role in predicting future tax-related cash flows. Conventional wisdom 
suggests that the value relevance of deferred taxes depends on the timing and likelihood of 
their reversals. However, recent researches challenge this claim by arguing that the timing and 
likelihood of the reversals of deferred taxes can only be value relevant if the reversals have 
future cash tax consequences. Therefore, it is essential to determine the value relevance of 
reported tax information by examining the extent to which it provides incremental information 
about future tax-related cash flows. Overall, previous literature reviewed in the section 3.4.1 
and 3.4.2 lays the theoretical and methodological foundation for the development of this 
study’s research topic, i.e., the informativeness of income tax provision. The next section 3.4.3 
is aimed to show the research gap that exists in the literature and develop this study’s research 
framework under the context of the existing literature. 
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3.4.3. The impacts of corporate tax management and corporate governance 
on the informativeness of income tax provision 
To the researcher’s knowledge, no previous study has directly investigated the association 
between corporate tax management, corporate governance and the informativeness of firms’ 
income tax provision, particularly in the U.K. setting. Therefore, it is worth investigating the 
impact of corporate tax management and corporate governance on the informativeness of 
income tax provision to fill the research gap. This section aims at providing a theoretical 
framework related to how corporate tax management and corporate governance affect the 
relevance and reliability of the reported income tax provision. 
Figure 3.2 
Tax Management, Corporate Governance and the Informativeness of Income Tax Provision 
 
The association between corporate tax management, corporate governance mechanism and the 
informativeness of income tax provision can be illustrated from the above figure 3.2. 
Specifically, corporate tax management behaviours, such as tax-induced earnings management 
and tax planning activities, are expected to reduce the informativeness of income tax provision, 
while effective corporate governance mechanisms likely play a mediating role in enhancing 
the informativeness of the reported income tax information through monitoring and restricting 
the opportunistic tax managements activities. 
Chapter 3 Literature Review and Theoretical Framework 
151 
 
As shown from section 3.2.2.3, previous literature that examines corporate tax management 
activities from the agency perspective suggests that corporate tax management and managerial 
rent diversion can be complementary. This is because the separation of onwership and control 
could provide self-interested managers with latitude to explore their disctretion and flexibility 
and undertake opportunistic tax management activities, such as deliberately manipulating 
income tax accruals to meet particular earnings targets176, or engaging in tax planning activities 
that entail undesirably high degree of risks of being challenged and penalised by tax authorities. 
Specifically, managing earnings through distorting income tax accruals could reduce the 
reliability of income tax provision in faithfully representing firms’ real tax obligation, and 
compromise the informativeness of income tax accruals to explain firms’ future tax cash flows. 
Moreover, the engagements in tax planning strategies may increase the risks of being detected 
and penalised by tax authorities, which could make it more difficult for managers to predict 
firms’ future cash tax consequences and accurately estimate firms’ income tax accruals, thereby 
compromising the reliability and informativeness of the income tax provisions (Desai et al. 
2006; 2009; Choudhary et al. 2016).  
The association between corporate tax management and the informativeness of income tax 
provision can be better explained in conjunction with firms’ corporate governance mechanism. 
This is because shareholders rely on effective corporate governance mechanism to correct 
managerial misconducts and enhance financial reporting quality. In this context, tax 
management activities and corporate governance mechanism can be interrelated in the sense 
that effective corporate governance mechanism plays a role in enhancing the quality and 
transparency of firms’ tax management decisions and restricting self-interested managers from 
opportunistically pursuing tax management activities at the expense of shareholders. Therefore, 
effective corporate governance mechanism is expected to play a mediating role in enhancing 
the informativeness of firms’ income tax provision, through monitoring and restricting the 
opportunistic tax managements behaviours of engaging in: 1) tax-induced earnings 
management to meet particular earnings target through biasing income tax accruls or; 2) tax 
planning activities which may cause difficulties for managers to accurately estimate income 
tax accruals.  
 
176 Although manipulating the amount of cash tax payments can also contribute to the achievement of meeting 
particular earnings targets, managers may lack flexibility in altering the amount of cash tax payment through 
changing the real arrangements of firms’ tax activities. By contrast, the provisioning process of income tax 
accruals requires managers’ estimations to be made and subjects to managerial discretion and assumption, which 
provides managers with more scope and opportunity to gain financial reporting benefits (Armstrong et al. 2014).  
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The development of this study’s research topic is inspired by several previous studies. The 
most enlightening study is Choudhary et al. (2016) which develops a measure of income tax 
accruals quality to capture the ability of income tax accruals to map into current, past and future 
tax-related cash flows. The authors argue that income tax accruals in low quality is partially 
attributable to managements’ intentional or unintentional estimation errors in forecasting the 
taxable implication of their firms’ operation. However, Choudhary et al. (2016) does not 
employ multivariate regressions to examine how corporate tax planning and tax-induced 
earnings management affect the income tax accruals quality. More important, it does not 
provide empirical evidence about whether effective governance mechanism plays a role in 
restricting managers’ opportunistic behaviours and improving the income tax accruals quality. 
In addition, this study is enlightened by the research findings of Dhaliwal et al. (2004) and 
Holland and Jackson (2004) that managers have incentives to manipulate the income tax 
expense accounts through utilising the complexity involved in estimating the income tax 
information, especially when firms’ pre-tax performances have missed certain earnings target. 
This study also shed light on empirical findings of Desai et al. (2006), Kim et al. (2011) and 
Balakrishnan et al. (2018). Those studies find that corporate tax management activities, which 
are designed with the intention to avoid being detected by tax authorities, could create shields 
and masks for managerial opportunistic behaviours and damage the corporate financial 
transparency. The negative impacts from tax management activities however appear to be 
mitigated by effective corporate governance mechanisms (e.g., as captured by higher level of 
institutional shareholders or financial analysts). 
To the researcher’s knowledge, no previous study has directly investigated the association 
between corporate tax management, corporate governance and the informativeness of firms’ 
income tax provision. However, a number of published value-relevant accounting studies have 
examined the joint impacts of earnings management and corporate governance on earnings 
informativeness (as summarised in the following table 2.3). As can be seen from table 3.1, 
previous studies use the slope coefficient and the coefficients of determination (𝑅2) generated 
from the return-earning regression to measure the cross-sectional variations in earnings 
informativeness, and then employ the pooled cross-sectional OLS model to test the impact of 
earnings management or corporate governance on earnings’ informativeness (see Donnelly and 
Lynch 2002). This study is aimed to fill the research gap in the tax literature with reference to 
the methodology employed by those value-relevant accounting studies.
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Table 3.1 
Summary of Value-Relevant Accounting Studies on the Informativeness of Reported Financial Information 
 
Authors Sample Dependent 
Variable 
Variable of Interest Methodology Research Findings 
Warfield, Wild 
and Wild (1995) 
A sample of 
U.S. firms for 
period 1988-
1990 
Firms’ contemporaneous 
stock return 
ERC, i.e., the Earnings 
Response Coefficient, which is 
measured as the slope 
coefficient generated from a 
regression of contemporaneous 
returns on earnings, is used to 
measure the informativeness of 
earnings. 
Pooled cross-sectional OLS 
model is used to test the cross-
sectional variations in earnings 
informativeness conditional 
upon managerial ownership and 
regulatory environment. 
Earnings informativeness is 
positively associated with the level 
of managerial ownership (as 
reflected by a positive coefficient 
of the interaction term between 
earnings and the percentage of 
managerial ownership).  
 
The positive association between 
earnings informativeness and 
managerial ownership is attenuated 
by the monitoring role of regulation 
(as reflected by a negative 
coefficient of the interaction term 
between earnings, the percentage 
of managerial ownership and an 
indicator of regulated industry) 
 
Donnelly and 
Lynch (2002) 
A sample of 
U.K. firms 
for period 
1985-1991 
ERC i.e., Earnings Response 
Coefficient which is 
measured as the slope 
coefficient in a regression of 
return on earnings 
The percentage of institutional 
shareholdings (OB) and the 
percentage of diffused outside 
ownership (DOO). 
A two-stage method is used as 
the main test which involves 
generating the informativeness 
of earnings as measured by ERC 
for each firm in the first stage, 
and then examine the cross-
sectional variation in ERC due to 
ownership structures (as 
measured by OB and DOO 
respectively). 
 
A one-stage method is used as 
robustness check which 
regresses changes in stock price 
Earnings informativeness is 
negatively related to the percentage 
of institutional shareholding and is 
negatively related to the percentage 
of diffused outside ownership, 
suggesting that the importance of 
accounting earnings as an 
information source can be diluted 
by large shareholders who have the 
ability to acquire pre-disclosure 
information, and managers in firms 
with diffused outside ownership 
have greater incentive to distort 
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on earnings and the interaction 
term between earnings and 
proxies for ownership structure 
OB and DOO. 
 
reported earnings and thereby 
reduce earnings informativeness. 
Beekes, Pope 
and Young 
(2004) 
A sample of 
U.K. firms 
for period 
1993-1995 
Earnings per share scaled by 
prior year-end price 
The timeliness of income 
recognition which is measured 
as the slope coefficient 
obtained from a regression of 
earnings on contemporaneous 
return 
Pooled cross-sectional OLS 
regression is used to investigate 
the impact of earnings 
conservatism (i.e., the bad news 
is reflected more quickly than 
good news in earnings) and 
board composition (i.e., the 
percentage of outsiders on 
board) on the timeliness of 
income recognition 
 
Earnings conservatism is more 
pronounces in firms with higher 
level of outside directors on board 
(as reflected by a positive 
coefficient on the interaction term 
between stock return, negative 
earnings and percentage of outside 
directors on board) 
Bandyopadhyay, 
Chen, Huang 
and Jha (2010) 
A sample of 
U.S. firms for 
period 1972-
2006 
The incremental ability of 
earnings in predicting future 
cash flow (FCFO), which is 
measured as the differences 
between the 𝑅𝑎
2 - 𝑅𝑏
2, Where 
𝑅𝑎
2  is generated from the 
firm-specific time-series 
regression of one-year-
ahead cash flow on current 
operating cash flow and 
current earnings, and 𝑅𝑏
2  is 
generated from the firm-
specific time-series 
regression of one-year-
ahead cash flow on current 
operating cash flow 
 
The incremental ability of 
earnings in predicting future 
earnings (FE), which is 
measured as the differences 
between the 𝑅𝑐
2 - 𝑅𝑑
2 , Where 
Two measures of accounting 
conservatism  
Pooled cross-sectional OLS 
regression for the constant 
sample and Fama-MacBeth 
yearly cross-sectional GLS 
regression for the full sample are 
both used to investigate the 
impact of accounting 
conservatism on the ability of 
earnings to predict future cash 
flows and future earnings (FCFO 
and FE).  
Accounting conservatism exerts a 
positive impact on the 
predictability of future cash flow 
but exerts a negative impact on the 
predictability of future earnings. 
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𝑅𝑐
2  is generated from the 
firm-specific time-series 
regression of one-year-
ahead earnings on current 
operating cash flow and 
current earnings, and 𝑅𝑑
2  is 
generated from the firm-
specific time-series 
regression of one-year-
ahead earnings on current 
operating cash flow 
 
Wang (2006) A sample of 
U.S. firms 
over period 
1994-2002 
Firms’ contemporaneous 
stock return 
ERC, i.e., the Earnings 
Response Coefficient, which is 
measured as the slope 
coefficient generated from a 
regression of contemporaneous 
returns on earnings, is used to 
measure the informativeness of 
earnings. 
Pooled cross-sectional OLS 
regression is used to test the 
impact of family ownership on 
the informativeness of earnings 
Earnings informativeness of family 
firms is higher than that of 
nonfamily firms (as reflected by a 
positive coefficient of the 
interaction term between earnings 
and the indicator of family 
ownership), suggesting that family 
ownership improves earnings 
informativeness through aligning 
managerial interests with those of 
outside investors. 
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3.5. Conclusion  
This chapter reviews previous literature on corporate tax management; the impact of corporate 
governance mechanism on firms’ engagement in tax management activities; and the value 
relevance of accounting and tax-related disclosures. Overall, according to the reviewed 
literature evidence, tax avoidance and tax evasion constitute important components of the 
corporate tax management continuum. Since the line of demarcation between ‘acceptable’ and 
‘unacceptable’ tax avoidance is ambiguous and blurred, this thesis will not attempt to 
differentiate between tax avoidance and tax evasion and will define corporate tax management 
as firms’ ability to reduce the explicit tax obligation.  
Although engaging in corporate tax management activities may benefit firm owners in the form 
of increased after-tax net income and increased after-tax cash flows, previous literature 
suggests that there can be various direct and indirect costs associated with tax management 
activities, which constrains firms from achieving the aim of effective tax management, i.e., the 
maximisation of firms’ after-tax wealth. A growing literature analyses corporate tax 
management under the agency perspective and suggests that corporate tax management and 
managerial rent diversion can be complementary. That is, the separation of ownership and 
control can cause self-interested managers to undertake tax management activities for 
opportunistic reasons. In this principal-agent context, corporate tax management and corporate 
governance can be interrelated to the extent that effective corporate governance mechanism 
plays a role in alleviating the information asymmetry between managers and shareholders and 
ensuring that tax management activities are conducted in line with shareholders’ interest.  
Value-relevance studies focus on determining the reliability and relevance of an accounting 
amount, by investigating the relationship between an accounting amount and a normative 
valuation benchmark to assess how well this accounting amount provides useful information 
in explaining the selected valuation benchmark. Previous value-relevance tax studies have 
examined the informative role of tax-related disclosures from aspects of the ability of reported 
tax information to indicate firms’ earnings characteristics; to help capital market participants 
in forming expectations about firm value and pricing stocks; and to predict future tax cash 
flows. 
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Based on the previous literature evidence, it can be expected that managers’ incentives to 
undertake tax-induced earnings management or engage in tax management activities could 
compromise the relevance and reliability of income tax accruals in representing firms’ 
underlying tax obligation, resulting in reduced informativeness of income tax provision in 
explaining future tax cash flows. Moreover, the relationship between corporate tax 
management and the informativeness of income tax provision can be better explained in 
conjunction with corporate governance mechanism, to the extent that good corporate 
governance mechanism plays an active role in monitoring managerial behaviours and 
restricting self-interested managers from undertaking tax activities at the expense of 
shareholders. However, to the researcher’s knowledge, there is no published research that 
investigates the association between corporate tax management, corporate governance 
mechanism and the informativeness of income tax provision. Therefore, this thesis aims to fill 
this research gap with reference to the methodology employed by previous value-relevance 
accounting and taxation studies. 
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4.1. Introduction 
The literature review presented in chapter 3 highlights the needs to investigate the 
informativeness of income tax provision in the UK setting to fill the research gap. This chapter 
is aimed to detail the process of developing the hypotheses and constructing estimation models 
for hypothesis tests, based on the institutional knowledge discussed in chapter 2 and the 
previous research evidence reviewed in chapter 3.  
This chapter begins with stating the hypotheses that will be empirically tested in this thesis. 
Hypotheses in this thesis are designed to seek answers regarding 1) Whether income tax 
accruals are incrementally informative over cash tax paid in explaining future tax cash flows? 
2) How managers’ incentives to undertake tax management activities affect the informativeness 
of income tax accruals? 3) Whether effective corporate governance mechanisms play a 
significant role in attenuating the negative impacts of managers’ tax management incentives 
on the informativeness of income tax accruals? 4) Whether the incremental informativeness of 
income tax accruals to explain future tax cash flows has deteriorated or improved over time in 
the U.K? All of the research questions will be hypothesised in alternative forms. Subsequently, 
this chapter details the process of developing estimation models for testing the hypotheses, 
along with the explanation of definitions of the variables employed in the estimation models 
and the potential econometric issues inherent in the process of multivariate regression analysis. 
4.2. Hypothesis Development 
The ability of generating cash inflows in excess of disbursement is a decisive factor of firm 
success (Badertscher et al. 2012). The International Accounting Standard Board (IASB) 
highlights the importance of financial reporting in cash flow projection by stating that “existing 
and potential investors, lenders and other creditors need information to help them assess the 
prospects for future net cash inflows to an entity” (IFRS Foundation OB3). The information 
asymmetries between managers and investors make it necessary for firms to report internally-
generated information about their continuous cash-generating ability (Dechow 1994). Realised 
cash flow information could help users to assess firms’ future performance through reflecting 
how firms have generated, spent and distributed cash during the past periods. However, over 
finite intervals, the realised cash flow information may not be informative in predicting firms’ 
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future performance due to its inherent timing and matching problems177 . As a result, the 
accounting standard setters have evolved the generally accepted accounting principles by 
establishing an accrual system to smooth out the temporary fluctuations in cash flows, thereby 
providing a less noisy measure of firm performance than the cash-based system (Dechow 1994; 
Charitou 1997; Bushman et al. 2016).  
Through mitigating the timing and matching issues in cash flows178, the accrual accounting 
system is aimed at enhancing the informativeness of the reported financial information by 
providing a better indicator of a firm’s present and continuous ability to generate favourable 
cash flows, rather than providing information solely about cash receipts and payments during 
that period179. In addition, the accrual accounting system requires managers to make reliable 
assumptions, judgements and estimations in the process of financial measurements and 
reporting, which could provide managers a venue to communicate their private forward-
looking information about their firms’ future performance and reduce the information 
asymmetry between management and users of financial reports (Subramanyam 1996; Healy 
and Wahlen 1999; Arya et al. 2003; Louis and Robinson 2005). However, the usefulness of 
accrual accounting system in enhancing the informativeness of reported financial information 
can be counteracted by management’s unintentional and intentional estimation errors in the 
process of accruals provisioning (Dechow et al. 2002; Lev et al. 2010; Badertscher et al. 2012).  
Unintentional estimation errors could arise from management difficulties in making accurate 
forecasts about the economic consequences of firms’ business and economic events. According 
to Lev et al. (2010), the move to fair value accounting results in the prevalence of managerial 
estimates in the reported accounting data, while today’s “competitive and contested” economic 
environments increase the difficulty of accurately estimating the economic consequences in a 
future period (pp 781). By contrast, intentional estimation errors could arise from managerial 
self-interests to influence the reported financial information through biasing accruals. As 
auditing is imperfect, management's exercise of judgments and estimates could create 
 
177  For example, cash flow may not be reliable in representing a firm’s actual performance when there is 
unexpected delay in customer payment or temporary increase in inventory. Dechow (1994) and Bushman et al. 
(2016) state that the timing role of accruals prevents the transitory fluctuations in cash flows and thereby 
mitigating the timing and matching problems inherent in cash flows. 
178 According to IFRS foundation (OB17), accrual accounting mitigates the timing and matching issues in cash 
flows by reflecting the economic transactions and other events of a firm in periods when those transactions and 
events occur, even if the cash flow consequences (i.e., cash receipts or payment) occur in a different period. 
179 See IFRS Foundation OB17.  
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potentials for managerial manipulation of reported financial information, in which managers 
“choose reporting methods and estimates” to influence their firms’ reported financial 
information and make it divergent from firms' underlying performance (Healy et al. 1999, pp 
366; Bergstresser and Phillippon 2006). The intentional and unintentional estimation errors in 
accruals could compromise the informativeness of accruals and exacerbate the information 
asymmetry between managers and users of financial statement.   
4.2.1. Development of the first hypothesis  
Whether income tax accruals are incrementally informative in predicting future tax-related cash 
flows is an empirical question. According to IFRS conceptual framework, the reported 
financial information should have predictive value or/and confirmatory value in order to be 
‘capable of making a difference’ in the decisions made by financial statement users (IFRS 
QC6-7). Income tax accruals, which consist of the taxes accrued but not yet paid in respect of 
taxable profit for the current period; the unsettled tax liabilities in respect of previous periods’ 
tax outcomes; and deferred taxes in respect of temporary book-tax differences, should be 
representative about future cash tax consequences when the accrued/unsettled income taxes are 
realised or when the carrying amount of assets (liabilities) is recovered (settled)180. Moreover, 
because of managers’ estimates and projections embedded in the accruals provisioning process, 
income tax accruals can be a potentially useful device for managers to convey their private 
information about firms’ tax-related transactions and management strategies which may be 
useful for predicting firms’ future tax-related cash flows. Consequently, income tax accruals 
should provide incremental information about future tax-related cash flows.  
For example, the creation of deferred tax asset due to employee benefits (i.e., pension or 
deferred compensation), if estimated properly, informs investors on expected tax reduction in 
a future period. The revaluation of investment properties under IAS 40 could lead to an increase 
in the temporary book-tax difference and therefore an increase in the recognition of deferred 
tax liability, since the revaluation creates book income under IFRS while movements in fair 
value of investment properties are not taxable under UK tax law181. Assuming the fair value of 
 
180 See section 2.4 for detailed information about the definition and the components of income tax accruals.  
181 According to HMRC (2017), “assuming the property is held, for tax purposes, as an investment, the income 
arising on the property is brought into tax as it is recognised in the accounts (for example rental income would be 
bought into tax as recognised in profit or loss). In this case, movements in fair value of investment properties are 
not taxable. The disposal of the investment properties will typically give rise to a chargeable gain”. See 
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the investment properties is estimated accurately, the creation of this deferred tax liability from 
revaluation of investment properties could inform investors on a present obligation to pay taxes 
in a future period, when the fair value is translated into firms’ taxable income either through 
using (i.e. lease income) or selling the investment properties182 (Brouwer et al. 2018).  
However, there are several reasons why income tax accruals may not be informative about 
future tax cash flows. First, future obligations to pay income tax is contingent on firms’ ability 
to make profits in the future. A firm’s current recognised income tax accruals in respect of 
taxable temporary differences may not necessarily result in future tax payment if this firm 
makes a loss in a future period183. Second, the provision of income tax accruals can be complex 
and subjective, as it requires managers’ assumptions, estimations and discretion to determine 
‘whether, where, when and at what rate’ transactions are taxable across all taxable jurisdictions 
(Choudhary et al. 2016, pp 90). For example, managers must estimate the expected manner of 
recovery (settlement) of assets (liabilities) to determine the corresponding tax base and 
calculate the deferred taxes in respect of temporary book-tax differences (Brouwer et al. 2018). 
In addition, due to the stock market listing requirements on timeliness, the income tax 
information disclosed in financial reports primarily relies on figures estimated by firm 
managers, as the financial reports are generally prepared before tax returns are filled to tax 
authorities184 (Wahab and Holland 2018).  
Income tax accruals, which involve managements’ estimates of the tax consequence of certain 
business events, may subject to estimation errors. Unintentional estimation errors are common 
in tax accruals provisioning185 (Plumlee et al. 2010; Usvyatsky and Whalen 2014; Choudhary 
 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/accounting-standards-the-uk-tax-implications-of-new-uk-gaap/frs-
102-overview-paper-new 
182 Assuming that both the use and the sale of the investment properties are taxable based on the relevant tax law. 
183 The verification requirements between deferred liabilities and deferred assets under IAS 12 are asymmetrical. 
IAS 12 para 24 requires a deferred tax asset to be recognised if it is probable that sufficient taxable profit will be 
available against the deductible temporary difference. Conversely, under IAS 12 para 15, a deferred tax liability 
is required to be recognised for all taxable temporary differences except certain exemptions, regardless of whether 
it will result in future tax cash flows (Brouwer et al. 2018). The asymmetrical verification requirement could make 
the deferred tax liabilities recognised under IAS 12 divergent from the definition of liability as stated by IFRS 
conceptual framework that a liability should be recognised “when it is probable that an outflow of resources 
embodying economic benefits will result from the settlement of a present obligation and the amount at which the 
settlement will take place can be measured reliably” (IFRS Conceptual Framework, para 4.46). 
184 According to HMRC, the deadline for a firm to fill tax return is 12 months after the end of the accounting 
period it covers. See https://www.gov.uk/company-tax-returns. 
185 For example, the bad/doubtful debt provision should be recognised for financial reporting purpose when there 
is objective evidence that a firm will not be able to collect the debt, but the bad/doubtful debt is not tax-deductible 
until the loss from bad/doubtful debt is realised in this firm’s profit and loss account. This creates a short-term 
timing difference (deferred tax asset) between the firm’s book income and taxable income, which requires 
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et al. 2016). This is due to the complex nature of computing income tax accruals, as they require 
managers to interpret and apply judicial tax law in different tax jurisdictions; to anticipate the 
tax implications of business operations over all taxable jurisdictions; and to possess specific 
knowledge on tax accounting to articulate the GAAP-based income and taxable income 
(Choudhary et al. 2016).  
Furthermore, previous studies provide evidence that income tax expense accounts are regularly 
used by managers to manipulate earnings in order to achieve certain earnings target, leading to 
intentional estimation errors and making the income tax account a biased construct (Holland 
and Jackson 2004; Dhaliwal et al. 2004; Phillips et al. 2003; Phillips et al. 2004). Specifically, 
Holland and Jackson (2004) document that firms have incentives to manage deferred tax 
provision to avoid the breach of loan convents; to achieve desirable profit status and desirable 
effective tax rate; and to avoid “tax shocks” in the form of prior year adjustment. Dhaliwal et 
al. (2004) provide evidence that managers take advantage of the complexity and discretion in 
estimating income tax accruals to manage the income tax expense account as the last 
opportunity to achieve analysts’ earnings target, when the pre-tax accruals fail to achieve the 
target. Accordingly, the intentional and unintentional errors could introduce noises and biases 
to income tax accruals, compromising the ability of reported income tax accruals to predict 
future tax cash flows.  
Therefore, whether income tax accruals are informative to explain future tax-related cash flows 
is an empirical question which is worth investigating. The first hypothesis of this study is 
designed to examine whether income tax accruals are incrementally informative over cash tax 
paid in explaining future tax-related cash flows. Hence, it is hypothesised (in alternative form) 
that: 
H1: Income tax accruals are incrementally informative over cash tax paid to explain future tax 
cash flows. 
 
 
managers to estimate the amount and timing of the deferred tax asset. Inaccurate estimate of the deferred tax asset 
could result in future tax deduction that differ from the recognised income tax provision.  
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4.2.2. Development of the second hypotheses  
After examining the extent to which income tax provisions track future tax cash flows on 
average, this study will further investigate the determinant factors that cause variations in the 
informativeness of income tax accruals across firms186. As discussed in chapter 3, under the 
agency perspective of corporate tax management, the separation of ownership and control 
could provide managers, who possess the informational advantage and discretion in making 
and implementing tax-related decisions and activities, with opportunities to pursue their 
personal interests through engaging in opportunistic tax activities at the expense of firm 
owners187. The opportunistic tax management activities could compromise the relevance and 
reliability of income tax disclosures in representing firms’ underlying tax obligation, and 
reduce the informativeness of income tax accruals in explaining future tax cash flows. The 
principal-agency perspective of corporate tax management also implies that the relationship 
between corporate tax management and the informativeness of income tax accruals can be 
better explained in conjunction with corporate governance mechanism, to the extent that 
corporate governance mechanism plays a role in alleviating the information asymmetry 
between managers and shareholders and restricting managers from engaging in opportunistic 
tax management behaviours. 
In summary, it is expected that the informativeness of income tax accruals decreases in 
managers’ incentives to undertake tax management activities which may result in intentional 
and/or unintentional estimation errors in income tax accruals; and the negative impact of tax 
management incentives on the informativeness of income tax accruals is expected to be 
alleviated by an effective governance mechanism to monitor managements’ behaviours during 
the information distribution process. In addition, the informativeness of income tax accruals is 
also expected to decrease in the complexity of firms’ tax environment which may increase the 
difficulty of managers in estimating income tax accruals accurately. Below is the development 
 
186 As compared to the cash component of income tax provision, the accruals component of income tax provision 
requires managers’ estimations regarding the taxable implication of firm operation and assumptions about future 
tax cash flows, therefore involving managerial discretion and might be frequently manipulated and distorted by 
managers. For this reason, this section focuses on examining the determinant factors that affect the 
informativeness of income tax accruals, with the primary interests in investigating the impact from managers’ tax 
management incentives. 
187 See page 71-75 in chapter 3 for detailed discussions.  
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of empirical predictions for the variable factors that are expected to cause variations in the 
informativeness of income tax accruals across firms188. 
4.2.2.1. Tax management incentives  
Corporate tax planning. Tax planning activities designed to reduce firms’ tax burden could 
put firms at risks of being challenged and penalised by tax authorities in the future (Desai et al. 
2006; Kim et al. 2011; Hanlon et al. 2014; Guenther et al. 2017). More ex-ante uncertainty of 
firms’ current tax planning behaviours will likely increase difficulties for managers to 
anticipate firms’ future tax consequences and thereby constraining their ability to accurately 
estimate income tax accruals for the current accounting period189 (Choudhary et al. 2016). In 
addition, engaging in tax planning activities may inevitably increase the complexity and 
opacity of firms’ organisational structure and tax-related disclosures, with the intention to avoid 
providing a roadmap to external auditors and tax authorities. The increased organisational 
complexity associated with tax planning arrangements will likely make it harder for managers 
to perfectly understand the taxable implications of their firms’ operations over all tax 
jurisdictions, leading to unintentional estimation errors in income tax accruals190  (Choudhary 
et al. 2016). The tax-planning induced opacity and obfuscation in financial statements may in 
turn increase latitudes for managers to manipulate tax accruals for opportunistic reasons, which 
 
188 The informativeness of income tax accruals is measured by their ability to predict future one-year ahead tax 
cash flows. The informativeness measure is limited to the ability of income tax accruals to explain future one-
year ahead tax cash flows, based on the assumption that tax estimation errors will be corrected in the subsequent 
following year. The assumption is reasonable since the UK GAAP and IAS 12 require tax-related estimation errors to be 
corrected in a timely manner when the estimation errors are identified. See section 4.3.2.1. for detailed discussion.  
 
189 For example, the expected cost of employees’ profit-sharing and bonus payments should be recognised in 
financial statements when an entity has a present obligation to make such payments, while for tax purposes, costs 
related to the profit-sharing and bonus payments are not allowed for tax deduction until the amounts are paid. This 
will give rise to a timing difference and therefore a deferred tax asset (CTA 2009, Part 20). Firms that use the 
disguised remuneration scheme (e.g., remunerations paid to family member which are not wholly and exclusively 
for business purposes) to boost deferred tax assets and to reduce income taxes will bear substantial uncertainty 
regarding challenges and penalties by HMRC, thereby compromising the informativeness of reported tax accruals 
in explaining future tax-related cash flows.  
 
190 In order to reduce the probability of being detected, many aggressive tax planning schemes inevitably increase 
firms’ operational and informational complexity. For example, the complex transfer pricing scheme designed to 
shift income from high-tax jurisdictions to low-tax jurisdictions can make it difficult for shareholders and board 
members to interpret the tax consequence of firms’ underlying performance (Bushman et al. 2004). When 
estimating income tax accruals, the increased operational and informational complexity requires managers to cope 
with issues arising from geographic dispersion; differences in legal systems and culture; changes of regulations 
in foreign subsidiaries; and changes in currency exchange rates, making it difficult for managers to have a perfect 
insight into firms’ tax positions and accurately estimate tax accruals (Hutches et al. 2016; Choudhary et al. 2016). 
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give rise to intentional estimation errors in the reported tax information and make the income 
tax disclosures divergent from firms’ real tax performance191 (Balakrishnan et al. 2018; Edgley 
and Holland 2018). As a result, it is expected that corporate tax planning likely increases the 
intentional and/or unintentional estimation errors inherent in income tax accruals, leading to 
compromised informativeness of income tax accruals to explain future tax cash flows. Hence, 
it is hypothesised (in alternative form) that: 
H2a: The incremental informativeness of income tax accruals to explain future tax cash flows 
is negatively related to the level of corporate tax planning. 
Tax-induced earnings management. Income tax disclosures provide a source of earnings 
management, since changes in income taxes could significantly alter firms’ net earnings for the 
current financial reporting period. The discretions and complexity involved in estimating 
income tax accruals make it difficult for financial statements users to detect managers’ 
opportunistic attempts to manage earnings through manipulating income tax accruals, leading 
to tax-information asymmetry between managers and financial statements users192 (Desai et al. 
2006; Kim et al. 2011; Balakrishnan et al. 2018). The combination of discretion, complexity 
and information asymmetry provides opportunities for managers to manage earnings via 
biasing income tax accruals (Dhaliwal et al. 2004). Firms that attempt to beat earnings target 
tend to have stronger incentives to engage in earnings management, and thereby can be more 
likely to manipulate income tax accruals if their non-tax sources of earnings management fail 
to achieve the target (Dechow et al. 2000; Dhaliwal et al. 2004; Holland and Jackson 2004). 
 
191 Opacity and obfuscation of financial statements refer to the concealments of key information to outside 
financial reports’ users, to prevent them from understanding firms’ underlying performance and making proper 
decisions (Bushman et al. 2004). For instance, the tax-aggressiveness induced opacity in Enron facilitates the 
manufacturing financial reporting benefits through tax-motivated transactions while preventing outside investors 
from realising and understanding this opportunistic behaviour: “Enron looked to its tax department to devise 
transactions that increased financial accounting income. In effect, the tax department was converted into an Enron 
business unit, complete with annual revenue targets. The tax department, in consultation with outside experts, 
then designed transactions to meet or approximate the technical requirements of tax provisions with the primary 
purpose of manufacturing financial statement income” (Desai 2009, pp. 5). Similarly, the complexity arising from 
Tyco's aggressive tax activities leads to centralised power at the hand of top-level management which facilitates 
their managerial opportunistic behaviours such as abusing unauthorised compensation (Kim et al. 2011, pp. 640).  
192 Income tax expense reported in financial statements primarily relies on estimated figures, because tax returns 
are generally filed after financial statements are prepared. Estimating income tax accruals involves substantial 
discretion and complexity because it requires managers to estimate the tax implication of revenues and expenses 
across all their firms’ operating jurisdictions; estimate the timing and the future realisation amount of the deferred 
taxes arising from the “timing differences”, i.e., items of income or expense which are recognised for the current 
income statement but are not taxable for this period; and estimate the amount of the permanently reinvested foreign 
earnings, tax credits, goodwill capitalisation and amortisation, movements in fair value of investment assets 
(Dhaliwal et al. 2004; Choudhary et al. 2016; Wahab and Holland 2018).  
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Therefore, it can be expected that firms are more (less) likely to deliberately manage income 
tax accruals if their pre-tax profit of the current period has missed (beat) the earnings target. 
The opportunistic management of income tax accruals could induce intentional estimation 
errors and make the income tax account a biased construct from firms’ real tax performance. 
Hence, it is hypothesised (in alternative form) that: 
H2b: The incremental informativeness of income tax accruals to explain future tax cash flows 
is negatively related to whether and by how much firms’ pre-tax performance misses firms’ 
earnings target193. 
4.2.2.2. Corporate governance 
The disclosure of true and fair ﬁnancial information is central to users of financial reports, as 
it provides a foundation to understand and analyse a firm’s underlying economic performance 
and such understanding and analysis are fundamental to financial statements users’ investment 
decisions. However, due to the separation of ownership and control, the self-interested 
executives in the publicly-traded firms may have incentives to distort the reported financial and 
tax information, in order to “window dress financial statements prior to public securities 
offerings, to increase corporate managers’ compensation and job security, to avoid violating 
lending contracts, or to reduce regulatory costs or to increase regulatory benefits” (Healy et 
al. 1999). Such distortions can seriously undermine the informativeness of reported financial 
information and aggravate the information asymmetry between managers and users of financial 
reports (Krishnan 2003; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2006).  
Corporate governance represents “the set of mechanisms that inﬂuence the decisions made by 
managers when there is a separation of ownership and control” (Larcker et al. 2007, pp. 964). 
Through effectively monitoring the managements’ behaviours to make sure that financial 
reporting requirements are complied with; reporting mistakes are detected and corrected in a 
timely manner; managerial opportunistic behaviours are restricted and firms’ economic 
performances are fairly presented in accordance with GAAP, an effective corporate governance 
mechanism would restrict the extent of intentional and unintentional estimation errors reported 
 
193 Following Dhaliwal et al. (2004) and Holland and Jackson (2004), this study considers three situations where 
earnings managements to meet target level of earnings are likely present: (1) to avoid reporting a post-tax earnings 
decline; (2) to avoid failing to meet analysts' forecasts of post-tax earnings; and (3) to avoid reporting a post-tax 
loss. See section 4.3.2.2 for details. 
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in financial statements (Klein 2002; Vafeas et al. 2005; Cornett et al. 2007; Yu 2008; Desai et 
al. 2009; Kent et al. 2010). Corporate governance mechanism employed in this study focuses 
on functions to monitor management actions, scrutinise financial reporting irregularities and 
ensure the credibility of the firm’s financial statements, including the intensity of analyst 
coverage, institutional shareholding, audit quality and board independence.  
Analysts coverage. Financial analysts, who possess relevant expert knowledge with industry 
background and are capable of processing and scrutinising information reported in firms’ 
financial statements, are expected to play an external monitoring role in detecting managerial 
misconducts and influencing managers’ financial reporting decisions (Healy et al. 2001). 
Financial analysts act as external monitors primarily through their ability to collect and 
disseminate firms’ public and private information and convey it to the public, thereby 
increasing the public awareness of firms’ underlying performance and creating public scrutiny 
of firms’ reported financial information (Yu 2008; Mola et al. 2013; Allen et al. 2016). Inside 
executive management tends to possess substantial informational advantage because of their 
full-time status and full access to firms’ price-sensitive information, which allows the self-
interested managers to exploit the informational advantage to engage in financial misreporting 
or earnings management activities for opportunistic reasons (Ellul and Panayides 2018). The 
presence of financial analysts, who regularly track and scrutinise firms’ financial reporting 
irregularities and participate in firms’ information distribution process194, will likely constrain 
managers from exploiting their discretion and flexibility for opportunistic purposes and 
alleviate the information asymmetry between managers and financial statements users (Yu 
2008; Ellul and Panayides 2018). In addition, as the intensity of analyst coverage increases, a 
firm’s stock becomes more publicly visible so does its underlying economic practices, 
including its tax-related strategies (Allen et al. 2016). As a result, managers’ incentives to 
manipulate income tax provision or/and engage in aggressive tax planning might reduce as the 
number of analysts following increases due to the heightened public scrutiny. Indeed, Graham 
et al.’s (2014) survey evidence highlights that firms with significantly higher analyst coverage 
 
194 According to Yu (2008) and Allen et al. (2016), financial analysts participate in firms’ financial reporting 
process by questioning various aspects of firms’ financial reporting, including firms’ tax behaviours and strategies, 
during the earnings release conference calls. Financial analysts can also express their concerns about the financial 
and tax performance of the covered firms through their research report to their clients; through recommendations 
and forecasts to public investors and through providing comments to the press. In this way, financial analysts play 
a role in reducing information asymmetries and enhancing corporate transparency by conveying firms’ private 
information from managers to the public.   
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are more concerned about the reputational damage and adverse media attention resulting from 
undertaking aggressive tax activities.  
However, the effectiveness of financial analysts in scrutinising financial reporting irregularities 
and enhancing financial reporting quality can be impaired in several situations. First, higher 
analyst coverage may create excessive performance pressure on managers, which may in turn 
create stronger motivation for managers to manipulate financial statements in order to meet 
analyst’ expectations about earnings (Yu 2008; He and Tian 2013). Thus, if income tax 
provision serves as a tool for inflating earnings (e.g., Dhaliwal et al. 2004), more intensive 
analyst coverage will likely induce greater managerial incentives to manipulate income tax 
accruals for the purpose of meeting analysts’ earnings expectations. Second, financial analysts 
who maintain close working relationship with firm managers in order to keep personal contacts 
with managers and gain access to firms’ private information can be less likely to report negative 
information of the covered firms195, which compromises the external monitoring function of 
financial analysts (Francis et al. 1998; Cowan et al. 2003; Chen and Jiang 2006). 
Therefore, to the extent that analysts actively participate in firms’ information distribution 
process and subject firms’ tax-related behaviours to heightened public scrutiny, intensive 
analyst coverage will likely dampen managers’ incentives to engage in aggressive tax planning 
or/and manipulate income tax provision for the purpose of inflating earnings, which can 
enhance the informativeness of income tax accruals (Capstaff et al. 1995; Yu 2008). However, 
the external monitoring function of analysts to scrutinise managerial misconducts can be 
compromised if the presence of analysts in turn motives managers to manipulate financial 
statements or if there is a strong social tie between managers and analysts. Hence, it is 
hypothesised (in alternative form) that: 
H2c_i: The negative relationship between firms’ tax management incentives and the 
incremental informativeness of income tax accruals is attenuated by higher analyst coverage. 
 
195 For example, Yu (2008) documents that managers can discriminate among analysts by rewarding analysts who 
report more positive views of firms’ underlying performance with more access to managements’ private 
information, such as being able to ask questions during the conference calls. Such private access to firm 
information can provide a distinct competitive advantage to analysts in respect of gathering data and better 
understanding and analysing the firm. However, U.K. mirrors the Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) 
promulgated in the U.S. 2010 to prohibit the selective disclosure by public companies to analysts and institutional 
investors. The information which is intentionally released to a limited groups of individuals should be disclosed 
to the public simultaneously. 
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Institutional shareholding. Institutional shareholders, i.e., individuals or institutions that hold 
a sizable investment in a firm, tend to have both incentives and capacity to monitor 
management behaviours and constrain managers from engaging in self-interested activities. 
First, as compared to small and diffused shareholdings whose return may not be large enough 
to cover the associated monitoring cost, institutional shareholders, by virtue of their large 
shareholding, tend to have stronger incentives to protect their sizable investment through 
monitoring managerial behaviours and ensuring that managers act in the best interest of 
shareholders (Grossman et al. 1980; Shleifer and Vishny 1986; Gillan et al. 2000; Cornett et 
al. 2007). Second, institutional shareholders who have superior resources in acquiring firm 
information and analysing firm performance can be more sophisticated and better informed 
than individual shareholders in scrutinising firm behaviours (Shiller and Pound 1989; Lev 1988; 
Rajgopal et al. 1999). Through transmitting their private information about firms’ underlying 
performance to the capital market and requiring more voluntary disclosures of important 
information about firms’ major activities and future plans196, institutional investors play a role 
in improving firms’ information environment and reducing information asymmetry between 
managers and investors (Gillan et al. 1998; Gillan et al. 2003). Third, institutional shareholders 
can directly discipline and influence management performance through negotiating with 
management; submitting a shareholder proposal; or liquidating their holdings to create 
downward pressure on firms’ stock price when they detect managers’ misconducts, making it 
more difficult for managers to abuse accounting discretions and manipulate financial 
statements (Gillan et al. 2000). 
However, it is argued that the effectiveness of institutional shareholders in monitoring 
management behaviours and alleviating information asymmetry between managers and 
shareholders depends on the size and concentration of their shareholding (Maug 1998). Large 
and concentrated institutional shareholders whose investment stakes are less marketable and 
less easily to be liquidated tend to concern more about firms’ long-term profitability, and 
thereby have greater incentives to analyse firm performance; prevent managerial opportunism; 
 
196 Specifically, to the extent that institutional shareholders make investment decisions based on their private 
information about firms’ underlying performance, large changes in their shareholdings are likely to be driven by 
their private information and thereby can convey their private information about firms’ underlying performance 
to the capital market (Chakravarty 2001; Piotroski et al. 2004). In addition, prior studies find that firms with large 
institutional ownership tend to maintain high-level of voluntary disclosures about firms’ underlying performance 
and future plan to cater to institutional investors’ strong incentives to collect pre-disclosure information, with the 
primary purpose of improving their portfolio performance and satisfying their fiduciary responsibility (Utama et 
al. 1997; El-Gazzar 1998). 
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and discourage managers from temporarily inflating earnings by distorting accruals (Black et 
al. 1992; Rajgopal et al. 1999; Chung et al. 2002; Koh 2003). By contrast, small and transient 
institutional shareholders who are often short-term oriented may be less incentivised to monitor 
management behaviours and can possibly exert pressure on managers to manipulate earnings 
in order to avoid reporting earnings decreases (Bushee and Noe 2000; Chuang et al. 2002). The 
ownership structure in the UK tends to be dispersed rather than concentrated because of the 
existing takeover code which restricts on building controlling stakes in order to protect the 
rights of small shareholdings (Goergen and Renneboog, 2001; Faccio and Lang 2002; Florackis 
2005).  
In summary, to the extent that institutional investors play an informed role in constraining 
managerial opportunism and alleviating the information asymmetry between managers and 
shareholders, the presence of institutional investors will likely restrict managers’ incentives to 
engage in opaque and aggressive tax planning activities undesired by shareholders, or to 
manipulate income tax accruals for the purpose of inflating earnings, which could enhance the 
informativeness of income tax accruals. However, the effectiveness of the informed monitoring 
function of institutional investors may vary owing to the different sizes of their shareholding. 
Hence, it is hypothesised (in alternative form) that: 
H2c_ii: The negative relationship between firms’ tax management incentives and the 
incremental informativeness of income tax accruals is attenuated by higher institutional 
shareholding. 
Auditor quality. A primary role of auditors is to obtain reasonable assurance about whether the 
reported financial information is free from material misstatement and to verify whether the 
client firms’ economic condition is fairly presented in financial statements in accordance with 
generally accepted accounting principles (DeAngelo 1981; Kanagaretnam et al. 2016). By 
providing adequate assurance to the financial statements users about the validity and reliability 
of the reported financial information, auditors serve as an external monitoring mechanism to 
constrain managerial scope of opportunistically exploiting the latitude available in the financial 
reporting procedures, which can potentially enhance the informativeness of the reported 
financial information (Becker et al. 1998; Francis et al. 1999; Gul et al. 2002; Krishnan 2003).  
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Evidence suggests that auditors face a greater probability of being penalised or sued for failing 
to detect or prohibit upward earnings management as compared to earnings understatement 
(Antle and Nalebuff 1991; Becker et al. 1998). Firms’ tax management behaviours, such as 
engaging in tax planning activities or biasing income tax provision for the purpose of inflating 
earnings, could subject their auditors to heightened litigation risk and reputational damage, due 
to the greater likelihood of the tax-related misstatements, restatements and being accused as 
tax-noncompliant by tax authorities (Klassen et al. 2016). As a result, an important part of the 
audit engagement is to evaluate the validity of clients’ tax-related information disclosed in 
ﬁnancial statements197  (Barrett 2004; Donohoe et al. 2014). In order to provide adequate 
assurance about the reliability and the appropriateness of the reported tax information, auditors 
should use their specialised skills and knowledge to review their clients’ tax accounts and 
disclosures; request their clients to provide additional information or interpretation about the 
questionable and opaque tax transactions; and require their clients to adjust the tax-related 
items if necessary (Kanagaretnam et al. 2016).  
Audit quality in terms of detecting and reporting financial statement errors is expected to vary 
with auditors’ independence, expertise and experience (e.g., DeAngelo 1981; Teoh and Wong 
1993; Becker et al. 1998; Francis et al. 1999). To the extent that high-quality auditors impose 
stricter reporting standards on tax-related provision and thereby dampening managers’ 
incentives to undertake opportunistic tax management behaviours, the employment of higher 
quality auditors will likely enhance the informativeness of income tax accruals. Hence, it is 
hypothesised (in alternative form) that: 
H2c_iii: The negative relationship between firms’ tax management incentives and the 
incremental informativeness of income tax accruals is attenuated by better audit quality. 
Board independence. The board of directors is an important internal control mechanism 
designed to alleviate agency issues arising from the separation of ownership and control in 
modern corporations (Fama and Jensen 1983). Shareholders, who often hold diffused 
shareholdings in numerous firms and are less incentivised to devote resources to closely 
monitoring management, delegate authorities and responsibilities to the board to scrutinise the 
decision-making and activities of executive directors on their behalf (Grossman and Hart 1980). 
 
197 As argued by Barrett (2004), an auditor should always consider “the amount for any period’s income tax 
expense as material to the financial statements” since income taxes “can amount to approximately one-half of a 
public company’s net income” (pp. 491). 
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The board of directors therefore can be perceived as the ‘apex’ of the internal monitoring 
mechanism within a corporation, because it has the ultimate control over top management to 
set firms’ strategic aims; to ratify and supervise the making and application of important 
corporate decisions; to hire, dismiss and reward top-level management for the benefits of 
shareholders; and to monitor the content and presentation of firms’ financial reporting (Fama 
and Jensen 1980; Beasley 1996; Peasnell et al. 2000; 2005; Lanis and Richardson 2011). For 
this reason, firms with stronger and more effective board of directors in monitoring executive 
actions are expected to be less likely to engage in risky and obscure activities, such as 
aggressive tax planning activities that are not desired by shareholders or manufacturing 
accounting figures via manipulating income tax provision at the expense of shareholders 
(Richardson et al. 2013; Williams 2007; Erle 2008). Indeed, UK tax authorities recognise that 
an important role played by the board of directors as an internal monitoring mechanism is to 
limit aggressive tax activities and to bear the ultimate responsibility for firms’ tax strategies 
and outcomes (HMRC 2006; OECD 2009).  
The effectiveness of the board in monitoring management actions can be a function of the 
composition of the individuals who serve on the board. That is, the extent to which the board 
is made up of both insiders (i.e., the executive members) and outsiders (i.e., the non-executive 
members) (Fama 1980; Fama and Jensen 1983). Although it is important to include internal 
executive managers in the board since their private information about firms’ underlying 
performance and strategies is crucial in assisting the board to better understand and monitor 
executive activities and reinforcing the effectiveness of the board, the effectiveness of the board 
as a monitoring mechanism can be hampered if the board is dominated by internal executive 
managers who possess huge information advantages and decision-making discretion due to 
their “full-time status and insider knowledge” (Beasley 1996, pp 446; Lanis and Richardson 
2011). Therefore, board effectiveness in monitoring executive directors and protecting 
shareholder benefits can be a positive function of the proportion of independent outside 
directors (Rosenstein et al., 1990; Brickley et al., 1994; Core et al., 1999). This is because that 
outside directors, who have neither a management role in the firm nor compensation tied to 
firm’s performance or/and stock price, tend to be strongly incentivised to enhance the board’s 
effectiveness through monitoring managerial behaviours and restricting internal executives’ 
discretions in making key decisions, in order to develop good reputation and signal their 
competence in decision control to the external market (Beasley 1996; Marra et al. 2011).  
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To the extent that the board plays a significant role in restricting opportunistic tax management 
behaviours, it is reasonable to expect that a more independent board (i.e., having a higher 
proportion of outside directors on the board) will likely enhance the informativeness of income 
tax accruals. However, survey evidence suggests that only 10% of tax departments consider 
their work as widely understood outside the tax department within the firm (KPMG 2005). 
Therefore, the prediction that independent board improves the informativeness of reported 
income tax accruals is based on the assumption that the outside directors on the board are 
capable of understanding and identifying firms’ tax affairs. Hence, it is hypothesised (in 
alternative form) that: 
H2c_iv: The negative relationship between firms’ tax management incentives and the 
incremental informativeness of income tax accruals is attenuated by more independent board. 
4.2.2.3. Innate firm characteristics associated with tax environment complexity 
Operational uncertainty. As the disclosures of income tax accruals rely on mangers’ 
assumptions, estimations and judgements on “whether, where, when and at what rate” 
operational transactions are taxable, greater volatility in firms’ operational performance may 
cause more difficulties for managers to accurately forecast and estimate the taxable 
consequences of their firms’ operations (Choudhary et al. 2016, pp 90). As a result, firms’ 
operational uncertainty would likely lead to increased estimation errors in income tax accruals, 
which reduces their informativeness to explain future tax cash flows. Hence, it is hypothesised 
(in alternative form) that: 
H2d: The incremental informativeness of income tax accruals to explain future tax cash flows 
is negatively associated with the level of firms’ operational uncertainty. 
Dispersed operation and firm size. Operating in multiple jurisdictions could increase the 
complexity of estimating income tax accruals and give rise to greater estimation errors, because 
it requires tax managers to interpret and comply both tax laws and regulations in every tax 
jurisdiction and anticipate the taxable implications of firm’s transactions across all business 
segments (Choudhary et al. 2016). In addition, firms with highly dispersed business 
environments may face information asymmetry due to less-integrated financial information 
system and barriers of coordination between geographic locations, which may add difficulties 
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to the process of collecting, estimating and documenting information necessary for financial 
and tax reporting purpose (Gallemore et al. 2015). As a result, operating in multiple 
jurisdictions and highly dispersed business segments can increase complexity in estimating 
income tax accruals, giving rise to estimation errors which make the estimated income tax 
accruals differ from future realised tax cash flows.  
Although larger firms are likely to devote more resources to obtaining sophisticated tax and 
financial expertise with high ability to understand tax implications of firms’ business 
transactions and estimate and record tax-related information in a proper way, larger firms may 
face information asymmetry among different business departments and experience 
complicated coordination and communication in the decision-making process (Mill et al. 1998; 
Lassila et al. 2010; Choudhary et al. 2016).  Hence, it is hypothesised (in alternative form) that: 
H2e: The incremental informativeness of income tax accruals to explain future tax cash flows 
is negatively associated with the number of business segments. 
H2f: The incremental informativeness of income tax accruals to explain future tax cash flows 
is negatively associated with firm size. 
Firm profitability. Profitable firms are likely to devote more necessary funds and resources to 
their tax departments to enable that the tax documentation processes are in an efficient and 
high-quality manner (Mills et al. 1998). As a result, the level of firms’ profitability is expected 
to be positively associated with the informativeness of income tax accruals. Hence, it is 
hypothesised (in alternative form) that: 
H2g: The incremental informativeness of income tax accruals to explain future tax cash flows 
is positively associated with firm profitability. 
Growth opportunities. Although growth firms would place more emphasis on innovation rather 
than cost and tax minimisation, they may have greater opportunities for tax planning due to 
their aggressive pursuit of entering into new products and new geographic market as compared 
to their less-growth counterparties (Higgins et al. 2015). Moreover, growth firms tend to have 
greater propensity for risk. The aggressive culture in growth firms would likely encourage them 
to engage in tax planning activities which entail a higher level of risk and uncertainty (Higgins 
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et al. 2015). By contrast, less-growth firms are likely to emphasise on costs and tax 
minimisation due to their limited innovation opportunities. However, their ability to reduce tax 
through engaging in aggressive tax planning activities can be constrained because of their focus 
on maintaining organisational and operational stability and because of their aversion to risk 
(Chen et al. 2010). As a result, growth firms, who possess more risk tolerance and pursue to 
enter into new product and geographic markets, may have more tax-planning opportunities that 
are aggressive in nature and entail uncertainty regarding challenges and penalties by tax 
authorities. The tax outcome uncertainty could increase the difficulty for managers to anticipate 
firms’ future tax consequences and accurately estimate income tax accruals in the current 
period. Hence, it is hypothesised (in alternative form) that:  
H2h: The incremental informativeness of income tax accruals to explain future tax cash flows 
is negatively associated with firms’ growth rate. 
Capital intensity. Capital intensive firms, which are subject to high level of utilisation of 
property, plant and equipment in corporate operation, may have tax planning opportunities that 
are not available to their noncapital-intensive counterparties, including the choice of buying or 
leasing equipment; the decisions of the amount and the timing of capital allowances to be 
claimed198; or the management of the timing of assets acquisition and disposal for purposes of 
deferring gains or accelerating losses (Mills et al. 1998; Miller et al. 2017). Exploiting tax 
planning opportunities with respect to property, plant and equipment could make the process 
of collecting and recording income tax information more complicated199, thereby increasing 
the likelihood of estimation errors in income tax accruals (Gallemore et al. 2015). By contrast, 
taking advantage of the qualified capital allowances can be perceived as a well-established and 
benign tax-favoured investment with relatively stable future tax outcomes and less uncertainty 
regarding challenges by tax authorities. Therefore, the informativeness of income tax accruals 
 
198 Rather than claiming the full amount of the available capital allowance associated with qualifying fixed assets, 
a firm can select the amount of capital allowance, i.e., choose to make reduced claim of capital allowance or not 
claim at all, for purposes of maximising its accounting loss for a specific accounting period, which may “influence 
both the immediate exposure to tax and the allowances available in subsequent accounting period” (Miller et al. 
2017, pp. 111) 
199Tax planning opportunities associated with plant, property and equipment such as the management of the timing 
of assets acquisition or disposal and the choice of buying or leasing equipment often require managers to keep 
track of methods of depreciation and costs for each fixed asset and anticipate the consequence of acquiring or 
disposing assets, thereby increasing the complexity of the process of information collection and documentation 
(Mills 1998; Gallemore et al. 2015).  
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is presumed to be related to firms’ capital intensity in unpredictable directions and, hence, it is 
hypothesised (in alternative form) that: 
H2i: There is an association between firms’ capital intensity and the incremental 
informativeness of income tax accruals to explain future tax cash flows. 
Leverage. Highly levered firms who are subject to monitoring and scrutiny by lenders may 
attempt to loosen their debt covenant constraints through engaging in income-increasing 
accounting procedures, such as temporarily inflating the fair value of investment assets or 
inventories; lengthen the economic useful lives of tangible assets or capitalised intangible 
assets to an unreasonable level; or improperly capitalise expense (Dhaliwal et al. 1982; Skinner 
1993; Phillips et al. 2003). Such activities have no significant impacts on firms’ current tax 
payments but can cause firms to recognise questionable deferred tax expenses in income 
statements, which confounds the credibility of firms’ income tax provision in reflecting current 
tax performance and explaining future tax payments, putting firms at risks of being suspected 
and challenged by tax authorities and external auditors200 (Phillips 2003; Erickson et al. 2004; 
Blaylock et al. 2012). By contrast, highly leveraged firms may be less inclined to engage in 
complex tax shelter activities with uncertain tax outcomes, since the tax benefits of debt 
financing can reduce the value of non-debt tax management activities (Graham et al. 2006; 
Francis et al. 2014). Therefore, the informativeness of income tax accruals is presumed to be 
related to firm leverage in unpredictable directions and, hence, it is hypothesised (in alternative 
form) that: 
H2j: There is an association between firm leverage and the incremental informativeness of 
income tax accruals to explain future tax cash flows. 
4.2.3. Development of the third hypothesis  
After examining the extent to which income tax provision provides information about the 
realizability of future tax cash flows and the cross-sectional determinants of the incremental 
informativeness of income tax accruals, this study will further investigate if there are changes 
 
200 To be sure, managers can manage taxable or book income without creating temporary book-tax difference and 
deferred taxes by engaging in transactions that generate permanent book-tax differences. Hence, deferred taxes 
may not be able to capture all aspects of managers’ discretionary attempts in managing taxable or book income 
(Phillips et al. 2003).  
Chapter 4 Hypothesis Development and Research Design 
178 
 
in the ability of income tax accruals to predict future tax cash flows over time in the UK. That 
is, whether the incremental informativeness of income tax accruals about future tax cash flows 
has improved or deteriorated over time. Over the past three decades, accounting method for 
deferred taxes has evolved dramatically in the UK201. Under SSAP 15, deferred taxes should 
be recognised on a partial provision basis. UK firms were required to recognise deferred taxes 
in the financial accounts to the extent that “it is probable that a liability or asset will crystallise”, 
i.e., when the deferred taxes are expected to be reversed in the foreseeable future (three to five 
years in the future) without being replaced by deferred taxes from new timing differences 
(SSAP15, para 15). Any amounts not expected to crystallise are only disclosed in the notes 
rather than in the financial accounts. By contrast, FRS 19 and IAS 12 require deferred taxes to 
be provided on full provision basis, whereby all amount of timing (or temporary) book-tax 
difference202 is required to be recognised in the deferred tax accounts, irrespective of whether 
the deferred taxes would crystallise in the future or not. However, the Financial Reporting 
Council highlights that FRS 19 adopts a conceptually different approach than IAS 12, since it 
perceives that the comprehensive nature underpinning the IAS 12 would lead firms to make 
excessive deferred tax provisions203.  
Specifically, FRS 19 requires deferred taxes to be provided in full using a so-called 
“incremental timing difference approach”. This approach requires the provision of deferred tax 
on all timing differences but with a narrower range as compared to IAS 12. For example, under 
FRS 19, deferred taxes would not be provided on valuation gains or losses if there is no binding 
commitment to sell the asset (FRS 19, para 44). Deferred taxes would not be provided on 
 
201 SSAP 15 was effective since 1980s. On 7 December 2000, FRS 19 ‘Deferred Tax’ was issued and SSAP 15 
‘Accounting for deferred tax’ was superseded. FRS 19 became effective for years ending on or after 23 January 
2002 and was withdrawn for accounting periods beginning on or after 1 January 2015, when FRS 102 became 
effective. All UK listed companies are required to prepare their consolidated financial reports in accordance with 
IAS 12 ‘Income taxes’ for periods on or after 2004. See https://www.frc.org.uk/accountants/accounting-and-
reporting-policy/uk-accounting-standards/standards-in-issue/uk-accounting-standards-and-statements-for-
account  
202 Although both FRS 19 and IAS 12 both require deferred taxes to be provided on full provision basis, there are 
fundamental differences between FRS 19 and IAS 12 in respect of deferred tax provision. FRS 19 focuses on 
timing differences that arise because the inclusion of income and expenses in tax assessments in periods different 
from those in which they are recognised in financial statements (FRS 19, para 2). IAS 12 focuses on temporary 
differences that arise from differences between the carrying amount of an asset or liability and its tax base (IAS 
12, para5). The temporary difference can be broader than, and includes, timing difference. In short, “timing 
difference is the reversible difference between revenues/expenses for accounting and tax” which focuses on the 
profit and loss account, while “temporary difference is the difference between the tax and financial reporting base 
of asset or liabilities” which focuses on the balance sheet (James et al. 2016, pp 284; Telford et al. 2014, pp 127). 
See page 22-30 for detailed discussions. 
203 See https://www.frc.org.uk/accountants/accounting-and-reporting-policy/uk-accounting-standards/standards-
in-issue/frs-19-deferred-tax 
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realised gains or losses on disposal of assets if the assets are rolled over into replacement assets 
(FRS 19, para 42). In respect of earnings from subsidiaries associates and joint ventures, 
deferred taxes would not be provided if the earnings are not accrued as receivable or there are 
no binding agreements to distribute the earnings in the future (FRS 19, para 43). By comparison, 
IAS 12 is based on the “comprehensive balance-sheet approach” to account for future tax 
consequences by recognising deferred taxes in respect of all temporary book-tax differences204 
(IAS 12, para 5). As a result, deferred taxes recognised under IAS 12 could include items with 
almost permanent nature of their underlying temporary difference, which are not expected to 
result in tax cash flows in the near future (Brouwer et al. 2018).  
IFRS Conceptual framework requires a liability to be recognised “when it is probable that an 
outflow of resource embodying economic benefits will result from the settlement of a present 
obligation and the amount at which the settlement will take place can be measured reliably” 
(IFRS Conceptual Framework, para 4.46). The definition of a liability stated in IFRS 
conceptual framework is therefore particularly linked to an expected future outflow of 
economic benefits. As a result, a deferred tax liability provided under SSAP 15 partial 
allocation approach, which is based on management’s projections of its expected future 
reversal, can be more qualifying as a liability that represents a present obligation towards tax 
authorities to pay income taxes in the foreseeable future (Citron 2001; Gordon et al. 2004; 
Brouwer et al. 2018).  
However, partial provision approach is criticised as allowing too much discretion and could be 
easily manipulated by self-interested managers for opportunistic reasons, which may 
compromise the informativeness of reported income tax accruals in predicting future tax cash 
flows (Gordon et al. 2004; Holland and Jackson 2004). By contrast, the full provision approach 
used under FRS 19 and IAS 12, whereby deferred tax liability is provided on all taxable timing 
(or temporary) differences205, is likely to reduce the latitudes for opportunistic management 
behaviours via deferred tax provisioning (Holland and Jackson 2004). However, the full 
provision approach, which requires firms to recognise deferred tax liabilities on all taxable 
timing (or temporary) differences with less emphasis on whether they are expected to result in 
future tax cash flows, may restrict managers’ ability to convey their private information and 
 
204 See page 33 for detailed discussion about the difference between FRS19 and IAS 12. 
205 Besides several exemptions as discussed above. 
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expectation about firms’ future cash tax consequences, which could reduce the informativeness 
of reported income tax accruals about future tax cash flows206.  
Based on the above discussions, the third hypothesis of the study is designed to examine the 
variation in the incremental informativeness of income tax accruals about future tax cash flows 
over the past three decades from 1992 to 2017, to see whether the informativeness of income 
tax accruals has improved or deteriorated over time in the UK. Hence, it is hypothesised (in 
alternative form) that: 
H3: There is a time trend in the incremental informativeness of income tax accruals to explain 
future tax cash flows in the UK over the past three decades. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
206 The application of the full provision approach under FRS 19 and IAS 12 may ensure a relatively stable effective 
income tax rate, which can be useful for investors to derive firms’ future after-tax income. However, one may 
argue that “the most relevant information is that which assists assessment of future cash ﬂow rather than future 
reported income” (see Discussion Paper by EFRAG, para 2.21; Brouwer et al. 2018, pp 10). 
Chapter 4 Hypothesis Development and Research Design 
181 
 
4.3. Research Design 
4.3.1. Research design of the first hypothesis 
The first hypothesis of this study is to examine whether income tax accruals are incrementally 
informative over cash tax paid in explaining future tax cash flows. Following Robinson et al. 
(2016), the predictive ability of income tax accruals for future tax cash flows will be tested 
based on the pooled cross-sectional models as follows. 
 
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡+𝜌 𝑜𝑟 ∑ 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡+5 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (1) 
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡+𝜌 𝑜𝑟 ∑ 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡+5 = ∅ + 𝜕𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (2) 
 
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡+𝜌  = Future tax-related cash flows scaled by lagged total assets for 
future years, where 𝜌 varies from 1 to 5. 
∑ 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡+5         = The sum of future tax-related cash flows scaled by the sum of 
lagged total assets over future five aggregated years. 
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡           = Cash tax paid scaled by lagged total assets for company i at time 
t. 
𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡  = Income tax accruals scaled by lagged total assets for company i 
at time t. 
 
All continuous variables are deflated by opening total assets. All continuous variables are winsorised at the 1st 
and 99th percentile 
 
In model (1) and (2), the dependent variable, 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡+𝜌, is the future tax-related cash 
flows scaled by lagged total assets for year 𝑡 + 𝜌 , where 𝜌  varies from one to five. 
∑ 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡+5 is the sum of future tax-related cash flows scaled by the sum of lagged 
total assets over future five aggregated years 207 . The independent variable in model (1),  
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡 , refers to the cash tax paid scaled by lagged total assets for year 𝑡. A firm’s 
 
207 The five-year forecasting window is consistent with Lauz (2013) that some income tax accruals are long-term 
in nature, which may take several years before their tax effects are finally realized. The five-year forecasting 
window also captures the normal 4-year limit of HMRC assessment, see https://www.gov.uk/hmrc-internal-
manuals/compliance-handbook/ch51300. The prediction of aggregated sum of cash tax paid is consistent with 
Doyle et al. (2003) and Patatoukas et al. (2015) that it is necessary to regress cumulative cash flows on assets or 
liabilities if there is uncertainty about when the assets or liabilities will affect future cash flows. 
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future tax-related cash flows can be associated with its current cash tax payments because many 
cash tax incentives are serially correlated over time (Citron et al. 2013). For example, under 
UK tax legislation, the systematic annual amortisation of intangible assets such as goodwill, 
research and development costs or software and website costs are generally allowable for tax 
deductions over their useful lives. In addition, the tax benefits arising from firms’ operation in 
foreign low-tax jurisdictions can also be serially correlated until such activities are forbidden 
and terminated by tax authorities208. Hence, a firm’s current cash tax payments are expected to 
provide useful information in explaining its future tax cash flows.  
The first independent variable in model (2), 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡 , is the same with that in model 
(1). The second independent variable in model (2), 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 , represents the income tax 
accruals which are calculated as the difference between total income tax expense and cash tax 
paid, scaled by lagged total assets for year 𝑡 . If income tax accruals are incrementally 
informative over cash tax paid in predicting future tax cash flows on average, then the 
coefficient of 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 , i.e.,  𝛿 , will be significantly different from zero. The 
significance of coefficients 𝛿 in model (2) will be analysed based on Wald tests of coefficient 
equality. The comparison of the goodness of fit between model (1) and (2) will be based on 
likelihood-ratio test 209 (Fitzmaurice et al. 2004).  
 
 
 
 
208 See Chapter 2 section 2.3.3. for detailed discussions about the tax treatments of key accounting issues under 
UK tax legislations. 
209 The likelihood ratio test can be used to compare the goodness of fit of two nested models, i.e., the reduced 
model (model 1) and the full model (model 2), by comparing their respective maximised log-likelihoods. 
Specifically, the maximised log-likelihood of the full model (model 2) should be at least the same with that of the 
reduced model (model 1), and the larger the difference between the maximised log-likelihoods of the two models, 
the stronger the evidence that the full model (model 2) performs better than the reduced model (model 1). By 
comparison, the Wald test works to test how far the estimated parameter of the variable of interest (𝛿) in the full 
model (mode 2) is different from zero.  
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4.3.2. Research design of the second hypotheses 
The second hypotheses are to investigate the cross-sectional determinants that cause variations 
in the informativeness of income tax accruals across firms. The test of the second hypotheses 
is based on the methodology employed by previous value-relevant accounting studies (e.g., 
Donnelly and Lynch 2002; Bandyopadhyay et al.) 210 . Relationships between the 
informativeness of income tax accruals and variables that proxy firms’ tax management 
incentives will be tested individually based on the following models, which will be discussed 
further in the subsequent section. 
 
𝑇𝐴𝑋_𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑡 = ω0 + ω1𝑐𝐴𝐺𝐺𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑆𝐼𝑉𝐸𝑖𝑡(𝑇𝐴_𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖𝑡) + ∑ ω2𝑐𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀_𝐶𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐴𝑖𝑡 + ∑ ω3𝑐 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑖𝑡 +
ω𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 + ω𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                                                                                                  (3.11) 
𝑇𝐴𝑋_𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑡 = τ0 + τ1𝑐𝑇𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑇1𝑖𝑡 + τ2𝑐𝐷𝐸𝐶𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸_𝐴𝑀𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 + τ3𝑐𝑇𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑇1𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐸𝐶𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸_𝐴𝑀𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 +
∑ τ4𝑐𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀_𝐶𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐴𝑖𝑡 + ∑ τ5𝑐 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑖𝑡 + τ𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 + τ𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                                             (3.12) 
𝑇𝐴𝑋_𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑡 = Κ0 + Κ1𝑐𝑇𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑇2𝑖𝑡 + Κ2𝑐𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑅_𝐴𝑀𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 + Κ3𝑐𝑇𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑇1𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑅_𝐴𝑀𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 +
∑ Κ4𝑐𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀_𝐶𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐴𝑖𝑡 + ∑ Κ5𝑐 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑖𝑡 + Κ𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 + Κ𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                                          (3.13) 
𝑇𝐴𝑋_𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑡 = Ζ0 + Ζ1𝑐𝑇𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑇3𝑖𝑡 + ∑ Ζ2𝑐𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀_𝐶𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐴𝑖𝑡 + ∑ Ζ3𝑐 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑖𝑡 + Ζ𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 + Ζ𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡     (3.14)                                                                                                                     
 
𝑇𝐴𝑋_𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑡 = The incremental informativeness of income tax accruals over cash 
tax paid in predicting future one-year-ahead tax cash flows, which 
is denoted as ?̅?𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙
2
and 𝛿𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠 
 
𝐴𝐺𝐺𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑆𝐼𝑉𝐸𝑖𝑡         = A binary variable to proxy the corporate tax planning of company 
i at time t 
 
𝑇𝐴_𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖𝑡 = The sum of cash taxes paid scaled by the sum of pre-tax income 
over a five-year period 
 
𝑇𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑇1𝑖𝑡              = A binary variable which equals 1 if a firm’s current period’s pre-
tax profit is lower than that of previous period, and 0 otherwise  
 
𝐷𝐸𝐶𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸_𝐴𝑀𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡                = The difference between a firm’s pre-tax profit of a previous period 
and that of the current period 
 
 
210 In the main tests, this study uses the two-stage estimation method following Donnelly and Lynch (2002), which 
first estimates the informativeness of income tax accruals for each sample firm, and then examines how the 
between-firm variations in the informativeness of income tax accruals are explained by firms’ tax management 
incentives and the strength of corporate governance mechanism. In the robustness check, the one-stage estimation 
approach following Warfield et al. (1995) will be employed to show the robustness of the main results generated 
using the two-stage estimation. See chapter 3 page  152 for detailed discussion. 
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𝑇𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑇2𝑖𝑡            =  A binary variable which equals 1 if the actual pre-tax profit 
reported by I/E/B/S of a firm-year is lower than that of most recent 
consensus analysts’ forecast, and 0 otherwise 
𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑅_𝐴𝑀𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡            = The difference between the analysts’ estimated pre-tax profit and 
the actual reported pre-tax profit 
 
𝑇𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑇3𝑖𝑡            = A binary variable which equals 1 if firms’ net income scaled by 
the opening market value of equity is within the range between 0 
and 0.02, and 0 otherwise 
 
𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀_𝐶𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐴𝑖𝑡 = A vector of variables to capture firms’ tax environment complexity 
 
𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆𝑖𝑡                = 
 
A vector of controls variables that may affect the informativeness 
of income tax accruals in explaining future tax payments 
 
Φ𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 = Industry dummies 
 
Φ𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 = Year dummies 
 
All financial accounting variables are deflated by opening total assets. Variable 𝑇𝐴_𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖𝑡  is winsorised at 0 
and 1. All other continuous variables are winsorised at the 1st and 99th percentile. See section 3.2.1 to 3.2.4. 
for detailed information about variable definition 
 
4.3.2.1. Incremental informativeness of income tax accruals 
The dependent variable, 𝑇𝐴𝑋_𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑡, represents the incremental informativeness of 
income tax accruals over cash tax paid to explain future one-year-ahead tax cash flows211. 
𝑇𝐴𝑋_𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑡 is captured by two measures. Following Robinson et al. (2016), we firstly 
measure the incremental informativeness of income tax accruals using the difference between 
the coefficients of determination for model (1) and (2). Specifically, the coefficients of 
determination from model (1) and (2) are denoted as ?̅?𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑇𝑎𝑥
2
and ?̅?𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑇𝑎𝑥 
2
, 
respectively. Then ?̅?𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑇𝑎𝑥
2
− ?̅?𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑇𝑎𝑥
2
=  ?̅?𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙
2
 represents the 
incremental informativeness of income tax accruals to explain future tax cash flows. In addition, 
following previous value-relevant accounting literature (e.g., Francis and Schipper 1999; 
Kothari  2001), this study employs the slope coefficient of income tax accruals generated from 
model (2.2), i.e., 𝛿𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠, as an alternative measure of the incremental informativeness of 
income tax accruals to ensure robustness of this study’s research findings. 
 
211 The informativeness measure is limited to the ability of income tax accruals to explain future one-year ahead tax cash flows, 
based on the assumption that tax estimation errors will be corrected in the subsequent following year. The assumption is 
reasonable since the UK GAAP and IAS 12 require tax-related estimation errors to be corrected in a timely manner when the 
estimation errors are identified. In the robustness check, the estimation window will be extended to show whether firms’ tax 
management incentives exert longer impact on the informativeness of income tax accruals. 
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4.3.2.2. Tax management incentives  
Firms’ tax management incentives are captured by a vector of variables that proxy firms’ 
incentives to undertake tax management activities for purposes of 1) reducing tax burdens 
through permanent or deferral tax planning transactions or; 2) managing earnings via income 
tax accruals to achieve particular earnings targets.  
4.3.2.2.1. Corporate tax planning  
The first variable employed to capture firms’ tax management incentive is the level of corporate 
tax planning (𝐴𝐺𝐺𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑆𝐼𝑉𝐸𝑖𝑡), which is captured by the level of firms’ long-term cash ETR 
(𝑇𝐴_𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖𝑡 ). Following Dyreng et al. (2008) and Guenther et al. (2017), 𝑇𝐴_𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖𝑡  is 
calculated as the sum of total taxes paid over the five-year period scaled by the sum of pre-tax 
income over the same five-year period. A lower (higher) 𝑇𝐴_𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖𝑡  indicates the greater 
(poorer) ability of firms to reduce tax burdens through engaging in permanent or deferral tax 
planning activities. 𝐴𝐺𝐺𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑆𝐼𝑉𝐸𝑖𝑡 is defined as a binary variable which equals 1 if a firm’s 
𝑇𝐴_𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖𝑡 is in the lowest quintile within the pooled sample of firms (Blaylock et al. 2012). 
Consistent with the hypothesis H2a that the corporate tax planning would likely increase the 
intentional and/or unintentional estimation errors in income tax accruals, the coefficient of 
𝐴𝐺𝐺𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑆𝐼𝑉𝐸𝑖𝑡 (𝑇𝐴_𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖𝑡) in mode 3.1.1. is expected to be negative (positive).  
4.3.2.2.2. Tax-induced earnings management 
In order to avoid demonstrating deteriorated performance to financial statement users, a firm 
may set particular earnings targets as the desired minimum level of the current period’s 
earnings performance. Firms’ incentives to meet particular ‘target’ earning figures through 
manipulating income tax accruals will likely induce intentional estimation errors to income tax 
accounts and, hence, negatively affect the ability of income tax accruals to explain future tax-
related cash flows. Following Phillips et al. (2003) and Holland and Jackson (2004), this study 
considers three situations where earnings management to meet target level of earnings are 
likely to present: (1) to avoid reporting a post-tax earnings decline; (2) to avoid failing to meet 
analysts' forecasts of post-tax earnings; and (3) to avoid reporting a post-tax loss.  
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Earnings Target 1. In order to show improved earnings performance, firms may set previous 
period’s after-tax profit as the earnings target to avoid reporting declined earnings, and firms’ 
incentive to manage earnings through deliberately biasing income tax accruals might increase 
(fall) if there is a decline (an increase) in their current-periods’ pre-tax profit. Following 
Holland and Jackson (2004), the first earnings target variable 𝑇𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑇1𝑖𝑡 represents a dummy 
variable which equals 1 if firms’ current period’s pre-tax profit is lower than that of the previous 
period, and 0 otherwise. The variable 𝐷𝐸𝐶𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸_𝐴𝑀𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 captures the difference between 
a firm’s previous period’s pre-tax profit and that of the current period.  
This study predicts that the lower a firm’s current pre-tax profit as compared to that of its 
previous period, the greater its incentive to deliberately manipulate income tax accruals for the 
purpose of avoiding the report of an apparent post-tax earnings decline. Therefore, the 
incremental informativeness of income tax accruals is expected to be negatively associated 
with whether and by how much a firm’s current pre-tax profit is lower than that of its previous 
period. This is expected to be represented in a significant negative coefficient on the interaction 
term 𝑇𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑇1𝑖𝑡 × 𝐷𝐸𝐶𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸_𝐴𝑀𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 (τ3𝑐) in model 3.1.2. The sum of coefficients on 
𝐷𝐸𝐶𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸_𝐴𝑀𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡  and on 𝑇𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑇1𝑖𝑡 × 𝐷𝐸𝐶𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸_𝐴𝑀𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡  ( τ2𝑐 + τ3𝑐 ) is also 
expected to be negative212.  
Alternatively, the entire sample will be partitioned into two subsamples of firm-years (firms-
years where 𝑇𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑇1𝑖𝑡  equals 1 and firm-years where 𝑇𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑇1𝑖𝑡  equals 0). If it is 
consistent with the hypothesis that firms which have missed previous period’s pre-tax profits 
exhibit strong incentives to distort income tax accruals for earnings management purposes, a 
negative relationship between 𝑇𝐴𝑋_𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑡  and 𝐷𝐸𝐶𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸_𝐴𝑀𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡  will be observed 
in the subsample of firm-years where 𝑇𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑇1𝑖𝑡 equals 1. 
Earnings Target 2. Besides avoiding the report of an apparent reduction in post-tax earnings, 
financial analysts’ focus consensus with respect to the level of earnings can also be a strong 
target for firms to achieve, with the aim of showing their competent performance to the capital 
 
212 Because a firm’s incentive to engage in tax management activities is less clear when its pre-tax profit of current 
period exceeds that of the previous period (i.e., building a tax cookie jar), this study does not predict the sign of 
the coefficient of 𝐷𝐸𝐶𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸_𝐴𝑀𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡  (τ2𝑐 ). Tax cookie jar means that managers may have incentives to 
increase their income tax expense if their pre-tax performance exceeds the earnings target, in order to smooth the 
post-tax earnings. See Dhaliwal et al. (2004) for discussion about the tax cookie jar. 
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market and avoiding the negative stock valuation by equity investors. Firms’ incentive to 
manage earnings through biasing income tax accruals might increase (decrease) if their actual 
pre-tax profits fall below (exceed) the pre-tax profits forecasted by consensus analysts. The 
second earnings target variable 𝑇𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑇2𝑖𝑡 is denoted as a dummy variable which equals 1 if 
a firm’s actual pre-tax profit reported in I/E/B/S is less than that of most recent consensus 
analysts’ forecast, and 0 otherwise. The variable 𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑅_𝐴𝑀𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 captures the difference 
between analysts’ expected pre-tax profits and firms’ actual pre-tax profit.  
This study predicts the lower the firm’s actual pre-tax profit as compared to that of consensus 
analysts’ forecasts, the greater the incentive of this firm to deliberately influence income tax 
accruals to narrow the difference between the actual and analysts forecasted post-tax profit. 
Therefore, the informativeness of income tax accruals is expected to be negatively associated 
with whether and by how much the firm’s actual pre-tax profit is lower than that expected by 
financial analysts. This is expected to be represented in a significant negative coefficient on 
the interaction term 𝑇𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑇2𝑖𝑡 × 𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑅_𝐴𝑀𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡  (Κ3𝑐 ) in model 3.1.3. The sum of 
coefficients on 𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑅_𝐴𝑀𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 and on 𝑇𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑇2𝑖𝑡 × 𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑅_𝐴𝑀𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 (Κ2𝑐+Κ3𝑐) is 
also expected to be negative213. 
Alternatively, the entire sample will be partitioned into two subsamples of firm-years (firms-
years where 𝑇𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑇2𝑖𝑡  equals 1 and firm-years where 𝑇𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑇2𝑖𝑡  equals 0). If it is 
consistent with the hypothesis that firms which have missed analysts’ forecasted pre-tax profits 
exhibit strong incentive to distort income tax accruals for earnings management purposes, a 
negative relationship between 𝑇𝐴𝑋_𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑡 and 𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑅_𝐴𝑀𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 will be observed in 
the subsample of firm-years where 𝑇𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑇2𝑖𝑡 equals 1.  
Earnings Target 3. Firms may also have incentives to avoid reporting a post-tax loss through 
manipulating income tax accruals. With respect to the setting of manipulating income tax 
accruals to avoid reporting a post-tax loss, consistent with Phillips et al. (2003) the third tax-
management-incentive variable (𝑇𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑇3𝑖𝑡) is denoted as a dummy variable which equals 1 
if the net income scaled by the opening market value of equity of a particular firm-year is within 
 
213 This study does not predict the sign of the coefficient of 𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑅_𝐴𝑀𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 (Κ2𝑐) because a firm’s incentive 
to engage in tax management activities is less clear when its actual pre-tax profits exceeds the consensus analysts’ 
forecasts (i.e., building a tax cookie jar). 
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the range between 0 and 0.02, and 0 otherwise214. Consistent with the hypothesis H2b, a firm 
is expected to be more likely to engage in earnings management through manipulating income 
tax accruals if it attempts to avoid reporting a post-tax loss. As the opportunistic use of income 
tax accruals for the purpose of beating earnings target could induce intentional estimation errors 
to the income tax provision and thereby compromising the informativeness of income tax 
accruals, the coefficient of 𝑇𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑇3𝑖𝑡 in model 3.14 is expected to be negative. 
4.3.2.3. Innate firm characteristics associated with tax environment complexity 
𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀_𝐶𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐴𝑖𝑡 included in model 3.11-3.14 represents a set of variables to capture firms’ tax 
environment complexity, including firms’ operational uncertainty; firms’ profitability; firm 
size; the intensity of firms’ multinational operations; opportunities for growth; capital intensity; 
and leverage. Greater level of firms’ tax environment complexity will likely make it harder for 
managers to understand and anticipate the taxable implications of their firms’ operations; to 
comply with tax laws and tax-related accounting standards; and to estimate income tax accruals 
accurately, leading to reduced informativeness of income tax accruals about future tax cash 
flows.  
It is important to control for firms’ operational uncertainty, since the operational uncertainty 
can increase difficulties faced by managers in estimating firms’ current and future tax position, 
which may lead to estimation errors in income tax accruals even in the absence of management 
deliberate bias. Following Guenther et al. (2017), we control for firms’ operational uncertainty 
using the volatility of firms’ pre-tax income (𝑉𝑂𝐿_𝑃𝑇𝐵𝐼𝑖𝑡) and the volatility of firms’ cash 
flows (𝑉𝑂𝐿_𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝐹𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑖𝑡). 𝑉𝑂𝐿_𝑃𝑇𝐵𝐼𝑖𝑡 is defined as the standard deviation of annual pre-
tax income scaled by lagged total assets over a rolling three-year window. 𝑉𝑂𝐿_𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝐹𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑖𝑡 
is defined as the standard deviation of annual cash flow scaled by lagged total assets over a 
rolling three-year window. Since firms’ operational uncertainty would likely make it difficult 
for managers to estimate income tax accruals accurately, the coefficients of 𝑉𝑂𝐿_𝑃𝑇𝐵𝐼𝑖𝑡 and 
𝑉𝑂𝐿_𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝐹𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑖𝑡 are expected to be negative.  
Firms’ profitability (𝑃𝑇𝐵𝐼𝑖𝑡) is included to capture the magnitude of firms’ available resources 
to be allocated to tax departments and the economies of scale for tax-related investments, which 
 
214 Following Burgstahler and Dichev (1997), this study employs another two scaled net income intervals (0-
0.01 and 0-0.03), untabulated results remain statistically identical. 
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is defined as the pre-tax income scaled by lagged total assets (Choudhary et al. 2016). Since 
more profitable firms are likely to devote more resources to their tax department to ensure the 
tax documentation process is in a high-quality manner (Mills et al. 1998), the coefficient of 
𝑃𝑇𝐵𝐼𝑖𝑡 is expected to be positive. 
Firm size (𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡) is defined as the natural log of total assets and the level of firms’ geographic 
segment (𝑆𝐸𝐺𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡) is defined as the number of segments in which a firm operates (Iliev 
2010). Large firms and firms operating in a highly dispersed business environment may face 
difficulties in coordinating and communicating among different business departments, which 
may increase managerial judgement and complexity inherent in the process of estimating 
income tax accruals (Gallemore and Labro 2015). Therefore, the coefficients of 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 and 
𝑆𝐸𝐺𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 are expected to be negative. 
Firms’ growth rate (𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖𝑡) is captured by the ratio of firms’ market value of equity to 
the book value of equity. A higher (lower) market-to-book ratio indicates a higher (lower) 
growth rate (Ittner et al. 1997; Balakrishnan et al. 2018). Firms in high growth rate may have 
more opportunities for tax planning due to their aggressive pursuit of entering into new 
products and geographic market, which can make their future tax consequence more uncertain 
to be predicted (Higgins et al. 2015). Therefore, the coefficient of 𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖𝑡 is expected to 
be negative. 
Capital intensity (𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡) is defined as the gross cost of property, plant and equipment 
scaled by the lagged total assets (Laux 2013). The utilisation of tax planning opportunities with 
respect to property, plant and equipment could make the process of tax information collection 
and record-keeping complicated and costly. However, taking advantage of the qualified capital 
allowances can be perceived as a well-established and benign tax-favored investment with 
relatively stable future cash tax outcomes. Therefore, 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 is expected to be related to the 
informativeness of income tax accruals in an unpredictable direction.  
Leverage (𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡) is defined as the ratio of long-term debt to total assets (Mills e al. 
1998; Holland and Jackson 2004). Highly-levered firms, which may be subject to monitor and 
scrutiny by lenders, may attempt to loosen their debt covenant constraints through engaging in 
income-increasing accounting procedures. Such activities may cause firms to manipulate their 
income tax provision, which makes the income tax account a less trustworthy construct in 
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reflecting firms’ current and future cash tax performance (Dhaliwal et al. 1982; Skinner 1993; 
Phillips et al. 2003). By contrast, highly levered firms may be less incentivised to reduce their 
tax burdens by engaging in complex and risky tax shelter activities, since the tax benefits from 
debt financing can reduce the value of non-debt tax management activities. Therefore, 
𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡 is presumed to be associated with the informativeness of income tax accruals in 
an unpredictable direction. 
The control variable 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑁𝑈𝐸𝑖𝑡 , calculated as the absolute value of earnings from 
discontinued operation scaled by the lagged total assets215, is included in the regression analysis 
to control for the impact of non-articulating items such as discontinued operations and 
extraordinary items on the informativeness of income tax accruals. According to IAS 12 para 
81h, the discontinued operations and extraordinary items are reported net of income taxes 
separately below the continuing activities, but their cash tax consequences are included in cash 
flow statements216. This will induce differences between total income tax expense and cash tax 
paid (i.e., income tax accruals) for a particular accounting period. Changes in income tax 
accruals stemming from the accounting treatments of non-articulating items are not designed 
to mitigate the timing issues and, thus, are not anticipated to be informative about future tax 
cash flows even if the GAAP is appropriately. 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑁𝑈𝐸𝑖𝑡 is expected to have a negative 
sign. 
By definition, long-term deferred taxes (𝐷𝐸𝐹𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡) often do not reverse within future one-year 
period. Therefore, this study controls long-term deferred tax balances because income tax 
accruals resulting from them would add noise to the measure of informativeness of income tax 
accrual about future one-year-ahead cash taxes, even if there is no managerial intentional or 
unintentional estimation errors in the income tax provision. The variable 𝐷𝐸𝐹𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡  is 
calculated as the deferred tax balances scaled by the lagged total assets217 and is expected to 
have a negative sign. 
 
215 The variable 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑁𝑈𝐸𝑖𝑡  is calculated on the basis of absolute value of earnings from discontinued 
operation, since both positive and negative earnings from discontinued operation are expected to negatively affect 
the informativeness of income tax accruals in the same manner.  
216  Results remain statistically identical if omitting companies exhibiting discontinued operations and 
extraordinary items from the sample. 
217 According to Kern et al. (1992), deferred taxes in the liability account in balance sheet would “approximate 
long-term deferrals only”, but deferred tax expense in income statement consist of “both current and long-term 
deferrals” (pp. 2). Thus, this study control deferred tax balances in the balance sheet to mitigate the impact of 
long-term deferred taxes that may not reverse within future one-year ahead. 
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The year fixed effect is included to allow variations in the intercept across the sample period, 
in order to adjust the cross-sectional correlation in the error term resulting from common 
shocks across years (Jayaraman 2008). The industry fixed effect is included to control for the 
systematic difference in the tax treatments in credit; incentives; and allowance across industries 
(Omer et al. 1993; Holland 1998; Wahab and Holland 2015). The firm-level clustering of 
standard errors is aimed at correcting for problems of serial correlation arising from the inter-
dependence in the error terms across years for a given firm (Petersen 2009). 
4.3.2.4. Corporate governance  
To further investigate whether corporate governance mechanism plays a significant role in 
restricting firms’ tax management incentives and thereby improving the informativeness of the 
reported income tax accruals, model 3.21-3.24 are re-estimated with the inclusion of the 
interaction terms between corporate governance and the individual tax management 
incentive218.  
𝑇𝐴𝑋_𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑡 = ω0 + ω1𝑐𝑇𝐴_𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖𝑡 + ω2𝑐𝐺𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡 + ω3𝑐𝑇𝐴_𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐺𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡 +
∑ ω4𝑐𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀_𝐶𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐴𝑖𝑡 + ∑ ω5𝑐 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑖𝑡 + ω𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 + ω𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                                            (3.21)                                                                            
𝑇𝐴𝑋_𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑡 = τ0 + τ1𝑐𝐷𝐸𝐶𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸_𝐴𝑀𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 + τ2𝑐𝐺𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡 + τ3𝑐𝐷𝐸𝐶𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸_𝐴𝑀𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡  ∗
𝐺𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡+  ∑ τ4𝑐𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀_𝐶𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐴𝑖𝑡 + ∑ τ5𝑐 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑖𝑡 + τ𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 + τ𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                          (3.22)                                                                                                                             
𝑇𝐴𝑋_𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑡 = Κ0 + Κ1𝑐𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑅_𝐴𝑀𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 + Κ2𝑐𝐺𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡 + Κ3𝑐𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑅_𝐴𝑀𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐺𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡+  
∑ Κ4𝑐𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀_𝐶𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐴𝑖𝑡 + ∑ Κ5𝑐 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑖𝑡 + Κ𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 + Κ𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                                       (3.23) 
𝑇𝐴𝑋_𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑡 = Ζ0 + Ζ1𝑐𝑇𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑇3𝑖𝑡 + Ζ2𝑐𝐺𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡 + Ζ3𝑐𝑇𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑇3𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐺𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡  
+ ∑ Ζ4𝑐𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀_𝐶𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐴𝑖𝑡 + ∑ Ζ5𝑐 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑖𝑡 + Ζ𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 + Ζ𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                                                              (3.24) 
 
𝑇𝐴𝑋_𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑡 = The incremental informativeness of income tax accruals over cash 
tax paid in predicting future one-year-ahead tax cash flows, which 
is denoted as ?̅?𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙
2
and 𝛿𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠 
 
𝑇𝐴_𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖𝑡 = The sum of cash taxes paid scaled by the sum of pre-tax income 
over a five-year period 
 
𝐷𝐸𝐶𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸_𝐴𝑀𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡                = The difference between a firm’s pre-tax profit of a previous period 
and that of the current period. 
 
218 This study concentrates on the subsamples of firm-years that exhibit tax management incentives to undertake 
tax-induced earnings management (e.g., when 𝑇𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑇1𝑖𝑡 = 1), when examining the mediating role played by 
corporate governance mechanism. 
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𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑅_𝐴𝑀𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡            = The difference between the analysts’ estimated pre-tax profit and 
the actual reported pre-tax profit. 
 
𝑇𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑇3𝑖𝑡             A binary variable which equals 1 if firms’ net income scaled by 
the opening market value of equity is within the range between 0 
and 0.02, and 0 otherwise. 
 
𝐺𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡            = A proxy for the effectiveness of firms’ governance and monitoring 
mechanism 
 
𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀_𝐶𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐴𝑖𝑡 = A vector of variables to capture firms’ tax environment complexity 
 
𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆𝑖𝑡                = 
 
A vector of controls variables that may affect the informativeness 
of income tax accruals in explaining future tax payments. 
 
Φ𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 = Industry dummies. 
 
Φ𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 = Year dummies. 
 
 
All financial accounting variables are deflated by opening total assets. Variable 𝑇𝐴_𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖𝑡  is winsorised at 0 
and 1. All other continuous variables are winsorised at the 1st and 99th percentile. See section 3.2.1. to 3.2.5. 
for detailed information about variable definition 
𝐺𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡 included in model 3.21-3.24 refers to a proxy for the effectiveness of firms’ 
governance and monitoring mechanism. This study considers four different channels of 
monitoring managerial behaviours and scrutinising financial reporting irregularities, including 
analyst coverage, audit quality, institutional shareholding and board independence.   
Analysts coverage (𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡) represents the number of analysts who make forecasts about 
firms’ earnings for an accounting period. It is defined as the number of analysts following from 
Institutional Brokers Estimate System (I/B/E/S). A higher (lower) level of 𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡 
indicates more (less) intensive analysts coverage of a firm (Yu 2008; Kim et al. 2011). Audit 
quality (𝐴𝑈𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡) represents the quality of employed auditing firms which is proxied by the 
size of the auditing firm. It is defined as a binary variable which equals to 1 if the employed 
auditor is from one of the ‘big four’ auditing firms, and 0 otherwise (Holland and Jackson 2004; 
Chi et al. 2011). Institutional shareholding (𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝐼𝑇𝑈𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖𝑡) represents the level of firms’ 
institutional ownership. It is defined as the percentage of shares held by large institutional 
shareholders (Cornett et al. 2008). Board independence (𝐵𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑡) captures the composition 
of insiders and outsiders serving on the board. It is defined as the percentage of the non-
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executive (i.e., outside) directors to total number of directors on the board (Wahab and Holland 
2012).  
Hypotheses H2c_i to H2c_iv predict that stronger corporate monitoring mechanism (i.e., higher 
analysts coverage, larger institutional shareholding, better audit quality and more independent 
board) plays a role in attenuating the hypothesised negative relation between firms’ tax 
management incentives and the incremental informativeness of income tax accruals. Thus, the 
coefficients of the interaction terms, i.e., 𝑇𝐴_𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖𝑡  × 𝐺𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡 in model 3.21 are 
expected to be positive and significant, and the coefficients of 𝐷𝐸𝐶𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸_𝐴𝑀𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 ×
𝐺𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡 , 𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑅_𝐴𝑀𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 × 𝐺𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡  and 𝑇𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑇3𝑖𝑡 ×
𝐺𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡 in model 3.22-3.24 are expected to be positive and significant. 
The year fixed effect is included to allow variations in the intercept across the sample period 
in order to adjust the cross-sectional correlation in the error term resulting from common 
shocks across years (Jayaraman 2007). The industry fixed effect is included to control for the 
systematic difference in the tax treatments in credit, incentives and allowance across industries 
and to control for the variation in the persistence of corporate tax performance varies by 
industry group219 (Omer et al. 1993; Holland 1998; Wahab and Holland 2015). The firm-level 
clustering of standard errors is aimed at correcting for problems of serial correlation arising 
from the inter-dependence in the error terms across years for a given firm (Petersen 2009). 
Variables employed in the regression estimation models are summarised in the following table 
4.1. 
4.3.3. Research design of the third hypothesis 
The third hypothesis is to investigate whether the incremental informativeness of income tax 
accruals to predict future tax cash flows has improved or deteriorated over time. Following 
Kim and Kross (2005), Hail. (2013) and Bushman et al. (2016), this study will re-estimate 
model (1) and (2) cross-sectionally each year, to generate the annual incremental explanatory 
power provided by income tax accruals to explain future tax cash flows. Then the annual 
informativeness of income tax accruals (𝑇𝐴𝑋_𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑡) will be regressed on two time-trend 
variables based on the following model (4) and model (5). 
 
219 For example, Wahab and Holland (2014) find that within industry groupings, there is wide variations in the 
level of persistency in corporate book tax difference. 
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Linear Trend Model:  𝑇𝐴𝑋_𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑡 = 𝜗0 + 𝜗1𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅+𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (4) 
Three-Period Model:  𝑇𝐴𝑋_𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑡 = Π0 + Π1𝑃𝐸𝐼𝑂𝑅𝐷𝑆+𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (5) 
In model (4) and (5), the dependent variable, 𝑇𝐴𝑋_𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑡, represents the incremental 
informativeness of income tax accruals over cash tax paid to explain future one-year-ahead tax 
cash flows, which is captured by ?̅?𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙
2
and 𝛿𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠. In model (4), 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 is set to one 
in the initial sample year and increasing by one for every sample year thereafter, i.e., 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 
ranges from 1 to 26. The coefficient on 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅, i.e., 𝜗1, captures the linear time trend in the 
incremental informativeness of income tax accruals to predict future tax cash flows over the 
sample period. A significantly positive (negative) 𝜗1 indicates that the incremental explanatory 
power of income tax accruals to predict future tax cash flows has been increasing (decreasing) 
over time. An insignificant 𝜗1 indicates that there is no significant linear time trend in the 
incremental explanatory power of income tax accruals. In model (5), 𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐼𝑂𝐷 is set to zero for 
sample period from 1992 to 1999 when deferred taxes are provided under SSAP 15 
“Accounting for Deferred Taxation”; set to one for sample period from 2000 to 2004 when 
deferred taxes are provided under FRS 19 “Deferred Tax”; and set to two for sample period 
from 2005 to 2017 when deferred tax are provided under IAS 12 “Income Taxes”220. The 
inclusion of 𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐼𝑂𝐷 allows to break the entire sample into three periods when different tax 
accounting standards (i.e., SSAP 15 for period 1992-1999, FRS 19 for period 2000-2004, and 
IAS 12 for period 2005-2017) have been adopted in UK, to investigate whether the adoption 
of different tax accounting standards leads to changes in the incremental informativeness of 
income tax accruals to explain future tax cash flows. 
Controlling the effects of changes in firm characteristics over time 
The tests of the third hypothesis thus far are based on the assumption that the underlying 
institutional and microeconomic factors affect the incremental informativeness of income tax 
accruals in the same manner over time. However, changes in the tax accounting standards 
adopted in the UK may not be the only reason that causes variations in the incremental 
 
220 Three indicator variables were generated to split the sample period into three periods. Each of the variables 
respectively represents one period of the enforcement of a different deferred tax accounting standard (i.e., SSAP 
15, FRS 19 and IAS 12) among UK listed entities. During the analyses, the first indicator variable for sample 
period from 1992 to 1999 is omitted and treated as the baseline group due to multicollinearity.  
See https://www.stata.com/manuals13/u25.pdf  
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informativeness of income tax accruals over time. Other factors, such as that firms themselves 
have changed in underlying characteristics and performance over time, may also explain the 
time trends in the incremental informativeness of income tax accruals to predict future tax cash 
flows. For example, if a firm’s operation becomes more uncertain and less predictable (i.e., 
less predictable income will result in less predictable future tax payments), a decrease in the 
ability of its income tax accruals to explain future tax cash flow can be evident over time even 
holding the tax accounting standard constant. In this section, the time trend of the incremental 
informativeness of income tax accruals to predict future tax cash flows will be re-examined 
after controlling for influences from changes in firms’ underlying characteristics. Following 
the methodology employed by Dyreng et al. (2017), variables that proxy for changes in firm 
characteristics will be included in model (6) and (7).  
𝑇𝐴𝑋_𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑡 = 𝜗0+𝜗1𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 + ∑ 𝜗2𝑐𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀_𝐶𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐴𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝜗3𝑐𝐺𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡 +𝜗𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡              (6) 
𝑇𝐴𝑋_𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑡 = Π0 + Π1𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐼𝑂𝐷 + ∑ Π2𝑐𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀_𝐶𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐴𝑖𝑡 + ∑ Π3𝑐𝐺𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡 + Π𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  (7)               
 
 
𝑇𝐴𝑋_𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑡 = The incremental informativeness of income tax accruals over 
cash tax paid at time t. 
𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀_𝐶𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐴𝑖𝑡 = A vector of variables associated with firms’ characteristics to 
proxy firms’ tax environment complexity of company i at time 
t. 
𝐺𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡                 A vector of variables that capture the strength of firms’ 
corporate governance mechanism of company i at time t. 
𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 = Ranges from 1 to 26 to capture the sample period. 
𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐼𝑂𝐷 = Equals to 0 for the sample period from 1992 to 1999, to 
1 for the sample period from 2000 to 2004; and to 2 for 
the sample period from 2005 to 2017. 
 
All continuous variables are deflated by opening total assets. All continuous variables are winsorised at the 1st 
and 99th percentile. See section 3.2.1. to 3.2.2. for detailed information about the variable definition 
𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀_𝐶𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐴𝑖𝑡 represents a vector of variables discussed in section 3.2 which capture the 
innate firm characteristics associated with firms’ tax environment complexity, and therefore 
are expected to be associated the informativeness of income tax accruals in explaining future 
tax cash flows. As discussed in section 3.2., variables that proxy firms’ tax environment 
complexity include firms’ operational uncertainty (𝑉𝑂𝐿_𝑃𝑇𝐵𝐼𝑖𝑡), firms’ profitability (𝑃𝑇𝐵𝐼𝑖𝑡), 
firm size (𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡), the number of operating segments (𝑆𝐸𝐺𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡), opportunities for growth 
(𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖𝑡), capital intensity (𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡), level of leverage (𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡) and discontinued 
operations (𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑁𝑈𝐸𝑖𝑡). 𝐺𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡 represents a vector of variables that capture 
the strength of corporate governance mechanism including the intensity of analyst coverage 
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(𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡); audit quality (𝐴𝑈𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡); institutional shareholding (𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝐼𝑇𝑈𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖𝑡); and 
board independence (𝐵𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑡). Industry fixed effects are also included in model (6) and (7) 
to account for the inner-industry changes in the composition of firms across industries and over 
time (Dyreng et al. 2017).  
The following table 4.1 describes all the variables employed in the estimation models. 
Table 4.1: Variable Measurements 
Item Name Measures 
Future tax cash flows  𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡+𝜌 Future tax-related cash flows scaled by lagged 
total assets for future years, where 𝜌 varies from 
1 to 5. 
The sum of future tax cash 
flows 
∑ 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡+5         The sum of future tax-related cash flows scaled 
by the sum of lagged total assets over future five 
aggregated years. 
Current tax cash flows 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡  Cash tax paid scaled by lagged total assets for 
company i at time t. 
Income tax accruals 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡  Income tax accruals scaled by lagged total 
assets for company i at time t. 
Incremental informativeness of 
income tax accruals 
?̅?𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠
2
 The difference between coefficients of 
determination from model (1) and (2): 
?̅?𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑇𝑎𝑥
2
− ?̅?𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑇𝑎𝑥
2
 
Incremental informativeness of 
income tax accruals 
𝛿𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠 The slope coefficient of income tax accruals 
generated for each firm from model (2) 
Tax management incentives 
Earnings target1 𝑇𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑇𝑖𝑡1 A binary variable which equals 1 if firms’ 
current period’s pre-tax profit is lower than that 
of previous period, and 0 otherwise.  
Earnings target1 𝐷𝐸𝐶𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸_𝐴𝑀𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡  Difference between a firm’s previous period’s 
pre-tax profit and that of the current period 
scaled by lagged total assets 
Earnings target2 𝑇𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑇𝑖𝑡2 A binary variable which equals 1 if firms’ actual 
pre-tax profit reported in I/E/B/S is lower than 
that of most recent consensus analysts’ forecast, 
and 0 otherwise 
Earnings target2 𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑅_𝐴𝑀𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡  Difference between analysts’ expected pre-tax 
profits and actual pre-tax profit reported by this 
firm scaled by the lagged total assets 
Earnings target3 𝑇𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑇𝑖𝑡3 A binary variable which equals 1 if firms’ 
current net income scaled by the opening market 
value of equity is within the range between 0 
and 0.02, and 0 otherwise 
Tax planning 𝑇𝐴_𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖𝑡 Calculated as the sum of total taxes paid over 
the five-year period scaled by the sum of pre-tax 
income over the same five-year period. 
Tax planning 𝐴𝐺𝐺𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑆𝐼𝑉𝐸𝑖𝑡  A binary variable which equals 1 if a firms’  
𝑇𝐴_𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖𝑡  is in the lowest quintile 
Tax environment complexity 
Operational uncertainty 𝑉𝑂𝐿_𝑃𝑇𝐵𝐼𝑖𝑡  The standard deviation of annual pre-tax 
income scaled by lagged total assets over a 
rolling three-year window 
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Operational uncertainty 𝑉𝑂𝐿_𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝐹𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑖𝑡  The standard deviation of annual cash flow 
scaled by lagged total assets over a rolling three-
year window 
Firm size 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡  The natural log of total assets 
Profitability 𝑃𝑇𝐵𝐼𝑖𝑡  The pre-tax income scaled by lagged total assets 
Business segments 𝑆𝐸𝐺𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 The number of segments in which a firm 
operates 
Growth opportunities 𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖𝑡  The ratio of firms’ market value of equity to 
book value of equity 
Capital intensity 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡  The gross cost of property, plant and equipment 
scaled by lagged total assets 
Leverage  𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡  Long-term debt to total assets scaled by lagged 
total assets 
Discontinued operation 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑁𝑈𝐸𝑖𝑡  The absolute value of earnings from 
discontinued operation scaled by the lagged 
total assets 
Deferred tax balance 𝐷𝐸𝐹𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡  The deferred tax balances scaled by the lagged 
total assets 
Corporate governance  
Analyst coverage  𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡  The number of analysts following 
Audit quality  𝐴𝑈𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡  A binary variable equals to 1 if the employed 
auditor is from one of the ‘big four’ auditing 
firms, and 0 otherwise 
Institutional shareholding 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝐼𝑇𝑈𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖𝑡  The percentage of shares held by large 
institutional shareholders 
Board independence 𝐵𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑡  The percentage of the non-executive (i.e., 
outside) directors to total number of directors on 
the board 
Time-trend variables 
Sample period dummy 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 Ranges from 1 to 26 to capture the sample 
period 
Three-period dummy 𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐼𝑂𝐷 Equals to 0 for sample period from 1992 to 
1999, to 1 for sample period from 2000 to 2004; 
and to 2 for sample period from 2005 to 2016 
 
4.3.4. Econometric issues and regression diagnostic procedure 
4.3.4.1. Heteroscedasticity and scaling effects 
Scale-related heteroscedasticity problem arises because firms of different size tend to have 
different values of many variables. For instance, the level of income tax accruals and cash tax 
payment can be naturally higher (lower) for large (small) firms. Failing to control for the scale 
differences can cause the variability of the dependent variable to be unequally distributed 
across the range of values of the independent variables and thus compromise the explanatory 
power of the independent variables, which will in turn lead to scale-related heteroscedasticity 
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in the distribution of error terms and reduce the regression estimation efficiency221 (Hurd 1979; 
Barth and Kallapur 1996; Akbar and Stark 2003; Baum 2006). Heteroscedasticity tests based 
on Breusch and Pagan (1979) will be conducted to detect heteroscedasticity problems.  
To mitigate the scaling effect and the heteroscedasticity problems, a common method is to 
deflate all continuous variables employed in the regression analysis by a proxy for scale (Akbar 
and Stark 2003; Horton 2008; Barth et al. 2009; Brav 2009). Deflating the continuous variables 
by a proxy for scale could also yield estimation results that better reflect the explanatory power 
of the independent variables rather than that of the variations in scale (Brown et al. 1999). A 
range of deflators has been employed by previous literature to control for the scale-related 
problems, including opening book value of assets (e.g., Kim et al. 2011; Guenther et al. 2017); 
net book value of equity (e.g., Akbar and Stark 2003; Wahab and Holland 2012); sales (e.g., 
Hirschey 1985); market value of equity (e.g., Christie 1987; Horton 2008); and numbers of 
shares outstanding (e.g., Rees 1997). In the absence of methodological consistency regarding 
the deflator’s choice, this study employs the lagged total assets as a deflator to control for the 
scale-related heteroscedasticity problems in order to be consistent with many of the current tax 
studies222. Further, the Eicker-Huber-White robust standard errors will be used in the regression 
analysis if the Breusch and Pagan (1979) and White (1980) tests detect any heteroscedasticity 
problems after deflating all continuous variables by a proxy for scale to control for the scaling 
effects.  
4.3.4.2. Outliers  
Outliers are unusual observations “with a unique combination of characteristics identifiable as 
distinctly different from the other observations” (Hair et al. 2014, pp. 62). Since the “arithmetic 
mean (a least-squares estimator) is sensitive to extreme values (relative to the sample media)”, 
including unusual points of data in the OLS regression can cause the coefficient estimates 
strongly influenced by the extreme values and, thus, poorly fit the regression sample (Baum 
2006, pp. 126). In summary, outliers are observations with unusually high or low value, which 
 
221 According to Baum (2006), the disturbance variances of cross-sectional datasets are often related to some 
measures of scale within groups of observations. For instance, the dispersion of wealthy households’ errors around 
the predicted value will likely be much greater than those of low-income households (Baum 2006, pp 144). In this 
case, the coefficient estimation conducted under the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) assumption of homoscedasticity 
is not consistent when in fact the distribution of error terms is heteroscedastic which can cause estimation 
inefficiency (Hurd 1979).  
222 See Kim et al. (2011); Robinson et al. (2014); Choudhary et al. (2016); and Guenther et al. (2017). 
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are not representative of characteristics of the entire sample and distort the results and the 
interpretation of the OLS multivariate coefficient estimates. There are two commonly used 
approaches in dealing with outliers, i.e., winsorisation (where the extreme values of data are 
replaced by the value of the closest nonoutliers); and trimming or truncation (where the 
detected outliers and influential data are dropped from the sample). As winsorisation keeps the 
estimate of scale constant while trimming or truncation involves the omission of certain 
percentage of observations which can increase the amount of missing data and affect the results 
of multivariate analysis, this study follows previous published tax accounting studies (e.g., Kim 
et al. 2011; Hope et al. 2013; Choudhary et al. 2016; Guenther et al. 2017) to mitigate the 
influence of outliers through winsorising the continuous variables employed in the regression 
analysis at the 1st and 99th percentile.  
4.3.4.3. Normality of residuals 
The Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression should be conducted based on the assumption 
that the residuals from the regression model are normally distributed. Although the estimated 
coefficients obtained from the OLS regression are still BLUE (best linear unbiased estimators) 
in the absence of normality in the distribution of the model residuals, the validity of the overall 
model goodness of fit (F-statistic) and the statistical significance of the coefficients (t-statistics) 
is based on the normality of the model residuals (Crown 1998, pp. 71). If the normal 
distribution of the model residuals is violated, the OLS statistical inferences based on the t-
statistics and F-statistics will become unreliable, since the generated OLS estimators will be 
inefficient and the estimated standard errors will be biased (Green 2003; 2008). The Normal-
Probability plots will be employed before multivariate regression analysis to show the 
distribution of model residuals.  
4.3.4.4. Autocorrelation 
The assumption of OLS estimation that error terms in the regression model are independently 
distributed can be violated when there is “correlation between members of series of 
observations ordered in time (as in time series data) or space (as in cross-sectional data)” 
(Gujarati 2003, pp. 442). With the cross-sectional data, departures from the independence of 
the distribution of error terms may reflect the ‘neighbourhood effect’ among contiguous 
observations while in terms of the time-series data, observations that are close in time may 
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share some correlation in their disturbance (Baum 2006, pp. 154-155). The presence of 
autocorrelated error terms in the regression model can cause the OLS standard error to under- 
or overestimate the true standard error, thereby reducing the efficiency of the OLS estimator 
and violating the OLS test statistics223 (Gujarati 2003, pp. 442; Maddala and Lahiri 2009, pp. 
253; Petersen 2009, pp. 440). Following, following Hoechle (2007) and Petersen (2009), the 
year dummies will be included in the regression models to mitigate the potential correlation 
between observations over the same period (i.e., the cross-sectional dependence among error 
terms)224, and the clustered firm-level Eicker-Huber-White robust standard errors225 will be 
employed in the multivariate regression analysis to mitigate both the normality dispersion and 
the potential aucorrelation of error terms across years for a given observation (i.e., the serial 
correlation among error terms) (Hair et al. 2014). 
4.3.4.5. Multicollinearity 
Multicollinearity refers to an interdependency condition in which two or more explanatory 
variables of a regression model correlate with each other (Gujarati 2003). Multicollinearity 
problems can cause threats to the model specification and the parameter estimates of the 
multivariant regression analysis, since the presence of multicollinearity indicates that the 
explained variance of an explanatory variable can be allocated arbitrarily between the linearly 
interdependent explanatory variables, leading to difficulties in distinguishing “the independent 
contribution to explained variance of an explanatory variable that exhibits little or no truly 
independent variation” and making the coefficient estimation unreliable (Farrar and Glauber 
1967, pp. 93). According to O’Brien (2007), multicollinearity problems can “increase 
estimates of parameter variance; yield models in which no variable is statistically signiﬁcant 
 
223 For example, Maddala and Lahiri (2009) indicate that the presence of serial-correlation tends to make the 𝑅2, 
T-statistic and F-statistic exaggerated.  
224 According to Petersen (2009), “since many panel data sets have more firms than years, a common approach is 
to include dummy variables for each time period (to absorb the time effect) and then cluster by firm (Lamont and 
Polk, 2001; Anderson and Reeb, 2004; Gross and Souleles, 2004; Sapienza, 2004; and Faulkender and Petersen, 
2006)” (pp. 458).  
225 It is important to distinguish the difference between the robust standard errors and the clustered standard errors. 
According to Baum (2006), estimating the robust standard errors only affect the coefficients’ standard errors and 
interval estimates rather than affecting the magnitude of the coefficient. The robust estimator of standard errors 
will produce test statistics (i.e., p-value, t-statistics and F-statistics) that are “robust to conditional 
heteroskedasticity of unknown forms”. By comparison, the cluster estimator of the standard errors “allows the 
disturbance within each cluster to be correlated with each other but requires that the disturbances from different 
clusters be uncorrelated”. The cluster estimator will produce test statistics (i.e., p-value, t-statistics and F-statistics) 
that are “robust to the correlation of disturbances within groups”. As a result, the cluster-robust-standard error 
estimator produce test statistics that are robust to the correlation of model residuals and to the nonidentically 
distributed model residuals (pp. 136-138). 
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even though  𝑅2 is large; produce parameter estimates of the incorrect sign and of implausible 
magnitude; create situations in which small changes in the data produce wide swings in 
parameter estimates; and, in truly extreme cases, prevent the numerical solution of a model” 
(pp. 673). For this reason, it is crucial to detect and correct the problem of multicollinearity 
before conducting any multivariate regression analysis. Two well-known diagnostic tests, i.e., 
the analysis of correlation coefficients and the variance inflation factors (VIF), will be 
employed to detect problems of multicollinearity. 
Specifically, in the analysis of correlation coefficients, any Spearman correlations between 
pairs of variables equal to or higher than 0.8 reveal the existence of multicollinearity problems 
in the model (Hair et al. 2014). However, analysis of correlation coefficients can only be 
performed to explain the collinearity condition of two explanatory variables rather than that 
between the multiple (i.e., three or more) explanatory variables. As a result, the variance 
inflation factors (VIF) will be further performed to detect problems of multicollinearity among 
multiple explanatory variables employed in the regression models. VIF is calculated as the 
inverse of the tolerance value, in which the tolerance value for an independent variable equals 
1 minus the property of variance it shares with other independent variables in the model. 
Consequently, a higher level of VIF (i.e., VIF equal or higher than 10) indicates that the 
variability of an independent variable can be largely explained by other independent variables 
and, hence, signifies the presence of multicollinearity problems (O’Brien 2007). 
4.4. Conclusion 
This chapter details the process of hypotheses development and estimation model construction. 
As this thesis attempts to examine the cross-sectional determinates and the time-series trend of 
the informativeness of income tax accruals in the UK setting, the hypotheses and estimation 
models are designed to first test whether the income tax accruals are incrementally informative 
over cash tax paid to explain future tax cash flows. This study further examines the cross-
sectional determinants of the income tax accruals, with the primary interests in investigating 
how managers’ incentives to undertake tax management activities affect the informativeness 
of income tax accruals; and whether corporate governance mechanism plays a significant role 
in attenuating the impacts of the tax management incentives on the informativeness of income 
tax accruals. Finally, this study examines the time-series trend in the informativeness of income 
tax accruals to show whether the incremental informativeness of income tax accruals has 
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deteriorated or improved over time in the UK. Overall, through testing the hypotheses, this 
thesis aims to provide a thorough understanding on the ability of income tax provision to 
explain future tax cash flows in the UK setting.  
Chapter 5 Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics 
203 
 
 
Chapter 5 
Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 5 Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics 
204 
 
5.1. Introduction 
This chapter concentrates on presenting the process of sample selection and the summary of 
descriptive statistics. It begins with stating the data source and sample framework which are 
inclusive of the data type and the screening criteria imposed on the sample selection process. 
The subsequent section of this chapter presents the summary statistics and univariate variable 
correlations for the dependent and independent variables employed in the estimation models 
for hypotheses tests. The last section concludes this chapter. 
5.2. Data Source and Sample Selection 
This study employs a panel dataset of publicly-traded non-financial U.K. companies listed on 
the London Stock Exchange (LSE) for the period 1992 to 2017, obtained from the Datastream 
database. The year 1992 is used as a starting point since data for corporate tax payment is 
generally not available on Datastream prior to the year 1992. The sample includes both active 
and inactive stocks to avoid survivorship bias226, and the sample frame focuses only on non-
financial companies, as financial companies (such as financial institutions, insurance 
companies and unit trusts) tend to have different financial reporting regulations as compared 
to other non-financial companies (Fama and French 1992; Hanlon 2005)227.  
The data employed in the dataset can be classified into three different types, including the 
reported financial accounting and taxation data; the corporate governance data; and the industry 
classification. All of the data included in the dataset are archive in nature and can be obtained 
from firms’ publicly-reported financial statements. First, the reported financial accounting and 
taxation data, for example, profit before tax, cash tax paid or income tax expenses, were 
obtained from Worldscope provided by Thomson Reuters. Second, the corporate governance 
data were collected from several different sources. For instance, data regarding the composition 
 
226 The original sample is generated using the Datastream constituent list FTSE All-Share+DEADUK which 
produces 9912 active and inactive (i.e., dead or delisted) firms. In order to avoid the inclusion of foreign 
companies that list in the UK, companies with exchange/market name (EXMNEM) that is not denoted as “London” 
and equity record (ISIN and MAJOR) that is denoted as secondary quotation will be excluded from the sample 
(3948 firms are excluded). 
227 For instance, Fama and French (1992) state that high leverage is normal for financial companies. But the 
meaning of high leverage is quite different between financial and non-financial companies, as for non-financial 
companies, high leverage more likely indicates financial distress. 
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of board directors and names of audit firms were collected from Datastream; the financial 
analyst data were collected from the Institutional Brokers Estimate System (I/B/E/S) database 
provided by Thomson Reuter; and the institutional ownership data were collected from Capital 
IQ. Third, the industry classification is based on the Financial Times Stock Exchange (FTSE)/ 
Dow John (DJ)’s industry classification benchmark industry name (ICBIN) obtained from the 
Thomas Reuters Datastream.  
Following previous tax literature, several screening criteria were further imposed on the sample 
selection process. First, companies that provide financial information in currencies other than 
U.K. sterling are excluded due to the difficulties in comparing and analysing firm performances 
if their reported financial information are provided in different currencies. Second, following 
Hanlon (2005), firms reporting pre-tax financial reporting loss and negative current tax expense 
are excluded from the sample228. The inclusion of only profit-making companies in the sample 
is intended to control tax losses carried forward or transferred among groups, because changes 
in tax losses can obscure the true informativeness of income tax accruals in explaining future 
tax payments. The exclusion of loss-making observations with negative pre-tax profit is also 
intended to eliminate the confounding denominator effect and maintain a reasonable economic 
interpretation of ETRs, as “it is not clear how to interpret negative tax rates because firms do 
not necessarily receive a refund for annual tax losses” (Guenther et al. 2017, pp. 121). Third, 
companies with negative book value of equity are excluded from the sample. The exclusion of 
companies with negative book value of equity is to avoid negative market-book ratios due to 
their limited economic meaning in indicating companies’ expected future growth (Collins et al. 
1999). Finally, each company included in the sample is required to have tax data (i.e., income 
tax expense and cash tax paid) for at least six consecutive years to ensure that there is sufficient 
data (i.e., data for current year and future five years, i.e., t, t+1, t+2, t+3, t+4 and t+5) to regress 
model (1) and model (2). The final sample consists of 323 UK quoted non-financial companies 
(8398 company-year). The sample data were cross-checked with information reported in firms’ 
annual reports to verify the accuracy of the data employed229. The following table 5.1 to 5.3 
 
228 According to Hanlon (2005), net operating losses (NOL) could lead to a lower (or possible zero) deferred tax 
expense when there is a true temporary book-tax difference in the deferred tax expense account for a respective 
reporting period and, accordingly, the explanation power of the income tax accruals to predict future cash tax 
payment could be compromised if the true value of deferred taxes is masked by the NOL. Therefore, this study 
eliminates loss-making companies to control the effect of the NOL. 
229 88 companies’ financial reports were collected from the Company House, to compare the data reported in firms’ 
financial reports with the data gathered from the secondary database. No questionable data was found during the 
cross-checking process. 
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summarises the data source; the sample selection process; and the industry classification of the 
employed dataset, respectively. 
 
Table 5.1: Data Sources 
Type of 
Data 
 Source Corresponding  
Regression Variables 
Reported 
financial 
accounting 
and taxation 
data 
 Worldscope 
provided by 
Thomson Reuters 
 
 
Cash tax paid; total asset; 
income tax expense; current 
tax expense; deferred taxes; 
pre-tax income; operating 
cash flow; the percentage of 
foreign sales to total sales; 
segment sales; market value 
of equity; book value of 
equity; gross cost of plant, 
property and equipment; and 
long-term debt. 
 
 
 
The 
corporate 
governance 
data 
The composition of 
board directors and 
names of audit firms 
Datastream The percentage of non-
executive board members; 
The name of auditing firms 
employed by companies 
The financial analyst 
data 
Institutional Brokers 
Estimate System 
(I/B/E/S) database 
The number of financial 
analyst covering; the 
consensus financial analysts’ 
estimates of pre-tax income in 
t+1; companies’ actual 
reported pre-tax income in 
t+1. 
The institutional 
ownership data 
Capital IQ The percentage of shares hold 
by institutional owners 
The industry 
classification 
 Financial Times 
Stock Exchange 
(FTSE)/ Dow John 
(DJ)’s industry 
classification 
benchmark 
The name of the industry 
under which the equity is 
classified 
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Table 5.3: Industry Classification 
FTSE/DJ’s Industry Classification Number of Companies 
 
Basic Materials 
 
24 
Consumer Goods 60 
Consumer Services 99 
Health Care 10 
Industrials 95 
Oil & Gas 3 
Technology 18 
Telecommunications 3 
Utilities 11 
Total 323 
 
Table 5.2: Sample Selection Process 
Details Number of Companies 
Publicly-listed U.K. firms 
(Listed throughout the sample period 1992-2017) 
9912 
Less: firms whose primary quotation is not in UK (3958) 
Less: Financial firms (843) 
Less: firms with no industry identifications (1265) 
Less: firms with currencies other than sterling (1134) 
Less: firms that report negative pre-tax income (1853) 
Less: firms that report negative book income (71) 
Less: firms that report negative current tax expense (66) 
Less: firms that do not have income tax expense for 6 
consecutive years 
(383) 
Less: firms that do not have cash tax for 6 consecutive years (60) 
Final companies  323 
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5.3. Descriptive Statistics  
Table 5.4 and table 5.5 panel A to B respectively present the summary statistics and univariate 
variable correlations for the dependent and independent variables employed in regressions for 
the hypotheses tests. Following Dyreng et al. (2008) and Guenther et al. (2017), the variable 
𝑇𝐴_𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻it, which is used to proxy levels of corporate tax planning, is winsorised at zero and 
one to maintain a reasonable economic interpretation of the effective tax rate. All other 
financial accounting variables are deflated by the lagged total assets and are winsorised at the 
1st and 99th percentiles.  
Table 5.4 shows that cash tax payments (𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡 ) on average account for 3.28 
percent of the opening total assets, and range from -0.01 percent to 11.04 percent of the opening 
total assets. The mean value of income tax accruals (𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 ) is 0.0028, which 
indicates that income tax accruals account for 0.28 percent of the opening total assets on 
average. Income tax accruals averagely explain 28.27 percent of future one-year-ahead cash 
tax payments (mean of ?̅?𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠
2
=0.2827); and one unit change in income tax accruals 
leads to 0.7436 unit change in the future one-year-ahead cash taxes on average (mean of 
𝛿𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠=0.7436). The mean (median) of the five-year cash ETR, i.e., 𝑇𝐴_𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖𝑡, is 0. 
2712 (0. 2756), which suggests that sample firms are able to maintain a long-run cash effective 
tax rate below 30% on average. The mean value of the indicator variable 𝐴𝐺𝐺𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑆𝐼𝑉𝐸𝑖𝑡 is 
0.1435, suggesting that 14.35 percent of the sample firm-years are defined as engaging in tax-
planning activities.  
The minimum value of pre-tax profit (𝑃𝑇𝐵𝐼𝑖𝑡) is above zero (0.0072), because firms that report 
pre-tax financial reporting losses are excluded from the sample to mitigate the impact of tax 
losses carryforward on the informativeness of income tax accruals. The mean value of the 
indicator variable 𝑇𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑇1𝑖𝑡  is 0.3691, suggesting that 36.91 percent of firm-years in the 
sample report pre-tax profit lower than that of the previous period. Variable 
𝐷𝐸𝐶𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸_𝐴𝑀𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 , which is defined as the difference between pre-tax profits of the 
previous period and that of the current period scaled by the lagged total assets, has a mean 
value of -0.0119 and ranges from -0.1770 to 0.1996. This means that firms’ pre-tax profit (year 
𝑡) in the sample averagely rises by 1.19 percent of the opening total assets from their previous 
period (year 𝑡-1). The average of the indicator variable 𝑇𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑇2𝑖𝑡  (0.7512) indicates that 
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75.12 percent of firm-years in the sample report pre-tax profits that are lower than what the 
financial analysts expected. The variable 𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑅_𝐴𝑀𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 , which is defined as the 
difference between analysts’ expected pre-tax profits and the actual pre-tax profit reported by 
this firm, has a mean value of 0.0482, indicating that firms’ reported pre-tax profit is averagely 
4.82 percent lower than the pre-tax profits forecasted by financial analysts. The mean value of 
the indicator variable 𝑇𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑇3𝑖𝑡 (0.0403) indicates that 4.03 percent of firm-years report zero 
or slightly positive post-tax profit (i.e., the net income divided by market value of equity is 
between 0 and 0.02). 
In terms of the corporate governance data, the mean value of 𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡 is 8.0130, with 
values ranging from 1 to 43, indicating an average of 8 financial analysts making forecasts 
about earnings for a particular firm-year, and the maximum (minimum) number of financial 
analysts covering a firm is 43 (1). The mean value of the indicator variable 𝐴𝑈𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡 shows that 
on average 76.02 percent of the sample firms employ auditors from one of the “big four” 
auditing firms. The mean value of 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝐼𝑇𝑈𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖𝑡  (0.1632) indicates that institutional 
shareholders averagely hold 16.32 percent of firms’ common outstanding shares in the sample. 
On average, 65.35 percent of non-executive directors serve the board (mean value of 
𝐵𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑡=0.6535), which is consistent with Wahab and Holland (2012) that the average level 
of non-executive directors serving the board is proportionately higher than that of executive 
directors in UK. 
Table 5.5 panel A shows that the cash tax payment (𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡 ) and the income tax 
accruals ( 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 ) are negatively correlated (-0.2564), and are both positively 
correlated with tax cash flows over the future one to five years (𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡+1 through 
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡+5 ). Table 5.5 panel B shows that the two measures of firm-specific 
informativeness of income tax accruals (?̅?𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠
2
 and 𝛿𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠) are highly correlated, 
with a ratio of 0.5707. Correlations between the informativeness of income tax accruals 
(measured by ?̅?𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠
2
 and 𝛿𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠 ) and the level of corporate tax planning 
(measured by 𝑇𝐴_𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖𝑡  and 𝐴𝐺𝐺𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑆𝐼𝑉𝐸𝑖𝑡 ) are as expected: ?̅?𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠
2
 and 
𝛿𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠 are positively correlated with 𝑇𝐴_𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖𝑡 (0.1216 and 0.0708, respectively) and 
are negatively correlated with 𝐴𝐺𝐺𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑆𝐼𝑉𝐸𝑖𝑡 (-0.0675 and -0.0062, respectively). In addition, 
both measures of firm-specific informativeness of income tax accruals are negatively correlated 
with 𝑇𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑇1𝑖𝑡  (-0.0117 and -0.0138); 𝐷𝐸𝐶𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸_𝐴𝑀𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡  (-0.0178 and -0.0363); and 
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𝑇𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑇3𝑖𝑡 (-0.0076 and -0.0488), which provides initial univariate evidence to support the 
hypothesis that firms with strong incentives to meet particular earnings targets, i.e., to avoid 
reporting a decline in the post-tax earnings or to avoid reporting a post-tax loss, are more likely 
to manipulate income tax accruals which compromises the ability of income tax accruals to 
explain future tax cash flows. However, the positive correlations between firm-specific 
informativeness of income tax accruals and  𝑇𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑇2𝑖𝑡  (0.0355 and 0.0262) and 
𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑅_𝐴𝑀𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 (0.0967 and 0.0397) are not as expected, which potentially implies that 
the analysts’ consensus forecasts regarding the level of pre-tax profit may not be a strong target 
that motivates managers to manipulate income tax accruals for the purposes of managing 
earnings to meet analysts’ expectation. 
Correlations between firm-specific informativeness of income tax accruals and variables of 
tax-related firm characteristics are generally consistent with expectations: the informativeness 
of income tax accruals (measured by ?̅?𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠
2
 and 𝛿𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠) is positively correlated 
with firm profitability (𝑃𝑇𝐵𝐼𝑖𝑡, 0.0834 and 0.0712) and the level of capital intensity (𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡, 
0.0300 and 0.0537); and is negatively correlated with firm size (𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡, -0.2635 and -0.1243), 
firm growth (𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖𝑡, -0.0506 and -0.0845), leverage ratio (𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡, -0.1222 and -
0.1652), levels of discontinued operation (𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑁𝑈𝐸𝑖𝑡, -0.0240 and -0.0034), the number 
of firms’ operational segments (𝑆𝐸𝐺𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 , -0.0400 and -0.0250) and firms’ long-term 
deferred tax balances (𝐷𝐸𝐹𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡 , -0.0703 and -0.0362). However, the positive correlations 
between the informativeness of income tax accruals and the proxies to capture firms’ 
operational uncertainty, i.e., 𝑉𝑂𝐿_𝑃𝑇𝐵𝐼𝑖𝑡 (0.1165 and 0.0524) and 𝑉𝑂𝐿_𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝐹𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑖𝑡 
(0.2354 and 0.1707), are not consistent with the hypothesis. More important, the correlation 
matrix shown in table 5.5 panel A to panel B does not initially signify the existence of extreme 
multicollinearity issues between two variables employed in the regression analysis, as the 
univariate variable correlations are all below 0.8. 
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Table 5.4: Descriptive Statistics 
Firm N=323 Mean Median Max Min Standard 
Deviation 
Cash Tax Paidi,t  0.0328 0.0277 0.1104 -0.0001 0.0232 
Tax Accrualsi,t  0.0028 0.0021 0.0510 -0.0382 0.0132 
R̅Tax Accruals
2
 0.2827 0.2193 1.2295 -0.4519 0.3835 
δTax Accruals 0.7436 0.7306 3.5789 -1.5415 0.7186 
TA_CASHit 0.2712 0.2756 1.0000 0.0000 0.0886 
AGGRESSIVEit 0.1435 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.3506 
PTBIit 0.1400 0.1186 0.5143 0.0072 0.0949 
VOL_PTBIit 0.0417 0.0300 0.2196 0.0043 0.0388 
VOL_CASHFLOWit 0.0472 0.0352 0.2221 0.0058 0.0400 
SIZEit 12.2554 11.9790 17.2603 8.3982 2.0201 
GROWTHit 3.1014 2.3150 17.3300 0.4800 2.7262 
CAPINTit 0.2963 0.2431 1.0828 0.0053 0.2327 
LEVERAGEit 0.1345 0.0920 0.6862 0.0000 0.1522 
SEGMENTit 3.4063 3.0000 10.0000 1.0000 2.3099 
DISCONTINUEit 0.0003 0.0000 0.6814 -0.1508 0.0141 
DEFER_BALANCEit 0.0871 0.0000 4.7510 -0.4341 0.5548 
TARGET1it 0.3691 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.4826 
DECLINE_AMOUNTit -0.0119 -0.0111 0.1996 -0.1770 0.0492 
TARGET2it 0.7512 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.4327 
ERROR_AMOUNTit 0.0482 0.0205 0.4105 -0.2596 0.0989 
TARGET3it 0.0403 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.1966 
COVERAGEit 8.0130 6.0000 43.0000 1.0000 6.6332 
AUDITit 0.7602 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.4269 
INSTITUTIONit 0.1632 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.3070 
BOARDit 0.6535 0.6667 1.0000 0.2222 0.1356 
YEAR 13.5000 13.5000 1.0000 26.0000 7.5004 
PERIOD 2.1900 2.5000 1.0000 3.0000 0.8780 
See table 4.1 for detailed information about the variable definition 
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Table 5.5: Pairwise Correlation Matrix  
Panel A 𝐂𝐚𝐬𝐡 𝐓𝐚𝐱 𝐏𝐚𝐢𝐝𝐢,𝐭+𝟏 𝐂𝐚𝐬𝐡 𝐓𝐚𝐱 𝐏𝐚𝐢𝐝𝐢,𝐭+𝟐 𝐂𝐚𝐬𝐡 𝐓𝐚𝐱 𝐏𝐚𝐢𝐝𝐢,𝐭+𝟑 𝐂𝐚𝐬𝐡 𝐓𝐚𝐱 𝐏𝐚𝐢𝐝𝐢,𝐭+𝟒 𝐂𝐚𝐬𝐡 𝐓𝐚𝐱 𝐏𝐚𝐢𝐝𝐢,𝐭+𝟓 𝐂𝐚𝐬𝐡 𝐓𝐚𝐱 𝐏𝐚𝐢𝐝𝐢,𝐭 𝐓𝐚𝐱 𝐀𝐜𝐜𝐫𝐮𝐚𝐥𝐬𝐢,𝐭       
 
𝐂𝐚𝐬𝐡 𝐓𝐚𝐱 𝐏𝐚𝐢𝐝𝐢,𝐭 
 
0.7561 
 
0.6662 
 
0.6050 
 
0.5515 
 
0.5169 
 
1.0000 
      
 
𝐓𝐚𝐱 𝐀𝐜𝐜𝐫𝐮𝐚𝐥𝐬𝐢,𝐭  
 
 
0.1978 
 
0.1616 
 
0.1244 
 
0.1268 
 
0.0940 
 
-0.2564 
 
1.0000 
     
 
Panel B 
 
?̅?𝐓𝐚𝐱 𝐀𝐜𝐜𝐫𝐮𝐚𝐥𝐬
𝟐
 
 
𝛅𝐓𝐚𝐱 𝐀𝐜𝐜𝐫𝐮𝐚𝐥𝐬 
 
𝐓𝐀_𝐂𝐀𝐒𝐇 
 
𝐀𝐆𝐆𝐑𝐄𝐒𝐒𝐈𝐕𝐄 
 
𝐏𝐓𝐁𝐈 
 
𝐕𝐎𝐋 
_𝐏𝐓𝐁𝐈 
 
𝐕𝐎𝐋 
_𝐂𝐀𝐒𝐇𝐅𝐋𝐎𝐖 
 
𝐒𝐈𝐙𝐄 
 
𝐆𝐑𝐎𝐖𝐓𝐇 
 
𝐂𝐀𝐏𝐈𝐍𝐓 
 
𝐋𝐄𝐕𝐄𝐑𝐀𝐆𝐄 
 
𝐃𝐈𝐒𝐂𝐎𝐍𝐓𝐈𝐍𝐔𝐄 
 
𝐒𝐄𝐆𝐌𝐄𝐍𝐓 
 
DEFER 
 
 
𝐓𝐀𝐑𝐆𝐄𝐓𝟏 
 
𝐃𝐄𝐂𝐋𝐈𝐍𝐄_ 
_𝐀𝐌𝐎𝐔𝐍𝐓 
 
𝐓𝐀𝐑𝐆𝐄𝐓𝟐 
 
𝐄𝐑𝐑𝐎𝐑 
_𝐀𝐌𝐎𝐔𝐍𝐓 
 
𝐓𝐀𝐑𝐆𝐄𝐓𝟑 
?̅?𝐓𝐚𝐱 𝐀𝐜𝐜𝐫𝐮𝐚𝐥𝐬
𝟐
 1.0000                   
𝛅𝐓𝐚𝐱 𝐀𝐜𝐜𝐫𝐮𝐚𝐥𝐬 0.5717 1.0000                  
𝐓𝐀_𝐂𝐀𝐒𝐇 0.1216 0.0708 1.0000                 
𝐀𝐆𝐆𝐑𝐄𝐒𝐒𝐈𝐕𝐄 -0.0675 -0.0062 -0.5978 1.0000                
𝐏𝐓𝐁𝐈 0.0834 0.0712 -0.0618 -0.0914 1.0000               
𝐕𝐎𝐋_𝐏𝐓𝐁𝐈 0.1165 0.0524 0.0407 0.0490 0.2939 1.0000              
𝐕𝐎𝐋_𝐂𝐀𝐒𝐇𝐅𝐋𝐎𝐖 0.2354 0.1707 0.0553 -0.0074 0.3079 0.6108 1.0000             
𝐒𝐈𝐙𝐄 -0.2635 -0.1243 -0.1250 0.0839 -0.2389 -0.2046 -0.3236 1.0000            
𝐆𝐑𝐎𝐖𝐓𝐇 -0.0506   -0.0845 -0.0266 -0.0863 0.5240 0.1534 0.0724 0.0269 1.0000           
𝐂𝐀𝐏𝐈𝐍𝐓 0.0300 0.0537 0.0345 -0.0688 0.0054 -0.0536 -0.0704 0.0267 -0.0411 1.0000          
𝐋𝐄𝐕𝐄𝐑𝐀𝐆𝐄 -0.2222 -0.1652 -0.1844 0.1448 -0.1993 -0.1286 -0.2041 0.3872 0.0318 0.0538 1.0000         
𝐃𝐈𝐒𝐂𝐎𝐍𝐓𝐈𝐍𝐔𝐄 -0.0240 -0.0034 0.0068 0.0061 -0.0240 -0.0271 -0.0435 0.0689 0.0118 0.0036 0.0344 1.0000        
𝐒𝐄𝐆𝐌𝐄𝐍𝐓 -0.0400 0.0250 0.0330 0.0535 0.0141 0.1145 -0.0505 0.3716 0.1228 0.1153 0.0734 0.0523 1.0000       
DEFER -0.0703 -0.0362 -0.0384 0.0376 -0.0361 -0.0370 -0.0901 0.2954 0.0071 -0.0171 0.1191 0.0589 0.1602 1.0000      
𝐓𝐀𝐑𝐆𝐄𝐓𝟏 -0.0117 -0.0138 0.0838 -0.0064 -0.3257 0.0678 -0.0240 -0.0163 -0.1274 -0.0236 0.0066 0.0416 0.0308 -0.0002 1.0000     
𝐃𝐄𝐂𝐋𝐈𝐍𝐄_𝐀𝐌𝐎𝐔𝐍𝐓 -0.0178 -0.0363 0.0672 0.0155 -0.5280 0.0053 -0.0534 0.0614 -0.2045 -0.0180 0.0149 0.0508 0.0042 0.0064 0.6497 1.0000    
𝐓𝐀𝐑𝐆𝐄𝐓𝟐 0.0355 0.0262 0.0358 -0.0273 -0.0550 0.0115 -0.0104 -0.0626 0.0822 -0.0648 -0.0550 -0.0483 0.0837   -0.0545 0.0003 0.0255 1.0000   
𝐄𝐑𝐑𝐎𝐑_𝐀𝐌𝐎𝐔𝐍𝐓 0.0967 0.0397 0.1297 -0.0205 -0.1811 0.0035 -0.0020 -0.0637 0.0250 -0.1090 -0.0778 -0.0438 0.0410 -0.0693 0.1282 0.1061 0.4957 1.0000  
𝐓𝐀𝐑𝐆𝐄𝐓𝟑 -0.0076 -0.0488 0.0820 -0.0122 -0.1135 0.1445 0.0636 -0.0163 0.1354 -0.0376 0.0459 0.0480 0.0256 -0.0203 0.1553 0.1630 0.0711 0.1617 1.0000 
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5.4. Conclusion 
This chapter focuses on describing the data and sample employed in the estimation models for 
hypotheses tests. In summary, this study employs a panel dataset of publicly-traded non-
financial U.K. companies for the period 1992 to 2016. The data employed in the dataset can be 
classified into three types: the reported financial accounting and taxation data; the corporate 
governance data; and the industry classification. The financial accounting and taxation data is 
obtained from the Worldscope; the corporate governance data is obtained from Datastream, 
Capital IQ and the Institutional Brokers Estimate System (I/B/E/S) database; and the industry 
classification is based on the Financial Times Stock Exchange (FTSE)/ Dow John (DJ)’s 
industry classification benchmark industry name (ICBIN).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 6 Regression Analysis and Results 
214 
 
 
Chapter 6 
Regression Analysis and Results 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 6 Regression Analysis and Results 
215 
 
 6.1. Introduction 
This chapter focuses on the regression analyses based on the estimation models developed in 
chapter 4 and the sample discussed in chapter 5. This chapter begins with discussing the 
multivariate regression results generated from testing the first to the third hypothesis, and 
proceeds with conducting further analyses to test the robustness of the regression results. The 
final section concludes this chapter.  
In conducting the regression analyses, heteroscedasticity and multicollinearity problems have 
been tested and reported based on the Breusch and Pagan (1979) test and the variance inflation 
factors (VIF), respectively. The Quantile-normal plots are employed to check whether the 
model residuals are normally distributed230. All continuous variables are winsorised at the 1st 
and 99th percentile to mitigate the influence of outliers and are scaled by the lagged total assets 
to control for the scale-related heteroscedasticity problems. Moreover, the year fixed effect is 
included to adjust the cross-sectional correlation in the error term resulting from common 
shocks across years (Jayaraman 2007). The industry fixed effect is included to control for the 
systematic difference across industries which may affect the informativeness of income tax 
accruals. Standard errors are clustered at firm level to correct for potential problems of serial 
correlation arising from the inter-dependence in the error terms across years for a given firm 
(Petersen 2009). 
6.2. Multivariate Regression Results for the First Hypothesis 
Table 6.1 panel A and panel B present regression results of estimating model (1) and model 
(2), respectively. The Breusch-Pegan tests indicate that there is a significant level of 
heteroscedasticity. Therefore, standard robust errors are used to control for the 
heteroscedasticity problem (Eicker 1963). Results in table 6.1 panel A reveal that the current 
cash tax payment, 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡 , is significant in predicting future one- to five-year ahead 
cash tax payments, which is consistent with the prediction that firms’ future tax cash flows are 
related to the current cash tax payments231. The R-square statistics in table 6.1 panel A indicate 
 
230 The normality of model residuals is checked and reported in appendix D. Figures reported in appendix D show 
that the distribution of residuals of models employed for the hypotheses tests does not severely violate the 
normality assumption.  
231 A firm’s future tax-related cash flows can be associated with its current cash tax payments because many tax 
incentives are serially correlated over time (Citron et al. 2013). For example, under UK tax legislation, the 
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that the predictability of current tax payments reduces monotonically, from explaining 58.67 
percent of variations in future one-year ahead cash tax payments to 32.69 percent of variations 
in future five-year ahead cash tax payments.  
Results in table 6.1 panel B reveal that the income tax accruals, 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 , are 
incrementally informative over cash tax payment in explaining future one- to five-year ahead 
cash tax payments. Specifically, the Chi-squares from the Wald tests reject the null hypothesis 
that the coefficients of 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 in model (2) are not significantly different from zero. 
The likelihood ratio tests reject the null hypothesis that the predictive ability of those two 
models are the same, indicating that model (2) which exhibits higher 𝑅2 performs significantly 
better than model (1). Differences between 𝑅2 of model (1) and that of model (2) imply that 
the income tax accruals of the current period explain approximate 4.58 percent to 15.04 percent 
of variations in future cash tax payments.  
Overall, results reported in table 6.1 panel A and panel B provide evidence that cash tax 
payments and income tax accruals are both useful predictors of future tax cash flows. Although 
the provisioning process of income tax accruals relies on managers’ estimations and 
assumptions about the tax implications of firms’ business operations, and therefore may 
involve managerial intentional or unintentional estimation errors, income tax accruals are 
averagely found to be incrementally informative over cash tax payments in predicting future 
one- to five-year ahead tax cash flows.  
 
 
 
systematic annual amortisation of intangible assets is generally allowable for tax deductions over their useful lives. 
In addition, the tax benefits arising from firms’ operation in foreign low-tax jurisdictions can also be serially 
correlated until such activities are forbidden and terminated by tax authorities. See section 4.3.1 on page 182 for 
detailed information. 
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Table 6.1 Regression Results:  Incremental Informativeness of Income Tax Accruals 
Panel A: This table presents the results of whether firms’ current-period cash tax payment is a significant predictor of firms’ future tax payments, based on the following 
model (1).  𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡+𝜌 𝑜𝑟 ∑ 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡+5 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (1) 
 T+1 T+2 T+3 T+4 T+5 T+1~T+5 
Cash Tax Paidi,t  0.7274 
(34.73)*** 
0.6255 
(23.13)*** 
0.5555 
(18.13)*** 
0.5078 
(15.04)*** 
0.4751 
(12.45)*** 
2.9423 
(19.29)*** 
Constant 0.0061 
(3.66)*** 
0.0082 
(3.96)*** 
0.0150 
(6.74)*** 
0.0186 
(7.09)*** 
0.0186 
(6.48)*** 
0.0616 
(6.06)*** 
Industry Dummies Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3311 3026 2741 2,457 2178 2058 
R-Square 0.5867 0.4733 0.4072 0.3544 0.3269 0.5563 
F-statistic 68.10  
P=0.000 
33.84 
P=0.000 
22.19 
P=0.000 
14.65 
P=0.000 
11.78 
P=0.000 
22.09 
P=0.000 
Breusch-Pegan test 591.33 
P=0.000 
355.34 
P=0.000 
270.56 
P=0.000 
168.32 
P=0.000 
170.67 
P=0.000 
167.09 
P=0.000 
Panel B: This table presents the results of whether firms’ current-period income tax accrual is a significant predictor of firms’ future tax payments, based on the following 
model (2). 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡+𝜌 𝑜𝑟 ∑ 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡+5 = ∅ + 𝜕𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (2) 
 T+1 T+2 T+3 T+4 T+5 T+1~T+5 
Cash Tax Paidi,t  0.8399 
(58.45)*** 
0.7175 
(31.23)*** 
0.6337 
(23.12)*** 
0.5719 
(18.20)*** 
0.5289 
(14.57)*** 
3.3257 
(25.48)*** 
Tax Accrualsi,t  0.7085 
(24.40)*** 
0.5847 
(17.33)*** 
0.4893 
(13.84)*** 
0.4396 
(13.04)*** 
0.3721 
(9.29)*** 
2.6560 
(17.06)*** 
Constant 0.0019 
(1.72)* 
0.0047 
(2.68)*** 
0.0120 
(6.20)*** 
0.0160 
(6.80)*** 
0.0162 
(6.01)*** 
0.0475 
(5.50)*** 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3311 3026 2741 2457 2178 2058 
R-Square 0.7371 0.5781 0.4827 0.4169 0.3727 0.6718 
Differences between R-Squares of model 1 and model 2 0.1504 0.1048 0.0755 0.0652 0.0458 0.1155 
F-statistic 168.31 
P=0.000 
57.11 
P=0.000 
31.21 
P=0.000 
21.89 
P=0.000 
15.80 
P=0.000 
35.18 
P=0.000 
Breusch-Pegan test 645.64 
P=0.000 
636.74 
P=0.000 
442.85 
P=0.000 
313.81 
P=0.000 
218.18 
P=0.000 
310.16 
P=0.000 
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VIF 1.80 1.74 1.69 1.63 1.57 1.56 
Chi2 for wald test of 𝛿= 0 595.51 
P=0.000 
300.19 
P=0.000 
191.43 
P=0.000 
170.11 
P=0.000 
86.35 
P=0,000 
291.00 
P=0.000 
Likelihood ratio test of the equality of goodness-of-fit 
between model (1) and model (2) 
1497.35 
P=0.000 
671.19 
P=0.000 
373.29 
P=0.000 
249.99 
P=0.000 
153.40 
P=0.000 
620.16 
P=0.000 
Regression estimations are conducted with the employment of clustered firm-level Eicker-Huber-White robust standard errors. 
The figures in parentheses are t-statistics,  ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
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6.3. Multivariate Regression Results for the Second Hypotheses 
6.3.1. Tax management incentives and the informativeness of income tax accruals 
After confirming that income tax accruals are incrementally informative over cash tax 
payments in predicting future tax cash flows on average, the second hypotheses of this study 
are designed to investigate the cross-sectional determinative factors that cause variations in the 
incremental informativeness of income tax accruals across firms. It is expected that firms with 
strong incentives to 1) undertake tax planning activities for the purpose of reducing corporate 
tax burdens or; 2) achieve particular earnings targets through manipulating income tax accruals 
will likely induce tax-related-financial-reporting transparency issues and intentional and/or 
unintentional estimation errors to income tax accruals, resulting in reduced incremental 
informativeness of income tax accruals in explaining future tax cash flows. Table 6.2 to table 
6.7 present multivariate regression results of estimating model (3.11) to model (3.14) in testing 
the impact of tax management incentives on the incremental informativeness of income tax 
accruals. In order to alleviate concerns about potential heteroscedasticity and autocorrelations 
in error terms across years for a given firm, t-statistics and p-values are reported based on the 
Eicker-Huber-White robust standard errors corrected for firm clustering (Petersen 2009).  
Corporate Tax Planning. Estimating the model (3.11) to test the impact of corporate tax 
planning on the incremental informativeness of income tax accruals yields results presented in 
the following table 6.2. Four sets of results are reported in table 6.2 column I to column IV. 
Column I and column II present results of estimating model (3.11) where the incremental 
informativeness of income tax accruals is captured by 𝛿𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠, i.e., the slope coefficient 
of 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 generated from model (2). Column III and column IV present the results of 
estimating model (3.11) where the incremental informativeness of income tax accruals is 
captured by ?̅?𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠
2
, i.e., the difference between the coefficients of determination 
generated from model (1) and (2). Corporate tax planning is measured by 𝑇𝐴_𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖𝑡, firms’ 
five-year cash effective tax rate, and 𝐴𝐺𝐺𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑆𝐼𝑉𝐸𝑖𝑡, the indicator variable which equals 1 if 
a firm’s 𝑇𝐴_𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖𝑡 is in the lowest quintile within the pooled sample of firms, and 0 otherwise. 
The coefficient estimates reported in table 6.2 column I to column IV support hypothesis H2a 
which predicts the negative relationship between the incremental informativeness of income 
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tax accruals and the level of corporate tax planning. Specifically, as shown in column I to 
column IV, the coefficients of 𝐴𝐺𝐺𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑆𝐼𝑉𝐸𝑖𝑡 are highly significant with expected negative 
sign (-0.1823 with t=-2.74 and -0.0922 with t=-3.12, respectively), while the coefficients of 
𝑇𝐴_𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖𝑡 are significant with expected positive sign (0.6528 with t=1.95 and 0.3719 with 
t=2.17, respectively). These findings suggest that consistent with the hypothesis H2a, the 
informativeness of income tax accruals is significantly lower for firms that undertake tax 
planning activities designed to reduce their cash tax burden, which may either be because tax 
planning activities inevitably increase the organizational complexity and aggravate the 
uncertainty regarding future challenges and penalties by tax authorities, thereby adding 
difficulties for managers to accurately estimate the taxable implications of their firms’ 
operations; or because tax planning activities that are carried out with the intention to avoid 
providing roadmaps to tax authorities may increase the obfuscation and opacity of firms’ tax 
disclosures and, hence, provide opportunities for self-interested managers to manipulate 
income tax accruals for opportunistic reason.  
In terms of firm-specific variables that proxy the tax environment complexity, results reported 
in table 6.2 indicate significant negative relationships between the informativeness of income 
tax accruals and three variables: firm growth (𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖𝑡) when the informativeness is either 
captured by 𝛿𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠  or ?̅?𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙
2
, firm size (𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 ) and leverage (𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡 ) 
when the informativeness is captured by ?̅?𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙
2
. These results provide evidence that the 
informativeness of income tax accruals in predicting future tax cash flows is significantly lower 
for large firms that are more likely to face difficulties in coordinating and communicating 
among different business departments during the decision-making process; for growth firms 
that are more inclined to engage in aggressive tax-planning activities due to their greater risk 
tolerance and continuous pursuits of entering into new product and geographic markets; and 
for highly-levered firms that may attempt to loosen their debt covenant constraints through 
managing book income upward which may result in the recognition of questionable tax 
accruals with limited ability to explain future cash taxes. However, the significantly positive 
coefficient of 𝑉𝑂𝐿_𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝐹𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑖𝑡 is inconsistent with the hypothesis and indicates a positive 
relationship between the informativeness of income tax accruals and the volatility of operating 
cash flows, which implies that the informativeness of income tax accruals is significantly lower 
for firms that are subject to income smoothing activities. 
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Table 6.2 Regression Result: Tax Planning and the Informativeness of Income Tax Accruals 
This table presents the results of the impact of corporate tax planning on the incremental informativeness of income tax accruals, based on the following model (3.11).  
𝑇𝐴𝑋_𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑡 = ω0 + ω1𝑐𝐴𝐺𝐺𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑆𝐼𝑉𝐸𝑖𝑡(𝑇𝐴_𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖𝑡) + ∑ ω2𝑐𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀_𝐶𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐴𝑖𝑡 + ∑ ω3𝑐 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑖𝑡 + ω𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 + ω𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  (3.11)           
 
The dependent variable 𝑇𝐴𝑋_𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑡 represents the incremental informativeness of income tax accruals. It is captured by two measures, i.e., 𝛿𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠 and ?̅?𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙
2
. Variables of 
interest are 𝐴𝐺𝐺𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑆𝐼𝑉𝐸𝑖𝑡 and 𝑇𝐴_𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖𝑡, which proxy the level of corporate tax planning. The explanatory variables include: 𝑃𝑇𝐵𝐼𝑖𝑡: pre-tax income scaled by lagged total asset; 𝑉𝑂𝐿_𝑃𝑇𝐵𝐼𝑖𝑡: 
the standard deviation of annual pre-tax income scaled by lagged total assets over a rolling five-year window; 𝑉𝑂𝐿_𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝐹𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑖𝑡: the standard deviation of annual cash flow scaled by lagged 
total assets over a rolling five-year window; 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡: the natural log of total assets;  𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖𝑡: the ratio of firms’ market value of equity to the book value of equity; 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡: gross cost of 
property, plant and equipment scaled by the lagged total assets;  𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡: the ratio of long-term debt to total assets;  𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑁𝑈𝐸𝑖𝑡: the absolute value of earnings from discontinued 
operation scaled by the lagged total assets;  𝑆𝐸𝐺𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡: the number of segments in which a firm operates; 𝐷𝐸𝐹𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡:long-term deferred tax balances scaled by the lagged total assets. Industry 
and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. 
  
Regression estimations are conducted with the employment of clustered firm-level Eicker-Huber-White robust standard errors. 
The figures in parentheses are t-statistics,  ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.                                                                                                           
 Informativeness denoted as 𝜹𝑻𝒂𝒙 𝑨𝒄𝒄𝒓𝒖𝒂𝒍𝒔  Informativeness denoted as ?̅?𝑻𝒂𝒙 𝑨𝒄𝒄𝒓𝒖𝒂𝒍𝒔
𝟐
 
 I II III IV 
𝐀𝐆𝐆𝐑𝐄𝐒𝐒𝐈𝐕𝐄𝐢𝐭 -0.1823 
(-2.74)*** 
 -0.0922 
(-3.12)*** 
 
𝐓𝐀_𝐂𝐀𝐒𝐇𝐢𝐭  0.6528 
(1.95)* 
 0.3719 
(2.17)** 
PTBIit 0.3419 
(1.06) 
0.4821 
(1.46) 
-0.0537 
(-0.31) 
0.0253 
(0.15) 
VOL_PTBIit -0.2319 
(-0.28) 
-0.4616 
(-0.55) 
0.0118 
( 0.03) 
-0.1003 
(-0.22) 
VOL_CASHFLOWit 2.5651 
(3.12)*** 
2.6289 
(3.18)*** 
1.1744 
(2.62)** 
1.2002 
(2.73)*** 
SIZEit -0.0117 
(-0.53) 
-0.0083 
(-0.37) 
-0.0287 
( -2.30)** 
-0.0271 
(-2.15)** 
GROWTHit -0.0238 
(-2.17)** 
-0.0260 
(-2.36)** 
-0.0078 
(-1.90)* 
-0.0091 
(-2.19)** 
CAPINTit 0.1796 
(1.04) 
0.1762 
( 1.03) 
0.1277 
( 1.42) 
0.1245 
(1.37) 
LEVERAGEit -0.1375 
(-0.90) 
-0.1418 
( -0.91) 
-0.1683 
(-2.07)** 
-0.1663 
(-2.00)** 
DISCONTINUEit 4.2622 
(0.61) 
3.4407 
 (0.48) 
-0.4625 
(-0.19) 
-0.8100 
(-0.33) 
SEGMENTit -0.0041 
(-0.26) 
-0.0074 
(-0.46) 
-0.0072 
(-0.93) 
-0.0089 
(-1.16) 
DEFERit -0.0901 
(-0.09) 
-0.1652 
( -0.16) 
0.0720 
(0.20) 
0.0435 
(0.12) 
Chapter 6 Regression Analysis and Results 
222 
 
Constant 0.4614 
(1.30) 
0.1902 
(0.55) 
0.2454 
(1.28) 
0.1061 
(0.55) 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1255 1255 1255 1255 
R-Square 0.1604 0.1530 0.2595 0.2550 
VIF 1.41 1.42 1.41 1.42 
Breusch-Pagan Test 23.58 
P=0.000 
24.75 
P=0.000 
111.42 
P=0.000 
105.64 
P=0.000 
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Earnings Target 1. Hypothesis H2b predicts that the lower a firm’s current period’s pre-tax 
profit as compared to that of its previous period, the greater the incentive of this firm to 
manipulate its income tax accruals for the purpose of avoiding the report of an apparent decline 
in its post-tax profits, which may result in intentional estimation errors in the income tax 
accounts and compromised ability of income tax accruals to explain future tax cash flows. That 
is, the incremental informativeness of income tax accruals is expected to be negatively 
associated with whether and by how much a firm’s current pre-tax profit is lower than that of 
its previous period. 
Table 6.3 reports regression results based on the model (3.12). In this model, the variable 
𝐷𝐸𝐶𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸_𝐴𝑀𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡  captures the impact of the differences between a firm’s previous 
period’s pre-tax profit and that of the current period on the informativeness of income tax 
accruals, for firm-years where 𝑇𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑇1𝑖𝑡 equals 0; while the interaction term 𝑇𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑇1𝑖𝑡 ×
𝐷𝐸𝐶𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸_𝐴𝑀𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡  captures the marginal impact of 𝐷𝐸𝐶𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸_𝐴𝑀𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡  on the 
informativeness of income tax accruals for firm-years where 𝑇𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑇1𝑖𝑡 equals 1 (Beekes et 
al. 2004).  
Results reported in table 6.3 column I and column II are consistent with the hypothesis H2b, in 
which the coefficients of the interaction term 𝑇𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑇1𝑖𝑡 × 𝐷𝐸𝐶𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸_𝐴𝑀𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 are highly 
significant with expected negative sign (-2.2630 with t=-2.75 and -1.1430 with t=2.60, 
respectively). The sum of the coefficients on 𝐷𝐸𝐶𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸_𝐴𝑀𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡  and 𝑇𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑇1𝑖𝑡 ×
𝐷𝐸𝐶𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸_𝐴𝑀𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 is also negative (τ2𝑐+τ3𝑐 = -1.0240 and -1.5946, respectively). These 
results indicate that the informativeness of income tax accruals is negatively associated with 
how much firms’ current pre-tax profit is lower than that of its previous period. Specifically, 
one unit increase in 𝐷𝐸𝐶𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸_𝐴𝑀𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡, i.e., a one unit decline in firms’ current period’s 
pre-tax profit compared to that of the previous period, leads to 1.0240 (1.5946) units decrease 
in the informativeness of income tax accruals as measured by 𝛿𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠 (?̅?𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠
2
)232. 
 
232 The coefficients of 𝐷𝐸𝐶𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸_𝐴𝑀𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡  are positive and significant (1.2390 with t=2.47 and 0.4516 with 
t=1.88, respectively), indicating that for firm-years which have not missed previous period’s pre-tax profit (i.e., 
current period’s pre-tax profit exceeds that of the previous period, 𝑇𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑇1𝑖𝑡=0), the better the current pre-tax 
performance as compared to that of the previous period, the lower the informativeness of income tax accruals. 
This potentially indicates that firm-years with pre-tax profit significantly outperforming that of the previous period 
also have incentives to manipulate income tax accruals for the purpose of earnings management (e.g., smoothing 
post-tax profit), which results in reduced informativeness of income accruals. 
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Table 6.4 reports regression results after partitioning the whole sample into two subsamples, 
i.e., the subsample of firm-years where 𝑇𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑇1 𝑖𝑡 equals 1 and the subsample of firm-years 
where 𝑇𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑇1𝑖𝑡 equals 0. If it is consistent with the hypothesis H2b, a negative relationship 
between the informativeness of income tax accruals (?̅?𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠
2
 or 𝛿𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠) and the 
difference between firms’ previous period’s pre-tax profit and that of the current period 
(𝐷𝐸𝐶𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸_𝐴𝑀𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡) should be observed in the subsample of firm-years that have missed 
previous-period’s pre-tax profit (i.e., 𝑇𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑇1𝑖𝑡 equals 1). As shown in table 6.4 column I to 
column IV, the coefficients of 𝐷𝐸𝐶𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸_𝐴𝑀𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡  are negative and significant (-1.2023 
with t=-1.77 and -0.8859 with t=-2.08, respectively) for the subsample of firm-years that have 
missed previous period’s pre-tax profit ( 𝑇𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑇1𝑖𝑡 =1). However, the coefficients of 
𝐷𝐸𝐶𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸_𝐴𝑀𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡  are positive and insignificant (0.8494 with t=1.50 and 0.3503 with 
t=1.44, respectively) for the subsample of firm-years that have not missed previous period’s 
pre-tax profit (𝑇𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑇1𝑖𝑡=0).  
Overall, results reported in table 6.3 and table 6.4 provide strong empirical evidence that the 
informativeness of income tax accruals is negatively associated with how much firms’ current 
pre-tax profit is lower than that of the previous period. 
In terms of the firm-specific variables that proxy the tax environment complexity, results 
reported in table 6.3 and table 6.4 are generally consistent with results reported in table 6.2, 
which indicates negative relationships between the informativeness of income tax accruals and 
firm size (𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 ); firm leverage (𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡 ) and firm growth (𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖𝑡 ), and the 
positive relationship between the informativeness of income tax accruals and the volatility of 
firms’ operating cash flows (𝑉𝑂𝐿_𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝐹𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑖𝑡). In addition, as shown in table 6.4 column 
Ⅲ, the level of firms’ capital intensity (𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡) has a significant positive impact on the 
informativeness of income tax accruals, suggesting that taking advantage of the capital 
allowances from qualified fixed assets represents a benign tax investment activity with 
relatively stable and well-predictable future cash tax outcomes.  
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Table 6.3 Regression Result: 
Earnings Target 1 (Avoid Earnings Decline) and the Informativeness of Income Tax Accruals 
This table presents the results of testing if the incremental informativeness of income tax accruals is negatively related to 
whether and by how much a firm has missed its previous period’s pre-tax profit, based on the following model (3.12) 
𝑇𝐴𝑋_𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑡 = τ0 + τ1𝑐𝑇𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑇1𝑖𝑡 + τ2𝑐𝐷𝐸𝐶𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸_𝐴𝑀𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 + τ3𝑐𝑇𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑇1𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐸𝐶𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸_𝐴𝑀𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 +
∑ τ4𝑐𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀_𝐶𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐴𝑖𝑡 + ∑ τ5𝑐 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑖𝑡 + τ𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 + τ𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  (3.12)       
 
The dependent variable 𝑇𝐴𝑋_𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑡 represents the incremental informativeness of income tax accruals. It is captured by 
two measures, i.e., 𝛿𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠  and ?̅?𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙
2
. The variable of interest is the interaction term 𝑇𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑇1𝑖𝑡 ×
𝐷𝐸𝐶𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸_𝐴𝑀𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡.  𝑇𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑇1𝑖𝑡 equals 1 if a firm’s current pre-tax profit is lower than that of previous period, and 0 
otherwise. 𝐷𝐸𝐶𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸_𝐴𝑀𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 captures the difference between a firm’s previous period’s pre-tax profit and that of its current 
period. The explanatory variables include: 𝑃𝑇𝐵𝐼𝑖𝑡 : pre-tax income scaled by lagged total asset;  𝑉𝑂𝐿_𝑃𝑇𝐵𝐼𝑖𝑡 : the standard 
deviation of annual pre-tax income scaled by lagged total assets over a rolling five-year window; 𝑉𝑂𝐿_𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝐹𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑖𝑡: the 
standard deviation of annual cash flow scaled by lagged total assets over a rolling five-year window; 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡: the natural log of 
total assets;  𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖𝑡: the ratio of firms’ market value of equity to the book value of equity; 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡: gross cost of property, 
plant and equipment scaled by the lagged total assets;  𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡 : the ratio of long-term debt to total assets;  
𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑁𝑈𝐸𝑖𝑡: the absolute value of earnings from discontinued operation scaled by the lagged total assets;  𝑆𝐸𝐺𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡: 
the number of segments in which a firm operates; 𝐷𝐸𝐹𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡:long-term deferred tax balances scaled by the lagged total assets.  
Industry and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. 
 
Regression estimations are conducted with the employment of clustered firm-level Eicker-Huber-White robust standard errors. 
The figures in parentheses are t-statistics , ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 Informativeness 
denoted as 𝜹𝑻𝒂𝒙 𝑨𝒄𝒄𝒓𝒖𝒂𝒍𝒔  
Informativeness 
denoted as ?̅?𝑻𝒂𝒙 𝑨𝒄𝒄𝒓𝒖𝒂𝒍𝒔
𝟐
 
 I II 
TARGET1it -0.0187 
(-0.58) 
0.0051 
(0.32) 
𝐃𝐄𝐂𝐋𝐈𝐍𝐄_𝐀𝐌𝐎𝐔𝐍𝐓𝐢𝐭 1.2390 
(2.47)** 
0.4516 
(1.88)* 
𝐓𝐀𝐑𝐆𝐄𝐓𝟏𝐢𝐭 × 
𝐃𝐄𝐂𝐋𝐈𝐍𝐄_𝐀𝐌𝐎𝐔𝐍𝐓𝐢𝐭 
-2.2630 
(-2.75)*** 
-1.1430 
(-2.60)** 
PTBIit 0.5090 
(1.31) 
-0.0115 
(-0.06) 
VOL_PTBIit -0.0086 
(-0.01) 
0.0702 
(0.15) 
VOL_CASHFLOWit 2.9047 
(3.56)*** 
1.3309 
(3.07)*** 
SIZEit -0.0028 
(-0.13) 
-0.0247 
(-1.92)* 
GROWTHit -0.0239 
(-2.11)** 
-0.0071 
(-1.51) 
CAPINTit 0.1968 
(1.13) 
0.1307 
(1.45) 
LEVERAGEit -0.2542 
(-1.63) 
-0.2295 
(-2.71)*** 
DISCONTINUEit 4.1732 
(0.56) 
-0.0803 
(-0.03) 
SEGMENTit -0.0062 
(-0.37) 
-0.0080 
(-1.02) 
DEFERit -0.2804 
(-0.27) 
-0.0612 
(-0.17) 
Constant 0.1431 
(0.44) 
0.1034 
(0.54) 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes 
Observations 1286 1286 
R-Square 0.1585 0.2488 
VIF 1.92 1.92 
Breusch-Pagan Test 24.58 
P=0.000 
109.80 
P=0.000 
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Table 6.4 Regression Result: Earnings Target 1 (Avoid Earnings Decline) and the Informativeness of Income Tax Accruals 
This table presents the results of testing if the incremental informativeness of income tax accruals is negatively related to whether and by how much a firm has missed its 
previous period’s pre-tax profit,  by partitioning the entire sample into two subsamples of firm-years, i.e., where 𝑇𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑇1𝑖𝑡  equals 1 and where 𝑇𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑇1𝑖𝑡  equals 0. 
 
The dependent variable 𝑇𝐴𝑋_𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑡  represents the incremental informativeness of income tax accruals. It is captured by two measures, i.e., 𝛿𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠  and 
?̅?𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙
2
. The variable of interest is 𝐷𝐸𝐶𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸_𝐴𝑀𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 , which captures the difference between a firm’s previous period’s pre-tax profit and that of its current period. 
The explanatory variables include: 𝑃𝑇𝐵𝐼𝑖𝑡: pre-tax income scaled by lagged total asset; 𝑉𝑂𝐿_𝑃𝑇𝐵𝐼𝑖𝑡: the standard deviation of annual pre-tax income scaled by lagged total 
assets over a rolling five-year window; 𝑉𝑂𝐿_𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝐹𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑖𝑡: the standard deviation of annual cash flow scaled by lagged total assets over a rolling five-year window; 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡: 
the natural log of total assets;  𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖𝑡: the ratio of firms’ market value of equity to the book value of equity; 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡: gross cost of property, plant and equipment 
scaled by the lagged total assets;  𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡: the ratio of long-term debt to total assets;  𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑁𝑈𝐸𝑖𝑡: the absolute value of earnings from discontinued operation 
scaled by the lagged total assets;  𝑆𝐸𝐺𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡: the number of segments in which a firm operates; 𝐷𝐸𝐹𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡:long-term deferred tax balances scaled by the lagged total assets. 
Industry and year fixed effects are included in all regressions.  
 
Regression estimations are conducted with the employment of clustered firm-level Eicker-Huber-White robust standard errors.  The figures in parentheses are t-statistics , 
***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 Informativeness denoted as 𝜹𝑻𝒂𝒙 𝑨𝒄𝒄𝒓𝒖𝒂𝒍𝒔 Informativeness denoted as ?̅?𝑻𝒂𝒙 𝑨𝒄𝒄𝒓𝒖𝒂𝒍𝒔
𝟐
 
 I II III IV 
 𝐓𝐀𝐑𝐆𝐄𝐓𝟏𝐢𝐭=1 𝐓𝐀𝐑𝐆𝐄𝐓𝟏𝐢𝐭=0 𝐓𝐀𝐑𝐆𝐄𝐓𝟏𝐢𝐭=1 𝐓𝐀𝐑𝐆𝐄𝐓𝟏𝐢𝐭=0 
𝐃𝐄𝐂𝐋𝐈𝐍𝐄_𝐀𝐌𝐎𝐔𝐍𝐓𝐢𝐭 -1.2023 
(-1.77)* 
0.8494 
(1.50) 
-0.8859 
(-2.08)** 
0.3505 
(1.44) 
PTBIit 0.6553 
(1.25) 
0.4442 
(1.07) 
-0.1058 
(-0.37) 
0.0158 
(0.07) 
VOL_PTBIit 1.4368 
(1.26) 
-0.9615 
(-1.03) 
0.5849 
(0.98) 
-0.2405 
(-0.48) 
VOL_CASHFLOWit 2.0414 
(2.20)** 
3.2939 
(3.37)*** 
1.3525 
(2.68)*** 
1.2385 
(2.59)** 
SIZEit 0.0035 
(0.14) 
-0.0020 
(-0.08) 
-0.0202 
(-1.48) 
-0.0268 
(-1.84)* 
GROWTHit -0.0369 
(-2.19)** 
-0.0181 
( -1.51) 
-0.0095 
(-1.34) 
-0.0051 
(-0.99) 
CAPINTit 0.1818 
(0.98) 
0.2190 
(1.21) 
0.1882 
(1.95)* 
0.1067 
( 1.13) 
LEVERAGEit -0.3275 
(-1.67)* 
-0.2491 
(-1.43) 
-0.2744 
(-2.29)** 
-0.2152 
(-2.52)** 
DISCONTINUEit 15.7479 
(1.35) 
-1.2228 
(-0.16) 
1.0470 
(0.27) 
0.5615 
(0.14) 
SEGMENTit -0.0093 
(-0.48) 
-0.0065 
(-0.36) 
-0.0099 
(-1.07) 
-0.0077 
(-0.91) 
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DEFERit -0.5530 
(-0.49) 
-0.2323 
(-0.21) 
0.0117 
(0.02) 
-0.1067 
(-0.28) 
Constant -0.3063 
(-0.47) 
0.1244 
(0.35) 
0.2705 
(0.99) 
0.1597 
(0.77) 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 441 845 441 845 
R-Square    0.2037 0.1728 0.2916 0.2535 
VIF 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 
Breusch-Pagan Test  0.23 
P=0.6314 
42.81 
P=0.000 
44.45 
P=0.000 
59.60 
P=0.000 
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Earnings Target 2. Hypothesis H2b predicts that the lower a firm’s actual pre-tax profits as 
compared to the pre-tax profits forecasted by financial analysts, the greater this firm’s 
incentives to distort their income tax accruals for the purpose of meeting analysts’ post-tax 
forecasts, which may result in increased intentional estimation errors in the income tax account 
and reduced ability of income tax accruals to explain future tax cash flows. That is, the 
informativeness of income tax accruals is expected to be negatively associated with whether 
and by how much the firm’s actual pre-tax profit is lower than that expected by financial 
analysts. 
Table 6.5 reports regression results based on the model (3.13). In this model, the variable 
𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑅_𝐴𝑀𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 captures the impact of the differences between analysts’ forecasted and 
firms’ actually-reported pre-tax profits on the informativeness of income tax accruals, for firm-
years where 𝑇𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑇2𝑖𝑡  equals 0; while the interaction term 𝑇𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑇2𝑖𝑡 ×
𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑅_𝐴𝑀𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡  captures the marginal impact of 𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑅_𝐴𝑀𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡  on the 
informativeness of income tax accruals for firm-years where 𝑇𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑇2𝑖𝑡 equals 1.  
Results reported in table 6.5 column I and column II show that the coefficients of the interaction 
term 𝑇𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑇2𝑖𝑡 × 𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑅_𝐴𝑀𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 are significant with unexpected positive sign (1.2616 
with t=1.80 and 0.6694 with t=1.92, respectively). The sum of the coefficients on 
𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑅_𝐴𝑀𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡  and 𝑇𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑇2𝑖𝑡 × 𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑅_𝐴𝑀𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡  is also positive ( Κ2𝑐 + Κ3𝑐 =
 0.7874 and 0.4153, respectively). These results fail to support the hypothesis H2b which 
predicts that the informativeness of income tax accruals is negatively associated with how 
much firms’ actual pre-tax profit is lower than the consensus analysts forecast.  
Table 6.6 reports regression results after partitioning the whole sample into two subsamples, 
i.e., the subsample of firm-years where 𝑇𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑇2𝑖𝑡 equals 1 and the subsample of firm-years 
where 𝑇𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑇2𝑖𝑡 equals 0. A negative relationship between the informativeness of income 
tax accruals and 𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑅_𝐴𝑀𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 should be observed in the subsample of firm-years where 
𝑇𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑇2𝑖𝑡 equals 1, if it is consistent with the hypothesis H2b that the incentives to distort 
income tax accruals for earnings management purposes is stronger for firms that have missed 
analysts’ forecasted pre-tax profits. As shown in table 6.6 column I to column IV where the 
informativeness of income tax accruals is captured by 𝛿𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠  and ?̅?𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠
2
, the 
coefficients of 𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑅_𝐴𝑀𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡  are positive and significant (0.7749 with t=2.16 and 
0.3519 with t=2.25, respectively) for the subsample of firm-years that report pre-tax profits 
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lower than the amount forecasted by financial analysts (𝑇𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑇2𝑖𝑡=1). There is no significant 
relationship between the informativeness of income tax accruals and 𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑅_𝐴𝑀𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 (-
0.9475 with t=-1.47 and -0.5789 with t=-1.67, respectively) for the subsample of firm-years 
where 𝑇𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑇2𝑖𝑡 equals 0.  
Overall, results reported in table 6.5 and table 6.6 fail to support the hypothesis H2b and imply 
that financial analysts’ focus consensus regarding the level of earnings may not be a strong 
target that motivates managers to achieve through distorting their income tax accruals, even 
when their pre-tax profits fall below the amount forecasted by finacnial analysts. 
In terms of the firm-specific variables that proxy the tax environment complexity, results 
reported in table 6.5 and table 6.6 are generally consistent with results reported in table 6.2 to 
table 6.4, which indicates negative relationships between the informativeness of income tax 
accruals and firm size (𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡); firm leverage (𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡) and firm growth (𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖𝑡), 
and the positive relationship between the informativeness of income tax accruals and the 
volatility of firms’ operating cash flows (𝑉𝑂𝐿_𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝐹𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑖𝑡) and capital intensity (𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡). 
In addition, as shown in table 6.5 column I and column II, the number of firms’ operating 
segments (𝑆𝐸𝐺𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 ) has a significant and negative impact on the informativeness of 
income tax accruals, which is potentially due to that firms operating in dispersed business 
environment face heightened information asymmetry; less-integrated financial information 
system; and barriers of coordination between business and geographic units, which increases 
the complexity of estimating income tax accruals and aggravates the probability of estimation 
errors in income tax accruals. 
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Table 6.5 Regression Result: 
Earnings Target 2 (Avoid Missing Analysts’ Expectation)  
and the Informativeness of Income Tax Accruals 
This table presents the results of testing if the incremental informativeness of income tax accruals is negatively related to 
whether and by how much a firm’s pre-tax profit has missed analysts’ forecasts, based on the following model (3.13) 
𝑇𝐴𝑋_𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑡 = Κ0 + Κ1𝑐𝑇𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑇2𝑖𝑡 + Κ2𝑐𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑅_𝐴𝑀𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 + Κ3𝑐𝑇𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑇2𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑅_𝐴𝑀𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 +
∑ Κ4𝑐𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀_𝐶𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐴𝑖𝑡 + ∑ Κ5𝑐 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑖𝑡 + Κ𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 + Κ𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  (3.13)        
 
The dependent variable 𝑇𝐴𝑋_𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑡 represents the incremental informativeness of income tax accruals. It is captured by 
two measures, i.e., 𝛿𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠  and ?̅?𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙
2
. The variable of interest is the interaction term 𝑇𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑇2𝑖𝑡 ×
𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑅_𝐴𝑀𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡.  𝑇𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑇2𝑖𝑡 equals 1 if a firm’s actual pre-tax profit reported in I/E/B/S is less than that of most recent 
analysts’ forecast consensus, and 0 otherwise. 𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑅_𝐴𝑀𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 captures the difference between analysts’ expected pre-
tax profits and the actual pre-tax profit reported by this firm in I/E/B/S. The explanatory variables include: 𝑃𝑇𝐵𝐼𝑖𝑡: pre-tax 
income scaled by lagged total asset; 𝑉𝑂𝐿_𝑃𝑇𝐵𝐼𝑖𝑡: the standard deviation of annual pre-tax income scaled by lagged total 
assets over a rolling five-year window; 𝑉𝑂𝐿_𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝐹𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑖𝑡: the standard deviation of annual cash flow scaled by lagged total 
assets over a rolling five-year window; 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡: the natural log of total assets;  𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖𝑡: the ratio of firms’ market value 
of equity to the book value of equity; 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡: gross cost of property, plant and equipment scaled by the lagged total assets;  
𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡: the ratio of long-term debt to total assets;  𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑁𝑈𝐸𝑖𝑡: the absolute value of earnings from discontinued 
operation scaled by the lagged total assets;  𝑆𝐸𝐺𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡: the number of segments in which a firm operates; 𝐷𝐸𝐹𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡:long-
term deferred tax balances scaled by the lagged total assets. Industry and year fixed effects are included in all regressions.          
 
Regression estimations are conducted with the employment of clustered firm-level Eicker-Huber-White robust standard 
errors. The figures in parentheses are t-statistics , ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 Informativeness 
denoted as 𝜹𝑻𝒂𝒙 𝑨𝒄𝒄𝒓𝒖𝒂𝒍𝒔  
Informativeness 
denoted as ?̅?𝑻𝒂𝒙 𝑨𝒄𝒄𝒓𝒖𝒂𝒍𝒔
𝟐
 
 I II 
TARGET2it -0.0038 
(-0.08) 
-0.0115 
(-0.42) 
𝐄𝐑𝐑𝐎𝐑_𝐀𝐌𝐎𝐔𝐍𝐓𝐢𝐭 -0.4775 
(-0.73) 
-0.2541 
(-0.73) 
𝐓𝐀𝐑𝐆𝐄𝐓𝟐𝐢𝐭 × 
𝐄𝐑𝐑𝐎𝐑_𝐀𝐌𝐎𝐔𝐍𝐓𝐢𝐭 
1.2616 
(1.80)* 
0.6694 
(1.92)* 
PTBIit 0.3953 
(1.29) 
0.1084 
(0.57) 
VOL_PTBIit -1.1882 
(-1.17) 
-0.6094 
(-1.12) 
VOL_CASHFLOWit 3.5657 
(2.44)** 
0.7796 
(0.315) 
SIZEit 0.0261 
(0.84) 
-0.0268 
(-1.48) 
GROWTHit -0.0116 
(-1.18) 
-0.0060 
(-1.32) 
CAPINTit 0.7064 
(2.65)** 
0.1851 
(1.48) 
LEVERAGEit -0.4228 
(-1.83)** 
-0.1675 
(-1.82)* 
DISCONTINUEit -6.7927 
(-0.98) 
-3.5358 
(-1.29) 
SEGMENTit -0.0270 
(-1.74)* 
-0.0147 
(-1.99)** 
DEFERit 0.1767 
(0.18) 
-0.0137 
(-0.03) 
Constant 0.1184 
(0.27) 
0.6321 
(2.39)** 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes 
Observations 434 434 
R-Square 0.3549 0.3667 
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VIF 2.81 2.81 
Breusch-Pagan Test 0.47 
P=0.4935 
40.70 
P=0.000 
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Table 6.6 Regression Result:  
Earnings Target 2 (Avoid Missing Analysts’ Expectation) and the Informativeness of Income Tax Accruals 
This table presents the results of testing if the incremental informativeness of income tax accruals is negatively related to whether and by how much a firm’s pre-tax profit has missed analysts’ 
forecasts, by partitioning the entire sample into two subsamples of firm-years, i.e., where 𝑇𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑇2𝑖𝑡 equals 1 and where 𝑇𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑇2𝑖𝑡 equals 0. 
 
The dependent variable 𝑇𝐴𝑋_𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑡 represents the incremental informativeness of income tax accruals. It is captured by two measures, i.e., 𝛿𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠 and ?̅?𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙
2
. The variable 
of interest is 𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑅_𝐴𝑀𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡, which captures the difference between analysts’ expected pre-tax profits and the actual pre-tax profit reported by this firm in I/E/B/S. The explanatory 
variables include: 𝑃𝑇𝐵𝐼𝑖𝑡: pre-tax income scaled by lagged total asset; 𝑉𝑂𝐿_𝑃𝑇𝐵𝐼𝑖𝑡: the standard deviation of annual pre-tax income scaled by lagged total assets over a rolling five-year 
window; 𝑉𝑂𝐿_𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝐹𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑖𝑡: the standard deviation of annual cash flow scaled by lagged total assets over a rolling five-year window; 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡: the natural log of total assets;  𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖𝑡: the 
ratio of firms’ market value of equity to the book value of equity; 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡: gross cost of property, plant and equipment scaled by the lagged total assets; 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡: the ratio of long-
term debt to total assets;  𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑁𝑈𝐸𝑖𝑡: the absolute value of earnings from discontinued operation scaled by the lagged total assets;  𝑆𝐸𝐺𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡: the number of segments in which a 
firm operates; 𝐷𝐸𝐹𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡: long-term deferred tax balances scaled by the lagged total assets. Industry and year fixed effects are included in all regressions.  
 
Regression estimations are conducted with the employment of clustered firm-level Eicker-Huber-White robust standard errors. The figures in parentheses are t-statistics  ***, ** and * denote 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 Informativeness denoted as 𝜹𝑻𝒂𝒙 𝑨𝒄𝒄𝒓𝒖𝒂𝒍𝒔 Informativeness denoted as ?̅?𝑻𝒂𝒙 𝑨𝒄𝒄𝒓𝒖𝒂𝒍𝒔
𝟐
 
 I II III IV 
 𝐓𝐀𝐑𝐆𝐄𝐓𝟐𝐢𝐭=1 𝐓𝐀𝐑𝐆𝐄𝐓𝟐𝐢𝐭=0 𝐓𝐀𝐑𝐆𝐄𝐓𝟐𝐢𝐭=1 𝐓𝐀𝐑𝐆𝐄𝐓𝟐𝐢𝐭=0 
𝐄𝐑𝐑𝐎𝐑_𝐀𝐌𝐎𝐔𝐍𝐓𝐢𝐭 0.7749 
(2.16)** 
-0.9475 
(-1.47) 
0.3519 
(2.25)** 
-0.5789 
(-1.67) 
PTBIit 0.3160 
(0.86) 
-0.0237 
(-0.05) 
0.0614 
(0.26) 
-0.2200 
(-0.90) 
VOL_PTBIit -1.5080 
(-1.28) 
-0.0184 
(-0.01) 
-0.4855 
(-0.84) 
0.0932 
(0.12) 
VOL_CASHFLOWit 4.7303 
(3.03)*** 
0.2816 
 (0.16) 
0.8965 
(1.13) 
-0.5919 
(-0.46) 
SIZEit 0.0228 
(0.77) 
0.0055 
(0.12) 
0-.0244 
(-1.39) 
-0.0555 
(-1.88)* 
GROWTHit -0.0085 
(-0.72) 
-0.0188 
(-0.88) 
-0.0073 
(-1.26) 
0.0005 
(0.05) 
CAPINTit 0.5763 
(1.96)* 
1.1160 
(3.64)*** 
0.0696 
(0.51) 
0.5064 
(3.09)*** 
LEVERAGEit -0.3770 
(-1.78)* 
-0.3723 
(-1.11) 
-0.1800 
(-1.90)* 
-0.0507 
(-0.35) 
DISCONTINUEit -7.0842 
(-0.95) 
-1.2517 
(-0.07) 
-2.4241 
(-0.98) 
-10.0056 
(-1.19) 
SEGMENTit -0.0194 
(-1.24) 
-0.0360 
(-1.51) 
-0.0101 
(-1.36) 
-0.0161 
(-1.41) 
DEFERit 0.1706 -0.1577 -0.4122 0.4514 
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(0.17) (-0.11) (-0.88) (0.60) 
Constant 0.0208 
(0.05) 
0.6150 
(1.00) 
0.6041 
(2.17) 
0.9424 
(2.29)** 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 329 105 329 105 
R-Square 0.3314 0.6436 0.3522 0.5990 
VIF 1.67 1,67 1.67 1.67 
Breusch-Pagan Test  0.02 
P=0.8890 
1.51 
P=0.2194 
26.30 
P=0.000 
5.95 
P=0.0147 
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Earnings Target 3. Estimating the model (3.14) to test the impact of tax management 
incentives to avoid reporting a post-tax loss on the incremental informativeness of income tax 
accruals yields results presented in the following table 6.7. Hypothesis H2b predicts that firm-
years reporting zero or slightly positive post-tax earnings are likely to manipulate income tax 
accruals for the purpose of meeting the target of avoiding reporting a post-tax loss, which could 
give rise to intentional estimation errors in income tax accruals and make the estimated income 
tax accruals differ from future realised tax cash flows. Therefore, the informativeness of 
income tax accruals (?̅?𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠
2
 or 𝛿𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠) is expected to be negatively related to 
𝑇𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑇3𝑖𝑡 (i.e., an indicator variable equals 1 if the net income scaled by the opening market 
value of equity of a particular firm-year is within the range between 0 and 0.02, and 0 
otherwise)233.  
As shown from table 6.7, there is no significant evidence supporting the hypothesis H2b that 
the incentives to avoid reporting a post-tax loss strongly motivate managers to distort income 
tax provision in a way that compromises the ability of income tax accruals to explain future tax 
cash flows. Specifically, the coefficients of 𝑇𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑇3𝑖𝑡 are insignificant (0.0353 with t= 0.051 
and 0.0712 with t= 1.37, respectively), indicating that there is no significant difference in the 
informativeness of income tax accruals between firm-years that are classified as successfully 
avoiding a post-tax loss and firm-years that report negative or highly-positive post-tax earnings.  
In terms of the firm-specific variables that proxy tax environment complexity, results reported 
in table 6.7 confirm that the informativeness of income tax accruals is positively related to the 
volatility of firms’ operating cash flow (𝑉𝑂𝐿_𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝐹𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑖𝑡) and is negatively related to firm 
size (𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 ); firms’ growth opportunities (𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖𝑡 ); and the level of firms’ leverage 
(𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡). 
 
 
 
 
233 Following Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) this study employs another two scaled net income intervals (0-0.01 
and 0-0.03), untabulated results remain statistically identical. 
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Table 6.7 Regression Result: 
Earnings Target 3 (Avoid Reporting Post-Tax Loss)  
and the Informativeness of Income Tax Accruals 
This table presents the results of testing if the incremental informativeness of income tax accruals is negatively related to 
firms’ incentives to avoid reporting a post-tax loss, based on the following model (3.14) 
𝑇𝐴𝑋_𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑡 = Ζ0 + Ζ1𝑐𝑇𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑇3𝑖𝑡 + ∑ Ζ2𝑐𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀_𝐶𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐴𝑖𝑡 + ∑ Ζ3𝑐 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑖𝑡 + Ζ𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 + Ζ𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡    
(3.14) 
 
The dependent variable 𝑇𝐴𝑋_𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑡 represents the incremental informativeness of income tax accruals. It is captured 
by two measures, i.e., 𝛿𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠  and ?̅?𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙
2
. The variable of interest is the variable 𝑇𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑇3𝑖𝑡. 
𝑇𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑇3𝑖𝑡equals 1 if the net income scaled by the opening market value of equity of a particular firm-year is within the 
range between 0 and 0.02, and 0 otherwise. The explanatory variables include: 𝑃𝑇𝐵𝐼𝑖𝑡: pre-tax income scaled by lagged 
total asset; 𝑉𝑂𝐿_𝑃𝑇𝐵𝐼𝑖𝑡: the standard deviation of annual pre-tax income scaled by lagged total assets over a rolling five-
year window; 𝑉𝑂𝐿_𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝐹𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑖𝑡: the standard deviation of annual cash flow scaled by lagged total assets over a rolling 
five-year window; 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡: the natural log of total assets;  𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖𝑡: the ratio of firms’ market value of equity to the book 
value of equity; 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡: gross cost of property, plant and equipment scaled by the lagged total assets;  𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡: 
the ratio of long-term debt to total assets;  𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑁𝑈𝐸𝑖𝑡: the absolute value of earnings from discontinued operation 
scaled by the lagged total assets;  𝑆𝐸𝐺𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡: the number of segments in which a firm operates; 𝐷𝐸𝐹𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡:long-term 
deferred tax balances scaled by the lagged total assets. Industry and year fixed effects are included in all regressions.          
 
Regression estimations are conducted with the employment of clustered firm-level Eicker-Huber-White robust standard 
errors. The figures in parentheses are t-statistics , ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.                                                           
 Informativeness 
denoted as 𝜹𝑻𝒂𝒙 𝑨𝒄𝒄𝒓𝒖𝒂𝒍𝒔  
Informativeness 
denoted as ?̅?𝑻𝒂𝒙 𝑨𝒄𝒄𝒓𝒖𝒂𝒍𝒔
𝟐
 
 I II 
𝐓𝐀𝐑𝐆𝐄𝐓𝟑𝐢𝐭 0.0353 
(0.51) 
0.0712 
(1.37) 
PTBIit 0.4794 
(1.45) 
0.0340 
(0.21) 
VOL_PTBIit -0.5397 
(-0.65) 
-0.2312 
(-0.54) 
VOL_CASHFLOWit 2.8593 
(3.47)*** 
1.2962 
(2.93)*** 
SIZEit -0.0031 
(-0.14) 
-0.0245 
(-1.92)* 
GROWTHit -0.0250 
(-2.16)** 
-0.0086 
(-1.85) 
CAPINTit 0.1925 
(1.10) 
0.1277 
(1.42) 
LEVERAGEit -0.2265 
(-1.47) 
-0.2122 
(-2.58)** 
DISCONTINUEit 3.7355 
(0.49) 
-0.2113 
(-0.07) 
SEGMENTit -0.0074 
(-0.45) 
-0.0086 
(-1.08) 
DEFERit -0.1941 
(-0.19) 
-0.0237 
(-0.06) 
Constant 0.1808 
(0.55) 
0.1183 
(0.62) 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes 
Observations 1286 1286 
R-Square 0.1538 0.2465 
VIF 1.43 1.43 
Breusch-Pagan Test  22.93 
P=0.000 
111.04 
P=0.000 
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6.3.2. Tax management incentives, corporate governance and the informativeness of 
income tax accruals 
Table 6.8 to table 6.9 present multivariate regression results of estimating model (3.21) to 
model (3.24) in testing the efficacy of firms’ governance mechanisms on attenuating the 
strength of the relation between the informativeness of income tax accruals and firms’ tax 
management incentives 234. The t-statistics and p-values reported in table 6.8 to table 6.9 are 
based on the Eicker-Huber-White robust standard errors corrected for firm clustering, in order 
to alleviate concerns about potential heteroscedasticity and autocorrelations in error terms 
across years for a given firm (Petersen 2009).  
Results reported in table 6.8 column I and II show the efficacy of individual corporate 
governance component in attenuating the strength of the relation between the informativeness 
of income tax accruals and corporate tax planning. Specifically, the incremental 
informativeness of income tax accruals is captured by 𝛿𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠  and ?̅?𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠
2
, 
respectively. The variable 𝑇𝐴_𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖𝑡 captures the main effect of corporate tax planning on 
the informativeness of income tax accruals. 𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡 represents the number of financial 
analysts following a firm. 𝑇𝐴_𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖𝑡 × 𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖,𝑡 captures the interaction effect between 
tax planning and analysts coverage. 𝐵𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑡  represents the percentage of non-executive 
directors serving the board. 𝑇𝐴_𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖𝑡 × 𝐵𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑡 captures the interaction effect between tax 
planning and board independence. 𝐴𝑈𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑖,𝑡 represents whether a firm’s external auditor is a 
“big four”. 𝑇𝐴_𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖𝑡 × 𝐴𝑈𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡  captures the interaction effect between tax planning and 
audit quality.  𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝐼𝑇𝑈𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑡  represents the number of institutional investors of a firm. 
𝑇𝐴_𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖𝑡 × 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝐼𝑇𝑈𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑡 captures the interaction effect between tax planning and the 
number of institutional investors.  
 
234 In this section, the importance of corporate governance mechanism in restricting the extent of intentional and 
unintentional estimation errors reported in income tax accruals will only be examined among firms that exhibit 
strong tax management incentives to 1) engage in tax planning activities and; 2) achieve the earnings target of 
avoiding the report of apparently declined post-tax earnings. This is because that in section 3.1., only those two 
tax management incentives are found to exert negative impacts on the informativeness of income tax accruals and, 
thus, are expected to be mediated by effective corporate governance mechanisms. However, since tax management 
incentives to meet analysts’ earnings forecasts and to avoid the reports of a post-tax loss are not found to induce 
estimation errors to income tax accruals and reduce their informativeness, it does not make sense to investigate 
the role of corporate governance in attenuating the negative impacts of those two tax management incentives on 
the informativeness of income tax accruals. 
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If corporate tax planning reduces the informativeness of income tax accruals; and each 
individual component of the corporate governance mechanism plays a significant role in 
mediating the negative impact of corporate tax planning on the informativeness of income tax 
accruals, it is expected that the variable 𝑇𝐴_𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖𝑡  is significantly positive and all the 
interaction terms ( 𝑇𝐴_𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖𝑡 × 𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖,𝑡,  𝑇𝐴_𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖𝑡 × 𝐵𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐷𝑖,𝑡 , 𝑇𝐴_𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖𝑡 ×
𝐴𝑈𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑖,𝑡 and 𝑇𝐴_𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖𝑡 × 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝐼𝑇𝑈𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑡) are significantly negative. 
Results reported in table 6.8 show that when the informativeness of income tax accruals is 
captured by 𝛿𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠, both the variable 𝑇𝐴_𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖𝑡 and all the interaction terms between 
corporate tax planning and individual corporate governance component are insignificant. When 
the informativeness of income tax accruals is captured by ?̅?𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠
2
, only the interaction 
term 𝑇𝐴_𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖𝑡 × 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝐼𝑇𝑈𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑡 is significant but with an unexpected positive sign. These 
results indicate that corporate governance mechanisms are not effective in attenuating the 
negative impact of corporate tax planning on the informativeness of income tax accruals.  
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Table 6.8: Tax Planning, Corporate Governance 
and the Informativeness of Income Tax Accruals 
This table presents the results of testing whether good corporate monitoring mechanism plays a role in attenuating the 
negative impact of corporate tax planning on the incremental informativeness of income tax accruals, based on the 
following model (3.21).  
𝑇𝐴𝑋_𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑡 = ω0 + ω1𝑐𝑇𝐴_𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖𝑡 + ω2𝑐𝐺𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡 + ω3𝑐𝑇𝐴_𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐺𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡 +
∑ ω4𝑐𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀_𝐶𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐴𝑖𝑡 + ω𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 + ω𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  (3.21)  
 
The dependent variable 𝑇𝐴𝑋_𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑡 represents the incremental informativeness of income tax accruals. It is captured 
by two measures, i.e., 𝛿𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠 and ?̅?𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙
2
. The variables of interest is the interaction terms 𝑇𝐴_𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖𝑡 ×
𝐺𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡 . 𝑇𝐴_𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖𝑡 proxy the level of corporate tax planning. 𝐺𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡  refers to a proxy for the 
effectiveness of firms’ corporate monitoring mechanism, which includes four different monitoring channels, i.e., the 
numbery of analyst following (𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡), the audit quality (𝐴𝑈𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡), the percentage of institutional shareholding 
(𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝐼𝑇𝑈𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖𝑡) and board independence (𝐵𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑡). The explanatory variables include: 𝑃𝑇𝐵𝐼𝑖𝑡 : pre-tax income 
scaled by lagged total asset; 𝑉𝑂𝐿_𝑃𝑇𝐵𝐼𝑖𝑡: the standard deviation of annual pre-tax income scaled by lagged total assets 
over a rolling five-year window; 𝑉𝑂𝐿_𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝐹𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑖𝑡: the standard deviation of annual cash flow scaled by lagged total 
assets over a rolling five-year window; 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡: the natural log of total assets;  𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖𝑡: the ratio of firms’ market 
value of equity to the book value of equity; 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡: gross cost of property, plant and equipment scaled by the lagged 
total assets; 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡: the ratio of long-term debt to total assets;  𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑁𝑈𝐸𝑖𝑡: the absolute value of earnings 
from discontinued operation scaled by the lagged total assets;  𝑆𝐸𝐺𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡: the number of segments in which a firm 
operates; 𝐷𝐸𝐹𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡: long-term deferred tax balances scaled by the lagged total assets.  
 
The t values reported in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered at firm-level. Industry and year fixed effects 
are included in all regressions. Here ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively.                                                                    
 Informativeness 
denoted as 𝜹𝑻𝒂𝒙 𝑨𝒄𝒄𝒓𝒖𝒂𝒍𝒔  
Informativeness 
denoted as ?̅?𝑻𝒂𝒙 𝑨𝒄𝒄𝒓𝒖𝒂𝒍
𝟐
 
 I II 
TA_CASHit -0.5959 
(-0.27) 
-0.7671 
(-0.74) 
COVERAGEit -0.1915 
(-0.66) 
-0.0172 
(-0.15) 
BOARDit 0.0042 
(0.42) 
0.0012 
(0.25) 
AUDITit -0.1864 
(-0.61) 
0.0277 
(0.24) 
INSTITUTIONit  -0.0055 
(-1.45) 
-0.0033 
(-2.08)** 
𝐓𝐀_𝐂𝐀𝐒𝐇𝐢𝐭 × 
𝐂𝐎𝐕𝐄𝐑𝐀𝐆𝐄𝐢𝐭 
0.5755 
(0.59) 
0.2977 
(0.72) 
𝐓𝐀_𝐂𝐀𝐒𝐇𝐢𝐭 × 
𝐁𝐎𝐀𝐑𝐃𝐢𝐭 
-0.0199 
(-0.51) 
-0.0055 
(-0.29) 
𝐓𝐀_𝐂𝐀𝐒𝐇𝐢𝐭 × 
𝐀𝐔𝐃𝐈𝐓𝐢𝐭 
0.8328 
(0.76) 
0.0549 
(0.14) 
𝐓𝐀_𝐂𝐀𝐒𝐇𝐢𝐭 × 
𝐈𝐍𝐒𝐓𝐈𝐓𝐔𝐓𝐈𝐎𝐍𝐢𝐭 
0.0157 
(1.24) 
0.0121 
(2.39)** 
PTBIit 0.6831 
(2.02)** 
0.2310 
(1.48) 
VOL_PTBIit -0.8542 
(-0.85) 
-0.2843 
(-0.66) 
VOL_CASHFLOWit 2.3904 
(2.00)** 
0.4532 
(0.69) 
SIZEit 0.0265 
(0.48) 
-0.0353 
(-1.17) 
GROWTHit -0.0278 
(-2.16)** 
-0.0116 
(-2.80)*** 
CAPINTit 0.5957 
(2.28)** 
0.2766 
(2.20)** 
LEVERAGEit -0.1649 
(-0.73) 
-0.0554 
(-0.55) 
DISCONTINUEit 2.5226 1.0771 
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(0.29) (0.50) 
SEGMENTit -0.0175 
(-1.13) 
-0.0094 
(-1.22) 
DEFERit -0.0289 
(-0.03) 
0.2254 
(0.47) 
Constant 0.5811 
(0.66) 
0.6965 
(1.33) 
Industry Dummies Yes  Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes 
Observations 464 464 
R-Square 0.4158 0.3922 
 
Results reported in table 6.9 column I and II show the efficacy of individual corporate 
governance component in attenuating the strength of the relation between the informativeness 
of income tax accruals and firms’ tax management incentives to avoid reporting an apparent 
decline in post-tax profits. Specifically, the incremental informativeness of income tax accruals 
is captured by 𝛿𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠  and ?̅?𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠
2
, respectively. The variable 
𝐷𝐸𝐶𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸_𝐴𝑀𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 captures the main effect of firms’ tax management incentives to avoid 
reporting an apparent decline in post-tax profits on the informativeness of income tax accruals. 
𝐷𝐸𝐶𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸_𝐴𝑀𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 × 𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖,𝑡  captures the interaction effect between analysts 
coverage and managerial incentives to avoid reporting declined post-tax profits. 
𝐷𝐸𝐶𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸_𝐴𝑀𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 × 𝐵𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑡  captures the interaction effect between board 
independence and managerial incentives to avoid reporting declined post-tax profits. 
𝐷𝐸𝐶𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸_𝐴𝑀𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 × 𝐴𝑈𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡  captures the interaction effect between audit quality and 
managerial incentives to avoid reporting declined post-tax profits. 𝐷𝐸𝐶𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸_𝐴𝑀𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 ×
𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝐼𝑇𝑈𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑡 captures the interaction effect between the number of institutional investors 
and managerial incentives to avoid reporting declined post-tax profits.  
If it is consistent with the prediction that the incremental informativeness of income tax 
accruals is negatively associated with how much a firm’s current pre-tax profit is lower than 
that of its previous period, it is expected that the variable 𝐷𝐸𝐶𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸_𝐴𝑀𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡  is 
significantly negative. If each individual component of the corporate governance mechanism 
plays a significant role in mediating the strength of the negative relation between the 
informativeness of income tax accruals and the tax management incentive, it is expected that 
all the interaction terms (𝐷𝐸𝐶𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸_𝐴𝑀𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 × 𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖,𝑡,  𝐷𝐸𝐶𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸_𝐴𝑀𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 ×
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𝐵𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐷𝑖,𝑡 , 𝐷𝐸𝐶𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸_𝐴𝑀𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 × 𝐴𝑈𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑖,𝑡  and 𝐷𝐸𝐶𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸_𝐴𝑀𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 × 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝐼𝑇𝑈𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑡)  are 
significantly positive.  
Results reported in table 6.9 show that when the informativeness of income tax accruals is 
captured by  𝛿𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠 , the variable 𝐷𝐸𝐶𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸_𝐴𝑀𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡  is significantly negative (-
12.4989 with t=-2.78), and the interaction terms 𝐷𝐸𝐶𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸_𝐴𝑀𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 × 𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖,𝑡 and 
𝐷𝐸𝐶𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸_𝐴𝑀𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 × 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝐼𝑇𝑈𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑡  are significant with the expected positive sign 
(3.0500 with t=1.83 and 0.0533 with t=2.48, respectively). When the informativeness of 
income tax accruals is captured by ?̅?𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠
2
, the variable 𝐷𝐸𝐶𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸_𝐴𝑀𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡  is 
negative but insignificant  (-2.0914 with t=-0.90), and the interaction terms 
𝐷𝐸𝐶𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸_𝐴𝑀𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 × 𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖,𝑡  and 𝐷𝐸𝐶𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸_𝐴𝑀𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 × 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝐼𝑇𝑈𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑡  are 
with the predicted positive sign (0.4006 with t=0.45 and 0.0121 with t=2.39, respectively). 
These results indicate that there is a negative relation between the informativeness of income 
tax accruals and how much a firm’s current pre-tax profit is lower than that of its previous 
period. However, higher analyst coverage and institutional shareholding appear to play a role 
in attenuating this negative relation.   
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Table 6.9: Earnings Target 1 (Avoid Earnings Decline),  
Corporate Governance and the Informativeness of Income Tax Accruals 
This table presents the results of testing if good corporate monitoring mechanism plays a role in attenuating the relation 
between the incremental informativeness of income tax accruals and whether and by how much  a firm has missed its 
previous period’s pre-tax profit, based on the following model (3.22).  This regression analysis concentrates on the 
subsamples of firm-years that exhibit tax management incentives to undertake tax-induced earnings management (e.g., 
when 𝑇𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑇1𝑖𝑡 = 1), to examine the mediating role played by corporate governance mechanism. 
𝑇𝐴𝑋_𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑡 = τ0 + τ1𝑐𝐷𝐸𝐶𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸_𝐴𝑀𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 + τ2𝑐𝐺𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡 + τ3𝑐𝐷𝐸𝐶𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸_𝐴𝑀𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡  ∗
𝐺𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡+  ∑ τ4𝑐𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀_𝐶𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐴𝑖𝑡 + ∑ τ5𝑐 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑖𝑡 + τ𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 + τ𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡   (3.22)      
                                                                                                                        
The dependent variable 𝑇𝐴𝑋_𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑡 represents the incremental informativeness of income tax accruals. It is captured 
by two measures, i.e., 𝛿𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠  and ?̅?𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙
2
. The variables of interest is the interaction term 
𝐷𝐸𝐶𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸_𝐴𝑀𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 × 𝐺𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡. 𝐷𝐸𝐶𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸_𝐴𝑀𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 captures the difference between a firm’s previous 
period’s pre-tax profit and that of its current period. 𝐺𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡 refers to a proxy for the effectiveness of firms’ 
corporate monitoring mechanism, which includes four different monitoring channels, i.e., the number of analyst following 
(𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡),  the audit quality (𝐴𝑈𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡), the percentage of institutional shareholding (𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝐼𝑇𝑈𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖𝑡) and board 
independence ( 𝐵𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑡 ). The explanatory variables include: 𝑃𝑇𝐵𝐼𝑖𝑡 : pre-tax income scaled by lagged total 
asset; 𝑉𝑂𝐿_𝑃𝑇𝐵𝐼𝑖𝑡: the standard deviation of annual pre-tax income scaled by lagged total assets over a rolling five-year 
window; 𝑉𝑂𝐿_𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝐹𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑖𝑡: the standard deviation of annual cash flow scaled by lagged total assets over a rolling five-
year window; 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡: the natural log of total assets;  𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖𝑡: the ratio of firms’ market value of equity to the book 
value of equity; 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡: gross cost of property, plant and equipment scaled by the lagged total assets; 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡: 
the ratio of long-term debt to total assets;  𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑁𝑈𝐸𝑖𝑡: the absolute value of earnings from discontinued operation 
scaled by the lagged total assets;  𝑆𝐸𝐺𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡: the number of segments in which a firm operates; 𝐷𝐸𝐹𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡: long-term 
deferred tax balances scaled by the lagged total assets.  
 
The t values reported in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered at firm-level. Industry and year fixed effects 
are included in all regressions. Here ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively.                                                                                                                                                                
 Informativeness 
denoted as 𝜹𝑻𝒂𝒙 𝑨𝒄𝒄𝒓𝒖𝒂𝒍𝒔  
𝐓𝐀𝐑𝐆𝐄𝐓𝟏𝐢𝐭=1 
Informativeness 
denoted as ?̅?𝑻𝒂𝒙 𝑨𝒄𝒄𝒓𝒖𝒂𝒍
𝟐
 
𝐓𝐀𝐑𝐆𝐄𝐓𝟏𝐢𝐭=1 
 I II 
DECLINE_AMOUNTit -12.4989 
(-2.78)*** 
-2.0914 
(-0.90) 
COVERAGEit -0.1011 
(-0.84) 
0.0250 
(0.51) 
BOARDit -0.0026 
(-0.75) 
0.0002 
(0.13) 
AUDITit 0.2447 
(0.97) 
0.1048 
(1.04) 
INSTITUTIONit -0.0054 
(-2.12)** 
-0.0014 
(-1.67)* 
𝐃𝐄𝐂𝐋𝐈𝐍𝐄_𝐀𝐌𝐎𝐔𝐍𝐓𝐢𝐭 × 
𝐂𝐎𝐕𝐄𝐑𝐀𝐆𝐄𝐢𝐭 
3.0500 
(1.83)* 
0.4006 
(0.45) 
𝐃𝐄𝐂𝐋𝐈𝐍𝐄_𝐀𝐌𝐎𝐔𝐍𝐓𝐢𝐭 × 
𝐁𝐎𝐀𝐑𝐃𝐢𝐭 
0.0390 
(0.94) 
-0.0105 
(-0.56) 
𝐃𝐄𝐂𝐋𝐈𝐍𝐄_𝐀𝐌𝐎𝐔𝐍𝐓𝐢𝐭 × 
𝐀𝐔𝐃𝐈𝐓𝐢𝐭 
-2.2552 
(-0.97) 
0.1072 
(0.10) 
𝐃𝐄𝐂𝐋𝐈𝐍𝐄_𝐀𝐌𝐎𝐔𝐍𝐓𝐢𝐭 × 
𝐈𝐍𝐒𝐓𝐈𝐓𝐔𝐓𝐈𝐎𝐍𝐢𝐭 
0.0533 
(2.48)** 
0.0182 
(1.69)* 
PTBIit   0.4129 
(0.68) 
0.3229 
(1.06) 
VOL_PTBIit 0.6725 
(0.48) 
0.3323 
(0.44) 
VOL_CASHFLOWit 1.8137 
(1.21) 
0.7009 
(0.90) 
SIZEit 0.0699 
(1.13) 
-0.0033 
(-0.12) 
GROWTHit -0.0258 
(-1.69)* 
-0.0141 
(-2.48)** 
CAPINTit 0.9181 
(2.91)*** 
0.4033 
(3.53)*** 
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6.4. Multivariate Regression Results for the Third Hypothesis 
After examining the cross-sectional determinants of the incremental informativeness of income 
tax accruals, the third hypothesis of this study is designed to further investigate if the 
informativeness of income tax accruals in predicting future tax cash flows has improved or 
deteriorated over time in the UK. Accounting method for deferred taxes has evolved 
dramatically in the UK over the last three decades. Specifically, the partial provision methods 
under SSAP 15, which require deferred tax liabilities or assets to be recognised in the financial 
accounts based on managers’ projection of their expected reversal in the foreseeable future, 
may facilitate managers to convey their private information about firms’ future cash tax 
payments and thereby improving the informativeness of income tax accruals. However, the 
partial provision method is criticised as allowing too much discretion and could be easily 
manipulated by self-interested managers for opportunistic reasons. By comparison, the full 
provision method under FRS 19 and IAS 12, which requires deferred tax liabilities to be 
recognised based on all amounts of taxable timing (or temporary) book-tax difference, is likely 
to reduce the latitudes for managements’ opportunistic behaviours via deferred tax provisioning. 
However, the full provision methods, which recognise deferred tax liabilities without 
considering managers’ expectation about their future reversal, may restrict managers’ ability 
to convey their expectation about firms’ future tax payments and, thereby, compromising the 
informativeness of reported income tax accruals in explaining future tax cash flows. 
LEVERAGEit -0.7216 
(-2.71)*** 
-0.2515 
(-1.93)* 
DISCONTINUEit 3.9797 
(0.28) 
2.8047 
(0.74) 
SEGMENTit -0.0196 
(-1.15) 
-0.0148 
(-1.77)* 
DEFERit -0.3602 
(-0.40) 
-0.0655 
(-0.14) 
Constant 0.2243 
(0.28) 
0.2521 
(0.71) 
Industry Dummies Yes  Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes 
Observations 149 149 
R-Square 0.5636 0.5488 
Regression estimations are conducted with the employment of clustered firm-level Eicker-Huber-White robust standard 
errors. The figures in parentheses are t-statistics, ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
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The following figure 6.1 and figure 6.2 show the incremental informativeness of income tax 
accruals in explaining future one- to five-year ahead tax cash flows over the entire 26-year 
sample period from the year 1992 to 2017, where the informativeness of income tax accruals 
is measured by 𝛿𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠 and ?̅?𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠
2
, respectively. Panel A in the following table 
6.10 and table 6.11 summarises the average annual informativeness of income tax accruals in 
explaining future one- to five-year ahead tax cash flows, based on the entire sample-period and 
the three subperiods (i.e., when different tax accounting standards have been adopted in UK235), 
respectively. A robustness check is provided in the table 6.10 and 6.11 panel B to show the 
average annual informativeness of income tax accruals using a sample of firms that survived 
over at least the 24 of the 26 sample years, in order to mitigate the concern that the observed 
time-series trend in the informativeness of income tax accruals is due to the selection bias of 
sample firms236. In addition, multivariate results reported in the following table 6.12 and table 
6.13 show the time-series trend of the informativeness of income tax accruals in predicting 
future one- to five-year ahead tax cash flows, by regressing  𝛿𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠 and ?̅?𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠
2
 on 
a time-trend variable (𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 or 𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐼𝑂𝐷) after controlling for a set of variables that proxy 
changes in firms’ underlying characteristics and governance mechanisms in a manner similar 
to Dyreng et al. (2017). Standard robust errors are used to control for the heteroscedasticity 
problem (Eicker 1963; Petersen 2009). 
The following figure 6.1 and figure 6.2 provide visual evidence on the time-series trend in the 
informativeness of income tax accruals to explain future one- to five-year ahead cash tax 
payments, through plotting the sample mean of the incremental informativeness of income tax 
accruals for each year from 1992 to 2017. As shown in figure 6.1 and figure 6.2, there is a clear 
downward trend in the incremental informativeness of income tax accruals. The highly 
significant and negative coefficients on the time trend variables, i.e., Y𝐸𝐴𝑅  and 𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐼𝑂𝐷 
reported in panel A and panel B of table 6.10 and table 6.11, confirm the visual evidence 
presented in figure 6.1 and figure 6.2, and show that the informativeness of income tax accruals 
to explain future one- to five-year ahead cash tax payments has been decreasing over the sample 
period, regardless of whether the full sample of firms or the sample of surviving firms is 
 
235 That is, SSAP 15 for period 1992-1999, FRS 19 for period 2000-2004, and IAS 12 for period 2005-2017.  
236 Since firms in the full sample are only required to survive for at least six consecutive years, the increase 
(decrease) in the informativeness of income tax accruals to explain future tax cash flows generated using the full 
sample of firms may only indicate that as compared to firms existed in the 1990s, firms in existence today have 
stronger (weaker) relation between current-period income tax accruals and future tax cash flows (Kim and Kross 
2005).  
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employed. Specifically, the highly significant and negative coefficients on the time trend 
variable 𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐼𝑂𝐷 potentially imply that the ability of income tax accruals to explain future 
cash taxes is greater during the period 1992-1999 when the partial provision method of deferred 
taxes (i.e., SSAP 15) has been adopted in the UK, as compared to that during the period 2000-
2004 and the period 2005-2017 when the full provision methods of deferred taxes (i.e., FRS 
19 and IAS 12, respectively) have been adopted in the UK. 
Table 6.12 and table 6.13 report coefficient estimate on the time trend variables Y𝐸𝐴𝑅 and 
𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐼𝑂𝐷, after controlling for changes in firms’ underlying characteristics and governance 
mechanisms. As shown from table 6.12 and table 6.13, coefficients on Y𝐸𝐴𝑅 are uniformly 
negative and highly significant, indicating that even after controlling for changes in firms’ 
underlying characteristics and governance mechanisms, there is still an apparent linear decline 
in the ability of current-period income tax accruals to predict future one- to five-year ahead tax 
cash flows over the sample period. However, after controlling for changes in firms’ underlying 
characteristics, coefficients on 𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐼𝑂𝐷 are significantly negative only in the cases that future 
two- to four-year ahead cash taxes are explained by current-period income tax accruals, which 
implies that as compared to the full provision methods of deferred taxes, the partial provision 
method of deferred taxes provides income tax accruals with significantly greater ability to 
predict future two- to four-year ahead tax cash flows. 
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Figure 6.1  
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Table 6.10: 
 Average Annual Informativeness of Income Tax Accruals Measured by 𝜹𝑻𝒂𝒙 𝑨𝒄𝒄𝒓𝒖𝒂𝒍𝒔 
Panel A Full Sample of Firms 
𝒀𝑬𝑨𝑹 N T+1 T+2 T+3 T+4 T+5 
1992-1996 1615 0.8558 0.6796 0.5654 0.4713 0.3896 
1997-2001 1615 0.6866 0.5790 0.4347 0.3397 0.3215 
2002-2006 1615 0.8626 0.5532 0.4278 0.3328 0.3255 
2007-2011 1615 0.5699 0.4811 0.4194 0.3434 0.3556 
2012-2017 1938 0.6053 0.3607 0.2976 0.1739 0.0619 
Coefficient on the Time  
Trend Variable 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 
-0.0104 
(-33.81)*** 
-0.0137 
(-47.83)*** 
-0.0135 
(-26.85)*** 
-0.0132 
(-28.10)*** 
-0.0113 
(-17.36)*** 
𝑷𝑬𝑹𝑰𝑶𝑫 N T+1 T+2 T+3 T+4 T+5 
1 (1992-1999) 2584 0.7726 0.6445 0.5119 0.4335 0.3781 
2 (2000-2004) 1615 0.7419 0.5835 0.5281 0.3989 0.2978 
3 (2005-2017) 4199 0.6627 0.4273 0.3297 0.2576 0.2521 
Coefficient on the Time  
Trend Variable 𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐼𝑂𝐷 
-0.0561 
(-21.65)*** 
-0.1109 
(-46.98)*** 
-0.0963 
(-27.34)*** 
-0.0905 
(-27.18)*** 
-0.0621 
(-15.51)*** 
Panel B Constant Sample of Firms 
𝒀𝑬𝑨𝑹 N T+1 T+2 T+3 T+4 T+5 
1992-1996 720 0.6878 0.5963 0.4964 0.5250 0.4219 
1997-2001 720 0.4858 0.3716 0.2852 0.2381 0.2129 
2002-2006 720 0.4146 0.4258 0.4291 0.2914 0.1992 
2007-2011 720 0.2748 0.2073 0.2199 0.1178 0.1419 
2012-2017 864 0.2199 0.1343 0.1065 0.0647 0.0161 
Coefficient on the Time  
Trend Variable 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 
-0.0221 
(-42.90)*** 
-0.0214 
(-67.70)*** 
-0.0173 
(-50.83)*** 
-0.0192 
(-49.38)*** 
-0.0176 
(-48.12)*** 
𝑷𝑬𝑹𝑰𝑶𝑫 N T+1 T+2 T+3 T+4 T+5 
1 (1992-1999) 1152 0.5819 0.4823 0.4008 0.3948 0.3243 
2 (2000-2004) 720 0.4731 0.4182 0.3938 0.3022 0.2783 
3 (2005-2017) 1872 0.2780 0.2201 0.2013 0.1335 0.0821 
Coefficient on the Time  
Trend Variable 𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐼𝑂𝐷 
-0.1540 
(-36.07)*** 
-0.13434 
(-34.58)*** 
-0.1042 
(-28.11)*** 
-0.1324 
(-33.19)*** 
-0.1247 
(-36.10)*** 
The figures in parentheses are t-statistics ,.***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
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Table 6.11: 
 Average Annual Informativeness of Income Tax Accruals Measured by ?̅?𝑻𝒂𝒙 𝑨𝒄𝒄𝒓𝒖𝒂𝒍𝒔
𝟐
 
Panel A Full Sample of Firms 
𝒀𝑬𝑨𝑹 N T+1 T+2 T+3 T+4 T+5 
1992-1996 1615 0.2936 0.2174 0.1669 0.1058 0.0781 
1997-2001 1615 0.1465 0.1346 0.0964 0.0726 0.0557 
2002-2006 1615 0.2361 0.1066 0.0767 0.0799 0.0702 
2007-2011 1615 0.0820 0.0580 0.0583 0.0311 0.0388 
2012-2017 1938 0.0725 0.0077 0.0226 0.0161 0.0159 
Coefficient on the Time  
Trend Variable 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 
-0.0095 
(-61.16)*** 
-0.0094 
(-65.89)*** 
-0.0064 
(-56.81)*** 
-0.0042 
(-45.41)*** 
-0.0020 
(-21.55)*** 
𝑷𝑬𝑹𝑰𝑶𝑫 N T+1 T+2 T+3 T+4 T+5 
1 (1992-1999) 2584 0.2397 0.1969 0.1477 0.1032 0.0823 
2 (2000-2004) 1615 0.2104 0.1137 0.0995 0.0921 0.0610 
3 (2005-2017) 4199 0.0966 0.0375 0.0345 0.0304 0.0437 
Coefficient on the Time  
Trend Variable 𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐼𝑂𝐷 
-0.0735 
(-53.73)*** 
-0.0796 
(-66.60)*** 
-0.0570 
(-54.37)*** 
-0.0376 
(-44.04)*** 
-0.0192 
(-24.35)*** 
Panel B Constant Sample of Firms 
𝒀𝑬𝑨𝑹 N T+1 T+2 T+3 T+4 T+5 
1992-1996 720 0.0994 0.1356 0.0846 0.0884 0.0734 
1997-2001 720 0.1166 0.0783 0.0546 0.0376 0.0196 
2002-2006 720 0.0798 0.0936 0.0696 0.0395 0.0187 
2007-2011 720 0.0381 0.0241 0.0312 0.0160 0.0164 
2012-2017 864 0.0503 0.0204 0.0203 0.0003 -0.0048 
Coefficient on the Time  
Trend Variable 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 
-0.0034 
(-28.47)*** 
-0.0059 
(-29.31)*** 
-0.0034 
(-27.20)*** 
-0.0038 
(-30.91)*** 
-0.0032 
(-32.29) 
𝑷𝑬𝑹𝑰𝑶𝑫 N T+1 T+2 T+3 T+4 T+5 
1 (1992-1999) 1152 0.1020 0.1101 0.0754 0.0690 0.0529 
2 (2000-2004) 720 0.0968 0.0720 0.0529 0.0333 0.0269 
3 (2005-2017) 1872 0.0517 0.0415 0.0349 0.0172 0.0055 
Coefficient on the Time  
Trend Variable 𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐼𝑂𝐷 
-0.0261 
(-26.59)*** 
-0.0341 
(-18.44)*** 
-0.0201 
(-18.10)*** 
-0.0254 
(-23.99)*** 
-0.0236 
(-27.35)*** 
The figures in parentheses are t-statistics ,.***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
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Table 6.12 Regression Results: Time-Series Trend of Income Tax Accruals Measured by 𝜹𝑻𝒂𝒙 𝑨𝒄𝒄𝒓𝒖𝒂𝒍𝒔 
 
 T+1 T+2 T+3 T+4 T+5 
𝐏𝐄𝐑𝐈𝐎𝐃 0.2499 
(5.30)*** 
 -0.6321 
(-39.34)*** 
 -0.5079 
(-15.73)*** 
 -0.3830 
(-10.49)*** 
 -0.0257 
(-0.52) 
 
𝐘𝐄𝐀𝐑  -0.0118 
(-3.95)*** 
 -0.0232 
(13.72)*** 
 -0.0319 
(-8.86)*** 
 -0.0365 
(-10.25)*** 
 -0.0432 
(-12.62)*** 
PTBIit 0.1766 
(1.03) 
0.1142 
(0.75) 
0.1130 
(1.33) 
-0.1056 
(-1.10) 
-0.2693 
(-1.08) 
-0.5389 
(-2.47)** 
0.1220 
(0.51) 
-0.1695 
(-0.84) 
0.7058 
(2.25)** 
0.3969 
(1.42) 
VOL_PTBIit 0.0279 
(0.04) 
0.3954 
(0.66) 
-0.4066 
(-1.31) 
-0.4000 
(-1.34) 
0.5610 
(0.65) 
0.7998 
(1.08) 
0.8587 
(0.92) 
1.2580 
(1.54) 
0.4391 
(0.48) 
1.1852 
(1.48) 
VOL_CASHFLOWit -1.3883 
(-1.99)* 
-1.4510 
(-2.19)** 
0.0494 
(0.14) 
-0.3056 
(-0.73) 
-0.3293 
(-0.35) 
-0.7428 
(-0.86) 
0.4570 
(0.49) 
0.0247 
(0.03) 
1.0503 
(1.12) 
0.6264 
(0.72) 
SIZEit 0.0176 
(1.04) 
0.0189 
(1.21) 
-0.0068 
(-1.05) 
-0.0108 
(-1.21) 
-0.0468 
(-2.30)** 
-0.0503 
(-2.49)** 
-0.0461 
(-1.49) 
-0.0490 
(-1.92)* 
-0.0170 
(-0.46) 
-0.0179 
(-0.64) 
GROWTHit 0.0040 
(0.82) 
0.0068 
(1.19) 
-0.0028 
(-0.89) 
0.0068 
(1.95)* 
-0.0054 
(-0.65) 
0.0064 
(0.84) 
-0.0307 
(-3.49)*** 
-0.0180 
(-2.49)** 
-0.0455 
(-4.23)*** 
-0.0321 
(-3.76)*** 
CAPINTit 0.0151 
(0.15) 
0.0002 
 (0.00) 
0.0037 
(0.10) 
0.0014 
(0.03) 
-0.1878 
(-1.74)* 
-0.1997 
(-1.83)* 
-0.1256 
(-0.99) 
-0.1438 
(-1.23) 
-0.0267 
(-0.20) 
-0.0586 
(-0.55) 
LEVERAGEit -0.0323 
(-0.38) 
-0.0505 
(-0.66) 
-0.0038 
(-0.08) 
-0.0883 
(-1.52) 
-0.2054 
(-2.17)** 
-0.3059 
(-3.12)*** 
-0.0684 
(-0.58) 
-0.1748 
(-1.65) 
0.0492 
(0.36) 
-0.0582 
(-0.50) 
DISCONTINUEit 4.2969 
(0.74) 
6.0315 
(1.00) 
-1.3441 
(-0.47) 
-4.6339 
(-1.57) 
0.8783 
(0.12) 
-1.4914 
(-0.23) 
0.3680 
(0.04) 
-1.1621 
(-0.13) 
6.4379 
(0.45) 
7.1779 
(0.55) 
SEGMENTit 0.0017 
(0.29) 
-0.0029 
(-0.64) 
0.0045 
(1.72)* 
0.0039 
(1.27) 
0.0036 
(0.62) 
0.0001 
(0.01) 
-0.0012 
(-0.16) 
-0.0068 
(-0.93) 
-0.0034 
 (-0.44) 
-0.0132 
(-1.67)* 
COVERAGEit -0.1405 
(-3.62)*** 
-0.1436 
(-3.96)*** 
0.0249 
(1.48) 
0.0347 
(1.68)* 
0.2081 
(4.06)*** 
0.2164 
(4.46)*** 
0.2547 
(4.76)*** 
0.2614 
(5.71)*** 
0.1617 
(2.42)** 
0.1637 
(2.74)*** 
BOARDit 0.0009 
(0.74) 
0.0022 
(2.38)** 
-0.0008 
(-1.52) 
-0.0005 
(-0.74) 
-0.0028 
(-1.83)* 
-0.0016 
(-1.11) 
-0.0036 
(-1.94)* 
-0.0019 
(-1.22) 
-0.0035 
(-1.67)* 
-0.0007 
(-0.43) 
INSTITUTIONit -0.0035 
(-4.70)*** 
-0.0019 
(-3.90)*** 
-0.0009 
(-3.81)*** 
-0.0017 
(-4.55) 
0.0002 
(0.47) 
0.0004 
(0.70) 
0.0005 
(0.83) 
0.0014 
(2.08)** 
-0.0003 
(-0.39) 
0.0022 
(3.63)*** 
AUDITit 0.1909 
(3.86)*** 
0.0869 
(2.06)** 
0.0478 
(2.28) 
0.0524 
(1.83) 
-0.0661 
(-1.29) 
-0.1268 
(-2.28)** 
-0.0003 
(-0.01) 
-0.1067 
(-1.90)* 
0.1460 
(2.21)** 
-0.0596 
(-0.96) 
Constant 0.0507 
(0.20) 
0.9446 
(4.32)*** 
2.4001 
(28.94)*** 
1.1212 
(10.16)*** 
2.3539 
(8.87)*** 
1.5714 
(5.62)*** 
1.6613 
(4.89)*** 
1.3012 
(3.99)*** 
0.1811 
(0.46) 
0.9114 
(2.68)** 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 481 481 481 481 481 481 481 481 481 481 
R-Square 0.1406 0.1369 0.4861 0.3246 0.1289 0.1552 0.1356 0.2096 0.0738 0.1642 
Regression estimations are conducted with the employment of clustered firm-level Eicker-Huber-White robust standard errors.  The figures in parentheses are t-statistics ***, ** and * 
denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
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Table 6.13 Regression Results: Time-Series Trend of Income Tax Accruals Measured by ?̅?𝑻𝒂𝒙 𝑨𝒄𝒄𝒓𝒖𝒂𝒍𝒔
𝟐
 
 
 T+1 T+2 T+3 T+4 T+5 
𝐏𝐄𝐑𝐈𝐎𝐃 -0.0120 
(-1.05) 
 -0.1558 
(-24.68)*** 
 -0.2290 
(-53.06)*** 
 -0.1765 
(-31.78)*** 
 0.0052 
(0.91) 
 
𝐘𝐄𝐀𝐑  -0.0060 
(-8.92)*** 
 -0.0092 
(-22.86)*** 
 -0.0058 
(-8.99)*** 
 -0.0045 
(-7.02)*** 
 -0.0022 
(-4.04)*** 
PTBIit 0.0489 
(1.30) 
0.0055 
(0.15) 
0.0490 
(1.67)* 
-0.0293 
(-1.18) 
0.0089 
(0.27) 
-0.0516 
(-1.37) 
0.0570 
(1.66) 
0.0097 
(0.28) 
0.1030 
(2.23)** 
0.0876 
(1.87)* 
VOL_PTBIit -0.0649 
(-0.45) 
0.0325 
(0.22) 
-0.0903 
(-0.87) 
-0.0278 
(-0.36) 
0.0377 
(0.32) 
-0.0063 
(-0.05) 
-0.0554 
(-0.36) 
-0.0879 
(-0.69) 
-0.1862 
(-1.26) 
-0.1432 
(-0.99) 
VOL_CASHFLOWit -0.1989 
(-1.21) 
-.02591 
 (-1.59) 
0.0652 
(0.54) 
-0.0557 
(-0.52) 
0.0903 
(0.70) 
-0.0129 
(-0.08) 
 0 .2630 
(1.65) 
0.1827 
(1.19) 
0.3525 
(1.81)* 
0.3318 
(1.75)* 
SIZEit 0.0051 
(1.20) 
0.0048 
(1.40) 
-0.0025 
(-0.78) 
-0.0036 
(-1.76)* 
  -0.0058 
(-2.00)** 
-0.0072 
(-2.04)** 
-0.0071 
(-1.92)* 
-0.0082 
(-2.26)** 
-0.0049 
(-1.35) 
-0.0049 
(-1.43) 
GROWTHit 0.0004 
(0.39) 
0.0023 
(1.87)* 
-0.0026 
(-2.23)** 
0.0009 
(0.97) 
-0.0024 
(-2.25)** 
0.0002 
(0.16) 
-0.0049 
(-4.10)*** 
-0.0029 
(-2.10)** 
-0.0049 
(-3.72)*** 
-0.0042 
(-3.34)*** 
CAPINTit 0.0058 
(0.23) 
0.0016 
(0.08) 
-0.0013 
(-0.09) 
-0.0044 
(-0.42) 
-0.0152 
(-1.02) 
-0.0140 
(-0.80) 
0.0095 
(0.51) 
0.0103 
(0.55) 
0.0176 
(0.96) 
0.0158 
(0.83) 
LEVERAGEit 0.0001 
(0.01) 
-0.0150 
(-0.94) 
-0.0002 
(-0.02) 
-0.0296 
(-2.34)** 
-0.0181 
(-1.42) 
-0.0422 
(-2.31)** 
0.0189 
(1.19) 
0.0001 
(0.00) 
0.0186 
(1.00) 
0.0133 
(0.69) 
DISCONTINUEit 0.6880 
(0.51) 
0.7397 
(0.50) 
-0.3427 
(-0.46) 
-1.0822 
(-1.75)* 
0.2242 
(0.17) 
-1.0218 
(-0.84) 
-0.9626 
(-0.66) 
-1.9213 
(-1.44) 
-0.3169 
(-0.21) 
-0.2389 
(-0.16) 
SEGMENTit 0.0008 
(0.56) 
-0.0005 
(-0.44) 
0.0012 
(1.20) 
0.0002 
(0.35) 
-0.0001 
(-0.01) 
0.0003 
(0.35) 
0.0002 
(0.15) 
0.0004 
(0.39) 
-0.0001 
(-0.07) 
-0.0006 
(-0.58) 
COVERAGEit -0.0350 
(-3.90)*** 
-0.0346 
(-4.32)*** 
0.0119 
(1.88)* 
0.0145 
(3.19)*** 
0.0313 
(4.91)*** 
0.0347 
(4.93)*** 
0.0396 
(5.05)*** 
0.0423 
(5.79)*** 
0.0303 
(3.83)*** 
0.0303 
(3.95)*** 
BOARDit -0.0001 
(-0.05) 
0.0004 
(1.64) 
-0.0005 
(-2.01)** 
-0.0002 
(-1.00) 
-0.0003 
(-1.73)* 
-0.0004 
(-1.49) 
-0.0004 
(-1.80)* 
-0.0004 
(-1.63) 
-0.0003 
(-1.09) 
-0.0001 
(-0.37) 
INSTITUTIONit -0.0009 
(-4.78)*** 
-0.0006 
(-4.65)*** 
-0.0004 
(-4.06)*** 
-0.0004 
(-3.96)*** 
0.0001 
(1.67)* 
-0.0003 
(-2.35)** 
0.0002 
(2.06)** 
-0.0001 
(-1.20) 
0.0001 
(1.80)* 
0.0003 
(3.30)*** 
AUDITit 0.0550 
(4.44)*** 
0.0282 
(2.97)*** 
0.0268 
(3.35)*** 
0.0112 
(1.67)* 
-0.0070 
(-1.06) 
 0 .0075 
(0.71) 
-0.0050 
(-0.60) 
0.0057 
(0.57) 
-0.0003 
(-0.03) 
-0.0122 
(-1.22) 
Constant 0.1579 
(2.60)** 
0.2358 
(4.89)*** 
0.5343 
(14.76)*** 
0.2830 
(10.67)*** 
0.7488 
(22.22) 
0.2370 
(5.20)*** 
0.5565 
(12.43)*** 
0.1635 
(3.44)*** 
0.0001 
(0.00) 
0.0560 
(1.36) 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 481 481 481 481 481 481 481 481 481 481 
R-Square 0.1855 0.2855 0.4498 0.5252 0.4788 0.2066 0.3147 0.1629 0.0498 0.0587 
Regression estimations are conducted with the employment of clustered firm-level Eicker-Huber-White robust standard errors.  The figures in parentheses are t-statistics ***, ** and * 
denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
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6.5 Additional Analyses and Robustness Check 
6.5.1. Discretionary accruals to control pre-tax earnings management 
Low cash ETR can be attributable to both tax planning activities that reduce tax payments 
without affecting pre-tax income; and pre-tax accrual management activities that increase pre-
tax profits without affecting the tax payment (Kim et al. 2011). In order to show whether results 
of the main tests are robust to controlling for pre-tax earnings management, this section will 
further control the absolute discretionary accruals (𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑈𝐴𝐿𝑖𝑡) in the tests of the second 
hypotheses, in an effort to isolate the impact of corporate tax management from pre-tax 
earnings manipulation. Following Dechow et al. (1995) and Hutton et al. (2009), this study 
employs the modified Jones model to measure the pre-tax earnings management (𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑈𝐴𝐿𝑖𝑡) 
using the cross-sectional absolute value of discretionary accruals237.  
The re-estimated results shown in table A.1 are consistent with the initial results, which 
indicates that the informativeness of income tax accruals is significantly lower for companies 
that engage in tax planning activities or exhibit strong incentives to avoid reporting an apparent 
decline in the post-tax profits238. These results imply that the detected negative impacts of tax 
management incentives (i.e., corporate tax planning and the incentive to avoid reporting an 
apparently declined post-tax profits) on the informativeness of income tax accruals are mainly 
due to managers’ manipulation of income tax provision rather than due to the pre-tax earnings 
management.  
6.5.2. Alternative measures of corporate tax planning 
In the main tests, corporate tax planning is measured by the five-year Cash ETR (𝑇𝐴_𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖𝑡) 
which is calculated as the sum of total taxes paid over the five-year period scaled by the sum 
of pre-tax income over the same five-year period. In order to show whether results of the main 
tests are sensitive to measurements of corporate tax planning, this section will re-estimate the 
tests of the second hypotheses with the employment of three-year cash ETR, and three-year 
 
237 See Appendix B for procedures of estimating 𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑈𝐴𝐿𝑖𝑡.  
238 Results reported in table A.1 show that coefficients of 𝑇𝐴_𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖𝑡  are significantly positive; coefficients of 
𝑇𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑇1𝑖𝑡 × 𝐷𝐸𝐶𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸_𝐴𝑀𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡  are significantly negative; and the sum of the coefficients of 
𝐷𝐸𝐶𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸_𝐴𝑀𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡  and the coefficients of 𝑇𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑇1𝑖𝑡 × 𝐷𝐸𝐶𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸_𝐴𝑀𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 are negative.  
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and five-year GAAP ETR. Specifically, the three-year cash ETR is calculated as the sum of 
total taxes paid over the three-year period scaled by the sum of pre-tax income over the same 
three-year period. The three-year (five-year) GAAP ETR is calculated as the sum of income 
tax expense paid over the three-year (five-year) period scaled by the sum of pre-tax income 
over the same three-year (five-year) period. 
Results reported in table A.2 show that when the informativeness of income tax accruals is 
captured by 𝛿𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠, coefficients of the three-year Cash ETR (𝑇𝐴_𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻3𝑖𝑡), the three-
year GAAP ETR ( 𝑇𝐴_𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃3𝑖𝑡 ) and the five-year GAAP ETR ( 𝑇𝐴_𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃5𝑖𝑡 ) are all 
significant with the expected positive sign. However, when the informativeness of income tax 
accruals is captured by ?̅?𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠
2
, only the three-year Cash ETR ( 𝑇𝐴_𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻3𝑖𝑡 ) is 
significantly positive while the three-year and the five-year GAAP ETR are both positive but 
insignificant. These results indicate that corporate tax planning measured by firms’ cash tax 
positions has more robust negative impacts on the informativeness of income tax accruals than 
that measured by the GAAP ETRs.  
6.5.3. Alternative measure of operational uncertainty 
In examining the impact of managers’ tax management incentives on the informativeness of 
income tax accruals, it is important to control for uncertainty and difficulties faced by managers 
in making accurate estimations of income tax accruals. This is because low reliability of the 
reported income tax accruals to explain future tax cash flows can stem from the uncertainty 
and difficulties in managers’ estimation and forecasts of firms’ current and future tax position, 
even in the absence of management deliberate bias in the income tax accruals. In the main tests, 
the volatility of firms’ pre-tax income (𝑉𝑂𝐿_𝑃𝑇𝐵𝐼𝑖𝑡) and the volatility of firms’ cash flows 
(𝑉𝑂𝐿_𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝐹𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑖𝑡) are employed to control for firms’ operational uncertainty, as greater 
uncertainty in firms’ operational environment can make it more difficult to estimate tax 
position. However, Holland and Jackson (2004) point out that in order to reflect difficulties 
that managers face in making accurate estimation, it can be more efficient to control uncertainty 
in managers’ forecasts instead of uncertainty in firm operation using “a measure of variability 
in expectation, rather than a measure of variability in outcomes” (pp. 108).  
Following Holland and Jackson (2004), this study further employs the coefficient of variation 
in analysts’ forecasted sales and pre-tax profits to control for firms’ operational uncertainty 
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when testing the second hypotheses of this study. Table A.4 shows that results generated with 
the employment of 𝑈𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑇_𝑃𝑇𝐵𝐼𝑖𝑡  and 𝑈𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑇_𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑖𝑡  (the coefficient of variation in 
analysts’ forecasted pre-tax profits and sales) are generally consistent with the initial results. 
Specifically, results reported in table A.3 confirm that the informativeness of income tax 
accruals is negatively associated with the level of corporate tax planning and firms’ incentives 
to avoid reporting an apparent decline in the post-tax profits239.  
6.5.4. Alternative measure of dispersed operation 
The main tests of the second hypotheses use the number of segments in which a firm operates 
(𝑆𝐸𝐺𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡) to measure difficulties and complexity in the estimations of income tax accruals 
due to firms’ operations in multiple jurisdictions. Operating in a highly dispersed business 
environment, especially with intensive operations in foreign countries, requires tax managers 
to interpret and comply both local and foreign tax laws and regulations in every tax jurisdiction, 
which may impart estimation errors in income tax accruals (Choudhary et al. 2016). This 
section further investigates whether results of the second hypotheses tests are sensitive to 
alternative measure of firms’ dispersed operation. The alternative proxy for the level of firms’ 
dispersed operation (𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑖𝑡) focuses on the intensity of the foreign operations and is 
calculated using firms’ foreign sales divided by the total sales. Results reported in table A.4 
shows that the initial inferences are robust to the alternative measure of dispersed operation.  
6.5.5. Longer estimation windows of informativeness of income tax accruals 
The main tests of the second hypotheses examines the cross-sectional determinates of the 
informativeness of income tax accruals, in which the firm-specific informativeness of income 
tax accruals is measured as the ability of income tax accruals to explain future one-year-ahead 
cash tax payments. However, results of the first hypothesis test show that income tax accruals 
are able to predict tax cash flows beyond the future one-year-ahead window. In order to show 
whether firms’ tax management incentives exert longer impact on the informativeness of the 
reported income tax accruals, this section further increases the estimation window of the 
informativeness of income tax accruals beyond future one-year ahead to future two years and 
three years as robustness check. Results reported in table A.5 and A.6 show that extending the 
 
239  Table A.4 shows that the coefficients of 𝑇𝐴_𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖𝑡 are positive and the coefficients of  𝑇𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑇1𝑖𝑡 ×
𝐷𝐸𝐶𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸_𝐴𝑀𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡are negative. 
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estimation window weakens the results. Specifically, firms’ tax management incentives do not 
have significant impact on the ability of income tax accruals to explain future tax cash flows 
beyond the immediate-following year.  
This may due to the fact that UK GAAP and IAS 12 require tax-related estimation errors to be 
corrected in a timely manner when the estimation errors are identified, and auditors are 
responsible for comparing the level of tax provision with the subsquent agreed liability and 
requiring their clients to correct the questionable tax disclosures on an annual basis. Therefore, 
it is likely that the estimation erros in firms’ income tax accruals arising from their ealier tax 
management behaviours are corrected in the immediate subsquent year, which in turn results 
in the stronger impact of firms’ tax management incentives on the informativeness of income 
tax accruals to explain future one-year-ahead realised tax cash flows, but weaker relation 
between firms’ tax management incentives and the informativeness measures that predict 
future two-year- and three-year-ahead tax cash flows. 
6.5.6. Firm-fixed effect of the first and third hypothesis tests 
Results of the main tests are estimated based on the year and industry fixed effect, to control 
determinative factors of informativeness of income tax accruals that may correlated across 
years and industries. However, it is possible that the regression analyses of the main tests are 
affected by uncontrolled heterogeneity in firm-specific characteristics which affect the 
informativeness of income tax accruals. This section will re-estimate tests of the first and the 
third hypotheses240 using firm-fixed effect estimation models to show whether the main results 
are sensitive to heterogeneity in firms’ specific characteristics. Results estimated using the 
fixed effect models are presented in table A.7 to table A.9, which remain qualitatively identical 
to the original results.  
Table A.7 shows that when the fixed effect models are employed, the current-period income 
tax accruals (𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 ) is still incrementally informative over current-period cash tax 
payment in explaining future one- to five-year ahead cash tax payments, indicating that the 
original results are not affected by heterogeneity in firms’ specific characteristics. However, 
 
240 When testing the second hypotheses, the informativeness of income tax accruals is estimated for each firm 
using firm-specific ?̅?𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠
2
 and 𝛿𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠 . Therefore, the fixed effect estimation models cannot be 
applied for testing the second hypotheses because of the insufficient observations each year for each firm.  
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the fixed effect results show that current-period cash tax paid is not useful in predicting future 
tax cash flows beyond four year ahead. Consistent with the original results, results of fixed 
effect models presented in table A.8 and table A.9 show that all the coefficients of the time 
trend variable Y𝐸𝐴𝑅 and 𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐼𝑂𝐷 are significantly negative without controlling for changes 
in firms’ underlying characteristics. After controlling for changes in firms’ underlying 
characteristics, it shows that there is significant downward trend in the informativeness of 
income tax accruals to explain future two- to four-year ahead cash flows. 
6.5.7. One-stage estimation of the second hypotheses  
In the main tests of the second hypotheses, the two-stage estimation method is employed 
following Plenborg et al. (1998) and Donnelly and Lynch (2002), which first estimates the 
informativeness of income tax accruals as measured by 𝛿𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠  and ?̅?𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠
2
 for 
each firm in the sample, and then examines the impact of firms’ tax management incentives 
and corporate governance mechanism on the informativeness of income tax accruals estimated 
in the first stage. The two-stage estimation method focuses on investigating how the between-
firm variations in the informativeness of income tax accruals are explained by firms’ tax 
management incentives and corporate governance strength.  
This section will further employ the one-stage estimation approach following Warfield et al. 
(1995) as a test of the robustness of the main results generated using the two-stage estimation. 
The one-stage estimation method involves the use of interaction terms between income tax 
accruals and variables of interests (e.g., firms’ tax management incentives and corporate 
governance strength). Different from the two-stage estimation method which focuses on the 
cross-sectional determinations of the informativeness of income tax accruals, the one-stage 
approach focuses on explaining both the cross-sectional and inter-temporal variations in the 
informativeness of income tax accruals based on the panel data regression (Donnelly and Lynch 
2002). It is possible that the original tests estimated based on the year and industry fixed effect 
may omit to control some firm-specific characteristics which can significantly affect the 
informativeness of income tax accruals. Thus, the one-stage models will be estimated using 
firm-fixed effect to mitigate this concern. The one-stage models are presented in Appendix C. 
Results reported in table A.10 and A.11 show that results generated using the one-stage 
estimation with the control of firm-fixed effect are consistent with the initial results. 
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Specifically, as shown from table A.10, the coefficient Η3 of 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝐴_𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖,𝑡  in 
model (8.11) is significant with an expected positive sign (1.7124 with t=3.37) and the 
coefficient Μ3 of 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐸𝐶𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸_𝐴𝑀𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑖,𝑡  in model (8.21) is significant with 
an expected negative sign (-5.3080 with t=-1.77). Consistent with the original results, these 
results show that firms which engage in tax planning activities or have missed previous-
period’s pre-tax profit exhibit significantly lower informativeness of income tax accruals. 
Results reported from table A.11 column I indicate that corporate monitoring mechanisms are 
not significant in attenuating the negative impacts from corporate tax planning (as shown from 
the insignificant coefficients of 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 × 𝑇𝐴_𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖,𝑡 × 𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖,𝑡,𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 ×
𝑇𝐴_𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖,𝑡 × 𝐵𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐷𝑖,𝑡 and 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 × 𝑇𝐴_𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖,𝑡 × 𝐴𝑈𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑖,𝑡, and the significant positive 
coefficient of 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 × 𝑇𝐴_𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖,𝑡 × 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝐼𝑇𝑈𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑡). Results reported in table A.11 
column II indicate that higher level of analysts coverage and institutional shareholding play a 
significant role in attenuating the negative relation between the informativeness of income tax 
accruals and firms’ incentives to meet previous period’s post-tax profit (as shown from the 
significant positive coefficients of 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 × 𝐷𝐸𝐶𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸_𝐴𝑀𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑖,𝑡 × 𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖,𝑡 and 
𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 × 𝐷𝐸𝐶𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸_𝐴𝑀𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑖,𝑡 × 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝐼𝑇𝑈𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑡 ).  
6.6. Conclusion 
This chapter analyses and discusses the results of the hypotheses tests of this study. This 
chapter begins with examining whether income tax accruals are incrementally informative over 
cash tax paid in explaining future tax cash flows. The following section of this chapter tests 
how tax management incentives, including the engagement in corporate tax planning activities 
and tax-induced earnings management to meet or beat specific earnings targets, affect the 
informativeness of income tax accruals. This chapter further tests whether effective corporate 
governance mechanism plays a significant role in attenuating the negative impact of tax 
management incentives on the informativeness of income tax accruals. Subsequently, this 
section investigates the time-series trend in the incremental informativeness of income tax 
accruals over the past three decade from 1992 to 2017. Finally, several additional analyses are 
conducted to check the robustness of the estimated results regarding the control of pre-tax 
earnings management, alternative measures of corporate tax planning, alternative measures of 
operational uncertainty, alternative measure of dispersed operation, longer estimation window 
of the informativeness of income tax accruals, firm fixed effect and one-stage estimation. 
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In summary, this study finds that income tax accruals are incrementally informative over cash 
tax paid in explaining future tax cash flows in UK. Using the methodology employed in the 
value-relevance accounting studies, this study provides evidence that the incremental 
informativeness of income tax accruals to explain future tax cash flow is significantly lower 
for firms that engage in tax planning or earnings management activities to avoid reporting a 
decline in the post-tax profits. Higher analysts coverage and institutional shareholding are 
found to play a significant role in attenuating the negative relationship between the 
informativeness of income tax accruals and the managements’ incentives to avoid reporting an 
apparent decline in the post-tax profits. However, corporate governance is not significantly 
important in attenuating the negative impact of corporate tax planning on the informativeness 
of income tax accruals. In addition, this study finds a significant downward trend in the 
informativeness of income tax accruals to explain future tax cash flows over the past three 
decades in UK. 
Further analyses and robustness check provide evidence the initial results of this study are 
robust when 1) the measure of pre-tax earnings management is controlled in the regression 
estimation; 2) firm fixed effect estimation models are used; 3) alternative measures of 
operational uncertainty are employed; 4) alternative measure of dispersed operation is 
employed; and 5) one-stage estimation of the second hypotheses is conducted. However, the 
initial results can be sensitive to the length of the estimating window in measuring the 
informativeness of income tax accruals. Results of this thesis can be summarised in the 
following table 6.14. 
 
Table 6.14: Summary of Main Hypotheses and Results in This Study 
Hypothesis Aim of Hypotheses Results of Hypothesis Tests Table of 
Results 
The incremental informativeness of income tax accruals 
H1 To investigate whether 
income tax accruals are 
incrementally informative 
over cash tax paid in 
explaining future tax cash 
flows on average. 
 
Results supported:  
Income tax accruals are incrementally 
informative over cash tax paid in 
explaining future tax cash flows. 
Table 6.1 
Cross-sectional determinates of informativeness of income tax accruals 
Tax management activities  
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H2a To investigate the impact of 
corporate tax planning on the 
informativeness of income 
tax accruals. 
Results supported:  
There is a negative relationship 
between the informativeness of 
income tax accruals and the level of 
firms’ tax planning. 
Table 6.2 
H2b To investigate the impact of 
managers’ incentives to 
avoid reporting a decline in 
post-tax earnings on the 
informativeness of income 
tax accruals. 
Results supported:  
There is a negative relationship 
between the informativeness of 
income tax accruals and managers’ 
incentives to avoid reporting a decline 
in post-tax earnings. 
Table 6.3; 
6.4 
H2b To investigate the impact of 
managers’ incentives to 
avoid missing  analysts’ 
forecasted earnings on the 
informativeness of income 
tax accruals. 
Results not supported: 
There is a positive relationship 
between the informativeness of 
income tax accruals and managers’ 
incentives to avoid missing analysts’ 
forecasted earnings. 
Table 6.5; 
6.6 
H2b To investigate the impact of 
managers’ incentives to 
avoid reporting a post-tax 
loss on the informativeness 
of income tax accruals. 
Results not supported: 
There is no relationship between the 
informativeness of income tax 
accruals and managers’ incentives to 
avoid reporting a post-tax loss. 
Table 6.7 
Corporate Governance Mechanism 
H2c_i~ 
H2c_iv  
To investigate the role of 
corporate governance 
mechanisms played in the 
relation between the 
informativeness of income 
tax accruals and corporate 
tax planning. 
Results not supported: 
Corporate governance mechanisms 
are insignificant in attenuating the 
negative impact of corporate tax 
planning on the informativeness of 
income tax accruals. 
Table 6.8 
H2c_i~ 
H2c_iv 
To investigate the role of 
corporate governance 
mechanisms played in the 
relation between the 
informativeness of income 
tax accruals and managers’ 
incentives to avoid reporting 
a decline in post-tax 
earnings. 
Results partially supported: 
Higher analysts coverage and higher 
institutional shareholding are 
significant in attenuating the negative 
impact of managers’ incentives to 
avoid reporting a decline in post-tax 
earnings on the informativeness of 
income tax accruals. 
Table 6.9 
Time-series trend of informativeness of income tax accruals 
H3 To investigate the time-
series trend of the 
informativeness of income 
tax accruals to explain future 
tax cash flows 
There is a downward trend of the 
informativeness of income tax 
accruals over the period 1992-2017 in 
the UK. 
Figure 6.1 
and 6.2; 
Table 
6.10-6.13. 
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7.1. Introduction 
This study has been carried out to provide the first evidence concerning the informativeness of 
income tax provision to explain firms’ future tax cash flows in the UK setting. Using a panel 
dataset of publicly-traded UK companies for the period 1992 to 2017, this study provides strong 
evidence that income tax accruals on average have an incremental ability over cash tax paid to 
explain future tax cash flows. This study has also examined the cross-sectional determinates 
and the time-series behaviours of the informativeness of income tax accruals in the UK setting. 
To summarise this thesis, this chapter begins with overviewing the background, literature 
review, hypotheses and the research findings while simultaneously discussing the contributions 
of this thesis. Subsequently, this chapter discusses the theoretical and practical implications 
that can be drawn from the research findings of this thesis. Limitations and suggestions for 
future studies are discussed in the following section of this chapter, and the final section 
concludes this chapter.  
7.2. Summary of Background, Literature Review, Hypotheses, Research 
Findings and Contributions 
7.2.1. Summary of background, literature review and hypotheses 
The background knowledge provided in chapter 2 and the prior literature evidence reviewed in 
chapter 3 lay theoretical foundation and guidance for the hypotheses developed in this study.  
Chapter 2 of this thesis, which provides the background knowledge regarding the UK 
accounting and taxation environment, discusses the components of income tax provision and 
the definition of income tax accruals. Basically, the income tax accruals, i.e., the difference 
between the income tax expense and the cash tax paid, consist of 1) the deferred taxes; 2) the 
income taxes accrued but not yet paid; 3) the unsettled tax liabilities; and 4) the financial-
accounting-standards induced over- or under-statements of current tax expense relative to cash 
tax incurred. Therefore, income tax accruals should have predictive ability about future cash 
tax consequences that would occur when the accrued/unsettled income taxes are realised or 
when the carrying amount of tax assets (liabilities) is recovered (settled). The ability of income 
tax accruals to explain future tax cash flows depends on the precision of estimated income tax 
accruals to reflect firms’ underlying tax obligations. Both the intentional and unintentional 
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managerial estimation errors in income tax accruals can obfuscate the precision of income tax 
provision in reflecting firms’ real tax obligation and compromise the informativeness of 
income tax accruals to explain future tax-related cash flows.  
In addition, chapter 2 highlight that the accounting methods for deferred taxes have evolved 
dramatically in the UK from the partial to the full provision approach. The partial provision 
methods allow managers to convey their private information about firms’ future tax 
consequences but is criticised as allowing too much discretion for managers, while the full 
provision methods which restrict the latitudes for opportunistic management behaviours via 
deferred tax provisioning could in turn reduce managers’ ability to convey their private 
information about firms’ future cash tax consequences.  
The literature review in chapter 3 of this thesis provides evidence that managers might be 
incentivised to engage in tax management activities to increase firms’ after-tax net income and 
after-tax cash flows. However, under the principal-agent framework, corporate tax 
management activities and managerial rent diversion can be complementary (Desai et al. 2006; 
2009; Wahab and Holland 2012). The self-interested managers, who possess private tax 
information and discretion in making tax-related decisions, may undertake opportunistic tax 
management activities to pursue their personal interests at the expense of firm owners, such as 
managing earnings through distorting the income tax accruals or engaging in tax-planning 
activities which are undesired by shareholders. 
Specifically, the manipulation of income tax provision provides a source of earnings 
management. This is because that changes in the income tax expenses lead to corresponding 
changes in firms’ net earnings; and the discretion, complexity and information asymmetry 
involved in the process of estimating income tax accruals facilitate managers to manage 
earnings via deliberately biasing income tax accruals. Earnings management through 
manipulating income tax accruals could reduce the reliability and relevance of income tax 
provision to represent firms’ real tax obligations (Dhaliwal et al. 2004).  
In addition, tax planning activities designed to reduce firms’ tax burden could put firms at risks 
of being challenged and penalised by tax authorities in the future, which can increase the 
uncertainty of firms’ future cash tax outcomes and thereby making it difficult for managers to 
accurately estimate the current-period income tax accruals. Moreover, the tax-planning 
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activities carried out with the intention to avoid providing a roadmap to tax authorities could 
inevitably increase the complexity and opacity related to tax transactions and tax disclosures 
in financial statements, which could in turn provide self-interested managers with more latitude 
to manipulate the income tax provision for opportunistic reasons, giving rise to intentional 
estimation errors in income tax accruals (Desai et al. 2006; 2009; Kim et al. 2011). 
The literature review of chapter 3 also highlights the importance of corporate governance 
mechanism in reducing the agency problems and protecting the benefits of shareholders, 
through aligning the managements’ interests with that of shareholders. The relationship 
between corporate tax management and the informativeness of income tax accruals therefore 
can be better explained in conjunction with corporate governance mechanism, to the extent that 
the effective corporate governance mechanism plays a role in restricting opportunistic 
managerial performance and enhancing financial transparency, thereby attenuating the 
negative impact of tax management incentives on the informativeness of income tax accruals.   
This study attempts to first test whether the income tax accruals are incrementally informative 
over cash tax paid to explain future tax cash flows, and then examine the cross-sectional 
determinates and the time-series trends of the informativeness of income tax accruals in the 
UK setting. The hypotheses of this study can be summarised in the following table 7.1. 
7.2.2. Summary of research findings 
As discussed in the section of the summary of hypotheses, it can be concluded that the primary 
objectives of this study are to investigate: 1) whether income tax accruals are incrementally 
informative over cash tax paid in explaining future tax cash flows; 2) whether and how different 
tax management incentives affect the incremental informativeness of income tax accruals; 3) 
whether more effective corporate governance plays a significant role in attenuating the negative 
impacts of tax management incentives on the informativeness of income tax accruals and; 4) 
whether the ability of income tax accruals to explain future tax cash flows has improved or 
deteriorated over time in the UK. Multivariate regression results of this study are generated 
using a panel dataset of publicly-traded non-financial UK companies for the period 1992 to 
2017, and are summarised as follows. 
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Firstly, this study provides evidence that income tax accruals are incrementally informative 
over cash tax paid in explaining future tax cash flows. Current-period income tax accruals 
explain approximate 6.52 percent to 15.04 percent of variations in future one- to five-year 
ahead cash tax payments.  
Secondly, the incremental informativeness of income tax accruals is found to be significantly 
lower for firms that 1) engage in tax planning activities or; 2) exhibit strong incentives to avoid 
reporting an apparent decline in the post-tax profits. On the one hand, these results are 
consistent with the agency perspective of corporate tax management that tax planning activities 
carried out with the intention to avoid detections from tax authorities could add opacity and 
obfuscation to financial statements, which reduces the quality of reported income tax 
information (Desai and Dharmapala 2009; Kim et al. 2011; Balakrishnan et al. 2018). On the 
other hand, the result that tax-management incentives to avoid reporting declined post-tax 
earnings lead to reduced informativeness of income tax accruals is consistent with previous 
evidence that the income tax accounts provide the last-chance for earnings management, when 
the pre-tax accruals fail to achieve the earnings target (Dhaliwal et al. 2004; Holland and 
Jackson 2004). 
Thirdly, this study finds that higher level of analysts coverage and institutional shareholding 
play a significant role in attenuating the negative relationship between the informativeness of 
income tax accruals and the managements’ incentives to avoid reporting an apparent decline in 
the post-tax profits. However, corporate governance mechanisms are not significantly 
important in attenuating the negative impact of corporate tax planning on the informativeness 
of income tax accruals. These results indicate that higher levels of analysts coverage and 
institutional shareholding might be effective in restricting opportunistic managerial behaviours 
by using income tax expense as a source of manufacturing earnings. However, corproate 
governance mechisms examined in this study are ineffective in scrutinising financial reporting 
irregularities resulting from the engagements in tax planning activities, which may either due 
to that there is insufficient information about firms’ tax planning strategies available for a 
potential governance mechanism; or that the governance mechanism is less capable of 
understanding and identifying firms’ tax-planning-related affairs and issues. 
Finally, this study finds that the incremental informativeness of income tax accruals about 
future tax cash flows has deteriorated over time in the UK, implying that as compared to the 
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partial provision methods of deferred taxes, the full provision method of deferred taxes which 
focuses on restricting managerial discretions leads to less information content in the income 
tax provision. 
7.2.3. Summary of contributions 
This study makes several contributions to the literature by adding understandings of the 
reported income tax disclosures in the UK setting. Since this study provides the first evidence 
concerning the informativeness of income tax provision in the UK environment, it contributes 
to the value relevance literature by employing a value-relevance methodology to examine the 
reliability and relevance of the reported income tax information in explaining future tax cash 
flows. 
As discussed in the literature review of chapter 3, the Scholes-Wolfson framework and the 
principal-agent theory provide the theoretical underpinning of studies that examine the 
corporate tax management behaviours. This study finds that corporate tax planning activities 
and the tax-induced earnings management to avoid reporting apparent decline in post-tax 
profits significantly reduce the incremental informativeness of income tax accruals. In this way, 
this study adds further empirical evidence to support the Scholes-Wolfson framework and the 
principal-agent perspective of corporate tax management, by showing the importance of 
considering “all contracting parties, all taxes and all costs” associated with corporate tax 
management, since the sophisticated and complex tax management activities could induce 
nontax costs in the form of severe transparency issues to financial statements, which could 
excerbate the information asymmetry and the agency issues between managers and investors.  
This study also contributes to the agency perspective of corporate tax management by 
empirically examining the role of corporate governance mechanisms in restricting managers’ 
incentives to engage in opportunistic tax management activities. Through showing that certain 
corporate governance mechanisms (i.e., higher analysts coverage and institutional shareholding) 
play a significant role in attenuating the impact of tax management incentives to avoid 
reporting an apparently declined post-tax profits, this study extends the literature on 
understanding how corporate governance affects the managerial performance.  
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Finally, this study contributes to the literature that compares the information value of the partial 
provision method with that of the full provision method of deferred taxes. By showing a 
significant downward trend in the informativeness of income tax accruals to explain future tax 
cash flows, this study suggests that the full provision methods of deferred taxes adopted in FRS 
19 and IAS 12, which focuses on restricting managerial discretions, lead to reduced ability of 
income tax accruals to explain future tax cash flows as compared to the partial provision 
methods adopted in SSAP 15. These results imply that the accountings-standard setters’ focus 
on restricting managerial discretion may potentially reduce managers’ ability to convey their 
private information about firms’ future cash tax outcomes. 
7.3. Policy and Practical Implications 
Results of this study provide several policy and practical implications for academics, financial 
statement users, and regulatory authorities such as the accounting standard setters and corporate 
governance regulatory bodies. Basically, this study examines the cross-sectional determinates 
and the time-series behaviours of the informativeness of income tax accruals in the UK setting, 
and highlights that corporate tax planning and managers’ incentives to avoid reporting declined 
post-tax profits significantly reduce the informativeness of income tax accruals. In this way, 
this study broads the research scope by providing further empirical evidence on the “incentive 
structure involved in the corporate tax reporting” (Hanlon and Heitzman 2010, pp. 128). 
However, the understanding of the quality and the reliability of reported income tax disclosures, 
particularly in the UK setting, is not well developed and sufficiently investigated. This study 
therefore advocates that tax researchers consider more about the sufficiency of the tax 
disclosures in supplying reliable and informative tax information. In addition, this study finds 
that UK corporate governance is not effective in moderating the negative impact of corporate 
tax planning on the informativeness of income tax accruals, which suggests that tax researchers 
should incorporate relevant institutional and policy differences among firms and countries 
when assessing the transparency problems of income tax disclosures.  
In terms of financial statement users such as investors and financial analysts, the results of this 
study provide practical implications regarding the transparency of the reported income tax 
disclosures. This study signifies that tax management incentives, including corporate tax 
planning and earnings management via biasing income tax accruals, lead to reduced ability of 
income tax accruals to explain future tax cash flows. These results indicate that when 
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evaluating firms’ after-tax performance to make relevant investment decisions, financial 
statement users should pay attention to firms’ reported tax disclosures and analyse firms’ tax 
management incentives, in order to be aware of the potential loss in the information 
transparency incurred by firms’ opportunistic tax management behaviours and hence avoid 
making biased investment decisions.  
In addition to the academics and financial statement users, this study also provides practical 
implications for regulatory authorities from aspects of enforcing and regulating tax disclosures 
in financial statements. Firstly, in examining the time-series trend of the informativeness of 
income tax accruals to explain future tax cash flows, this study shows that there is a significant 
downward trend in the informativeness of income tax accruals to explain future tax cash flows 
over the year 1992 to 2017 in the UK. This implies that as compared to the partial provision 
methods of deferred taxes, the full provision methods which focuses on restricting managerial 
discretion in deferred tax provision may reduce managers’ ability to convey private information 
about firms’ future cash-tax consequences, leading to reduced informativeness of the reported 
income tax disclosures. These results provide practical and policy implications to accounting 
standard setters that it might be useful to require a note disclosure in financial statements to 
clarify the amount of deferred taxes that are likely to have future cash tax consequences and 
crystallise in the foreseeable future, in order to facilitate managers to convey their private tax 
information and improve the accuracy of investors’ evaluation about firms’ future 
commitments for internal funds.  
Secondly, in examining whether the relationship between the informativeness of income tax 
accruals and firms’ tax management activities is conditional upon the strength of corporate 
governance mechanism, this study shows that higher levels of analysts coverage and 
institutional shareholding appear to be effective in restricting self-interested managers from 
using income tax provision as a source of manufacturing earnings. However, the corporate 
governance mechanisms examined in this study are not effective in scrutinising tax reporting 
irregularities resulting from the engagements in tax planning activities. This could be due to 
the insufficiency of the tax disclosures available for a potential governance mechanism to 
assess a firm’s tax planning strategies; or due to the incapability of the governance mechanism 
in understanding and identifying firms’ tax-planning-related issues and affairs. The former 
highlights the importance of financial reporting and tax regulatory authorise to require 
increased tax disclosures, in order to ensure the adequacy of the tax planning information 
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available for firms’ control mechanisms when assessing firms’ tax planning strategies and tax 
reporting transparency. The latter suggests that the UK tax authority and corporate governance 
regulatory bodies should enforce further actions additional to the existing anti-tax-avoidance 
scheme, to enhance the capability of firms’ corporate governance mechanism (such as board 
of directors) in understanding firms’ tax information; monitoring managers’ tax management 
decisions and implementations; and ensuring that firms’ tax management activities are 
conducted with transparency and restricted uncertainty. 
7.4. Limitations and Suggestions for Future Studies 
This section discusses the limitations of this study and provides suggestions for future studies. 
Limitations of this study can be summarised as follows:  
First, in order to ensure that there is sufficient data to generate the firm-specific informativeness 
of income tax accruals, each company included in the sample is required to have sufficient data 
on income tax expense and cash tax payment for at least six consecutive years, which may 
induce survivorship bias. Second, when conducting the hypothesis tests, loss firms are omitted 
from the sample to control for tax losses that are carried forward or transferred among groups, 
which may inhibit generalising the results to other samples. However, the exclusion of loss 
firms is necessary as tax losses may obscure the true informativeness of income tax accruals in 
explaining future tax payments.  
Moreover, this study investigates the time-series trend of the informativeness of income tax 
accruals, in order to show whether the adoption of different tax accounting standards leads to 
changes in the informativeness of income tax accruals. However, changes in the tax accounting 
standards adopted in the UK may not be the only reason that causes variations in the 
informativeness of income tax accruals over time. Although several variables that capture the 
changes in firms’ underlying characteristics and performance are included in the regression, 
other factors which may shape managers’ behaviours in the financial reporting process (e.g., 
financial crises) are neglected, which may add noise to the interpretation of the results. 
Despite the limitations, this study provides suggestions for future studies which are interested 
in examining the reported tax disclosures. To begin with, as stated in chapter 3, this study does 
not distinguish between the benign tax avoidance and illegal tax evasion when examining the 
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impact of corporate tax management on the informativeness of income tax accruals. Future 
research therefore may be interested in differentiating the impacts of tax avoidance and tax 
evasion on the informativeness of income tax accruals, such as investigating whether the 
informativeness of income tax accruals is significantly lower in a sample of firms that are 
accused of engaging in tax-sheltering activities. 
In addition, this study uses the ability of income tax accruals to explain future tax cash flows 
as a criterion to evaluate the informativeness of income tax provision. Future studies may be 
interested in further analysing whether the capital market participants, such as the stock 
investors and the sophisticated financial analysis, appreciate the information contained in 
income tax provision and fully incorporate the informativeness of the income tax accruals into 
their valuations about firms’ future net performance. For example, future research could 
consider whether low informativeness of the income tax accruals aggravates analysts’ earnings 
forecast errors or leads to mispricing in stock markets. 
Furthermore, when examining cross-sectional determinates of the informativeness of income 
tax accruals, this study expects that managers’ tax management incentives to meet particular 
earnings target through biasing income tax accruals lead to intentional and/or unintentional 
estimation errors in income tax accruals, which reduces the ability of income tax accruals to 
explain future tax cash flows. However, this study has not examined how managers manipulate 
the income tax accruals to avoid failing the earnings target. Therefore, future research might 
consider examining 1) whether the willingness of managers to manipulate income tax provision 
downward for the current accounting period (e.g., to meet particular earnings targets) results 
in future upward adjustment to prior year tax; 2) whether the willingness of managers to 
manipulate income tax provision upward for the current accounting period (e.g., to build tax 
cookie jar) results in future downward adjustment to prior year tax. 
Moreover, this study does not investigate whether the income tax expense is regularly used by 
managers to relax firms’ debt covenant constraints. Future research might be interested in 
examining whether and how firms manage income tax expense when they are close to violate 
their lending contracts. Last but not the least, future research may extend the agency 
perspective of corporate tax management by investigating how family ownership, managers’ 
compensation incentives or the board properties affects the informativeness of income tax 
accruals to explain future tax cash flows.  
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7.5. Conclusion 
In summary, this thesis aims to investigate: 1) whether income tax accruals are incrementally 
informative over cash tax paid in explaining future tax cash flows; 2) whether and how different 
tax management incentives affect the incremental informativeness of income tax accruals; 3) 
whether more effective corporate governance plays a significant role in attenuating the negative 
impacts of tax management incentives on the informativeness of income tax accruals and; 4) 
whether the ability of income tax accruals to explain future tax cash flows has improved or 
deteriorated over time in the UK.  
Using a panel dataset of publicly-traded non-financial UK companies for the period 1992-2017, 
this study provides evidence that current-period income tax accruals are incrementally 
informative over current-period cash tax paid in explaining future tax cash flows. The 
incremental informativeness of income tax accruals is significantly lower for firms that 1) 
engage in tax planning activities or; 2) exhibit strong incentives to avoid reporting an apparent 
decline in the post-tax profits. There is no significant evidence indicating that the incentives to 
avoid missing analysts’ forecasted earnings or to avoid reporting a post-tax loss strongly 
motivate managers to distort the income tax accruals. Higher levels of analysts coverage and 
institutional shareholding are found to play a significant role in attenuating the negative impact 
of the managements’ incentives to avoid reporting an apparent decline in the post-tax profits 
on the informativeness of income tax accruals. However, there is limited evidence that 
governance mechanisms are important in moderating the negative impact of corporate tax 
planning on the informativeness of income tax accruals. In addition, this thesis finds that the 
incremental informativeness of income tax accruals about future tax cash flows has deteriorated 
over time in the UK, indicating that the adoption of partial provision method of deferred taxes 
gives rise to income tax information with significantly greater ability to explain future tax cash 
flows as compared to the full provision methods of deferred taxes. 
This study is not free from limitations. The limited sample size and the limited time periods 
may inhibit the generalisation of the research findings. First, the sample of firms employed in 
this study is restricted to publicly-traded non-financial UK companies that have relevant tax 
data (cash tax paid and income tax expenses) for at least six consecutive years, which could 
induce survivorship bias. Second, when conducting the hypothesis tests, loss firms are omitted 
from the sample to control for tax losses that are carried forward or transferred among groups, 
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which may inhibit generalising the results to other samples. However, the exclusion of loss 
firms is necessary as tax losses may obscure the true informativeness of income tax accruals in 
explaining future tax payments. Despite the discussed limitations, this study provides several 
policy and practical implications for tax researchers, financial statement users, and relevant 
regulatory authorities. This study also provides suggestions for future studies that are interested 
in examining the reported tax disclosures.
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Appendix A Additional Tests and Robustness Check 
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(Tax Planning, Earnings Target 1, Earnings Target 2 and Earnings Target 3) and the Informativeness of Income Tax Accruals 
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0.6879 
(2.59)** 
0.1776 
(1.41) 
0.1741 
(1.00) 
0.1179 
(1.31) 
LEVERAGEit -0.1371 
(-0.90) 
-0.1651 
(-2.00)** 
-0.2577 
(-1.70)* 
-0.2287 
(-2.71)*** 
-0.3704 
(-1.58) 
-0.1477 
(-1.60) 
-0.2270 
(-1.51) 
-0.2107 
(-2.59)*** 
DISCONTINUEit 4.4389 
(0.62) 
-0.1701 
(-0.07) 
4.6783 
(0.62) 
0.3918 
(0.14) 
-6.1864 
(-0.88) 
-3.1491 
(-1.12) 
4.6696 
(0.60) 
0.4643 
(0.16) 
SEGMENTit -0.0078 
(-0.48) 
-0.0096 
(-1.24) 
-0.0067 
(-0.40) 
-0.0088 
(-1.11) 
-0.0258 
(-1.65)* 
-0.0142 
(-1.94)* 
-0.0079 
(-0.47) 
-0.0093 
(-1.17) 
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DEFERit -0.0986 
(-0.10) 
0.0563 
(0.16) 
-0.2271 
(-0.22) 
-0.0475 
(-0.13) 
0.2134 
(0.21) 
0.0033 
(0.01) 
-0.1392 
(-0.14) 
-0.0123 
(-0.03) 
Constant 0.2238 
(0.66) 
0.1316 
(0.70) 
0.1761 
(0.55) 
0.1273 
(0.67) 
0.1780 
(0.41) 
0.6575 
(2.45)** 
0.2134 
(0.66) 
0.1409 
(0.75) 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1236 1236 1267 1267 430 430 1267 1267 
R-Square 0.1560 0.2639 0.1601 0.2569 0.3522 0.3686 0.1556 0.2555 
Regression estimations are conducted with the employment of clustered firm-level Eicker-Huber-White robust standard errors. The figures in parentheses are t-statistics, ***, ** and * 
denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
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Table A.2 Alternative Measure of Corporate Tax Planning: 
Corporate Tax Planning and the Informativeness of Income Tax Accruals 
 Informativeness 
denoted as 𝜹𝑻𝒂𝒙 𝑨𝒄𝒄𝒓𝒖𝒂𝒍𝒔 
Informativeness 
denoted as ?̅?𝑻𝒂𝒙 𝑨𝒄𝒄𝒓𝒖𝒂𝒍
𝟐
 
 
𝐓𝐀_𝐂𝐀𝐒𝐇𝟑𝐢𝐭 0.4806 
(2.07)** 
 
 
 
 
0.2513  
(1.89)* 
  
𝐓𝐀_𝐆𝐀𝐀𝐏𝟓𝐢𝐭  0.6837 
(1.87)* 
  0.1736 
(0.85) 
 
𝐓𝐀_𝐆𝐀𝐀𝐏𝟑𝐢𝐭   0.5747 
(2.04)** 
  0.0936 
(0.56) 
PTBIit 0.5684 
(1.71)* 
0.4905 
(1.63) 
0.5252 
(1.73)* 
0.0605 
(0.36) 
-0.0110 
(-0.07) 
-0.0007 
(-0.00) 
VOL_PTBIit -0.6209 
(-0.74) 
-0.3390 
(-0.41) 
-0.5181 
(-0.63) 
-0.1914 
(-0.43) 
-0.1401 
(-0.31) 
-0.1811 
(-0.41) 
VOL_CASHFLOWit 
 
2.7627 
(3.35)*** 
2.6556 
(3.24)*** 
2.7812 
(3.41)*** 
1.2339 
(2.82)*** 
1.2629 
(2.84)*** 
1.2899 
(2.93)*** 
SIZEit -0.0055 
(-0.25) 
-0.0046 
(-0.22) 
-0.0046 
(-0.21) 
-0.0255 
(-2.01)** 
-0.0258 
(-2.02)** 
-0.0252 
(-1.97)** 
GROWTHit -0.0267 
(-2.39)** 
-0.0274 
(-2.49)** 
-0.0272 
(-2.46)** 
-0.0094 
(-2.28)** 
-0.0082 
(-1.83)* 
-0.0082 
(-1.83)* 
CAPINTit 0.1686 
(0.98) 
0.1748 
(1.03) 
0.1693 
(1.00) 
0.1191 
(1.30) 
0.1251 
(1.36) 
0.1245 
(1.35) 
LEVERAGEit -0.1665 
(-1.07) 
-0.1860 
(-1.23) 
-0.1937 
(-1.28) 
-0.1800 
(-2.17)** 
-0.2014 
(-2.42)** 
-0.2075 
(-2.48)** 
DISCONTINUEit 2.8787 
(0.40) 
3.9818 
(0.56) 
4.1343 
(0.57) 
-1.2291 
(-0.49) 
-0.0437 
(-0.02) 
-0.0430 
(-0.01) 
SEGMENTit -0.0072 
(-0.45) 
-0.0064 
(-0.40) 
-0.0064 
(-0.40) 
-0.0087 
(-1.13) 
-0.0081 
(-1.04) 
-0.0083 
(-1.05) 
DEFERit -0.1868 
(-0.19) 
-0.2316 
(-0.23) 
-0.2248 
(-0.22) 
-0.0044 
(-0.01) 
-0.0311 
(-0.08) 
-0.0310 
(-0.08) 
Constant 0.1576 
(0.47) 
0.0274 
(0.08) 
0.0435 
(0.13) 
0.0955 
(0.49) 
0.0870 
(0.44) 
0.1001 
(0.51) 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1272 1279 1286 1272 1279 1286 
R-Square 0.1580 0.1579 0.1615 0.2522 0.2447 0.2451 
Regression estimations are conducted with the employment of clustered firm-level Eicker-Huber-White robust standard 
errors. The figures in parentheses are t-statistics, ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
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Table A.3 Alternative Measure of Operational Uncertainty: Tax Management Incentives  
(Tax Planning, Earnings Target 1, Earnings Target 2 and Earnings Target 3) and the Informativeness of Income Tax Accruals 
 I Tax Planning II Target 1 Avoid Declined  Earnings III Target 2 Avoid Failing Analysts’ 
Forecast 
IV Target3 Avoid Reporting Post-Tax 
Loss 
 Informativeness 
denoted as 
𝜹𝑻𝒂𝒙 𝑨𝒄𝒄𝒓𝒖𝒂𝒍𝒔 
Informativeness 
denoted as 
?̅?𝑻𝒂𝒙 𝑨𝒄𝒄𝒓𝒖𝒂𝒍
𝟐
 
Informativeness 
denoted as 
𝜹𝑻𝒂𝒙 𝑨𝒄𝒄𝒓𝒖𝒂𝒍𝒔 
Informativeness 
denoted as 
?̅?𝑻𝒂𝒙 𝑨𝒄𝒄𝒓𝒖𝒂𝒍
𝟐
 
Informativeness 
denoted as 
𝜹𝑻𝒂𝒙 𝑨𝒄𝒄𝒓𝒖𝒂𝒍𝒔 
Informativeness 
denoted as 
?̅?𝑻𝒂𝒙 𝑨𝒄𝒄𝒓𝒖𝒂𝒍
𝟐
 
Informativeness 
denoted as 
𝜹𝑻𝒂𝒙 𝑨𝒄𝒄𝒓𝒖𝒂𝒍𝒔 
Informativeness 
denoted as 
?̅?𝑻𝒂𝒙 𝑨𝒄𝒄𝒓𝒖𝒂𝒍
𝟐
 
TA_CASHit 0.8131 
(1.87)* 
0.5088 
(2.91)*** 
      
TARGET1it   -0.0278 
(-0.90) 
-0.0022 
(-0.14) 
    
DECLINE_AMOUNTit   1.2595 
(2.40)** 
0.4635 
(1.81)* 
    
TARGET1it × 
DECLINE_AMOUNTit 
  -1.6213 
(-1.83)* 
-0.5583 
(-1.60) 
    
TARGET2it     -0.0247 
(-0.49) 
-0.0217 
(-0.83) 
  
ERROR_AMOUNTit     -0.2763 
(-0.49) 
-0.1798 
(-0.55) 
  
TARGET2it × 
ERROR_AMOUNTit 
    1.1340 
(1.79)* 
0.6379 
(1.99)** 
  
TARGET3it       0.0494 
(0.65) 
0.0269 
(0.62) 
PTBIit 0.6097 
(1.71)* 
0.2492 
(1.52) 
0.6973 
(1.76)* 
0.2601 
(1.31) 
0.2994 
(1.02) 
0.1064 
(0.58) 
0.5915 
(1.69)* 
0.2030 
(1.27) 
𝐔𝐍𝐂𝐄𝐑𝐓_𝐏𝐓𝐁𝐈𝐢𝐭 0.0003 
(0.85) 
  0.0001 
(0.04) 
0.0009 
(0.33) 
0.0003 
(0.23) 
-0.0066 
(-1.67)* 
-0.0030 
(-2.08)** 
0.0003 
(0.12) 
0.0001 
(0.05) 
𝐔𝐍𝐂𝐄𝐑𝐓_𝐒𝐀𝐋𝐄𝐢𝐭 -0.0025 
(-0.60) 
-0.0007 
(-0.35) 
-0.0032 
(-0.83) 
-0.0012 
(-0.65) 
-0.0070 
(-1.31) 
-0.0033 
(-1.78)* 
-0.0030 
(-0.78) 
-0.0011 
(-0.62) 
SIZEit 0.0011 
(0.04) 
-0.0298 
(-2.02)** 
  0.0081 
(0.32) 
-0.0264 
(-1.77)* 
0.0205 
(0.60) 
-0.0249 
(-1.26) 
0.0080 
(0.32) 
-0.0264 
(-1.77)* 
GROWTHit -0.0256 
(-2.32)** 
-0.0115 
(-2.85)*** 
-0.0237 
(-2.10)** 
-0.0095 
(-2.08)** 
-0.0158 
(-1.46) 
-0.0077 
(-1.65)* 
-0.0237 
(-2.07)** 
-0.0095 
(-2.11)** 
CAPINTit 0.1698 
(1.00) 
0.0914 
(0.83) 
0.2045 
(1.16) 
0.1119 
(1.06) 
0.6934 
(2.54)** 
0  .2133 
(1.86)* 
0.2029 
(1.14) 
0.1122 
(1.06) 
LEVERAGEit -0.1892 
(-1.07) 
-0.1554 
(-1.94)* 
-0.2785 
(-1.58) 
-0.2034 
(-2.48)** 
-0.4303 
(-1.93)* 
-0.1666 
(-1.85)* 
-0.2701 
(-1.54) 
-0.2034 
(-2.51)** 
DISCONTINUEit 3.6949 
(0.48) 
0.7472 
(0.31) 
4.6048 
(0.56) 
1.7979 
(0.58) 
-6.4955 
(-0.88) 
-3.4495 
(-1.28) 
3.9088 
(0.47) 
1.5223 
(0.49) 
SEGMENTit -0.0168 -0.0106 -0.0162 -0.0102 -0.0219 -0.01337 -0.0170 -0.0104 
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(-1.18) (-1.33) (-1.07) (-1.22) (-1.37) (-1.82)* (-1.13) (-1.25) 
DEFERit -0.3557 
(-0.34) 
-0.0447 
(-0.11) 
-9.5045 
(-0.48) 
-0.1761 
(-0.43) 
-0.1804 
(-0.18) 
-0.1009 
(-0.21) 
-0.4155 
(-0.40) 
-0.1400 
(-0.34) 
Constant 0.6299 
(1.63) 
0.5382 
(2.62)** 
0.7729 
(2.12)** 
0.6322 
(3.05)*** 
0.4407 
(0.96) 
0.6444 
(2.31)** 
0.7671 
(2.11)** 
0.6330 
(3.06)*** 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1084 1084 1105 1105 421 421 1105 1105 
R-Square 0.1246 0.2017 0.1229 0.1818 0.3512 0.3806 0.1195 0.1802 
Regression estimations are conducted with the employment of clustered firm-level Eicker-Huber-White robust standard errors. The figures in parentheses are t-statistics, ***, ** and 
* denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
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Table A.4 Alternative Measure of Dispersed Operation: Tax Management Incentives  
(Tax Planning, Earnings Target 1, Earnings Target 2 and Earnings Target 3) and the Informativeness of Income Tax Accruals 
 I Tax Planning II Target 1 Avoid Declined  Earnings III Target 2 Avoid Failing Analysts’ 
Forecast 
IV Target3 Avoid Reporting Post-Tax 
Loss 
 Informativeness 
denoted as 
𝜹𝑻𝒂𝒙 𝑨𝒄𝒄𝒓𝒖𝒂𝒍𝒔 
Informativeness 
denoted as 
?̅?𝑻𝒂𝒙 𝑨𝒄𝒄𝒓𝒖𝒂𝒍
𝟐
 
Informativeness 
denoted as 
𝜹𝑻𝒂𝒙 𝑨𝒄𝒄𝒓𝒖𝒂𝒍𝒔 
Informativeness 
denoted as 
?̅?𝑻𝒂𝒙 𝑨𝒄𝒄𝒓𝒖𝒂𝒍
𝟐
 
Informativeness 
denoted as 
𝜹𝑻𝒂𝒙 𝑨𝒄𝒄𝒓𝒖𝒂𝒍𝒔 
Informativeness 
denoted as 
?̅?𝑻𝒂𝒙 𝑨𝒄𝒄𝒓𝒖𝒂𝒍
𝟐
 
Informativeness 
denoted as 
𝜹𝑻𝒂𝒙 𝑨𝒄𝒄𝒓𝒖𝒂𝒍𝒔 
Informativeness 
denoted as 
?̅?𝑻𝒂𝒙 𝑨𝒄𝒄𝒓𝒖𝒂𝒍
𝟐
 
TA_CASHit 0.6236 
(1.83)* 
0.3251 
(1.84)* 
      
TARGET1it   -0.0317 
(-1.01) 
-0.0066 
(-0.42) 
    
DECLINE_AMOUNTit   0.9286 
(2.02)** 
0.4457 
(2.01)** 
    
TARGET1it × 
DECLINE_AMOUNTit 
  -1.9053 
(-2.33)** 
-1.0354 
(-2.24)** 
    
TARGET2it      0.0225 
(0.49) 
 0.0042 
(0.16) 
  
ERROR_AMOUNTit     -0.7865 
(-1.25) 
-0.3748 
(-1.17) 
  
TARGET2it × 
ERROR_AMOUNTit 
    1.5318 
(2.16)** 
0.7358 
(2.19)** 
  
TARGET3it       0.0394 
(0.55) 
0.1022 
(1.79)* 
𝐅𝐎𝐑𝐄𝐈𝐆𝐍𝐢𝐭 -0.0874 
(-0.94) 
-0.0568 
(-1.06) 
-0.0799 
(-0.83) 
-0.0475 
(-0.88) 
-0.2237 
(-2.45)** 
-0.0806 
(-1.38) 
-0.0862 
(-0.89) 
-0.0539 
(-1.01) 
PTBIit 0.3570 
(1.04) 
0.0032 
(0.02) 
0.3326 
(0.83) 
-0.0351 
(-0.17) 
0.2999 
(0.95) 
0.0335 
(0.18) 
0.3801 
(1.11) 
0.0357 
(0.22) 
VOL_PTBIit -0.4573 
(-0.55) 
-0.1567 
(-0.35) 
-0.0035 
(-0.00) 
0.0016 
(0.00) 
-1.2606 
(-1.18) 
-0.6243 
(-1.06) 
-0.5121 
(-0.61) 
-0.3105 
(-0.71) 
VOL_CASHFLOWit 2.1345 
(2.82)*** 
0.9741 
(2.28)** 
2.4312 
(3.21)*** 
1.1235 
(2.64)*** 
3.5792 
(2.41)** 
0.6775 
(0.86) 
2.3716 
(3.09)*** 
1.0750 
(2.46)** 
SIZEit -0.0050 
(-0.24) 
-0.0281 
(-2.16) 
0.0007 
(0.04) 
-0.0262 
(-2.03)** 
0.0342 
(1.16) 
-0.0282 
(-1.53) 
-0.0007 
(-0.00) 
-0.0261 
(-2.05)** 
GROWTHit -0.0233 
(-2.10)** 
-0.0071 
(-1.68)* 
-0.0211 
(-1.85)* 
-0.0053 
(-1.11) 
-0.0076 
(-0.82) 
-0.0033 
(-0.71) 
-0.0227 
(-1.94)* 
-0.0070 
(-1.48) 
CAPINTit 0.2006 
(1.13) 
0.1155 
(1.29) 
0  .2297 
(1.27) 
0.1236 
(1.40) 
0.6901 
(2.40)** 
0.1611 
(1.21) 
0.2231 
(1.23) 
0.1180 
(1.35) 
LEVERAGEit -0.1540 
(-0.92) 
-0.1774 
(-2.09)** 
-0.2684 
(-1.60) 
-0.2348 
(-2.71)*** 
-0.5558 
(-2.32)** 
0-.2385 
(-2.61)** 
-0.2364 
(-1.44) 
-0.2191 
(-2.63)*** 
DISCONTINUEit 1.7010 -1.3885 2.8384 -0.3007 -7.8337 -3.8673 2.2995 -0.6728 
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(0.24) (-0.59) (0.38) (-0.11) (-1.15) (-1.42) (0.30) (-0.23) 
DEFERit -0.2584 
(-0.25) 
-0.0894 
(-0.25) 
-0.2662 
(-0.25) 
-0.1489 
(-0.40) 
-0.0597 
(-0.06) 
-0.0876 
(-0.19) 
-0.2182 
(-0.21) 
-0.1166 
(-0.31) 
Constant 0.2001 
(0.59) 
0.1294 
(0.65) 
0.1481 
(0.46) 
0.1292 
(0.65) 
0.0222 
(0.05) 
0.6390 
(2.36)** 
0.1839 
(0.57) 
0.1451 
(0.73) 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1127 1127 1154 1154 416 416 1154 1154 
R-Square 0.1596 0.2539 0.1618 0.2483 0.3700 0.3749 0.1575 0.2489 
Regression estimations are conducted with the employment of clustered firm-level Eicker-Huber-White robust standard errors. The figures in parentheses are t-statistics, ***, ** and 
* denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
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Table A.5 Longer Estimation Window:  
Tax Management Incentives and the Informativeness of Income Tax Accruals to Explain Future Two-Year-Ahead Cash Tax 
 I Tax Planning II Target 1 Avoid Declined  Earnings III Target 2 Avoid Failing Analysts’ 
Forecast 
IV Target3 Avoid Reporting Post-Tax 
Loss 
 Informativeness 
denoted as 
𝜹𝑻𝒂𝒙 𝑨𝒄𝒄𝒓𝒖𝒂𝒍𝒔 
Informativeness 
denoted as 
?̅?𝑻𝒂𝒙 𝑨𝒄𝒄𝒓𝒖𝒂𝒍
𝟐
 
Informativeness 
denoted as 
𝜹𝑻𝒂𝒙 𝑨𝒄𝒄𝒓𝒖𝒂𝒍𝒔 
Informativeness 
denoted as 
?̅?𝑻𝒂𝒙 𝑨𝒄𝒄𝒓𝒖𝒂𝒍
𝟐
 
Informativeness 
denoted as 
𝜹𝑻𝒂𝒙 𝑨𝒄𝒄𝒓𝒖𝒂𝒍𝒔 
Informativeness 
denoted as 
?̅?𝑻𝒂𝒙 𝑨𝒄𝒄𝒓𝒖𝒂𝒍
𝟐
 
Informativeness 
denoted as 
𝜹𝑻𝒂𝒙 𝑨𝒄𝒄𝒓𝒖𝒂𝒍𝒔 
Informativeness 
denoted as 
?̅?𝑻𝒂𝒙 𝑨𝒄𝒄𝒓𝒖𝒂𝒍
𝟐
 
TA_CASHit -0.1409 
(-0.22) 
0.0789 
(0.37) 
      
TARGET1it   0.0076 
(0.16) 
-0.0218 
(-1.43) 
    
DECLINE_AMOUNTit     1.4628 
(2.08)** 
0.2174 
(0.75) 
    
TARGET1it × 
DECLINE_AMOUNTit 
  -2.8805 
(-2.36)** 
-0.2523 
(-0.51) 
    
TARGET2it     -0.0579 
(-0.93) 
-0.0213 
(-0.97) 
  
ERROR_AMOUNTit     -0.8371 
(-1.35) 
-0.1899 
(-0.71) 
  
TARGET2it × 
ERROR_AMOUNTit 
    1.4046 
(1.99)* 
0.5184 
(1.78)* 
  
TARGET3it       0.0990 
(0.97) 
-0.0303 
(-0.69) 
PTBIit 0.2828 
(0.69) 
0.1752 
(0.96) 
0.5329 
(1.08) 
0.1826 
(0.88) 
0.3259 
(0.81) 
0.1978 
(1.45) 
0.4994 
(1.18) 
0.1739 
(0.93) 
VOL_PTBIit -0.7787 
(-0.69) 
0.0090 
(0.02) 
-0.0491 
(-0.04) 
0.1336 
(0.29) 
-0.1405 
(-0.10) 
-0.5663 
(-1.15) 
-0.7138 
(-0.64) 
0.0689 
(0.16) 
VOL_CASHFLOWit 1.4854 
(1.01) 
0.0665 
(0.16) 
1.5488 
(1.08) 
  0.1340 
(0.33) 
-0.3952 
(-0.20) 
1.1238 
(2.01) 
1.4870 
(1.04) 
0.1319 
(0.33) 
SIZEit 0.0569 
(1.96)* 
-.0046 
(-0.46) 
0.0619 
(2.17)** 
-0.0028 
(-0.28) 
0.0873 
(2.72)** 
0.0206 
(1.56) 
0.0619 
(2.16)** 
-0.0030 
(-0.30) 
GROWTHit -0.0050 
(-0.47) 
0.0009 
(0.18) 
-0.0076 
(-0.73) 
0.0005 
(0.10) 
0.0187 
(1.45) 
0.0023 
(0.49) 
-0.0096 
(-0.94) 
0.0008 
(0.15) 
CAPINTit 0.1042 
(0.44) 
-0.0099 
(-0.12) 
0.0738 
(0.33) 
-0.0126 
(-0.16) 
  0.3527 
(1.17) 
0.0925 
(0.87) 
0.0691 
(0.30) 
-0.0135 
(-0.17) 
LEVERAGEit 0.1108 
(0.49) 
0.0757 
(0.78) 
0.0852 
(0.38) 
0.0587 
(0.60) 
-0.3650 
(-1.32) 
-0.2098 
(-2.19)** 
0.1159 
(0.52) 
0.0643 
(0.65) 
DISCONTINUEit    24.3012 
(0.93) 
-0.5305 
(-0.16) 
24.9079 
(1.00) 
-0.3000 
(-0.09) 
-2.4737 
(-0.26) 
-2.0899 
(-0.58) 
24.5456 
(0.97) 
-0.4732 
(-0.14) 
SEGMENTit -0.0102 0.0023 -0.0064 0.0033 -0.0352 -0.0033 -0.0078 0.0031 
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(-0.47) (0.28) (-0.30) (0.41) (-1.71)* (-0.36) (-0.36) (0.38) 
DEFERit 0.0332 
(0.03) 
0.3684 
(0.90) 
0.1053 
(0.10) 
0.3319 
(0.78) 
1.3104 
(1.31) 
0.7276 
(1.72)* 
0.2195 
(0.20) 
0.3394 
(0.79) 
Constant -0.7175 
(-1.56) 
0.2247 
(1.59) 
-0.8346 
(-1.83)* 
0.1969 
(1.45) 
-0.7050 
(-1.26) 
-0.2774 
(-1.60) 
-0.7897 
(-1.75)* 
0.2032 
(1.50) 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1255 1255 1286 1286 434 434 1286 1286 
R-Square 0.1114 0.0810 0.1135 0.0815 0.2536 0.2149 0.1105 0.0805 
Regression estimations are conducted with the employment of clustered firm-level Eicker-Huber-White robust standard errors. The figures in parentheses are t-statistics, ***, ** and * 
denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
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Table A.6 Longer Estimation Window:  
Tax Management Incentives and the Informativeness of Income Tax Accruals to Explain Future Three-Year-Ahead Cash Tax 
 I Tax Planning II Target 1 Avoid Declined  Earnings III Target 2 Avoid Failing Analysts’ 
Forecast 
IV Target3 Avoid Reporting Post-Tax 
Loss 
 Informativeness 
denoted as 
𝜹𝑻𝒂𝒙 𝑨𝒄𝒄𝒓𝒖𝒂𝒍𝒔 
Informativeness 
denoted as 
?̅?𝑻𝒂𝒙 𝑨𝒄𝒄𝒓𝒖𝒂𝒍
𝟐
 
Informativeness 
denoted as 
𝜹𝑻𝒂𝒙 𝑨𝒄𝒄𝒓𝒖𝒂𝒍𝒔 
Informativeness 
denoted as 
?̅?𝑻𝒂𝒙 𝑨𝒄𝒄𝒓𝒖𝒂𝒍
𝟐
 
Informativeness 
denoted as 
𝜹𝑻𝒂𝒙 𝑨𝒄𝒄𝒓𝒖𝒂𝒍𝒔 
Informativeness 
denoted as 
?̅?𝑻𝒂𝒙 𝑨𝒄𝒄𝒓𝒖𝒂𝒍
𝟐
 
Informativeness 
denoted as 
𝜹𝑻𝒂𝒙 𝑨𝒄𝒄𝒓𝒖𝒂𝒍𝒔 
Informativeness 
denoted as 
?̅?𝑻𝒂𝒙 𝑨𝒄𝒄𝒓𝒖𝒂𝒍
𝟐
 
TA_CASHit -0.5582 
(-0.72) 
0.0582 
(0.32) 
      
TARGET1it   -0.0743 
(-0.91) 
-0.0092 
(-0.54) 
    
DECLINE_AMOUNTit   2.3033 
(2.89)*** 
0.0183 
(0.07) 
    
TARGET1it × 
DECLINE_AMOUNTit 
  -4.2550 
(-1.98)** 
-0.5178 
(-1.18) 
    
TARGET2it     -0.0757 
(-0.94) 
-0.0152 
(-0.70) 
  
ERROR_AMOUNTit     1.1496 
(1.87)* 
0.2881 
(1.85)* 
  
TARGET2it × 
ERROR_AMOUNTit 
    -9.3566 
(-0.52) 
0.0049 
(0.03) 
  
TARGET3it       0.0716 
(0.54) 
-0.0522 
(-1.34) 
PTBIit 0.5707 
(1.02) 
-0.3471 
(-1.70)* 
0.6693 
(0.90) 
  -0.3995 
(-1.70)* 
0.5172 
(1.08) 
0.3519 
(2.10) 
0.7112 
(1.30) 
-0.3433 
(-1.68)* 
VOL_PTBIit -0.1402 
(-0.09) 
-0.3026 
(-0.88) 
1.0088 
(0.56) 
-0.0158 
(-0.04) 
0.6033 
(0.40) 
  -0.6842 
(-1.81)* 
-0.0806 
(-0.05) 
-0.1472 
(-0.40) 
VOL_CASHFLOWit 0.3806 
(0.20) 
0.0388 
(0.08) 
0.4880 
(0.26) 
0.1311 
(0.28) 
-1.1729 
(-0.42) 
0.8211 
(1.31) 
0.3903 
(0.21) 
  0.1099 
(0.23) 
SIZEit 0.0604 
(1.64) 
-0.0052 
(-0.51) 
0.0608 
(1.78)* 
-0.0028 
(-0.28) 
0.0299 
(0.81) 
0.0272 
(1.75)* 
0.0604 
(1.74)* 
-0.0032 
(-0.32) 
GROWTHit -0.0095 
(-0.67) 
0.0068 
(1.18) 
-0.0093 
(-0.67) 
0.0069 
(1.19) 
0.0066 
(0.31) 
-0.0051 
(-0.99) 
-0.0120 
(-0.90) 
0.0066 
(1.14) 
CAPINTit 0.0770 
(0.23) 
0.0398 
(0.39) 
0.0427 
(0.14) 
0.0458 
(0.46) 
-0.5740 
(-1.86)* 
-0.0279 
(-0.29) 
0.0318 
(0.10) 
0.0429 
(0.43) 
LEVERAGEit -0.2280 
(-0.91) 
0.0254 
(0.29) 
-0.2493 
(-1.00) 
-0.0025 
(-0.03) 
-0.2332 
(-0.79) 
-0.0152 
(-0.18) 
-0.1839 
(-0.76) 
0.0160 
(0.19) 
DISCONTINUEit 17.8721 
(0.71) 
-5.1667 
(-1.46) 
21.2084 
(0.89) 
-4.8799 
(-1.36) 
-2.1982 
(-0.19) 
-0.7790 
(-0.22) 
20.0902 
(0.84) 
-4.7971 
(-1.33) 
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SEGMENTit 0.0102 
(0.37) 
0.0051 
(0.65) 
0.0137 
(0.50) 
0.0055 
(0.69) 
-0.0295 
(-1.42) 
-0.0040 
(-0.47) 
0.0112 
(0.40) 
0.0053 
(0.67) 
DEFERit 0.1937 
(0.18) 
0.1430 
(0.42) 
0.1908 
(0.19) 
0.2055 
(0.60) 
1.7944 
(1.61) 
0.4129 
(1.42) 
0.3375 
(0.34) 
0.2005 
(0.58) 
Constant -1.5118 
(-2.38**) 
1.2479 
(7.44)*** 
-1.6292 
(-2.64)*** 
1.1985 
(7.32)*** 
0.3647 
(0.53) 
-0.3742 
(-1.64) 
-1.5604 
(-2.52)** 
1.2083 
(7.38) 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1255 1235 1286 1265 434 428 1286 1265 
R-Square 0.0512 0.1798 0.0560 0.1808 0.1171 0.2399 0.0517 0.1789 
Regression estimations are conducted with the employment of clustered firm-level Eicker-Huber-White robust standard errors. The figures in parentheses are t-statistics, ***, ** and * 
denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
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Table A.7 Firm-Fixed Effect of First Hypothesis:  Incremental Informativeness of Income Tax Accruals 
Panel A: 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡+𝜌 𝑜𝑟 ∑ 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡+5 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (1) 
 T+1 T+2 T+3 T+4 T+5 T+1~T+5 
Cash Tax Paidi,t  0.3282 
(8.96)*** 
0.1467 
(4.53)*** 
0.0704 
(2.16)** 
0.0247 
(0.68) 
0.0284 
(0.63) 
0.6369 
(2.97)*** 
Constant 0.0227 
(10.84)*** 
0.0284 
(12.88)*** 
0.0357 
(17.44)*** 
0.0393 
(16.44)*** 
0.0393 
(12.74)*** 
0.1643 
(13.83)*** 
Firm Fixed Effect Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3311 3026 2741 2457 2178 2058 
Overall R-Square 0.4976 0.2293 0.0958 0.0387 0.0409 0.2480 
F-statistic 11.37 
P=0.000 
4.98 
P=0.000 
3.89 
P=0.000 
4.60 
P=0.000 
4.20 
P=0.000 
4.03 
P=0.000 
Panel B: 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡+𝜌 𝑜𝑟 ∑ 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡+5 = ∅ + 𝜕𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (2) 
 T+1 T+2 T+3 T+4 T+5 T+1~T+5 
Cash Tax Paidi,t  0.6032 
(19.15)*** 
0.3036 
(8.11)*** 
0.1523 
(3.85)*** 
0.0798 
(1.73)* 
0.0708 
(1.26) 
1.2528 
(5.36)*** 
Tax Accrualsi,t  0.6317 
(18.81)*** 
0.3634 
(8,85)*** 
0.1884 
(4.58)*** 
0.1309 
(3.15)*** 
0.1040 
(2.15)** 
1.4786 
(7.62)*** 
Constant 0.0113 
(7.43)*** 
0.0220 
(10.08)*** 
0.0324 
(14.37)*** 
  0.0370 
(13.81)*** 
0.0376 
(10.92)*** 
0.1390 
(11.53)*** 
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3311 3026 2741 2457 2178 2058 
R-Square 0.7172 0.4736 0.2435 0.1172 0.0968 0.5181 
Differences between R-Squares of model 1 and 
model 2 
0.2196 0.2443 0.1477 0.0785 0.0559 0.2701 
F-statistic 33.86 
P=0.000 
9.96 
P=0.000 
5.25 
P=0.000 
4.86 
P=0.000 
4.04 
P=0.000 
9.27 
P=0.000 
Chi2 for wald test of 𝛿= 0 1184.26 
P=0.000 
250.74 
P=0.000 
55.43 
P=0.000 
22.76 
P=0.000 
11.97 
P=0.000 
275.92 
P=0.000 
Likelihood ratio test of the equality of goodness-of-fit 
between model (1) and model (2) 
1113.95 
P=0.000 
271.03 
P=0.000 
62.82 
P=0.000 
26.40 
P=0.000 
14.22 
P=0.000 
308.19 
P=0.000 
Regression estimations are conducted with the employment of clustered firm-level Eicker-Huber-White robust standard errors. The figures in parentheses are t-statistics, ***, ** and * 
denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
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Table A.8: Firm-Fixed Effect of Third Hypothesis 
 Average Annual Informativeness of Income Tax Accruals Measured by 𝜹𝑻𝒂𝒙 𝑨𝒄𝒄𝒓𝒖𝒂𝒍𝒔 
Panel A Full Sample of Firms 
𝒀𝑬𝑨𝑹 N T+1 T+2 T+3 T+4 T+5 
1992-1996 1615 0.8558 0.6796 0.5654 0.4713 0.3896 
1997-2001 1615 0.6866 0.5790 0.4347 0.3397 0.3215 
2002-2006 1615 0.8626 0.5532 0.4278 0.3328 0.3255 
2007-2011 1615 0.5699 0.4811 0.4194 0.3434 0.3556 
2012-2017 1938 0.6053 0.3607 0.2976 0.1739 0.0619 
Coefficient on 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 without 
Controlling Firm Characteristic 
-0.0104 
(-34.37)*** 
-0.0137 
( -44.08)*** 
-0.0134 
(-30.77)*** 
-0.0132 
(-31.27)*** 
-0.0113 
(-22.15)*** 
Coefficient on 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 With 
Controlling Firm Characteristic 
-0.0009 
(-0.14) 
-0.0126 
(-2.98)*** 
-0.0350 
(-3.98)*** 
-0.0591 
(-7.00)*** 
-0.0751 
(-9.99)*** 
𝑷𝑬𝑹𝑰𝑶𝑫 N T+1 T+2 T+3 T+4 T+5 
1 (1992-1999) 2584 0.7726 0.6445 0.5119 0.4335 0.3781 
2 (2000-2004) 1615 0.7419 0.5835 0.5281 0.3989 0.2978 
3 (2005-2017) 4199 0.6627 0.4273 0.3297 0.2576 0.2521 
Coefficient on 𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐼𝑂𝐷 without 
Controlling Firm Characteristics 
-0.0561 
(-20.86)*** 
-0.1109 
(-41.16)*** 
-0.0963 
(-25.28)*** 
-0.0905 
(-24.54)*** 
-0.0622 
(-14.03)*** 
Coefficient on 𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐼𝑂𝐷 with 
Controlling Firm Characteristics 
0.5228 
(8.10)*** 
-0.5500 
(-21.78)*** 
-0.4715 
(-10.48)*** 
-0.3156 
(-5.61)*** 
0.1466 
(1.96)* 
Panel B Constant Sample of Firms 
𝒀𝑬𝑨𝑹 N T+1 T+2 T+3 T+4 T+5 
1992-1996 720 0.6878 0.5963 0.4964 0.5250 0.4219 
1997-2001 720 0.4858 0.3716 0.2852 0.2381 0.2129 
2002-2006 720 0.4146 0.4258 0.4291 0.2914 0.1992 
2007-2011 720 0.2748 0.2073 0.2199 0.1178 0.1419 
2012-2017 864 0.2199 0.1343 0.1065 0.0647 0.0161 
Coefficient on 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 without 
Controlling Firm Characteristics 
-0.0078 
(-4.00)*** 
-0.0221 
(-16.78)*** 
-0.0148 
(-8.78)*** 
-0.0211 
(17.32)*** 
-0.0114 
(-7.12)*** 
𝑷𝑬𝑹𝑰𝑶𝑫 N T+1 T+2 T+3 T+4 T+5 
1 (1992-1999) 1152 0.5819 0.4823 0.4008 0.3948 0.3243 
2 (2000-2004) 720 0.4731 0.4182 0.3938 0.3022 0.2783 
3 (2005-2017) 1872 0.2780 0.2201 0.2013 0.1335 0.0821 
Coefficient on 𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐼𝑂𝐷 without 
Controlling Firm Characteristics 
-0.1116 
(-6.79)*** 
-0.2244 
(-21.60)*** 
-0.1764 
(-12.87)*** 
-0.1990 
(-19.96)*** 
-0.1031 
(-7.59)*** 
Coefficient on 𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐼𝑂𝐷 with 
Controlling Firm Characteristics 
0.2041 
(2.53)** 
-0.2490 
(-4.77)*** 
-0.3776 
(-6.89)*** 
-0.2044 
(-3.26)*** 
-0.2272 
(-3.96)*** 
The figures in parentheses are t-statistics, ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
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Table A.9: Firm-Fixed Effect of Third Hypothesis 
 Average Annual Informativeness of Income Tax Accruals Measured by ?̅?𝑻𝒂𝒙 𝑨𝒄𝒄𝒓𝒖𝒂𝒍
𝟐
 
Panel A Full Sample of Firms 
𝒀𝑬𝑨𝑹 N T+1 T+2 T+3 T+4 T+5 
1992-1996 1615 0.2936 0.2174 0.1669 0.1058 0.0781 
1997-2001 1615 0.1465 0.1346 0.0964 0.0726 0.0557 
2002-2006 1615 0.2361 0.1066 0.0767 0.0799 0.0702 
2007-2011 1615 0.0820 0.0580 0.0583 0.0311 0.0388 
2012-2017 1938 0.0725 0.0077 0.0226 0.0161 0.0159 
Coefficient on 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 without 
Controlling Firm Characteristic 
-0.0095 
(-71.15)*** 
-0.0094 
(-79.27)*** 
-0.0065 
(-56.50)*** 
-0.0042 
(-39.05)*** 
-0.0020 
(-18.02)*** 
Coefficient on 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 With 
Controlling Firm Characteristic 
-0.0025 
(-1.72)* 
-0.0077 
(-7.08)*** 
-0.0048 
(-2.64)** 
-0.0055 
(-3.23)*** 
-0.0052 
(-3.53)** 
𝑷𝑬𝑹𝑰𝑶𝑫 N T+1 T+2 T+3 T+4 T+5 
1 (1992-1999) 2584 0.2397 0.1969 0.1477 0.1032 0.0823 
2 (2000-2004) 1615 0.2104 0.1137 0.0995 0.0921 0.0610 
3 (2005-2017) 4199 0.0966 0.0375 0.0345 0.0304 0.0437 
Coefficient on 𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐼𝑂𝐷 without 
Controlling Firm Characteristics 
-0.0735 
(-60.86)*** 
-0.0796 
(-77.74)*** 
-0.0570 
(-59.24)*** 
-0.0376 
(-41.87)*** 
-0.0192 
(-20.24)*** 
Coefficient on 𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐼𝑂𝐷 with 
Controlling Firm Characteristics 
0.0607 
(4.40)*** 
-0.1161 
(-13.52)*** 
-0.2287 
(-34.06)*** 
-0.1827 
(-23.01)*** 
-0.0013 
(-0.14) 
Panel B Constant Sample of Firms 
𝒀𝑬𝑨𝑹 N T+1 T+2 T+3 T+4 T+5 
1992-1996 720 0.0994 0.1356 0.0846 0.0884 0.0734 
1997-2001 720 0.1166 0.0783 0.0546 0.0376 0.0196 
2002-2006 720 0.0798 0.0936 0.0696 0.0395 0.0187 
2007-2011 720 0.0381 0.0241 0.0312 0.0160 0.0164 
2012-2017 864 0.0503 0.0204 0.0203 0.0003 -0.0048 
Coefficient on 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 without 
Controlling Firm Characteristics 
-0.0028 
(-6.08)*** 
-0.0051 
(-14.11)*** 
-0.0046 
(-16.40)*** 
-0.0045 
(-18.68)*** 
-0.0014 
(-5.16)*** 
𝑷𝑬𝑹𝑰𝑶𝑫 N T+1 T+2 T+3 T+4 T+5 
1 (1992-1999) 1152 0.1020 0.1101 0.0754 0.0690 0.0529 
2 (2000-2004) 720 0.0968 0.0720 0.0529 0.0333 0.0269 
3 (2005-2017) 1872 0.0517 0.0415 0.0349 0.0172 0.0055 
Coefficient on 𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐼𝑂𝐷 without 
Controlling Firm Characteristics 
-0.0283 
(-7.17)*** 
-0.0481 
(16.16)*** 
-0.0455 
(-20.04)*** 
-0.0411 
(-20.47)*** 
-0.0145 
(-6.10)*** 
Coefficient on 𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐼𝑂𝐷 with 
Controlling Firm Characteristics 
0.0959 
(9.12)*** 
-0.0221 
(-2.30)** 
-0.0701 
(-10.56)*** 
 
-0.0474 
(-5.31)*** 
-0.0235 
(-4.39)*** 
The figures in parentheses are t-statistics, ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
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Table A.10: Firm-Fixed Effect of Second Hypotheses 
One-Stage Estimation Model : Tax Management Incentives and the Informativeness of Income Tax Accruals 
This table presents the results of the impact of tax management incentives (i.e., corporate tax planning, managerial incentives to avoid declined earnings, to avoid failing analysts’ forecasts and 
to avoid reporting post-tax loss) on the incremental informativeness of income tax accruals, based on the following models:  
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡+1 =∅ + Η1𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + Η2𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + Η3𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝐴_𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖,𝑡 + Η4𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (8.11) 
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡+1 =∅ + Μ1𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + Μ2𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + Μ3𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐸𝐶𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸_𝐴𝑀𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + Μ4𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (8.21)      
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡+1 =∅ + Θ1𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + Θ2𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + Θ3𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑅_𝐴𝑀𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + Θ4𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (8.31)        
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡+1 =∅ + Α1𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + Α2𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + Α3𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑇3𝑖,𝑡 + Α4𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (8.41)        
 
The dependent variable 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡+1 represents future one-year ahead tax-related cash flows scaled by lagged total assets. 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡 represents firms’ cash tax paid scaled by 
lagged total assets at current period.  𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡  represents firms’ income tax accruals scaled by lagged total assets at current period. Variables of interest are. 
𝑇𝐴_𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖𝑡 × 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡  ; 𝐷𝐸𝐶𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸_𝐴𝑀𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 × 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 ; 𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑅_𝐴𝑀𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 × 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡  and 𝑇𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑇3𝑖𝑡 × 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 . 𝑇𝐴_𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖𝑡 represents the sum of 
cash taxes paid scaled by the sum of pre-tax income over a five-year period. It is a proxy of the level of corporate tax planning. 𝐷𝐸𝐶𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸_𝐴𝑀𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 captures the difference between a firm’s 
previous period’s pre-tax profit and that of its current period. 𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑅_𝐴𝑀𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 captures the difference between analysts’ expected pre-tax profits and the actual pre-tax profit reported by 
this firm in I/E/B/S. 𝑇𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑇3𝑖𝑡 equals 1 if the net income scaled by the opening market value of equity of a particular firm-year is within the range between 0 and 0.02, and 0 otherwise. 
 
 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 is a proxy of  firms’ innate characteristic. It includes: 𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑈𝐴𝐿𝑖𝑡: represents the absolute discretionary accruals scaled by total assets; 𝑃𝑇𝐵𝐼𝑖𝑡: pre-tax income scaled 
by lagged total asset; 𝑉𝑂𝐿_𝑃𝑇𝐵𝐼𝑖𝑡: the standard deviation of annual pre-tax income scaled by lagged total assets over a rolling five-year window; 𝑉𝑂𝐿_𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝐹𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑖𝑡: the standard deviation 
of annual cash flow scaled by lagged total assets over a rolling five-year window; 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡: the natural log of total assets;  𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖𝑡: the ratio of firms’ market value of equity to the book 
value of equity; 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡: gross cost of property, plant and equipment scaled by the lagged total assets;  𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡: the ratio of long-term debt to total assets;  𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑁𝑈𝐸𝑖𝑡: the 
absolute value of earnings from discontinued operation scaled by the lagged total assets;  𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑖𝑡: firms’ foreign sales divided by the total sales; 𝐷𝐸𝐹𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡:long-term deferred tax balances 
scaled by the lagged total assets.  
 
Firm and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Regression estimations are conducted with the employment of clustered firm-level Eicker-Huber-White robust standard errors. 
The figures in parentheses are t-statistics,  ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.                                                                                                                 
  
 
I 
Tax Planning 
II  
Target 1 Avoid Declined  
Earnings 
III  
Target 2 Avoid Failing 
Analysts’ Forecast 
IV  
Target3 Avoid Reporting 
Post-Tax Loss 
Cash Tax Paidit 0.6131 
(16.44)*** 
  0.6942 
(17.20)*** 
0.7071 
(15.86)*** 
0.4948 
(6.90)*** 
0.6914 
(17.41)*** 
Tax Accrualsit 0.7000 
(13.95)*** 
-0.2180 
(-0.53) 
1.2477 
(1.83)* 
0.3584 
(0.70) 
 0.3844 
(0.88) 
𝐓𝐀_𝐂𝐀𝐒𝐇𝐢𝐭 × 𝐓𝐚𝐱 𝐀𝐜𝐜𝐫𝐮𝐚𝐥𝐬𝐢,𝐭   1.7124 
(3.37)*** 
   
𝐃𝐄𝐂𝐋𝐈𝐍𝐄_𝐀𝐌𝐎𝐔𝐍𝐓𝐢𝐭
× 𝐓𝐚𝐱 𝐀𝐜𝐜𝐫𝐮𝐚𝐥𝐬𝐢,𝐭  
  -5.3080 
(-1.77)* 
  
𝐄𝐑𝐑𝐎𝐑_𝐀𝐌𝐎𝐔𝐍𝐓𝐢𝐭
× 𝐓𝐚𝐱 𝐀𝐜𝐜𝐫𝐮𝐚𝐥𝐬𝐢,𝐭  
   0.7538 
(0.73) 
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𝐓𝐀𝐑𝐆𝐄𝐓𝟑𝐢𝐭 × 𝐓𝐚𝐱 𝐀𝐜𝐜𝐫𝐮𝐚𝐥𝐬𝐢,𝐭      -0.3431 
(-1.48) 
ACCRUALit × Tax Accrualsi,t   0.2913 
(0.60) 
-0.6203 
(-0.89) 
-1.2055 
(-1.68)* 
0.3904 
(0.99) 
PTBIit × Tax Accrualsi,t   0.5823 
(0.85) 
-0.0239 
(-0.02) 
1.2927 
(1.17) 
0.0161 
(0.03) 
VOL_PTBIit × Tax Accrualsi,t   0.6331 
(0.45) 
  4.9428 
(1.27) 
   1.4758 
(0.45) 
1.1591 
(0.78) 
VOL_CASHFLOWit × Tax Accrualsi,t   1.2830 
(0.77) 
-3.6318 
(-1.06) 
-3.1910 
(-0.97) 
2.0147 
(1.28) 
SIZEit × Tax Accrualsi,t   0.0149 
(0.46) 
-0.0291 
(-0.63) 
0.0085 
(0.28) 
0.0057 
(0.17) 
GROWTHit × Tax Accrualsi,t   -0.0005 
(-0.04) 
-0.0362 
(-1.38) 
-0.0534 
(-2.14)* 
0.0012 
(0.11) 
CAPINTit × Tax Accrualsi,t   -0.0448 
(-0.29) 
-0.3155 
(-0.81) 
-0.0567 
(-0.13) 
0.0575 
(0.32) 
LEVERAGEit × Tax Accrualsi,t   -0.4063 
(-1.26) 
-0.6577 
(-1.23) 
-0.6420 
(-2.10)** 
-0.8290 
(-3.00)*** 
DISCONTINUEit × Tax Accrualsi,t   -27.5834 
(-1.83)* 
-37.7681 
(-1.35) 
-12.3573 
(-0.42) 
-26.7872 
(-1.98)** 
FOREIGNit × Tax Accrualsi,t   -0.0345 
(-0.29) 
0.4796 
(2.19)** 
0.3558 
(1.91)* 
0.0573 
(0.43) 
DEFERit × Tax Accrualsi,t   3.1420 
(1.86)* 
1.9637 
(0.82) 
1.6198 
(1.01) 
3.4796 
(1.90)* 
Constant  0.0076 
(1.20) 
0.0144 
(7.86)*** 
0.0164 
(5.32)*** 
0.0038 
(0.61) 
Firm Fix Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fix Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3111 965 331 283 986 
R-Square 0.6376 0.7870 0.7361 0.7418 0.7896 
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Table A.11: Firm-Fixed Effect of Second Hypotheses 
One-Stage Estimation Model : Tax Management Incentives, Corporate Governance 
and the Informativeness of Income Tax Accruals 
This table presents results of testing whether good corporate monitoring mechanism plays a role in attenuating the negative 
impact of tax management incentives on the incremental informativeness of income tax accruals, based on the following 
models: 
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡+1 =∅ + Η5𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + Η6𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + Η7𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝐴_𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖,𝑡 + Η8𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 ∗
𝑇𝐴_𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐺𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + Η9𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  (8.12) 
 
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡+1 =∅ + Μ5𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + Μ6𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + Μ7𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐸𝐶𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸_𝐴𝑀𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑖,𝑡 +
Μ8𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐸𝐶𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸_𝐴𝑀𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐺𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + Μ9𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  (8.22) 
 
The dependent variable 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡+1 represents future one-year ahead tax-related cash flows scaled by lagged total 
assets. 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡 represents firms’ cash tax paid scaled by lagged total assets at current period.  𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 
represents firms’ income tax accruals scaled by lagged total assets at current period. Variables of interest 
are𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝐴_𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐺𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑖,𝑡  in model (8.12) and 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐸𝐶𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸_𝐴𝑀𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑖,𝑡 ∗
𝐺𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑖,𝑡 in model (8.22). 𝐺𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑖,𝑡 is a proxy for the effectiveness of firms’ governance mechanism, 
which includes four different monitoring channels, i.e., the numbery of analyst following (𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡), the audit quality 
( 𝐴𝑈𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡 ), the percentage of institutional shareholding ( 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝐼𝑇𝑈𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖𝑡 ) and board independence 
(𝐵𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑡). 𝑇𝐴_𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖𝑡 represents the sum of cash taxes paid scaled by the sum of pre-tax income over a five-year period. 
It is a proxy of the level of corporate tax planning. 𝐷𝐸𝐶𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸_𝐴𝑀𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 captures the difference between a firm’s previous 
period’s pre-tax profit and that of its current period. 
 
𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 is a proxy of  firms’ innate characteristic. It includes:  𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑈𝐴𝐿𝑖𝑡: represents the absolute 
discretionary accruals scaled by total assets; 𝑃𝑇𝐵𝐼𝑖𝑡: pre-tax income scaled by lagged total asset; 𝑉𝑂𝐿_𝑃𝑇𝐵𝐼𝑖𝑡: the standard 
deviation of annual pre-tax income scaled by lagged total assets over a rolling five-year window; 𝑉𝑂𝐿_𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝐹𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑖𝑡: the 
standard deviation of annual cash flow scaled by lagged total assets over a rolling five-year window; 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡: the natural 
log of total assets;  𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖𝑡: the ratio of firms’ market value of equity to the book value of equity; 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡: gross 
cost of property, plant and equipment scaled by the lagged total assets;  𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡: the ratio of long-term debt to total 
assets;  𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑁𝑈𝐸𝑖𝑡: the absolute value of earnings from discontinued operation scaled by the lagged total assets;  
𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑖𝑡: firms’ foreign sales divided by the total sales; 𝐷𝐸𝐹𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡:long-term deferred tax balances scaled by the lagged 
total assets.  
 
Firm and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Regression estimations are conducted with the employment of 
clustered firm-level Eicker-Huber-White robust standard errors. The figures in parentheses are t-statistics,  ***, ** and * 
denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.                                                                                                                 
 I 
Tax Planning 
II 
Target 1 Avoid Declined  
Earnings 
Cash Tax Paidit 0.7633 
(5.21)*** 
0.4533 
(4.69)*** 
Tax Accrualsit 2.2562  
(-2.38)* 
3.6825 
(2.29)** 
TA_CASHit × Tax Accrualsi,t  4.8950  
(1.90)* 
 
𝐓𝐀_𝐂𝐀𝐒𝐇𝐢𝐭 × 𝐓𝐚𝐱 𝐀𝐜𝐜𝐫𝐮𝐚𝐥𝐬𝐢,𝐭  
× 𝐂𝐎𝐕𝐄𝐑𝐀𝐆𝐄𝐢,𝐭 
-0.0562 
(-0.56) 
 
𝐓𝐀_𝐂𝐀𝐒𝐇𝐢𝐭 × 𝐓𝐚𝐱 𝐀𝐜𝐜𝐫𝐮𝐚𝐥𝐬𝐢,𝐭  
× 𝐀𝐔𝐃𝐈𝐓𝐢,𝐭 
-5.8518 
(-1.60) 
 
𝐓𝐀_𝐂𝐀𝐒𝐇𝐢𝐭 × 𝐓𝐚𝐱 𝐀𝐜𝐜𝐫𝐮𝐚𝐥𝐬𝐢,𝐭  
× 𝐁𝐎𝐀𝐑𝐃𝐢,𝐭 
-0.0110 
(-0.61) 
 
𝐓𝐀_𝐂𝐀𝐒𝐇𝐢𝐭 × 𝐓𝐚𝐱 𝐀𝐜𝐜𝐫𝐮𝐚𝐥𝐬𝐢,𝐭  
× 𝐈𝐍𝐒𝐓𝐈𝐓𝐔𝐓𝐈𝐎𝐍𝐢,𝐭 
0.0682 
(4.64)*** 
 
DECLINE_AMOUNTit × Tax Accrualsi,t   -7.8916 
(-4.27)*** 
𝐃𝐄𝐂𝐋𝐈𝐍𝐄_𝐀𝐌𝐎𝐔𝐍𝐓𝐢𝐭 × 𝐓𝐚𝐱 𝐀𝐜𝐜𝐫𝐮𝐚𝐥𝐬𝐢,𝐭  
× 𝐂𝐎𝐕𝐄𝐑𝐀𝐆𝐄𝐢,𝐭 
 1.2083 
(2.29)*** 
𝐃𝐄𝐂𝐋𝐈𝐍𝐄_𝐀𝐌𝐎𝐔𝐍𝐓𝐢𝐭 × 𝐓𝐚𝐱 𝐀𝐜𝐜𝐫𝐮𝐚𝐥𝐬𝐢,𝐭  
× 𝐀𝐔𝐃𝐈𝐓𝐢,𝐭 
 -0.0564 
(-0.70) 
𝐃𝐄𝐂𝐋𝐈𝐍𝐄_𝐀𝐌𝐎𝐔𝐍𝐓𝐢𝐭 × 𝐓𝐚𝐱 𝐀𝐜𝐜𝐫𝐮𝐚𝐥𝐬𝐢,𝐭   0.1270 
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× 𝐁𝐎𝐀𝐑𝐃𝐢,𝐭 (0.78) 
𝐃𝐄𝐂𝐋𝐈𝐍𝐄_𝐀𝐌𝐎𝐔𝐍𝐓𝐢𝐭 × 𝐓𝐚𝐱 𝐀𝐜𝐜𝐫𝐮𝐚𝐥𝐬𝐢,𝐭  
× 𝐈𝐍𝐒𝐓𝐈𝐓𝐔𝐓𝐈𝐎𝐍𝐢,𝐭 
 1.0451 
(1.92)* 
ACCRUALit × Tax Accrualsi,t  -0.3343 
(-0.60) 
-2.7254 
(-0.93) 
PTBIit × Tax Accrualsi,t  0.9481 
(1.38) 
0.4434 
(0.19) 
VOL_PTBIit × Tax Accrualsi,t  -3.0636 
(-0.84) 
-1.2162 
(-0.20) 
VOL_CASHFLOWit × Tax Accrualsi,t  8.0605 
(1.21) 
-9.8071 
(-1.00) 
SIZEit × Tax Accrualsi,t  -0.1430 
(-1.94)* 
-0.2506 
(-2.16)** 
GROWTHit × Tax Accrualsi,t  -0.0013 
(-0.03) 
-0.0836 
(-1.23) 
CAPINTit × Tax Accrualsi,t  0.0863 
(0.28) 
1.3801 
(2.56)** 
LEVERAGEit × Tax Accrualsi,t  -0.2895 
(-1.08) 
-0.0842 
(-0.09) 
DISCONTINUEit × Tax Accrualsi,t  -4.9094 
(-0.64) 
-6.6543 
(-0.30) 
FOREIGNit × Tax Accrualsi,t  -0.2541 
(-2.63)** 
-1.1393 
(-2.09)** 
DEFERit × Tax Accrualsi,t  -1.9748 
(-1.27) 
-3.6344 
(-0.86) 
Constant 0.0105 
(1.81) 
0.0063 
(0.59) 
Firm Fix Yes Yes 
Year Fix Yes Yes 
Observations 405 133 
R-Square 0.4099 0.4401 
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Appendix B Procedure of Estimating the Measure of Pre-tax Earnings Management 
(𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑈𝐴𝐿𝑖𝑡) 
Following Dechow et al. (1995), this study measures pre-tax earnings management using the 
absolute value of discretionary accruals. Firstly, the following regression is estimated cross-
sectionally for each industry and each year from 1992 to 2017:  
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑖𝑡−1
 = 𝜃0
1
𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑖𝑡−1
 + 𝜃1
∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡−∆𝑅𝐸𝐶𝐸𝐼𝑉𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑖𝑡−1
 + 𝜃2
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑖𝑡−1
 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Where the variable 𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 referrers to the total accruals for firm i during year t. 𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑖𝑡−1 is the 
total assets for firm i during year t-1. ∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 denotes changes in sales for firm i during year 
t. ∆𝑅𝐸𝐶𝐸𝐼𝑉𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 denotes changes in receivables for firm i during year t. 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡 denotes the 
property, plant and equipment for firm i during year t. 𝜀𝑖𝑡 represents the discretionary accrual 
which equals to:  
𝜀𝑖𝑡 = 
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑖𝑡−1
 – (𝜃0
1
𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑖𝑡−1
 + 𝜃1
∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡−∆𝑅𝐸𝐶𝐸𝐼𝑉𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑖𝑡−1
 + 𝜃2
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑖𝑡−1
) 
Specifically, 𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 is calculated using the following equation: 
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡= (∆𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑡 – ∆𝐶𝐿𝑖𝑡 + ∆𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖𝑡 + ∆𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡 – 𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑖𝑡)/ 𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑖𝑡 
Where ∆𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑡  denotes changes in the current asset for firm i during year t. ∆𝐶𝐿𝑖𝑡  denotes 
changes in the current liabilities for firm i during year t. ∆𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖𝑡 denotes changes in cash and 
cash equivalents for firm i during year t. ∆𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡 denotes changes in debt for firm i during year 
t. 𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑖𝑡 denotes depreciation of property, plant and equipment for firm i during year t.
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1) Corporate tax planning as captured by 𝑇𝐴_𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖𝑡  
 
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡+1 =∅ + Η1𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + Η2𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + Η3𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 ∗
𝑇𝐴_𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖,𝑡 + Η4𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                       (8.11)                  
 
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡+1 =∅ + Η5𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + Η6𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + Η7𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 ∗
𝑇𝐴_𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖,𝑡 + Η8𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝐴_𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐺𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + Η9𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 ∗
𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                                                                    (8.12) 
 
 
2) The incentive of firms to avoid reporting an apparently declined post-tax earnings, as 
captured by 𝐷𝐸𝐶𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸_𝐴𝑀𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 when 𝑇𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑇1𝑖𝑡 equals 1.  
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡+1 =∅ + Μ1𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + Μ2𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + Μ3𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 ∗
𝐷𝐸𝐶𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸_𝐴𝑀𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + Μ4𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                    (8.21)                  
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡+1 =∅ + Μ5𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + Μ6𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + Μ7𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 ∗
𝐷𝐸𝐶𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸_𝐴𝑀𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + Μ8𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐸𝐶𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸_𝐴𝑀𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐺𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑖,𝑡 +
Μ9𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                                (8.22) 
 
3) The incentive of firms to avoid missing analysts’ forecasted earnings, as captured by 
𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑅_𝐴𝑀𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 when 𝑇𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑇2𝑖𝑡  equals 1.  
 
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡+1 =∅ + Θ1𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + Θ2𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + Θ3𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 ∗
𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑅_𝐴𝑀𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + Θ4𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                         (8.31)                  
 
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡+1 =∅ + Θ5𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + Θ6𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + Θ7𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 ∗
𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑅_𝐴𝑀𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + Θ8𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑅_𝐴𝑀𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐺𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑖,𝑡 +
Θ9𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                                (8.32) 
 
 
4) The incentive of firms to avoid reporting a post-tax loss as captured by 𝑇𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑇3𝑖𝑡. 
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡+1 =∅ + Α1𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + Α2𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + Α3𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 ∗
𝑇𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑇3𝑖,𝑡 + Α4𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                       (8.41)                  
 
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡+1 =∅ + Α5𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + Α6𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + Α7𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 ∗
𝑇𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑇3𝑖,𝑡 + Α8𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑇3𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐺𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + Α9𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 ∗
𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                                                                    (8.42) 
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Appendix D Normality of Residuals in Regression Analyses 
Normal-Probability plot of residuals for the test of first hypotheses (Using income tax accruals and cash tax paid to explain future one- to five-
year ahead tax cash flows model (1) and model (2)) 
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Normal-Probability plot of residuals for the test of second hypotheses (model (3.11)-model (3.14) and model (3.21) to model (3.22)) 
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Normal-Probability plot of residuals for the test of third hypotheses (the time-series trend of income tax accruals model (6) and (7)) 
 
 
